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CZECHOSLOVAKIA

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

“They did not come with a map of their own country, but with a map of Europe.”

KAREL ČAPEK.

“Bohemia wants to reconstruct Mitteleuropa on a new basis which is neither German nor Russian. She therefore bases her claims not so much on national as on international justifications! For her, although National Unity comes first, and national prosperity second, the ultimate aim is the stability of Central Europe.”

HAROLD NICOLSON,
Peacemaking, 1919.

“Our democracy can thus be more dynamic than any other régime whatsoever. I know that not everything about it is perfect, and that there are still many social, political and nationality ills, with here and there actual distress and want. But it is a democracy that is fired with the passionate longing to remedy all in the process of time. It is a democracy which is conscious that it stands in Central Europe like a lighthouse high on a cliff with the waves crashing on it on all sides—a democracy that has to-day in Europe the great symbolical and practical mission to keep the flag of freedom, peace and toleration flying here in Central Europe, the flag of good-will and of faith in political and social progress, the flag of faith in a stronger and morally better mankind.”

DR. EDWARD BENEŠ,
President of the Czechoslovak Republic.
Christmas Message, 1936.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA:
KEYSTONE OF PEACE AND DEMOCRACY

by

LIEUTENANT-COMMANDER
EDGAR P. YOUNG

Royal Navy

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EPILOGUE

Written on 28th May, 1938

The crisis which arose during the week-end of May 21st–23rd should serve as a lesson—and a warning. The Press of Britain, France *and Germany* have done their utmost to create the impression that war was averted by tardy, but firm action on the part of the French and British Governments. *This is simply not true.*

War was averted because of the firm stand and resolute action of the Czechoslovak Government—which called the bluff of the Fascist International. It was because their plans had been frustrated, not because of solicitude for Czechoslovakia, that the British Cabinet met hurriedly during that critical week-end.

The crisis remains unsolved, however, and will only be solved satisfactorily from the democrat's point of view if Britain now associates herself *unreservedly* with the defensive system represented by the Pacts which link France, Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union. In this way *only* could be created that atmosphere of all-round security and mutual confidence in which the racial, territorial and economic disputes, which may precipitate war at any moment, could be amicably and fruitfully discussed.

E. P. Y.

NOTES FOR READERS

1. Czechoslovakia (Československo). The name "Czechoslovakia" is an anglicised form of the word "Československo", spelt with a "Cz" (as in Polish), instead of "Č", for the convenience of British printers. It is pronounced "Chekhoslovakia" (the "kh" as "ch" in the word "loch"). The same applies, of course, to the words "Czechoslovak", "Czech", etc. *It is incorrect* to spell the word with a hyphen, thus "Czechoslovakia."

2. Pronunciation of Czechoslovak Names, etc. The chief stress is always on the first syllable.

a	is pronounced like the u in cut
á	„ „ „ „ a in father
c	„ „ „ „ ts in mats
č	„ „ „ „ ch in church
d	„ „ „ „ English d
d'	„ „ „ „ d in duty
e	„ „ „ „ e in met

The terminal e is always pronounced.

é	is pronounced like the a in mare
ě	„ „ „ „ ye in yet
g	„ „ „ „ English hard g, as in gate
ch	„ „ „ „ ch in Scottish loch
i	„ „ „ „ i in pit
í	„ „ „ „ ee in deem
j	„ „ „ „ y in yoke
ň	„ „ „ „ ni in onion

NOTES FOR READERS

o is pronounced like the o in pot

ř „ „ „ rsh

š „ „ „ sh in she

t' „ „ „ t in tulip

u „ „ „ oo in hook

ú „ „ „ oo in moon

û „ „ „ oo in moon

y „ „ „ i in pit

ý „ „ „ ee in fee

ž „ „ „ s in treasure

e.g. “Beneš” is pronounced “Benesh”

“Dělnická” is pronounced “dyelnitskah”.

3. Place-Names. The Czechoslovak place-names are used throughout, but in the case of places in the German districts the German place-name is also inserted (in brackets). The capital, Praha, is called by its more familiar name of Prague.

4. Currency. The currency unit is the Czechoslovak Crown (Czechoslovak: Koruna—abbreviation: Kč.), which is worth about $1\frac{1}{2}$ d. This coin is subdivided into 100 hellers (Czechoslovak: haléřů—abbreviation: h.). The sterling rate of exchange at par is £1=164.25 Kč., and the current rate (when buying Czechoslovak currency) has for some time been £1=142–146 Kč.

5. Measures. The metric system of weights and measures is used and may be converted as shown below:—

(a) 1 kilometre (km.)=0.62 mile.

(b) 1 hectare (ha.)=2.47 acres.

(c) 1 sq. kilometre (sq. km.)=0.39 sq. mile.

(d) 1 kilogramme (kg.)=2.2 lbs.

(e) 1 quintal (q.)=1.97 cwt.

(f) 1 metric ton (t.)=0.984 ton.

(g) 1 litre (lit.)=1.76 pints=0.22 gallons.

(h) 1 hectolitre (hl.)=22 gallons=2.75 bushels.

(i) 1 hectolitre per hectare=1.113 bushels per acre.

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of Mr. J. F. Horrabin from his *An Atlas of Current Affairs*.

CHAPTER I

HISTORY

THE REPUBLIC OF Czechoslovakia bases its claim to independent existence and the determination of its present frontiers partly on the principle of national self-determination, and partly on that of historic rights. Some knowledge of its past history is essential, therefore, for the correct understanding of that claim (which is vigorously contested from various quarters), no less than for a correct appreciation of the national character and social structure of its population.

1. Early History. (Before A.D. 900.) The territories which now compose the Czechoslovak Republic appear to have been occupied first about the year 500 B.C. by celtic tribes, of whom, however, little trace remains beyond the name, Bohemia, which is derived from one of these tribes, the Boji.

This occupation, which extended eastwards to embrace Moravia and Western Slovakia, lasted until the last century B.C., when the Celts were driven out by germanic tribes which settled, the Marcomanni in Bohemia, the Quadi in Moravia and Western Slovakia.

During the 2nd century A.D., an attempt was made by the Roman Emperor, Marcus Aurelius, to conquer the Marcomanni and the Quadi, but the attempt was not carried to a conclusion owing to the outbreak of troubles in the Eastern Empire, and later, under the Emperor Commodus, the Roman troops engaged in this campaign were withdrawn. *The country therefore never came under the direct influence of Rome.*

It was during the same century also that commenced the influx of Slav tribes from the north-east. These tribes remained in the territory when the Marcomanni and the Quadi withdrew before the invading Huns, and passed several centuries in subjection to the Avars, an Asiatic people which had

invaded from the south-east, across the Hungarian plain. It was not, indeed, until the 7th century, about the years 623-624, that those Slav tribes united under the leadership of a Frankish merchant named Samo to shake off the Asiatic yoke, and set up the first big Western-Slav State. This State, the exact extent of which is to-day unknown, lasted, however, only until the death of its creator, in 658, when its peoples reverted to their former tribal condition.

Towards the end of the 8th century the western part of Czechoslovakia passed under the sway of the Emperor Charlemagne. Christianity was introduced, and early in the 9th century a new Slav State was constituted in Moravia under the Prince Mojmir. This State appears to have included the Province of Moravia, the northern part of what was, until recently, Austria, and later, between the years 833 and 836, the Slovak principality of Pribina. Prince Mojmir's successor, Rostislav, recognising the benefits of Christianity, appealed to the Pope in 860 for apostles knowing the slavonic language. His request was not complied with, but three years later Rostislav obtained from the Byzantine Emperor the services of the brothers **Cyril and Methodius**, Greeks from Salonika, who not only preached Christianity to the people, but also introduced to them the Cyrillic script which they had designed for the purpose of religious teaching in the slavonic languages—this script, in a modified form, is in use to-day in Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, and is the basis of the Russian alphabet. The initiative of the "eastern heretics" drew loud protests from the Frankish priests, who carried out their teaching (less effectively, no doubt) in German, but their outcry can have aroused little sympathy in Rome, for a Papal Bull of 869 authorised the conduct of church services in Slavonic as well as in Latin. On the death of Methodius, however, in 885, the Pope yielded to the incessant agitation of the Frankish priests and prohibited slavonic services; this surrender to reaction seems to have proved in the long run beneficial to the Western Slavs, for their cultural progress, in which the Church played no small part, was probably hastened by the consequently increased influence of the West.

Under Prince Svatopluk (870–894), nephew of Rostislav, the influence of Moravia was extended loosely over an Empire which embraced: to the north, the territories (now in Saxony) inhabited by the Lusatian Serbs (Wends), as far as the rivers Saal and Oder; to the east, the whole of Western Slovakia; to the south, considerable territories in what was later Austria; to the west, the province of present-day Bohemia, which retained, however, its own Prince. Svatopluk, who had availed himself of German aid in order to oust his uncle from the throne, found himself committed to a pro-German policy in connection with the religious feud to which reference has already been made. He was certainly party to the issuing of the Papal Bull against slavonic services, for he followed it up by helping the Frankish priests to oust their Slav rivals, thereby depriving himself of a powerful weapon against political subjection to his western neighbours.

It was in the struggle between the Moravian and German Empires that the Magyars first appeared on the scene in Czechoslovak history, as allies of the German Emperor. Nomadic barbarians of Mongol origin, they had recently occupied the plain of what is now Hungary and were desirous of extending their territories. When, after the death of Svatopluk, German pressure upon the weakening Moravian Empire became intensified, the Magyars succeeded in detaching for themselves the greater part of Slovakia. They thus disrupted for more than a thousand years (until 1918) the unity of the Western Slavs and were enabled to retard the development of the Slovaks, as compared with that of the Czechs, who retained their independence until 1620.

2. The Přemyslides. (10th, 11th, 12th and 13th Centuries.) The immediate effect of this disruption was to turn the eyes of the Czechs more definitely towards the west. Bohemia (Čechy) under **Prince Václav** (more familiar to the world as “**Good King Wenceslas**”) detached itself from the Moravian Empire and came to terms separately with the German Emperor by recognising his feudal overlordship. Václav achieved his immortal reputation for goodness not only on account of his devoutness, but also because of his enlightened

humanitarianism; he prohibited all forms of torture and had gibbets and gallows removed from public places. It is said, too, that on more than one occasion he offered personal combat to an invading prince as an alternative to involving peoples in war. His assassination by his brother, Boleslav, on 28th September 929, caused widespread grief, and is commemorated annually to this day in Czechoslovakia.

Prague, the seat of the Přemyslide princes, had now become the political centre of the Western Slavs. This was due less, perhaps, to direct political influence—for Václav never established his rule over the whole of Bohemia—than to the dominant German influence, exercised through Prague and through the germanised Church, on their political and cultural development. Boleslav I (929–967) fought the Germans for fourteen years, but eventually made peace by agreeing to pay them tribute and directed his energies in other directions. He and his successor, Boleslav II (967–999), succeeded in conquering the allegiance of all the Czech tribes and, thus fortified, in extending their rule over Moravia and Western Slovakia. For some time, at least, they held sway also over Upper Silesia and the region of Cracow. This tide of expansion was reversed, however, at the turn of the century by a Polish counter-offensive which drove the Czechs back into Bohemia, but eventually, though Western Slovakia passed again into the hands of the Magyars, Moravia was reunited, this time for good, with Bohemia by Břetislav I (1037–1055).

The progress of consolidation of the Czech State was delayed, however, during the next 250 years by the frequent disputes, accompanied by intrigue and violence, which resulted from the curiously vague system of succession to the Přemyslide throne. These disputes presented the German Emperor, by whom the King elected by the Czech princes had to be confirmed, with opportunities of adding to the confusion and of interfering in the internal affairs of Bohemia. At one time, indeed, it appeared as if the Czechs had become so divided among themselves that their national existence would pass into oblivion, for the Emperor Frederick Barbarossa in 1182 settled the claims of two rivals to the throne by allotting Bohemia to one and Moravia to the other, and decreeing that, in order to avoid

disputes about precedence, Moravia should become an imperial principality, independent of Bohemia and subordinate directly to him. Shortly afterwards the same Emperor continued his splitting policy by recognising the Bishop of Prague as a Prince of the Empire, directly subordinate to him, and it was not until the end of the 12th century that this fatal process was arrested.

In 1197 the two sons of Vladislav I agreed that one of them should succeed to the throne as Otakar I (1197–1230), while the other, Vladislav, should become Margrave of Moravia. They secured the agreement of the German Emperor to the reversion of the principality of Moravia and the bishopric of Prague to their former status with regard to Bohemia. In the following year one of the two elected German kings, Philip of Swabia, promoted Bohemia again to the status of a kingdom (this was confirmed later by Frederick II's Golden Bull of 1212), recognised the absolute right of the Czech princes to elect their own king, and acknowledged the right of the Kings of Bohemia to appoint their own bishops. Thereafter the rights of the Czech Crown increased steadily, its feudal duties to the German Emperor decreasing likewise, until, in the 13th century, the King of Bohemia was made one of the seven Electors of the German Emperor and *ipso facto* eligible for election as ruler of the Holy Roman Empire.

This revival of Czech prestige and influence resulted, of course, in an urge for territorial expansion. After a struggle with Bela, King of Hungary, Přemysl Otakar II (1253–1278) established by force of arms his claim to the vacant Babenburg succession to the Austrian throne. He thus extended his dominion southwards to embrace Austria, Styria, Carinthia and Carniola. At the same time he annexed the district of Cheb (Eger) from Germany. His attempts to expand northwards and eastwards were, however, without success: his two crusades against the Pagans—one into Prussia, and the other into Lithuania, secured him only the satisfaction of having Königsberg named in his honour, while he was unable to hold Western Slovakia, though he twice reconquered it from the Magyars.

The expansion of Bohemia had been rendered possible only by the disturbed conditions in Germany, but it might have been made more permanent if Otakar II had succeeded in

getting himself elected to the throne of the Holy Roman Empire. Rudolf of Habsburg, however, who became Emperor in 1273, at once commenced a campaign against his too successful rival and subject monarch. Otakar II was compelled to surrender all his conquests to the Habsburgs and to receive Bohemia and Moravia only in fief from the Emperor. His successor, Václav II (1278–1305), after making vain efforts to regain what Rudolf had taken from his father, turned his attention eastwards and made himself master of most of Poland, Hungary, Croatia and some parts of Roumania. After his death, his son, Václav III (1305–1306), renounced all claim to the Hungarian throne, but was on the eve of his departure on an expedition into Poland for the establishment of his claims there when he was assassinated at Olomouc by agents of the Habsburgs. With him the male line of the Přemyslides came to an end, and the Czechs were compelled to select another dynasty to provide their kings.

The closing years of the Přemyslide dynasty saw the first manifestations of the effects of German immigration, which were later to become a permanent feature of life in the Bohemian lands. Apart from occasional individual Germans who appeared at the Bohemian Court as a result of intermarriage between the princely families, the Germans who first settled in Bohemia were either merchants or priests. The former were not numerous, and were found only in the vicinity of the castles of the more important princes; the latter were increasingly numerous after the Papal Bull of 885 suppressed religious teaching in Slavonic. German priests were to be found all over the country, frequently occupying high office—the Bishop of Prague was almost always a German—and predominating among the members of the religious orders which, from the 12th century onwards, founded monasteries in various places. In the latter part of the 12th century, however, commenced a mass immigration of German colonists who settled, first on the estates of the new monasteries and of the princes, and later on those of the more wealthy noblemen. This epoch saw also the development of the German trading settlements into towns and the foundation of new towns. The populations of these towns were

at first mainly German, for the Czech kings encouraged German craftsmen to come into Bohemia, in order to stimulate industry and trade, just as Edward III encouraged the Flemings to come and found weaving centres in England.

The main effect of this German immigration—apart from its germanising influence, which was confined mainly to the Czech nobility—was to change the legal relationship between rural workers and their masters—in favour of the former. The German colonists were, as a rule, granted in advance certain definite rights and privileges which were summed up under the title of “German Law” (*Burgrecht*). It was soon found impracticable not to extend these rights and privileges also to Czech citizens, who thus obtained advantages which they might otherwise have been denied for some time longer. Moreover the creation of the new towns, founded either by the King (free or royal towns) or by the nobility (subject towns), undermined the position of the princes, and eventually destroyed their domination. What changed, more than anything else, however, the racial composition of the population of Bohemia was the settlement of large numbers of Germans in regions along the frontier which had hitherto been heavily forested, and which therefore had virtually no indigenous population.

3. The Luxemburgs (14th Century). The extinction of the Přemyslide dynasty was followed by the election of Rudolf of Habsburg to the Bohemian throne. He died, however, within a few months of his election, and was succeeded by Henry of Carinthia (1307–1310), who had married the eldest daughter of Václav II. Under his weak administration civil war broke out between the Czech noblemen and the German townspeople, who were claiming a greater share in the administration of their adopted country. It was generally agreed that it was no use having a king who could not keep order in his country, so Henry was deposed and replaced by John, the fourteen-year-old son of Henry VII of Luxemburg, Emperor of the Holy Roman Empire. It was arranged that he should marry Eliška, second daughter of Václav II, and in 1311 the royal couple were crowned in Prague as King and Queen of

Bohemia. Their reign, which lasted until 1346, was marked by a struggle between the Crown and the nobility, who claimed the right to administer their country. By the end of 1319 such a state of deadlock had been reached that John abandoned the government of the country to his nobles and embarked on a series of foreign adventures which secured considerable territorial gains. As a reward for Czech assistance in his struggle for the German throne, King Ludwig of Bavaria granted to John as an imperial fief the town and district of Cheb (Eger), which later became absorbed into Bohemia. Upper Lusatia and the whole of Silesia were also subjected to Bohemian rule, and it seems possible that John would have achieved still further imperialist successes if he had not met an untimely death fighting on the side of the French against the English in the Battle of Crécy.

Charles IV (1346–1378), who now came to the throne, was a very different kind of man from his father. He was an excellent diplomat, and obtained far more for his dynasty and for Bohemia by skilful diplomacy than could ever have been won by force of arms. Educated in Paris and instilled with the culture of France, yet withal a good Czech patriot, he had been fortunate, before coming to the throne, in being already elected Emperor of the Holy Roman Empire. Availing himself of this influential position he proclaimed the indissoluble union not only of Moravia, but also of Silesia and Upper Lusatia with the Kingdom of Bohemia. He then proceeded, in 1355, by means of his famous Golden Bull, to recognise the King of Bohemia as one of the seven Electors who enjoyed the right to elect the German king, allotting to him a position of precedence in this respect to all the other imperial Electors. By purchase, and by other peaceful means, he added important parts of Germany to the Bohemian State, which assumed dimensions that were maintained up to the Thirty Years War, and finally, in 1364, he came to an agreement with the ducal house of Habsburg whereby, on the extinction of that House or his own, the succession to its territories would pass to the House which survived—he was not able to foresee, of course, that it would be the House of Habsburg which would benefit by this agreement.

One of Charles IV's most important acts was to **found, in 1348, the University of Prague**, which was the first and for some time the only one in Central Europe, and which had attracted over 5,000 students before its founder died. It is interesting to note, in view of subsequent developments in Bohemia, that this University, modelled on that of Paris, was divided into four "nations":—

1. Bohemian, including Hungarians and Slovaks.
2. Bavarian, including Rhineland Germans and Austrians.
3. Saxon, including Danes and English.
4. Polish, including Silesians, Russians and Lithuanians.

Charles was very devout, and under his patronage the Church made great advances in power and in wealth. At that time half the land in Bohemia belonged to the clergy or to their institutions. Prosperity bred corruption, in reaction to which there grew up a spirit of revolt that was later to develop into a strong movement of a politico-religious character. Charles himself, clearly disapproving of the widespread immorality among the clergy, joined with Arnošt of Pardubice, the first Archbishop of Prague, in supporting those who denounced it publicly in their sermons. It was he, indeed, who invited the celebrated Austrian preacher, **Conrad Waldhauser**, to come to Prague and open the campaign against the abuses of the Church.

Waldhauser preached in German, but his Moravian successor, **Jan Milič of Kroměříž**, used the Czech language, thereby (probably unintentionally) introducing into the religious struggle an element of nationalism which later became very marked. By so doing he undoubtedly increased the force of the support which his sermons aroused, for already the natural expansion of the Czech elements in the towns, which were dominated by the Germans, had made inevitable the struggle for power between the races.

4. The Hussite Period (1400–1471). The development of this struggle was historically the most important event during the reign of Charles' son and successor, **Václav IV (1348–1419)**.

It seems likely that this development was influenced by the marriage of his sister Anne to Richard II of England, which must have fostered the spread of the teachings of John Wycliffe into Bohemia.

The great name connected with this movement of reform is, of course, that of **Jan Hus (John Huss)**, who in 1402 became Rector of Prague University and was appointed preacher at the Bethlehem Chapel, founded twenty years earlier as a place of worship for those who wished to hear sermons in the Czech language.

In 1403 Hus and the Czech masters at the University launched a powerful campaign in favour of Wycliffe's doctrines and in criticism of the abuses of the established Church. Concurrently, there took place inside the University a struggle for power between the Czechs and Germans, which was decided in 1409 in favour of the former, Václav IV issuing the **Decree of Kutná Hora**, whereby the Czechs for the first time were granted their majority rights.

The Church started a violent counter-campaign against the "heretics", and conditions became so disorderly in Prague that in 1412 Hus was persuaded by the King to retire to the country, where he continued his preaching among the peasants.

In November, 1414, Hus was summoned to appear before the General Council at Constance, whither he went, at the request of Sigismund, the Roman king of Hungary, brother of Václav IV, from whom he received a safe-conduct. After a long period of shameful imprisonment and numerous examinations, he was heard in public by the Council. He challenged the Council to prove from the Scriptures that his views were mistaken, undertaking to recant if they could succeed in doing so, but was merely told that, whatever his convictions might be, it was his duty to recant because his superiors required it of him. Refusing to be shaken in his beliefs, he was defrocked and handed over to the secular authorities for punishment, and on the very same day (July 6th, 1415) he was burnt at the stake by order of King Sigismund, whose safe-conduct he bore.

Hus now became a martyr and the hero of the Czech people,

and his motto, "**Pravda Vítězí**" ("**Truth wins**"), used by his followers the Hussites or Utraquists, is now the motto of the Czechoslovak Republic.

There was widespread indignation in Bohemia when the news of his death arrived, and on 2nd September, 1415, 452 nobles and gentry of Bohemia forwarded to the Council of Constance a strongly worded protest, in which they declared themselves ready to defend the teachings of the Master whom the Council had condemned as a heretic. This action was supported by the masses of the Czech people both in the towns and in the country.

Václav IV was bullied into attempting to suppress, by decrees, this popular movement against the authority of the Roman Church, but found it impossible to restrain his people. Disturbances between the Romanists and the Utraquists culminated on July 30th, 1419, when an angry crowd, incensed because the civic authorities would not release prisoners who had been arrested on account of religious disorders, stormed the Town Hall and threw the Mayor and his Councillors out of the windows to their death. After that Václav, daring no longer to oppose the popular will, withdrew his decrees, and a few days later he died from the effects of shock at his experiences.

Václav's brother, Sigismund, King of Hungary—he who had murdered Hus—claimed the throne of Bohemia, but the Czechs naturally would not have him and were able to repulse successfully the armies which he sent against them. Vain attempts were made to persuade other, more suitable, princes to accept the Bohemian throne, and so the Czechs remained under a Regency of nobles, gentry and burgesses until 1436.

The Czechs now found themselves surrounded by enemies on every side, and were subjected to continual attacks by "crusading" armies, notably from Germany. They were able, however, not only to repel these attacks, but to take the offensive successfully, even (in 1432) up to the Baltic coast. Their victories were due, not merely to the courage of the "**Warriors of God**", as the Hussites called themselves, or to the skill of blind **Jan Žižka** and their other leaders, but also to

the strength of their conviction of the righteousness of their cause, and to the intensity of their national consciousness.

The Hussite Movement was from the first divided into two sections. One, the more moderate, composed of the upper-class elements, centred itself round the University of Prague; whence its members became known as the "**Praguers**". The other, more radical than Hus himself, and composed of the more plebeian elements, built a fortified town on a hill in southern Bohemia which they named Tábör, after Mount Tabor in the Bible; its members became known as the "**Táborites**". The two sections were united, however, in the common cause of resistance to the Pope and his "crusaders", and in 1420 they agreed upon and published the well-known "**Four Articles of Prague**", defining their aims. These Articles provided for:—

- (1) the unrestricted preaching of the Word of God;
- (2) the administration of communion of both kinds to all believers;
- (3) the abolition of the possession by monks and clergy of large estates and possessions;
- (4) the strict punishment of immorality and simony, which was then widespread in the Church.

One interesting feature of the Hussite Movement was that women and men participated on terms of absolute equality. The principle thus established was followed later in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries by the Czech Brethren, who gave the same education to women as to men, and is now an accepted principle of the Czechoslovak Republic.

The Pope, having mobilised all the Western civilised countries against the "heretic nation", but having failed, nevertheless, to subdue them, decided in 1431 to invite them to discuss peace terms. It was agreed during the preliminary discussions between the Czechs and the Catholic Council of Basle that questions of doctrine should not be discussed at the Peace Conference. The Táborites were unwilling to engage in any such conference because they felt quite secure in Bohemia and mistrusted the sincerity of their enemies. They

were practically wiped out, however, by the nobles at the Battle of Lipany in 1434, and the Conference took place. Events proved that the Taborites had been right, for the Basle "**Compacts**" of 1436, while recognising the Czechs as "faithful sons of the Church" and conceding their demand for communion of both kinds, made no provision for the reforms for which the Czechs had fought so well.

After this the Czechs had a succession of short-lived foreign rulers before they obtained a real ruler in the person of **Jiří (George) of Poděbrady**, a Czech nobleman. Jiří, leader of the Utraquists, conducted a determined campaign against the anti-Hussite reaction which had set in. Backed by a powerful following of Hussite noblemen, he occupied Prague and in 1452 was elected by the Diet to act as Regent during the infancy of the King. In 1458, on the death of the King, he was placed on the throne by the Bohemian Estates.

Jiří (1458-1471), though a sincere Hussite, realised that his country needed to be pulled together after a long period under war conditions, and that it was not in a condition to provoke Rome. He attempted, therefore, to pacify the Pope by taking strong action against the remnants of the Taborites, who were more radical even than before, and did his best to discourage the development of the pacifist Unity of Bohemian Brethren, founded by the peasant, **Peter Chelčický**.

When he found, however, that the Pope was unresponsive to his conciliatory policy, he conceived the idea of forming a **League of Christian kings and princes** (on broadly the same lines of the present League of Nations) for mutual protection against the Turks, who were then very aggressive—and, he thought, for mutual liberation from the Pope. He found no support for this plan, and indeed it was opposed by the bishops on the grounds that it was an impertinence for anyone other than His Holiness or the Roman Emperor to make such a suggestion.

Jiří refused consistently to accept any "watering down" of the terms of the Basle "Compacts", and was excommunicated in 1465 for opposing the unilateral denunciation of the "Compacts" by the Pope.

During the latter part of his reign there was a constant struggle for power between him and his nobles. Feeling that

it would be less difficult for a foreign ruler than for a Czech to maintain the royal rights, and influenced also by the menacing attitude of Matthew Corvin, King of Bohemia, who acted as agent of the Pope, Jiří arranged before his death (in 1471) that the succession should pass to Vladislav, son of the King of Poland.

5. The Jagellon Period (1471–1526). (*The Growth of the Power of the Nobles.*) The Jagellon dynasty thus introduced from Poland into Bohemia failed completely, if indeed it ever seriously tried, to justify Jiří's hope that it would successfully withstand the pressure of the nobles.

The events of the Hussite period had almost completely deprived the Church of its wealth and consequently of most of its political power—so much so, indeed, that it had no representation in the Bohemian Diet, though it retained its representation in that of Moravia.

The lands which the Church had lost had passed into the hands mainly of the higher nobility, though to some extent also into the hands of the lower nobility, whose increased economic power was reflected in the political sphere.

The Hussite wars had also made the towns more important than before, their burgesses, especially those of Prague, assuming a leading position in political life and exercising a decisive influence in the Diets.

The Polish kings, Vladislav II (1471–1516) and Louis (1516–1526), were weak and were, moreover, without the Czech tradition of protecting the rights of the people, as represented at that time by the king. By the end of the Jagellon period, therefore, the nobles had substantially advanced in power at the expense of the Crown, and had, in the process, thrust back the towns from the leading position to which they had attained; the position of the rural population also deteriorated substantially—they lost all their former rights at the hands of the nobility and were reduced to a state of serfdom.

The struggle between the Romanists and Utraquists continued unabated, the former having the sympathy of the kings, but was temporarily brought to an end in 1485 by

an agreement concluded at Kutná Hora, whereby each party undertook to respect the other's views and the Basle "Compacts" were confirmed. While these two sections of the Roman Catholic Church—for the Utraquists could never bring themselves to the point of severing themselves from Rome—continued their mutually destructive internecine strife, Chelčický's **Unity of Brethren** instituted a priesthood and church order of its own and became the Protestant Church of Bohemia. It had been mildly persecuted already during the reign of Jiří, and was now declared by Vladislav II to be "a prohibited confession whose adherents were to be eradicated". Compelled by practical considerations to compromise regarding its somewhat anarchist principles, it increased its membership and influence despite all efforts at suppression, and has ever since deeply affected the intellectual development of the Czechs.

The Jagellon period marked also the recrudescence and development of German influence in Bohemia. During the Hussite wars many of the Germans had fled or had been expelled, with the result that the towns, previously dominated by the German element, had acquired a Czech character. Those Germans who had remained were an insignificant minority to which, on account of its hostility to the Hussites in an era when tolerance could not be exercised, no recognition was given. The wars had, moreover, depopulated the countryside and even, though to a lesser extent, the towns, and their cessation was followed by the mass immigration of Germans. These Germans settled in the frontier regions of the north and west of Bohemia, which thus assumed the character that they have to-day.

In the international field, Vladislav II began badly by ceding to Matthew Corvin of Hungary for life the provinces of Moravia, Silesia and Lusatia. When Matthew died, however, in 1490, these provinces were recovered and more besides, for Vladislav was elected King of Hungary. His successor, Louis, likewise ruled over the two kingdoms of Bohemia and Hungary, and was involved in war with the Turks who were then in full flood of expansion. His defeat at the Battle of Moháč, in 1526, at which he was deserted by

the Magyar nobles and depended for support on Czech volunteers who had responded to his appeal, was followed by the Turkish occupation of Buda and the greater part of Hungary and the transference by the Hungarians of their capital to Bratislava.¹

6. The First Habsburg Period (1526–1620). The death of Louis while fleeing from the Turks after the Battle of Mohács brought the Jagellon dynasty to an end. The succession had been prepared by family agreements and suitable marriages, but it was rather as a result of his election by the Bohemian Estates that Ferdinand of Habsburg became King of Bohemia as **Ferdinand I (1526–1564)**.

Ferdinand was already the ruler of all Austrian territories, and was shortly afterwards elected King of Hungary. His unification of the three kingdoms under one rule can hardly, however, be considered the birth of Austria-Hungary, for the Hungary over which he ruled consisted mainly of Slovakia—most of Hungary proper was at that time either under the Turks, who were in possession of its capital, Buda, until 1541, or under a rival Hungarian ruler, John Zápolya, elected by the Hungarian nobles. After the death of Ferdinand, moreover, the territories over which he ruled were divided among his three sons. This succession marked, however, the third and final appearance of the Habsburgs as rulers of Bohemia.

Within this combined kingdom Bohemia was the most important component part, both from the political and from the economic point of view. Politically, the fact that the King of Bohemia was an Elector of the German—Holy Roman—Empire enabled the Habsburgs to secure and retain the imperial Crown. Economically, it is significant that, for the war against the Turks, which was primarily the concern of Hungary, the Kingdom of Bohemia paid almost as much, and the Bohemian Crown almost twice as much, as was paid by all the territories of Austria, while Hungary paid only one-seventh of what was paid by the Bohemian Crown. The

¹ Bratislava remained the Hungarian capital until the Turks were driven out of Hungary, and was the town in which the Kings of Hungary were crowned. To-day the Hungarians quote this in justification of their claim to possess Bratislava!

importance of Bohemia was clearly recognised, for a later Habsburg, Rudolf II (1583-1612), made Prague the permanent seat of the imperial court and of all the head offices of state, and the residence of all diplomatic representatives.

The Habsburgs were able forthwith to unify the foreign policy of their composite Empire, but as regards internal affairs such unification and standardisation was limited because of the power of the Estates in each of its component parts. It was possible, however, to standardise with regard to those matters which came within the unrestricted competence of the Crown, such as the administration of justice, the imposition of customs dues, and the army. Ferdinand set up almost immediately a Privy Council, and in 1556 a Court Army Council, to advise him, but without granting them any executive powers. He attempted also to bring the Estates of each kingdom into closer contact with each other, by summoning them to joint Congresses, but they attended unwillingly, and the attempt was on the whole unsuccessful.

It was not until later, at the beginning of the 17th century, that the Estates themselves adopted the idea of joint Congresses—but that was done with the object of concerting their efforts against the dynasty in defence of their rights and liberties, particularly with regard to religious matters. This was first proposed in 1608 by the Estates of the provinces which backed Archduke Matthias in his attempt to depose Rudolf II, when Bohemia and Silesia stood by their Emperor, but it was not actually effected until the Czech rebellion of 1619-1620, when it was the Bohemians who proposed it, and then lasted only for a short while.

Despite the stubborn resistance of the Estates, however, the Habsburg efforts towards achieving greater absolutism met with considerable success even in Bohemia, where they might have succeeded still more if it had not been for religious differences between the decidedly Catholic dynasty and the Bohemian population which had for a long time been in opposition to Rome, and which now became increasingly Lutheran.

The infiltration of Lutheran teachings into Bohemia had the effect of reviving within the ranks of the Utraquists a

tendency towards the more extreme separatist ideas of the former Taborites. This led to a split, a minority only remaining faithful to the policy of compromise with Rome, while the majority, though not going so far as the Unity of Brethren, endeavoured to prepare the way for the complete severance of the Utraquists from Rome. The teachings of Luther had a powerful influence also upon the German population, who had hitherto been staunchly Catholic.

Ferdinand I had promised, when he was elected to the throne, to uphold the Basle "Compacts". He interpreted these "Compacts" not only as obliging him to recognise equally the Romanists and the Utraquists, but also as imposing upon him the duty of suppressing groups of all other religious persuasions and of opposing any innovations within the Utraquist group. From a political point of view this action was dictated by a desire to frustrate any tendency towards increased unity within the Czech nation, and from a class point of view, by a desire to prevent the development among the bourgeoisie of a tendency towards religious assimilation with the masses.

He persecuted the Unity of Brethren, expelling them from the towns immediately under his authority (the "royal towns"), so that they emigrated *en masse* from Bohemia into Poland, but without much effect, apparently, in Moravia, for there they stayed and grew in numbers. He acted quite unconstitutionally with regard to the Utraquists in "purging" them of the more progressive elements in their administration. At the same time he took steps to re-establish the position of the Romanists by introducing the Jesuit Order into Bohemia in 1556 and by restoring the Roman Archbishopric of Prague in 1561.

This policy of Romanisation was continued, though less effectively, by his successor Maximilian II (1564-1575) and decided the Unity of Brethren and the Neo-Utraquists to make a united front against their oppressor. Meeting in conference in 1575, these two groups formulated common articles of faith which they submitted to the king for approval. Instead of giving approval to this **Bohemian Confession**, as it was called, the king merely promised verbally that he would

put no obstacles in the way of its adherents—they were tolerated on sufferance, but those of the Brethren who, while adhering to the Bohemian Confession, were unwilling to give up their membership of the Unity of Brethren, were still subjected to persecution.

Rudolf II (1575–1611), though interesting himself rather in science and the arts, allowed the Romanist campaign to be developed still more violently by agents of the Pope. Fortune favoured, however, the Protestants, for in 1609, when an attempt was made by Rudolf's brother, the Archduke Matthias, to depose the king, the Bohemian Diet, led by Václav Budovec of Budov, made the support which they gave the latter conditional on his signature of the **Letter of Majesty (Majestát)**, whereby the right of free exercise of their religion without obstacle of any kind was granted to all adherents to the Bohemian Confession. The Utraquists also secured for themselves the right to make all appointments to the old Hussite consistories and to the University. Almost simultaneously the Estates of Silesia, who also had supported Rudolf, secured similar rights with regard to the Augsburg Confession, while the Estates of Moravia, who were on the side of the Archduke Matthias, obtained from him a number of religious concessions.

The spread of Lutheranism in Germany and other countries made the Czechs no longer religious "pariahs" among their neighbours, and led to the rapid development of intellectual intercourse with Bohemia. The adoption of a more tolerant attitude towards Protestantism in Bohemia was followed, moreover, by an influx of those who had fled abroad to escape persecution, and who brought back with them the culture they had acquired in exile.

From a racial point of view, the development of consonant religious creeds among the Czechs and Germans opened the way for a further influx of German immigrants into Bohemia. This influx was due primarily to economic circumstances, but also, to some extent, to the encouragement of the Habsburgs. Under the influence of Court many German noble families established themselves in Bohemia, encouraging by their presence the germanisation of the neighbourhood around

them. Some of these families became completely assimilated to the Czechs, while others preserved their national character. The Czechs remained nevertheless substantially in a majority in every class in Bohemia and Moravia. The Czech language was spoken exclusively in the Diets and in the offices and courts, the use of German being confined to the German towns and the estates of the German landowners, though it was used extensively in the royal offices that were independent of the Estates. In the struggle for religious freedom and for the rights of the Estates, Germans and Czechs of every class fought side by side, as Bohemians, against the Habsburgs.

Both Rudolf II and the Archduke Matthias were unwilling to reconcile themselves to the concessions which had been wrung from them by the Protestant nine-tenths of the Czech nation. Neither was sincere in his efforts to carry out the terms of his concessions and when, on the death of Rudolf in 1612, Matthias consolidated his hold over the territories that had formerly been his brother's, an aggressive counter-reformation set in. The election, as his eventual successor, of the Archduke Ferdinand of Styria, who had a black record of counter-reformation, indicated the future intensification of religious oppression of the Czechs. The situation therefore became increasingly tense and came to a crisis when Matthias ordered the demolition of two churches which had been built by the Protestants of Broumov and Hrov on the domains of dignitaries of the Roman Catholic Church.

The Letter of Majesty had provided that the interests of the Protestant community should be protected by a body of thirty "Defenders", chosen in equal numbers from the Protestant nobles, knights and townsmen. The incident of the churches was taken up by the "Defenders", who placed their complaint before a hastily-summoned Protestant Assembly in Prague. A Resolution calling upon the Emperor for redress was answered with a threat, ordering the immediate dissolution of the Protestant Assembly. On May 23rd, 1618, the whole Assembly, led by Count Thurn, went fully armed to the royal castle where they were to meet by appointment, Slavata and Martinic, the Roman Catholic councillors of the Emperor. The discussion became so heated that the

enraged nobles flung the two councillors out of the windows, shortly afterwards flinging out also their Secretary, Fabricius, who protested against such unseemly treatment of imperial councillors—none of them was killed.

This famous defenestration was the first act of violence in the **Thirty Years War (1618–1648)** which followed.

On the following day the Czechs set up a Revolutionary Government, composed of thirty members nominated by the nobility, and soon put a considerable army into the field. In 1619 the Emperor Matthias died, and the Czech Diet decided unanimously to depose Ferdinand II, his previously accepted successor, electing in his stead Prince Frederick of the Palatinate, son-in-law of James I of England, and head of the Protestant Union of German Princes.

By the following spring the situation of the Czechs was extremely grave, for their civil war was threatening to develop into international proportions. Spain, Italy, Poland, Bavaria—the “Roman Catholic League”—were preparing to attack them in support of Ferdinand, while their only foreign allies were the Hungarian Protestants of Transylvania.

Their fate was sealed on November 8th, 1620, when the Czech army, exhausted and demoralised, was decisively defeated at the **Battle of Bílá Hora (Battle of the White Mountain)** near Prague. After that defeat the Czechs' resistance was virtually at an end, and on November 23rd they handed over to Ferdinand at Vienna a chest containing the Charters of all their privileges.

The blame for this defeat may be ascribed very largely to the deterioration of the moral of the Czech peasants as a result of their enslavement in 1500. “*The Hussite battles were won by free peasants; the Battle of the White Mountain was lost by mercenaries.*”¹ It was befitting, therefore, that punishment should fall on the Czech nobility who were responsible for that enslavement, though it is regrettable that those who were called upon to pay the supreme penalty—the twenty-six leading nobles, citizens and learned men of Bohemia who were publicly beheaded before the Old Town Hall in Prague on June 21st, 1661—should have been those who deserved well of their countrymen.

¹ *Czechoslovakia*, by Jessie Mothersole, p. 50.

7. Period of Habsburg Absolutism (1620-1860). Ferdinand II (1620-1637) now established his claim to rule over the Lands of the Bohemian Crown with the exception of Lusatia, which he had promised to the Elector of Saxony in return for his help during the war. His triumph was followed by a campaign of intense catholicisation and germanisation. "*Better no population at all than a population of heretics*," said the new king, and his servants acted accordingly. All Protestants were exiled or persecuted and forcibly converted to Roman Catholicism, and all their property was confiscated. In two years alone, 1622 and 1623, 680 persons in Bohemia were condemned to complete or partial loss of their property, and several Bohemian towns were treated likewise, and this practice was continued for many years with regard to the property of those who had gone into exile for conscience' sake. By this process of confiscation about three-quarters of the land in Bohemia was seized and was either sold to meet the expenses of the Thirty Years War or, more often, given to generals, bishops and others (especially foreigners) who were in the service of Ferdinand. One way and another the Thirty Years War cost Bohemia more than one-third of her population.

All Protestant clergy were driven from the land, together with all those of the parishioners who refused to abandon their creed. Some 30,000 Protestant families were thus sent into exile, losing all their property by confiscation. Only the peasants, bound to the land, were not permitted to escape, for they were needed to work the land of their new masters. They were compelled, however, at least outwardly, to conform to Roman Catholicism, and their risings were ruthlessly suppressed. They were later subjected to intense religious propaganda by Counter-reformation Commissions, and by Jesuit and other missionaries.

Notable among those who at this time left the country was **Jan Amos Komenský**, known also as **Comenius**, who may, with Pestalozzi, be considered the founder of modern Elementary Education. He was an advocate of universal compulsory education in the mother tongue for all children without

distinction of social class or sex: an ideal which was realised only in the 19th and 20th centuries and which is still far from being universally accepted or applied. He conceived of a school as a human workshop, in which children should not only imbibe learning, but should be taught also to conduct themselves in accordance with the ideals of pure humanity. When expelled from Fulnek, in Moravia, he took refuge first at Lesna, in Poland, where he continued to teach and write, his books being very widely translated. He was invited to London in 1641 to expound his ideas. The Long Parliament actually voted the money for endowing three colleges at Chelsea, Winchester and the Savoy where his educational methods might be tried out in practice, but the scheme was never carried out owing to other preoccupations. In bequeathing all his possessions to the Czech and Moravian nation he wrote prophetically:—

“I also believe before God that after the passing of the storms of wrath brought down upon our heads by our sins, the rule over thine own possessions shall be restored to thee, O Czech people!”

It is significant that when the tercentenary of Komenský's birth was celebrated publicly in 1892 in Great Britain, Germany and very many other countries, no celebration in his own country was permitted by the Austrian authorities.

Profiting by the impotence to which the Czechs had been reduced, Ferdinand II set about extending his powers and consolidating the position of the Habsburgs in Bohemia. Justifying his actions, no doubt, by the argument that the Čzechs, having rebelled against their king, had forfeited all their rights and liberties, he issued “**Renewed Regulations**” (in 1627 for Bohemia and in 1628 for Moravia) which gave him almost absolute power by annulling most of the rights of the Bohemian Estates and emasculating the remainder. These Regulations also proclaimed the hereditary right of the House of Habsburg to the throne of Bohemia in such a manner that, immediately on the death of the reigning monarch, the royal power should pass to the legal heir to the throne, who need no longer even formally be acknowledged by the Estates in Diet. The king was no longer obliged

to consult his higher officials when making appointments to public offices, but would fill these at his own discretion. Whereas formerly the higher officials could not be dismissed from office, they were now to be subject to reappointment, transfer or dismissal every five years. These higher officials, moreover, who had hitherto been considered as Public Servants and answerable to the Estates, would now be Royal Servants answerable to the king. The Law Courts lost their independence and were subordinated to royal power.

Substantial changes were made also in the constitution of the provincial Diets: in Bohemia the three existing Estates—nobles, knights and burgesses—were to be joined by a fourth, the clergy, which was to take precedence over all the remainder; in Moravia, where the clergy already were a fourth Estate, that Estate was given precedence above even the nobles. The political power of the towns was reduced to negligible proportions by the fact that the representatives of the burgesses were allowed only one vote between them, whereas each member of the other Estates had an individual vote. Moreover the Diets, through which the Estates exercised their power, were shorn of all power save that of imposing taxation—in 1640 the Diets recovered their legislative power with regard mainly to social and economic questions, which did not affect the royal power.

The effect of this drastic curtailment of the powers of the Estates was increased and intensified by the change which occurred in the character of the Estates.

The religious persecution and confiscation of property which followed the Battle of the White Mountain drove a great many of the noble families out of the country and impoverished a great many more of them. Those who escaped this fate were the Roman Catholics, previously already in sympathy with the dynasty, and now only too anxious to prove their loyalty. Their depleted ranks were filled with foreigners, who naturally had no contact with the traditions of the Czechs. A nobility so constituted was inevitably a nobility of the Court, and was incapable, therefore, of being an independent and active political factor, as had been the former nobility on so many occasions.

The Estate of the burgesses was affected in much the same way as that of the nobility by the counter-reformation, though their ranks were less diluted with foreigners. Their diminished voting power reduced, moreover, such influence as they might wish to exert in the Diets.

The position of the peasants, already devoid of rights even under the old régime, became rapidly worse and worse. If the Crown had only sold the enormous areas of land which it had confiscated—instead of distributing it free among its friends—it would have obtained the money necessary to meet the expenses of the Thirty Years War. As it was, the heavy war expenditure had to be met by heavy taxation, the burden of which was felt most severely by the unfree peasants.

The Lands of the Bohemian Crown still remained an independent State entity, nominally an independent monarchy, and were formally recognised as such. Four out of the five Habsburgs who reigned during the period 1620 to 1740 were crowned as Kings of Bohemia. Moreover when the Imperial Court and all the main offices of State were transferred to Vienna, there was set up in that town a Bohemian Court Chancellery through which all imperial decisions touching the Bohemian Lands must pass and be formally approved. In point of fact, however, this independence was substantially reduced by the increased importance of the central State Departments and by the diminished power of the Bohemian Estates. Their relative importance within the Empire was decreased, partly owing to loss of territory,¹ but even more on account of the consolidation of Habsburg rule in Austria and Hungary and to its territorial extension as the Turks were driven back. They suffered economically from the fact that a large proportion of the heavy taxation levied on them was expended on the beautification of Vienna and otherwise diverted away from them.

The Czech nation, demoralised by its defeat and the ensuing persecution, was now subjected to a process of denationalisation. It was laid down by the Revised Regulations

¹ Lusatia was given to the Elector of Saxony in 1635 in return for his services during the war against the Czechs. In 1735 the greater part of Silesia—excluding the regions of Těšín, Opava and Krnovsko—were lost and Kladsko (Glatz) in 1742.

of 1637 that in all offices and courts the German language was to enjoy equal rights with the Czech, which till then had been the only language used. Thus given official recognition, and with the encouragement of the Court and of the bureaucracy, the German language displaced the Czech to an ever-growing extent. The remnants of the Czech nobility, aspiring after a career at Court for themselves or for their children, took to speaking German normally and sent their children to German schools, where they became properly germanised. The towns and villages, depopulated by the counter-reformation, were inundated with a new spate of German immigrants, and consequently they too became very much germanised. Indeed, if it had not been that the Czech peasants remained tied to the land, the germanisation of the Czech people might well have become complete. This dangerous tendency was aggravated by the disappearance from Bohemia of the greater part of the Czech intellectuals: Czech literature ceased almost to exist and with it the use of the Czech language for cultural purposes. The University, renamed the Charles-Ferdinand University, had been handed over for the most part to the Jesuits, with the result that Latin became the sole medium of instruction.

The State independence of Bohemia suffered a serious blow in 1749, when **Maria Theresa (1740-1780)** created two control offices—a supreme administrative office and a supreme court of justice—for Austria and Bohemia combined, which henceforward became known collectively as “the hereditary German lands”. This brought about the disintegration of the Lands of the Bohemian Crown into their component provinces and led, indirectly, to a further diminution of Czech national consciousness. Furthermore, owing to the fact that the Lands of the Hungarian Crown remained substantially more independent under the Habsburgs, the development of the Slovaks diverged more and more from that of the Czechs, with the result that spiritual and cultural unity between the two branches of the Western Slavs became correspondingly more difficult to achieve.

The progressive assimilation of the Czechs was further facilitated by the introduction into the Bohemian Lands of

a bureaucracy of officials appointed by the Court, in replacement of officials belonging to the Estates of the Lands, and by the undermining of the importance and powers of the Provincial Diets. The control of most forms of taxation passed into the hands of the Crown, and though the Diets were still allowed to control military contributions, their influence upon the use to which these contributions were put and upon the recruitment and maintenance of an army became negligible. The legislative activities of these Diets came completely to an end.

Some years later, in 1763, Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia were reorganised as royal governorships—receiving the title “Gubernium” which they retained until 1848—at the head of each of which was a High Burgrave, chosen from among the nobility who owned land in the province. The provincial administration also was then taken from the local Estates and entrusted to officials of the Crown.

Joseph II (1780–1790) completed this process of reform and centralisation by abolishing the ancient Law Courts of the Estates and setting up a new judicial system, administered by lawyers who were not necessarily members of the Estates.

Both these monarchs devoted great attention to the condition of the unfree peasants, and in 1781 Joseph II abolished by law the main features of serfdom. The serfs were no longer bound to obtain the permission of their masters if they wished to marry, to learn a trade, to study or to move to another place. Later on, Joseph issued another law which limited the powers of the masters to inflict punishment on their serfs, and which enabled the serfs to submit complaints against, and to obtain restitution from, their masters.

Important changes took place also at this time in the educational system. Under Maria Theresa the State, which had hitherto not concerned itself with education, began setting up elementary schools in every community. The consequent reduction in the influence of the Church, which had hitherto had a monopoly in education, created a tendency towards religious toleration, a tendency which was increased

when the Jesuit Order was abolished.¹ This increase of toleration was expressed by the issue by Joseph II in 1781 of the "Patent of Toleration", which permitted non-Catholics to adhere publicly either to the Augsburg or to the Reformed Confession, the Bohemian Confession and the Unity of Brethren still being banned—it is notable that the majority of the Czechs nevertheless remained loyal to the Roman Catholic Church.

From an intellectual and cultural point of view, the spread of rationalism and the increase of educational facilities were beneficial to the Czechs. From a national point of view, however, this was not without its drawbacks, for it exposed their children to intensive germanisation, especially in districts where the population was already mixed.

The coming of the industrial revolution contributed also to the process of germanisation. It affected primarily those districts in which conditions were favourable for industrial development—the frontier districts, peopled mainly by Germans—and thus increased the economic strength of the Germans, as compared with that of the Czechs.

All these changes aroused so much opposition and resentment that Leopold II (1790–1792) deemed it politic to reverse them to some slight extent. His successors—Francis I (1792–1835) and Ferdinand V (1835–1848)—were able, however, to withdraw these temporary concessions, and to make further progress with the establishment of absolutism—and with the centralisation of all legislative and administrative power in Vienna.

Local autonomy in the provinces of the Bohemian Crown became a mere formality, but their collective constitutional position within the Habsburg Federation remained intact. Even after 1804, when Francis I assumed the title of "Austrian Emperor", it was expressly laid down that the status of the three kingdoms over which he ruled should remain unchanged and that the Emperor should continue to be crowned also as King of Bohemia and of Hungary. This condition obtained

¹ The Jesuit Order had formerly dominated the secondary schools and the University. The former now passed into the hands of the Order of the Piarists, while the latter became predominantly secular in its outlook and curriculum.

right up to 1836, when Ferdinand V was crowned King of Bohemia, and was never changed until 1848.

Drastic changes took place, however, in the relations between the Crown and the people, owing to fear that the ideas of the French Revolution might spread. Religious toleration continued, and was indeed extended by the Crown as it sought to enlist the services of the Roman Catholic Church in the fight against "subversive" doctrines. Various religious Orders, among them even the Jesuits, were allowed to re-enter the Empire, and to re-establish their influence in the schools. At the same time, toleration in other fields was replaced by rigid intolerance reinforced by police oppression; international contacts of an intellectual nature were discouraged, especially where they were with "dangerous" countries, and freedom of thought, speech and publication was rigorously suppressed.

As always happens under such circumstances as then obtained, class interest overrode national pride and sentiment among the owning class. The Czech nobles, more fearful of losing their possessions than their souls, abandoned their opposition to Habsburg absolutism and centralisation, ceased all attempts to preserve or regain the rights of their Lands and of their people, and identified themselves with the dynasty. They were duly rewarded with official posts and commissions in the Army, but were no longer leaders, even in the former limited sense.

During all this period the process of germanising the Czechs continued unabated, and had progressed so far that even those who specialised in the study of Czech history, literature and culture, did not use the Czech language as their medium of expression. "Outstanding personalities who occupied themselves with the study of these things wrote as yet only in Latin or in German. Not even the first institutions of learning and art which arose in the Bohemian Lands at the close of the 18th century—the Royal Bohemian Society was founded in the reign of Joseph II, the Theatre of the States in 1783, the Prague Conservatory of Music in 1810, and the National Museum in 1818—were of Czech character."¹

¹ Dr. Kamil Krofta, *A Short History of Czechoslovakia*, p. 101.

There was, however, a growing reaction among the Czechs against this denationalisation, and a strong movement of Czech revival was started by a series of so-called "Awakeners". Prominent among these were **Josef Jungmann**, son of a Bohemian peasant, who wrote a great dictionary of the Czech language; **František Palacký**,¹ son of a Protestant village schoolmaster, the great historian; and a Slovak, **Pavel Josef Šafařík**, son of a Protestant, also an eminent historian.

The response to the appeal of these "awakeners" was at first among those classes who had preserved some national consciousness, but who were without any political power, so the movement of revival was at first of a cultural, not of a political, character.

In 1848, however, inspired by the success of the February Revolution in Paris, national feeling boiled over among the Czechs. At a mass meeting of the citizens of Prague, held in the St. Václav Baths on March 11th, it was resolved to submit to the Emperor a Petition demanding complete political liberty (including the freedom of the Press), the abolition of serfdom, a more equitable distribution of public duties and burdens, and the creation of freely elected bodies to manage the affairs of towns and communities. It demanded further that the masses should at last receive political representation, in that elected representatives of the towns and rural communities should be included with the Estates in the Provincial Diets, and that the sense of unity between the Lands of the Bohemian Crown should be strengthened by the summoning every year of a Diet common to them all and by the unification of their administration through the establishment in Prague of common central political, judicial and financial offices under the control of a special Ministry answerable to the Diet.

Some members of the Estates now stepped forward, hoping, no doubt, to win favour with the winning side by a tardy approval of the people's initiative, and offered to present the Petition at Court. The people had, however, lost all confidence in the classes which should have been leading this

¹ Responsible for the saying: "Before Austria was, we were; and when Austria no longer is, we shall be."

national revolt and decided that the Petition should be presented by their own representatives, after it had been signed by as many members as possible of the general public, German as well as Czech.

In the meanwhile, under pressure from other parts of the Empire, Prince Metternich, the Minister responsible for the oppression, had been swept from office, and the Imperial Government had made several concessions, including the freedom of the Press. The Czechs were somewhat surprised, as well as disappointed, when the Emperor replied to their Petition on 23rd March in an unsatisfactory manner. All he conceded was that the Bohemian Estates might, at their discretion, admit to their Diet elected representatives of the towns, but not of the rural communities, and that the Diets of the Estates of Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia might discuss together the question of a common Diet.

Undeterred by this rebuff the People's Committee which had been elected at the St. Václav meeting drew up a second Petition in which they flatly rejected the Emperor's proposal that the Estates should decide upon several of their demands, and emphatically repeated their former demands for the political, administrative and judicial unification of the three provinces.

On 8th April the Austrian Government replied, granting the early convocation of the Bohemian Diet, in which should be included elected representatives of the towns and countryside, and the establishment in Prague of supreme offices for the Kingdom of Bohemia, but postponing a decision regarding the proposed measures of unification, pending the forthcoming assembly of the Imperial Diet, in which the Bohemian Lands would be represented.

The Czechs were still dissatisfied, but decided to accept these terms "as a first instalment", anticipating further satisfaction when the terms of the Imperial Manifesto of 15th March (which declared that the future Constitution would be based on the ancient rights of the Estates of all the Habsburg Lands) were carried into execution. When, however, later in April, the new Constitution was published, it appeared that no respect whatever was paid to the rights of the Estates of the various Lands, for it introduced a joint

Imperial Diet, the members of which were to be elected directly by those who had the suffrage, not chosen by the Diets of the Lands, and a joint ministry responsible to that Imperial Diet. The promise to convoke the Bohemian Diet was never kept.

Deceived and disappointed, the Czechs were unwilling at this time to weaken the Habsburg Monarchy, which they regarded as a bulwark against the pan-German menace, so they did not protest much. They hoped that the inclusion of Slav representatives in the Imperial Diet would water down the too-exclusively German character in the Monarchy. In this too, however, they were to be disappointed, for the Imperial Diet which met in Vienna in July, and which completed its deliberations at Kroměříž in November, drew up a Constitution which granted the individual Diets of the Lands limited legislative powers, but subordinated them to an Imperial Parliament common to all the non-Hungarian Lands. The Czechs and others fought hard at this meeting of the Imperial Diet for the recognition of the sovereign power of the people, for the abolition of titles of nobility and entailed estates, for the democratisation of the Roman Catholic Church and for the limitation of its rights. All that was granted was that the Imperial Parliament should be elected—the People's Chamber by popular election; the Chamber of the Lands by the Provincial Diets.

Even then the Czechs' disappointments were not at an end. The Emperor Ferdinand abdicated, and his successor, **Francis Joseph**, dissolved the Diet of Kroměříž in March of the following year (1849), discarded the Constitution which it had drafted and himself decreed a new Constitution (the "**March Constitution**"). This Constitution declared all the Habsburg territories to be one territory, with one nationality for all its citizens, to be governed by an Imperial Parliament of two Chambers, of which one only, the Upper Chamber, was to be elected by the Diets of the Lands. The Lands, including Hungary, were granted limited independence within the framework of the Empire.

While all this was going on, the Slovaks too were struggling for their national existence, and in their case too the struggle

was conducted by the people, for their nobility had long since been completely magyarised. A Slovak Assembly held on May 10th, 1848, at Liptovský Svätý Mikuláš addressed to the Hungarian Diet a Petition demanding the introduction of Slovak into all schools, the right to use Slovak for official and judicial proceedings, the establishment of a Slovak University, and not only the establishment of a Diet for all Hungary, in which each representative might use his mother-tongue, but also separate Diets for each different nationality.

When this Petition was refused, the Slovaks petitioned the young Emperor, Francis Joseph, to grant autonomy to Slovakia. The March Constitution was, however, the only answer they got.

Thus the net gains of a year of struggle by the Czechs and Slovaks were the **abolition of serfdom (in September, 1848)** and the recognition of the principle of the equality of all citizens before the law, and in the case of the Slovaks, better and more humane administration and a temporary checking of the process of magyarisation.¹ In exchange for these Bohemia had lost all trace of its constitutional individuality, together with all its national institutions and rights; the Czechs, Slovaks and all other non-Austrians were subjected to a process of intense germanisation, designed to inculcate into them Austrian patriotism; the freedom of the Press had been withdrawn and police control of political and intellectual life was as strict as in the worst days of Metternich.

A Concordat concluded by the Emperor with the Pope in 1855 restored to the Roman Catholic Church its mediaeval powers, notably granting it more influence than ever before on education.

8. Constitutional Monarchy—the Dual Monarchy (1860–1914). This period of intense absolutism was brought to an end in 1860 merely because the Habsburgs found themselves in a difficult position after an unsuccessful war in Italy. By the **October Diploma** of 1860 the Emperor Francis Joseph promised to exercise legislative power only in co-operation with the Diets of the

¹ These improvements were due not to philanthropy on the part of Vienna, but to the anxiety of the Austrian Government to frustrate the political aspirations of the Hungarian

Lands (based on the old constitutions of their Estates, adapted to the changed conditions) and with the Imperial Parliament (Reichsrat), to which the Diets were to send certain representatives. This Diploma was issued by the Emperor "on his own authority" as "the permanent and irrevocable State law, as the rule of government for himself and his successors". It was promptly amplified by decrees providing for the constitution in some of the old Austrian lands of Diets in which the nobility and the clergy would be assured preponderance over the popular representatives.

On 21st February, 1861, a new Imperial Constitution was decreed which provided for a Reichsrat composed of two Chambers—a Chamber of Deputies elected by the Diets of the Lands, and an Upper Chamber composed partly of hereditary members and partly of members nominated by the Emperor for life. It also provided for Land Diets, with limited legislative powers, elected according to a special electoral system based on the principle of class interests. Both in the Reichsrat and with regard to their Diet, the Hungarians were treated better than other nationalities.

Notwithstanding their special privileges, the Hungarians decided not to accept this "**February Constitution**" and sent no representatives to the Reichsrat. The Czechs sent their representatives, but withdrew them two years later, because they found the working of the Constitution unsatisfactory. The ensuing deadlock came to an end in 1867, again as a result of a Habsburg defeat,¹ when the Emperor recognised the special constitutional position of the Hungarian Crown and proclaimed a new Constitution (the "**December Constitution**") for the non-Hungarian lands. This Constitution conceded great legislative power to the Diets, established the responsibility of Cabinet Ministers, and laid down the fundamental civic rights (personal liberty; freedom of conscience, of science and of the Press; liberty of association and of assembly; security and inviolability of property).

The Habsburg Empire thus became a Dual Monarchy, Austria-Hungary, within which Hungary became independent of Austria as regards internal affairs. This change was

¹ By Prussia.

disastrous for the Slovaks, who had hitherto been saved in the interests of Habsburg policy from the full rigour of Hungarian oppression.

In June, 1861, the Slovaks had addressed to the Hungarian Diet the Memorandum of Turčianský Svätý Martin, which demanded the recognition of their nationality and the establishment of an Upper-Hungarian Slovak Province, covering the whole area inhabited by them, within which the Slovak language alone should be used for all official and judicial purposes. This Memorandum had, of course, been rejected by the Hungarians, but nevertheless until 1867 the Slovaks had remained comparatively free. Indeed in 1862 they succeeded in obtaining permission to found a Slovak publishing association, the "**Slovenská Matica**", and in even founding a few Slovak secondary schools. The Settlement of 1867, however, handed them over completely to the tender mercies of the Magyars. Their secondary schools were closed in 1874 by the Hungarian Government, who, in the following year, liquidated the "**Slovenská Matica**", and thereafter the process of magyarisisation was ruthlessly carried on.

The Czechs were filled with righteous indignation at the fact that the Emperor should have made special conditions to the Hungarians, who had exploited the misfortunes of the dynasty during the war with Prussia, while they, who had refused the Prussian inducements to disloyalty, from a national point of view were granted nothing. Less than nothing, indeed, for the "December Constitution" studiously ignored Bohemian claims. In August, 1868, they issued a Declaration invoking the historic rights of Bohemia and demanding that Bohemia's relations to the other Habsburg Lands should be merely that of a personal union through a common Emperor. Attempts were made by the Hohenwart Government in Vienna to placate the Czechs by recognising some, at least, of the historic rights of Bohemia, and the Bohemian Diet obtained a promise that the Emperor would recognise those rights by taking a coronation oath as King of Bohemia. The promise was never fulfilled, however, and the Hohenwart concessions, small as they were, were withdrawn on account of Austrian and Hungarian opposition to them.

Under the next Government, headed by a so-called Liberal, Auersperg, there was commenced a campaign of general suppression against the Czechs. At the elections for the Bohemian Diet in 1872 the Government used improper influence to obtain the return of a German majority, and in 1873, by the introduction of direct elections for the Reichsrat, it deprived the Bohemian and other Diets of direct representation in that body. The Czechs countered by refusing to work a Constitution of which they disapproved and in the drawing up of which they had played no part. They sent no Deputies to the Reichsrat and took no part in the proceedings of their Diets until 1879, when a more reasonable Government, that of Count Edward Taaffe, replaced that of Auersperg.

At first the Czech deputies threw in their lot with the Conservatives, thus providing Count Taaffe with his majority in the Reichsrat, and were rewarded with concessions regarding education¹ and the use of their language. These "**Old Czechs**", as they were called, were much criticised, however, by their countrymen, especially for the concessions which they made to the Germans in exchange for a worthless settlement. In the elections of 1891 they were thoroughly defeated by the "**Young Czechs**", who henceforth were the leaders of the Czech Movement. The latter had in support of them three Deputies of the Realist Party: **Professor T. G. Masaryk**, **Professor Kaizl**, and **Dr. Karel Kramář**. The "Young Czechs" differed from their predecessors in having more progressive, liberal ideas, but differed from them little as regards policy: they pursued a policy of seeking minor concessions in return for their mildness and, sometimes, for their co-operation in the Government. They played an active and important part in the struggle for universal suffrage, which was granted in 1907, and which transformed the nature of the Czech national struggle by introducing a strong workers' element.

The struggle for national independence was by no means confined to the purely political field, however, and indeed the activities of Czech nationalists in other directions may almost be said to have played a greater part in

¹ The Charles University in Prague was re-established as a Czech University in 1882. Dr. T. G. Masaryk was at the same time appointed a Professor there.

bringing that struggle to a successful close. The motto of the **Workers' Academy (Dělnická akademie)**, "Through culture to liberty", echoed by the great **Sokol (Gymnastic) Movement**,¹ inspired the efforts of a small nation struggling for freedom. Then, as now, it was felt by the Czechs that they must make up for their lack of numbers by high individual quality, and they set about preparing themselves as a nation for the critical days which lay before them. In the sphere of economics the powerful development of their **Co-operative Banks (Popular Banking Institutions)** saved their rural population to a large extent from becoming enslaved by usurers, and enabled the nation as a whole to establish its independence of the Banks, largely Austrian or Hungarian.

In Slovakia, on the other hand, the decades which preceded the Great War were a period of set-back, rather than of progress towards emancipation. The initial effects upon them of the Settlement of 1867 have already been described. Thereafter the Hungarian Government, using to the utmost both Catholic and Protestant Churches, deliberately pursued a policy of denationalising and magyarising the Slovaks. Those who withstood this policy were excluded from the more important political posts and from the professions (if only because it was to Magyar schools that they must go for the necessary education). Politically they were scarcely recognised, having one to three Deputies in the Hungarian Parliament, when their numbers would have entitled them to forty-five. It is indeed remarkable that under such conditions their national spirit should nevertheless have survived, and that, despite the efforts of the Magyars to isolate them, the consciousness of national community between the Czechs and Slovaks should have developed as it did.

9. The War Years—Up to the Revolution (1914-1918). During the years which preceded the Great War the Czechs still hoped against hope that the Habsburgs would realise in time the error of their ways and would adopt a federal constitution for their Empire. They did their utmost always to show their preparedness to collaborate loyally within such a reformed

¹ See Chapter VII (3).

Empire. At the same time they strove hard to persuade the Austro-Hungarian Government and their Emperor to avoid their fatal alliance with Germany, but to seek rather to establish friendly relations with Russia and with Serbia.

The outbreak of war and the ensuing intensification of repressive measures against the subject races of the Empire made any thinking Czech realise that the only hope for his nation lay in bringing about the defeat and downfall of the Habsburg dynasty. It was towards this end, therefore, that the Czechs directed their efforts, which contributed in no small measure to bringing about the final victory of the Allies.¹

Czechs who were conscripted for service in the Army deserted in large numbers to the Allies. These helped at first, as prisoners of war, in munition factories or other work behind the lines, but eventually formed no less than six Divisions of troops, which fought on the Russian, Italian and French fronts.

Those who were not called up carried on, despite all threats and punishments, an incessant campaign of agitation against their rulers and in favour of their national liberation. There was set up among them a secret society, called the "**Maffia**" which carried on revolutionary propaganda and made preparations for the coming revolution. In Parliament, on May 30th, 1917, the Czech representatives demanded the reorganisation of the Austro-Hungarian Empire as a Federation of democratic, autonomous States, one of which must be the Bohemian Lands together with Slovakia. This demand was repeated in more emphatic form on January 6th, 1918, but aroused no response whatsoever. After that, realising that the Habsburgs would learn nothing, and conscious of the

¹ Colonel Emanuel Moravec, in his book, *The Strategic Importance of Czechoslovakia for Western Europe* (pp. 34-36), writes: "Austria's unjust policy towards her nationalities deprived the Austrian Army in the field of some 3 million fighters, 2 millions of whom went voluntarily into captivity. If the whole population of Austria had acquiesced in the Austrian servility to Germany, *Austria could have sent into the field not 80 divisions only but at least 120.* . . . The Slavonic and Latin nations of the Habsburg Monarchy, by preventing Austria from getting together 40 new divisions, deprived Germany and Austria in 1914 of victory over Serbia, and in 1915 of a crushing triumph against Russia. But that was not all. The Slavonic and Latin nations of Austria did not content themselves by merely going over to the Allies as prisoners of war. They also joined the ranks of the Allied armies whom they assisted up to the year 1918 with a force of 16 divisions (6 Czechoslovak, 3 Serb, Croat and Slovene, 3 Polish and Ruthenian, 2 Rumanian and 2 Italian)."

growing feeling of sympathy for Czechoslovak national aspirations in the Allied countries, the Czech representatives of all political parties, except the Social-Democrats, united to form a **Czech National Committee**, over which presided as chairman **Dr. Kramář**, who later became the first Prime Minister of the Czechoslovak Republic.

Outside the country two great patriots and statesmen worked hard and indefatigably to arouse interest in, and win sympathy for, the idea of an independent Czechoslovak State. The names of the late **Dr. T. G. Masaryk**, first President of Czechoslovakia, and **Dr. Edward Beneš**, for long Foreign Minister and now President of the Republic, are well known and well regarded throughout the world; the name of their able collaborator, a Slovak, **Milan Štefánik**, would be scarcely less revered if he had not come to an untimely end.¹

As early as 1915 a **Czech "Committee of Action"** was established in France and Britain. Early in 1916 this committee reconstituted itself on more official lines as "**The National Council of the Bohemian Lands**", and established itself in Paris. It kept in touch with events at home through its contacts with the Maffia, and worked actively among Czechs resident abroad or who had become "prisoners of war", organising them to help positively, as they had already helped negatively, the cause of the Allies.

Their main task was, however, to gain support for the realisation of national independence for the Czechs and Slovaks. This was difficult at first, not only because many people did not know that Czechs or Slovaks existed, but also because there were many people in the Allied countries who regarded Austria-Hungary as having been misguided, rather than bad, and who hoped to detach her from her evil genius, Germany. They had also to contend with the opposition of "Crowned Heads Ltd.", who were by no means anxious that so important a branch of their firm as the Habsburgs should go out of business—a similar sense of solidarity existed, moreover, as it exists to-day, between the British aristocracy and that of Hungary in particular.

¹ He was returning home to Slovakia by aeroplane on 4th May, 1919, when his machine crashed and he was killed.

A change took place in their favour, however, in the spring of 1918—a change brought about very largely by the influence of President Wilson and by the entry of the United States into the war. In June of that year the French Government recognised the National Council as representing the interests of the Czechoslovak nation, and as the basis of a future Czechoslovak Government. During August and September similar declarations were made by the British, American, Japanese and Italian Governments. The Habsburgs tried now, in vain, to “trim their sails to the wind” by offering to concede national autonomy to their subject races. It was too late, however, and their offer was firmly rejected by the Czech National Committee.

On October 14th, 1918, Dr. Beneš, as Secretary-General of the National Council, informed the Allied Governments that a **Provisional Czechoslovak Government** had been formed, composed of himself, Masaryk and Štefáník. This Government was soon given *de jure* recognition by all the Allied Powers.

More alarmed than ever at these developments, and anxious, at any cost, to save his throne, the Austro-Hungarian Emperor issued a **Proclamation on October 16th**, recognising the National Committees of the Czech and Jugoslavs, and promising the reconstruction of his Empire as a Union of Federal States. He thought that this would certainly satisfy the National Committee, and that he would then be able to argue that the Czech National Council in Paris was not representative of its nation—but he was disappointed, for the Czechs rejected the proposal on the ground that the future of Czechoslovakia was now an international question which it was beyond the Emperor’s competence to decide. He was still further disappointed when, having appealed to President Wilson for a separate peace settlement on the lines of his Proclamation he received on October 21st a reply stating that it was not the Government of the United States, but the National Councils of the Czechs and the Jugoslavs who should decide what were to be the future relations between them and the Monarchy.

The independence of Czechoslovakia had already been declared at Washington on October 18th by Dr. Masaryk, in a memorable speech in which he laid down the principles

of the new Republic and declared "the Habsburg dynasty unworthy of leading our nation". It had not yet been decided, however, what constitutional form the State should adopt. The National Committee in Prague, letting the Emperor believe that they wished to discuss with their National Council in Paris the terms offered in his Proclamation, were allowed on October 21st to send their delegates to Geneva, where they actually discussed with the delegates from the National Council and agreed upon the Republican Constitution which was eventually adopted. It was during these important discussions, and sooner than had been expected, that the Revolution took place and their hopes were at last realised.

10. The Revolution (October 28th, 1918) and After. It was estimated by the Czechs that in the spring of 1919 the situation would definitely be ripe for a *coup d'état*. The National Committee therefore set about completing the work of systematic preparation for revolution which had hitherto been carried on "underground" by the Maffia.

Detailed plans were drawn up of a shadow administration; success in feeding the population was rightly recognised as being the criterion by which the Revolutionary Administration would first be judged, and it was decided that the supply and distribution of food should be entrusted to an *ad hoc* Economic Council, with a network of local offices. Lists were drawn up of reliable Czechs who were competent to assume official responsibility. Administrative Commissions were nominated, which would assume the functions of the various State Departments, each being provided with a detailed programme of what it should do on the first, second, third, etc., days after assuming power. Local National Committees were actually set up.

The complete demoralisation of the Austro-Hungarian armies as the Allies assumed the offensive on the Italian front, and the outbreak of mutinies among the Hungarian troops, precipitated matters considerably.

What the Austro-Hungarian military authorities feared most of all was social revolution in the army. The army must be fed. The War Office, therefore, without consulting or even

informing the Cabinet, acted on its own authority in accordance with the letter of the Emperor's Manifesto of October 16th. Between October 26th and 29th the War Ministry addressed to all the National Committees an appeal for their collaboration in preserving order and in provisioning the armies, offering them full executive powers. It was promised, at the same time, that the army would be adapted to suit any constitutional changes which might take place in the Dual Monarchy.

This must have seemed to the Czechs too good to be true, for they thus received official authority to assume control of the most important key position. So far as food was concerned (and in other respects also), the Bohemian Lands were the mainstay of the Empire. Without Bohemian foodstuffs the army would starve, so control of the food supply would place the Czech National Committee effectively in control of the Emperor's armed forces—and therefore in control of the entire situation.

Preparations for a *coup d'état* were perhaps not yet quite so far advanced as might have seemed desirable, but telephone reports from Czech Deputies in Vienna indicated that the Imperial régime was already at the end of its tether—on October 27th the General Staff had been begging Czechoslovak and Yugoslav Deputies to go to the front in order to persuade their nationals to fight on.

Early in the morning on October 28th, **Dr. Antonín Švehla**, deputy-chairman of the National Committee,¹ accompanied by **Dr. Soukup**, representing the Czechoslovak Social-Democrats, called on the Director of the Corn Institute in Prague and informed him that the Czechoslovak National Committee was taking over forthwith the administration of the Corn Institute and assuming responsibility for supplying the population with food. The Director was requested to call together all the members of his Staff, in order that they might be asked whether they were prepared to serve the new State or would prefer to leave their posts.

The Director attempted to bluster, but was curtly told to make haste and obey. Švehla told the staff officials, when

¹ Dr. Kramář, the Chairman, was absent at Geneva, attending a joint meeting of representatives of the Czech National Movement at home and abroad, at which the constitutional form which Czechoslovakia should be given was being discussed.

they assembled, what had taken place, administered an oath of allegiance (which he improvised on the spot) to those who were willing to take it, and invited the remainder to leave their offices. The key to power thus passed peacefully into the hands of the National Committee, which placed the Corn Institute in charge of an Administrative Commission previously constituted in accordance with the strengths of the various political parties within the National Committee.

By good fortune it was on that very same morning that was published the Note sent to President Wilson by Count Andrassy in which the Monarchy accepted in principle the granting of independence to the Czechoslovaks and Jugoslavs. The result of this was that the Czechs turned out on the streets in triumphant crowds, soldiers and police began to sport the Czechoslovak colours, Austro-Hungarian crests were torn down from the walls of buildings and flung into the river, and Prague passed without a blow into the hands of its people.¹

The leadership of the Revolution was now assumed by **Dr. Rašín**, one of the organisers of the Maffia, who called an emergency meeting of the National Committee and proposed that advantage should be taken of the situation created by the Andrassy Note—while it lasted—by taking over from the Governor in Prague the entire administration of the Czech territories.

The Governor, Count Max Coudenhove, had gone to Vienna to obtain fresh instructions from the new Government. Shortly after midday, however, the Presidium² of the Czechoslovak National Committee visited his deputy, a Czech named Kosina, and informed him that the National Committee had decided to take over the functions of the Governor. Kosina was asked whether he had received instructions from Vienna regarding the transfer of the administration to the National

¹ Actually this rejoicing was unjustified, for the despatch of the Andrassy Note was merely a tactical manœuvre whereby it was hoped to secure a separate peace for Austria-Hungary. It was hoped that an immediate armistice would "stop the rot" in the Army, and would afford a breathing space during which the insincerity of the Monarchy's professions regarding its subject races would be made apparent.

² Composed of Švehla, Soukup, Rašín and a representative of the Czech National Socialists.

Committee, and when he replied in the negative, he was urgently requested to obtain such instructions—he was told that if he refused he would be dismissed and would be held personally responsible for any attempt to defend the old régime.

While waiting for a reply from Vienna, the Presidium went on to the Territorial Administration Commission, to the Chairman of which, Count Albert Schönborn, they delivered an ultimatum as before. Count Schönborn gave in without a murmur.

They then returned to the Václav Square, where a Deputy, **Zahradník**, was addressing an enormous open-air meeting, embraced each other publicly as a sign of unity, and drove back through streets crowded with jubilant Czechs to the House of Representatives.

Late in the afternoon, at a plenary meeting of the National Committee, Rašín submitted the first Czechoslovak Bill, proclaiming the establishment of an independent Czechoslovak State. Pending the return of their delegates from Geneva it was stated in the first article of this Bill that the form of the new State should be determined by the National Assembly in agreement with the Czechoslovak National Council in Paris. The Bill was carried unanimously.

Although it was certain that the civil authorities would not attempt to use the police to suppress the Revolution, there was obviously considerable risk that the army might be so used. There was further risk that serious fighting might break out as a result of the action of the public (and of Czech officers and soldiers) in tearing off the badges of those troops who still remained loyal to the Habsburgs. The National Committee took prompt action with regard to the latter, by ordering all the newspapers to issue a special edition in which there was an appeal to the public not to provoke trouble, and by stationing Sokol¹ members about the town as auxiliary police.

A counter-revolutionary attempt was made, however, by the local military authorities, who sent troops with machine-guns to clear the two main squares and to keep the crowd

¹ See Chapter VII (3).

away from the Town Hall. This attempt was made half-heartedly because it was realised that the Austrian civil authorities, in Vienna and in Prague, were anxious that there should be no bloodshed. Reassured by Soukup, Secretary of the National Committee, that order would be maintained by Sokol members and volunteers, the Prague military headquarters recalled their troops to barracks and informed Vienna that it would be impossible to suppress the popular movement by force.

As a precautionary measure, in case such an attempt might be repeated, the National Committee called on all Czech officers and men to form themselves into a revolutionary defence force and to relieve the Sokol bodies of their patrol duties in the town. The Sokol bodies were thus released to occupy strategically important places such as the railways. By 8 p.m., however, the risk of further trouble with the military was considerably reduced by the arrival of a telegram from the War Office instructing local headquarters to enter into relations with the National Committee in their district in order to maintain peace and to ensure the arrival of food supplies for their troops.

Not long after this, on the same night of October 28th, Soukup went to the Prague Military Headquarters, accompanied by **Scheiner**, who had been appointed by the National Committee to command the Czech troops. Scheiner informed the General Commanding, Krestřánek, that by virtue of the acceptance by the Austro-Hungarian Government of President Wilson's terms, Czechoslovakia was now an independent State, as representative of which he had been empowered to assume command over all Czech officers and soldiers. Krestřánek argued that without orders from the Emperor he could not release men under his command, but Scheiner was adamant. Feeling had risen high during this discussion and it seemed that a deadlock had been reached. While it was going on, however, a crowd had collected outside and the headquarters building had been quietly occupied by the Sokols—Scheiner assured the General that this had been done for his (the General's) protection—with the result that Krestřánek decided to be more reasonable. It was agreed at

a formal meeting between the National Committee and the Austrian Military Command that General Krestránek should retain command of his Austrian and Hungarian troops, but that the Czechs and Slovaks should pass under the command of Scheiner. Czech officers and men were to wear cockades of their national colours, and were to assist the police and the Sokols in keeping order. The National Committee undertook to provide the military with food and fuel. Liaison officers were exchanged, and finally it was agreed that all non-Czech troops should be withdrawn within two or three weeks.

Meanwhile at Vienna the authorities, despite the message sent by the deputy-Governor in Prague, could not conceive that such a complete transference of power could so rapidly have taken place. Count Coudenhove, the Governor, got in touch with his deputy and told him on no account to hand over his powers to the National Committee. The Cabinet Council decided that in principle they would not oppose the surrender of power to the National Committee, but would postpone surrender pending the return from Geneva of the representatives of that Committee, and pending the conclusion of an agreement whereby the German districts of Bohemia should remain attached to Austria (this was by instruction of the Emperor Charles). The Governor was ordered to go back to Prague and resume his duties.

The Governor got a surprise, however, immediately he stepped out of the train in Prague on October 29th. He was met by a detachment of Sokols who escorted him to the Station-Master's Office, where he was told that he must not go to his office, but to the Old Town Hall. He protested indignantly and was eventually allowed to go to his Palace, where he learned from his deputy and others how far matters had gone on the previous day. At noon he was visited by the four leaders of the National Committee who informed him that they had set up their own Government. They told him that his deputy had received telephonic instructions from Prague to do nothing, but to wait for his (the Governor's) return to Prague, and they now asked him what instructions he had brought from Vienna about handing over the administration.

Coudenhove informed the Czech leaders of what the Cabinet had decided, and asked them accordingly to let matters rest as they were until peace negotiations were started, or at least until their delegates returned from Geneva. The Czechs, however, were in no mood to wait and proposed, as a temporary compromise, a diarchy, such as had been agreed upon with the military authorities. After some discussion, it was agreed that the Governor should recognise the National Committee as the "Executive Organ of the Rule of the Nation" and as co-director, with him, of the administration, which was, however, to remain unchanged in every respect, e.g. as regards personnel.

The concessions made were obviously too unsatisfactory to the Czechs for this agreement to last long. The Governor, despite his isolation, had put up a stubborn opposition to them, but he realised that the game had already been lost while he was in Vienna. He communicated at once with the Vienna Cabinet, explaining in detail the hopelessness of the situation, and stating that under the circumstances he did not wish to remain in his post. The Cabinet gave official approval to the agreement which had been provisionally concluded, and gave Coudenhove permission to go on leave until the new system should come into force.

Though the National Committee could not have felt at ease about this compromise, they made the best of it for the time being—and at the same time made the most of the better conditions which they had obtained from the Military Command. The Czech officers and men were formed into organised bodies, and were armed and equipped from the State Ordnance Dépôt at Hostivice. All places of importance in Prague were occupied, and the Cadets' College was cleared and converted into a Czechoslovak Military Headquarters.

The Austrian Military Command observed the spirit of their agreement, and soon proposed to Vienna that they should arrange to evacuate the Czech territories. The Monarchy, however, was by no means yet convinced that it was doomed to complete liquidation and was still hoping to retain Czechoslovakia within a Federal State. The Minister for War was severely criticised for having acted on his own initiative with

regard to relations with the National Committees. Although he was obviously not in a position to annul completely the concessions which his subordinates in Prague had made, he took immediate steps to limit their application. The State Ordnance Dépôt might issue arms and ammunitions to the Czech army, but it was to remain under Austrian military control; the National Committee might use the wireless station at Petřín for communication with their delegates at Geneva, but their messages were to be censored by the Austrian military authorities and priority was to be given to military traffic. He refused absolutely, moreover, to sanction the formation of a separate Czechoslovak army until after demobilisation had been completed. He sent a War Office official, Bardloff, to Prague, in order to prevent any more "mistakes".

Sensing trouble, the National Committee immediately embarked on precautionary measures. Having drawn as much as possible from the State Ordnance Dépôt, they began to possess themselves of the arms and ammunition of all troops entraining at Prague. They had already, moreover, on October 29th, transferred into their service a number of Czech detachments and had taken over for their use the barracks at Beroun. Their position was further strengthened by the spread of dissatisfaction among troops of other nationalities: the Roumanians deserted and joined them, and the Hungarians began to agitate for repatriation.

On the night of October 29th-30th, having failed to provoke the Czechs to violence, some of the Austrian military made a feeble effort at counter-revolution, which was frustrated by quick action on the part of Scheiner. This decided the National Committee to assume complete military power without further delay. On October 30th their representatives went to the Military Headquarters, where General Krestřánek was about to make a group of Czech officers renew their oath of loyalty to the Emperor, and began to discuss with him the complete transference to them of military power. While the discussion was going on, the Czech officers persuaded the Hungarian guards to hand over their arms—and the discussion was concluded.

As regards the rest of the Czech territories, news of the *coup d'état* was circulated to them by telegram on the afternoon of October 28th. There was trouble in some places with the military, but as the Czech troops went over to the National Committee, and as the Hungarians were more anxious to go home than to fight, no serious opposition was experienced. At Brno, the Governor of Moravia did not surrender his powers until October 30th, when the cheering crowds in the streets convinced him that resistance was hopeless. In Silesia there were complications owing to rival claims for the possession of certain territories, which led to considerable delay before a final settlement was concluded.¹

In Slovakia, although by the **Declaration of Turčianšský Svätý Martin of October 30th, 1918**, the Slovaks expressed their will to be included in the Czechoslovak State, the Hungarians rendered any attempt at a *coup d'état* by a few poorly-organised nationalists impracticable. On November 4th the Czech National Committee decided, however, to take action on their behalf, and sent **Dr. Šrobár** with fifty gendarmes (!) to occupy the chief points in Slovakia. The outbreak of widespread pillaging soon led to the progressive occupation of the province by Czech troops and Sokols, reinforced later by Slovak Sokols and National Guards. Meanwhile the Hungarians continued, even after the downfall of the Monarchy, to do their utmost to persuade the Slovaks to content themselves with autonomy within Hungary.

The terms upon which the armistice was concluded on November 3rd with the Austro-Hungarian Empire made no reference to a line of demarcation in the east, beyond which Hungarian troops should be withdrawn. The Hungarians sought to take advantage of this omission by maintaining their claim to Slovakia as "Upper Hungary", and they regarded therefore with extreme disfavour the progress of Czech detachments through that province. They sent a representative to Prague to negotiate the withdrawal of the Czechs and the joint administration of Slovakia by the Hungarian Government and the Slovak National Council. When the Czechs were unwilling to agree, they sent into

¹ See pages 284-287.

Slovakia a force of two divisions, before whom the Czechs, who numbered 1,150, discreetly withdrew as far as the Moravian frontier.

There followed a great deal of quibbling as to whether Czech troops were, or were not, Allied troops, and meanwhile the Hungarians sought to arrange for a plebiscite of the Slovaks to be conducted under their supervision. On November 27th the French Government called upon Hungary to withdraw her troops from Slovakia, but again without specifying any line of demarcation. In order merely to prevent an unfair and misleading plebiscite being held by the Hungarians, Dr. Milan Hodža, who was conducting the negotiations on behalf of the Czechoslovak Government, compromised by agreeing on December 6th to a provisional frontier which left Bratislava and the Danube, as well as Košice and its surrounding district, in Hungarian territory.

This tactical manœuvre was the cause of much subsequent difficulty, for when, at a later date, Dr. Beneš persuaded the Supreme Council of the justice of the Czechoslovak claims to the present frontiers of Slovakia, the Hungarian Government argued that the provisional frontier mentioned above had been freely agreed upon by the Czechoslovak representative. Eventually the matter was effectively settled by a decision of the Supreme Council, and the last of the Hungarian Army of Occupation was withdrawn early in 1919. In May, 1919, however, the Hungarians again invaded Slovakia, under the Communist, Bela Kun, but they were ordered out again by the Allies, and the frontiers of Slovakia were finally settled by the Treaty of Trianon—a settlement which Hungarian reactionaries still contest.

CHAPTER II

THE COUNTRY AND HOW IT LIVES¹.

1. Geography. Czechoslovakia is situated almost exactly in the geographical centre of Europe. She is bordered on the north by Poland and Germany, on the west by Germany, on the south by Austria, Hungary and Roumania. The country is very awkwardly shaped, straggling from west to east in an irregular manner, and has very long frontiers, some of which would be difficult to defend. Its area is 54,877 square miles, its length from west to east 622 miles (about as far as from the Orkneys to Plymouth), and its breadth from north to south varies from 186 miles to as little as 31 miles in the extreme east.

The country is very mountainous. In the northern part of Bohemia the frontier is marked by an arc of mountains running from the Krušné hory (Ore Mountains) to the Krkonoše mountains (Giant Mountains). Southern Bohemia is likewise bordered with mountains by the Šumava Range. In the eastern part of the Republic there are, of course, the Carpathians and their subsidiary ranges, such as the High Tatra Mountains. The greater part of Slovakia and Subcarpathian Ruthenia is mountainous, the ranges in the latter province running north and south and thus making communication very difficult.

The principal rivers are the Labe (Elbe), and the Vltva (Moldau) which runs through Prague. In the south of Slovakia the Danube runs along the frontier for about 90 miles.

A notable feature are the fish ponds in Southern Bohemia, which produce considerable quantities of carp. There are numerous small lakes in the Tatra district which are stocked with trout.

2. Agriculture.² The importance of agriculture in the economy of Czechoslovakia has diminished slightly, but still remains at a level little below that of trade and industry, as is shown by the following figures:—

¹ See Folding Map 4 at End of Book.

² See Table XII.

<i>Number of persons per 100 inhabitants</i>				
	1900	1910	1920	1930
Trade . . .	5	6	6	7
Industry . .	32	34	33	35
Agriculture .	46	42	40	35

The average value of the annual agricultural production is estimated as being in the neighbourhood of 22,000 million Kč. (about £150 million), the value of milk and milk products being roughly equal to that of the production of heavy industries.

The climate of different parts of the Republic is conditioned mainly by the height above sea-level, which determines also, as a rule, the use to which land is put. The greater part of the land is devoted to the production of crops or to forests, which represented in 1936 41·67% and 32·65%, respectively, of the total area.

The standard of Czechoslovak agriculture has always been high, especially in the western provinces, approaching, and sometimes even surpassing, that which is found in such highly efficient states as Denmark and Belgium. Production is usually on the small and medium-sized farms created by the post-war Land Reform.¹

This form of production, which meets the social needs and conditions of the Republic, is rendered efficient by the great and complex network of co-operative organisations which have been developing since 1860, as described in Chapter VII. These organisations not only provide credit on advantageous terms, but also handle the supply of seed, fertilisers, feeding-stuffs and agricultural machinery for the farmers and organise the sale of their produce. Co-operative Societies of a somewhat different type from the foregoing have been created for handling dairy produce, for distilling spirits from potatoes and for other processes which utilise the farmers' produce.

(a) GRAIN.² Over 60% of the agricultural land is devoted to grain production, wheat and barley being grown on the lower lying ground, rye and oats on the uplands. Maize also is grown in the eastern parts of the Republic. Until recently

¹ See pages 137-141.

² See Table XIII.

the wheat crop was insufficient to meet home requirements, but of recent years, owing to the reduction of the area devoted to sugar-beet, and to meet the requirements of war, wheat production has been officially encouraged, so that Czechoslovakia has now a small surplus for export. This result, though satisfactory from many points of view—not least from that of the Agrarian Party, who doubtless fostered it as an electoral manoeuvre—represents a departure from the principles of the Economic Little Entente and has already had harmful effects on Czechoslovak industry, as well as on the international situation. In rye and oats also Czechoslovakia is self-sufficient, while barley represents an important item in her export trade, the famous “Haná” barley being well-known and much sought after in foreign markets.

(b) INDUSTRIAL CROPS. Although only 1·08% of the agricultural land is devoted to industrial crops, these are of great importance to the country. The more important are colza and linseed, poppies, flax and hemp, tobacco and particularly hops. The hopfields of Czechoslovakia represent about a quarter of the total hop area of the world: they are mainly in certain districts in the west of the Republic where the climate and soil are particularly suitable for hop production, and more than three-quarters of their output is exported¹ (mainly to Britain and the U.S.A.).

A further 18·41% of the agricultural land is used for the production of root-crops which are largely used for industrial purposes or for export. Sugar-beet, although the area devoted to it has never been large and has recently been considerably decreased, is the most important crop in the plains, being the basis of the world-famous sugar industry.² The function performed by sugar (“White Gold”) in payment for imports is of such importance that the production of sugar-beet is of interest far beyond mere agricultural circles. A somewhat similar rôle is played in Czechoslovak economy by the other important root-crop, potatoes, a considerable proportion of which is used for the distillation of spirit to use in place of

¹ Saaz (Žatec) hops are world-famous.

² Until 1927 Czechoslovakia was the second greatest sugar-producing country in the world. She has now reduced her production to one third and dropped to fifth place.

imported petrol. The production of sugar and potato-spirit is very largely in the hands of large financial groups, against whom the Co-operative Movement is fighting an uphill battle.

(c) THE GRAIN MONOPOLY.¹ A corporation known as the Czechoslovak Grain Company was constituted in 1934 to regulate conditions affecting the sale and prices of domestic grain. This Company, which commenced its operations during the season 1934-35, was granted the exclusive rights to purchase grain from farmers at fixed prices; to effect re-sale and exportation; to import and sell foreign grain and milled products; and finally to import certain specific forms of foreign fodder-stuffs and to sell similar fodder-stuffs of local production direct to the buyer.

The executive of the Czechoslovak Grain Company is composed of representatives of the Central Organisations of the following interested groups: agricultural co-operative societies, consumers' co-operative societies, millers and grain merchants. It has, therefore, at its disposal the specialised knowledge, trade connections, capital, credit and warehousing facilities of the entire grain trade. The State has a certain degree of control over its operations, but has no financial interest in the Company other than the small Turn-over Tax which is paid on its transactions.

The basic buying prices for different sorts of grain are fixed by the Government, who also determine each month what surcharge shall be added to the basic prices. The surcharge is intended to encourage farmers to effect delivery later on, to compensate for loss of interest and wastage of stocks, and to cover warehousing expenses. It is the Grain Company, however, which decides at what prices, varying according to the quality of the grain, it is prepared to take over the grain at its numerous collecting stations. The selling price is 7 to 8 Kč. higher than this, the difference being divided between the Company (3 Kč.), the accredited agent (1 Kč.), the commissionaires (2.30 to 3.30 Kč.) and the State (0.55 to 0.85 Kč.) (Turnover Tax).

In return for its privileges and in recognition of its responsibility towards the Republic, the Grain Company is called

¹ See Table XIV

upon from time to time to take action regardless of purely business interests. Thus, for instance, in 1935 it delivered at specially reduced prices for distribution to the unemployed 25,110 metric tons of rye, 27,640 metric tons of oats and 31,400 metric tons of barley. In the same year, by granting rebates amounting in all to 45 million Kč., the Company rendered possible the export of 51,960 metric tons of barley and 59,970 metric tons of malt. The Company helped the Government to further the consolidation of the Economic Little Entente by importing and taking into stock 100,000 metric tons of wheat from Yugoslavia and 180,850 metric tons of maize, chiefly from Yugoslavia and Roumania, of which it had no immediate or prospective need. Statistics show that it has been considered necessary to starve the home market in order to force up and maintain at a high level the prices of grain and more especially of wheat. This process of imposing on the general public what is virtually a forced subsidy, to the farmers in addition to the subsidy paid by the State to the Grain Company in respect of losses incurred, may have been unavoidable at first, but is causing a great deal of dissatisfaction among the poorer industrial workers. The legislation passed under pressure of the Agrarian Party is calculated, however, to perpetuate, rather than to liquidate, the situation, for it has entailed the reduction of the area under wheat from 929,181 hectares in 1936 to about 750,000 hectares in 1937 and prohibits any extension of the area sown with rye, barley or oats above that of 1935, farmers who fail to comply with these regulations being paid 20% less for their grain. It may be set off against this that farmers are now required to make contributions towards covering warehousing expenses and the Company's losses in respect of the realisation of stocks of domestic grain, thus reducing the amount of direct subsidy which the Company may claim from the State.

By a decree passed in July, 1936, the existence of the Grain Monopoly was prolonged for three more years, i.e. until June 30th, 1940.

In the summer of 1937, the Grain Company having accumulated a very considerable reserve by its process of starving

the market, the Agrarian Party persuaded the Government, against the opposition of the Social-Democrats, to buy up the entire reserve as an "iron ration" in preparation for possible war—thus the public pay the profiteers even before war starts.

(d) **LIVE STOCK.** Live stock is the mainstay of the small and medium farms. In 1936 there were in Czechoslovakia 4,283,071 cattle for breeding, including 2,437,214 milk cattle; the total quantity of milk delivered to the dairies in 1934 was 5,300,000 hectolitres, of which 49·2% went to the supply dairies and 48·9% to the butter dairies. The output of dairy butter is concentrated mainly (77·4%) in the butter dairies, which also produce the bulk of the dry curds (78·5%). A large quantity of cheese is produced, some of which is exported.

Pig breeding is not on a large enough scale to cover the home requirement of fat. In 1934 there were 3,429,919 pigs and in 1936 this number had fallen to 2,744,745. Considerable quantities of smoked meat, notably the well-known Prague Hams, are exported.

Fishing is one of the old industries in the south-west of Bohemia, where there are 1,200 fishing concerns, which produce carp. In the eastern part of the Republic the lakes and rivers contain excellent trout and thirty to fifty other varieties of fish.

(e) **FORESTS.** Forests cover about one-third of the whole area of Czechoslovakia. The forest land is not much affected by Land Reform, as it was obviously impracticable to carve it up. The biggest forestry concern is the State Forestry Enterprise, which possesses 20% of the total forest areas. Wood and wood products are an important article of export.

3. Mining. The mining industry is probably the oldest in Czechoslovakia. Early in the Middle Ages the silver mines of Bohemia, at Jáchymov (Joachimsthal), became important because of the wide use which was made (and which is still made in some countries) of the silver coins—Joachimsthaler, Thaler¹—which were minted there. The beginning of the 18th century saw the opening of the first iron mines, the development of which expanded rapidly in the 19th century,

¹ The word "Dollar" is a corruption of this.

when coal mining began the enormous development which has since raised it to the first place in the mining industry of the Republic. According to the census statistics of 1930 the mining industry and its subsidiaries (cokeries and briquette factories) employed 121,092 workers out of a total of 2,291,897 industrial workers: this figure is certainly smaller to-day, perhaps by as much as a quarter, but is rising steadily towards its former level, and its proportion relative to the total figure is probably materially unchanged.

Most of the mines and the greater part of the metallurgical industry are in private hands, but the State Enterprises employ about 12,000 workers and occupy an important, sometimes monopolistic, position in these industries. The State takes all royalties.

(a) COAL AND LIGNITE.¹ Czechoslovak industry is based upon its rich coal mines which produce large quantities of coal and lignite, the latter being greatly superior for heating purposes to the German product. Large quantities of coke are produced, while the production of tar, pitch and ammonia is constantly increasing.

The development of the coal industry was promoted first by the growth of industrial production during the second half of the 19th century and subsequently by the increased demand of the international coal market, both of which factors to-day influence to a varying degree the production of coal and lignite respectively. Coal, of which only 10% is used for domestic purposes, is influenced primarily by the condition ruling in the heavy industries throughout the Republic and abroad, while lignite, of which 20% to 30% is consumed domestically, and of which the greater proportion is used by local industries, is more dependent upon local conditions, as well, of course, as upon weather conditions and the general prosperity of the people.

The annual production of coal, which in 1913 had reached the figure of over 14 million tons, rose to 16½ million tons in 1929, the peak year before the crisis. It subsequently fell year by year until 1933, when it reached its lowest level of 10½ million tons, before gradually rising again by 1937 to

¹ See Tables XV to XX.

17 million tons. The improvement is due less to improvement in export than to the increased demand of heavy industry within the Republic. Coke production has followed much the same course. Lignite has had an even less happy career, for even in 1929 it failed, owing to the loss of pre-war markets, to attain its 1913 level of production (23 million tons). The production of lignite decreased even more seriously than that of hard coal and coke as a result of the crisis, falling to 15 million tons in 1933, and has shown less recovery, being only 16 millions in 1936.

The number of miners employed, averaging some 58,000 in the coal mines and some 39,000 in the lignite mines during the period 1926-30, has declined sharply, as has also the number of shifts actually worked, since the crisis. This decline, which is aggravated by the introduction since 1933 of what is known as "alternating unpaid leave", is continuing despite the improvement in the figure of production and is so straining the resources of the Miners' Benefit Societies that the State has had to come to their assistance by levying a special tax on coal and coke on their behalf and by undertaking to subsidise them to the extent of 90 million Kč. during the next ten years.

The coal-mining industry is mainly in the hands of private enterprise, the various companies being organised into local associations subordinate to the Central Association of Czechoslovak Coal Owners, in Prague. A more important joint organisation of the industry is, however, the "Uhlospol", a syndicate, with headquarters also in Prague, which deals with all commercial questions concerning coal-fields except that of sales, which are now handled by the joint sales organisations of each area. The portion of the industry which is owned and worked by the State is inconsiderable. The State mines do not belong to either of the Owners' Associations mentioned above, and their sales are handled by their own coal sales office in Prague.

The most important deposits of coal are situated in the Ostrava-Karvinná district of Silesia, close to the Polish frontier, in the centre of which lies the important railway junction of Bohumín. Much of the output is consumed locally, but the excellent rail communications enable the surplus to be sent cheaply all over the Republic, as well as to those

Central European States, like Austria and Hungary, which have insufficient coal of their own. Many varieties of coal are produced, the output of good coking coal being high. The equipment and methods of production are thoroughly up to date, the proportion of coal cut by machinery (97·1% in 1935) being as high as that of the best mines in Belgium or the Ruhr. The annual output of well over 10 million tons represents about 70% of the total output of the Republic.

A smaller deposit, producing about 1,300,000 tons a year, lies close to Prague, in the Kladno-Rakovnik area. The output of this area is mostly absorbed by the local iron works, or by the domestic requirements of the capital, but part of it is exported to Bavaria. Geological conditions in the Kladno mines are unfavourable for mechanisation, and only 33·1% of the coal is cut by machinery.

Over 900,000 tons of coal are raised each year, mainly for export to Austria and Bavaria, in the neighbourhood of the town of Plzeň, 78·4% of the output being machine-cut. Further deposits are also found near the north-eastern frontier of Bohemia, near Žacléř and Svatoňovice, where three very modern pits produce about half a million tons of coal each year, 92·8% of it being machine-cut, and also in Moravia in the Rosice-Oslovany area, near Brno. The latest deposits to be worked are those in the south of Slovakia, near Canovce.

Bohemian lignite, which is far superior in quality to that produced in Central Germany, is mined chiefly in two districts in the north-west of Bohemia, close to the German border, which are between them responsible for over 90% of the total output of lignite for the whole of the Republic. In pre-war days large quantities of this lignite were exported, in a raw state or in briquettes, to Western Austria and to Saxony and Bavaria. Since the war, however, the Austrian markets have been almost completely monopolised by lignite produced in Austria with the aid of a heavy State subsidy, while exports to Germany, though still considerable, have continued the decline which commenced with the development of the Central German lignite mines.

Lignite is mined also in the south of Moravia, round the towns of Kyjov, Hodonín and Dubňany, and in the Upper

Nitra valley, in Slovakia, but the output of these fields is still comparatively small. The South Moravian field is an extensive one, but is only partially workable; the main pit there, the Tomáš, is worked by the well-known firm of Bat'a to supply its works at and around Zlín. The lignite deposits in Slovakia are at present exploited by one solitary company, the Handlová Coal Mining Company, and that only to a limited extent; the heating value of the lignite is high (5,000 to 5,500 cal.) and the deposit represents a valuable reserve of fuel estimated at about 620 million tons.

(b) METAL ORE.¹ Less important by far than the mines of coal and lignite are the mines which produce various metallic ores to supply *in part* the demands of the metallurgical industries of Czechoslovakia. Chief among these are the iron mines which are situated in every province of the Republic. The output of iron ore had risen to 731,000 tons by 1935 and has since increased steadily on account of the increased activity of the heavy industries, *about half the demands of which can be met by their production*. Other metal mines of importance are those which produce manganese, iron pyrites, mercury, silver, lead, zinc, antimony and gold, the output of all of which is steadily increasing, as is also that of the important uranium mine at Jáchymov (Joachimsthal), which yields about 3 mg. of radium yearly. Most of the iron mines and smelting works are privately owned, but the mining of other metals is largely, and in some cases entirely, in the hands of the State.

(c) OTHER MINERALS. Among the other minerals of importance which are found in Czechoslovakia are salt, which is a State monopoly, graphite, of which Czechoslovakia is the fourth greatest producer in the world, and which is used for the valuable export trade in pencils, and magnesite, of which about 80,000 tons are mined each year, half this quantity being exported. Crude oil (used mainly for lubrication) and natural gas are also found, but their production is relatively insignificant in importance (19,946 tons of crude oil and 1,372,200 cubic metres of natural gas in 1935). In addition there are, of course, the rich deposits of fine china-clay,

¹ See Tables XXI to XXIII.

refractory clay and other raw materials for the celebrated china industry of Bohemia, considerable quantities of which are also exported, and the raw material for the Bohemian glass industry. The production of cement (almost 1,600,000 tons a year), chalk (about a million tons a year) and building stone is of importance, but is almost entirely utilised within the country.

The foregoing survey gives some indication of the mineral wealth of Czechoslovakia which is already being exploited, and which represents a reserve of no small economic value. It should be realised, however, that considerable areas in the mountainous eastern parts of the Republic have not yet been adequately prospected, and that *it is not improbable that further valuable deposits will be found if and as the need arises*, owing to war or other causes, for exploiting the natural resources of the country.

4. Industry.¹ On the break-up of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Czechoslovakia received the greater part of the industrial equipment of that Empire as shown below:—

*Percentage of Austro-Hungarian Industries in
Czechoslovakia.*

Sugar . . .	92 %	Glass . . .	92 %
Distilling. . .	46 %	Cotton . . .	75 %
Brewing . . .	57 %	Wool . . .	80 %
Malt . . .	87 %	Jute . . .	90 %
Foodstuffs . .	50 %	Leather . .	70 %
Chemical . . .	75 %	Glove . . .	90 %
Metallurgical .	60 %	Shoe . . .	75 %
China . . .	100 %	Paper . . .	65 %

(Average about 52·3 % of the total industries.)

She also found within her frontiers the agricultural raw produce, upon which, for instance, are based her important brewing and sugar industries, the coal which was required for her fuel supply, and a great wealth of minerals, notably of iron. The greater part of these industries are situated in the western part of the country, very largely in the so-called Sudete German districts.

¹ See Table XXIV.

(a) **TEXTILE INDUSTRY.** The textile industry is the most important in the country, both in regard to the number of persons engaged in it and the amount of its exports. The industry has suffered considerable embarrassment owing to the fact that it was built up to supply an assured market of 52 million inhabitants in Austria-Hungary, and now has an internal market of at most 15 million. To make matters worse, the other Succession States, in pursuit of a policy of economic nationalism, have set up their own textile industries and therefore no longer buy, as before, from Czechoslovakia. It is worth noting, in this connection, that the German owners of textile mills in Czechoslovakia, who to-day tell their unemployed workers to blame the Czechoslovak Government for their sufferings, helped in this process by transferring machinery from their mills into the other States, and in many cases now participate in the profits made by the new textile industry in those States.

The cotton industry, which is the most important branch of the Czechoslovak textile industry, has a capacity far in excess of the home demand, so that it is particularly dependent on exports. About two-thirds of the mills are concentrated in the mountain districts east and north of the Elbe (Labe), the remainder, except for a few in Central Bohemia and in Slovakia, being in North-west Bohemia, Silesia and North Moravia. The town of Liberec (Reichenberg) is the most important cotton centre.

The woollen industry also has an important centre in Liberec, as well as in the Aš (Asch) district in North-west Bohemia and at Brno. A large proportion of the wool used is imported from British sources.

After the cotton and woollen industries come flax spinning, linen manufacture, the jute industry, and the silk industry. There are important flax spinning mills in North-east Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia. The linen mills are situated in proximity to these. The Czechoslovak jute industry buys its raw material very largely from India and has a great export to the United States. As regards silk, Czechoslovakia now finds herself cut off from the districts of the former Austro-Hungarian Empire in which silkworms were reared. Some success has been

attained in silkworm culture in the warmer parts of the Republic, Slovakia and Subcarpathian Ruthenia. As, however, Czechoslovakia has silk manufacturing mills, but few silk spinning mills, she is obliged to import the larger part of her requirements of silk yarn.

The clothing industry, which has as principal centre the town of Prossnitz, exports a great quantity of cheap clothing, much of which comes to Great Britain.

(b) GLASS INDUSTRY. The glass industry is among the first to have been founded in Czechoslovakia, the first hollow glass factories having been built in the 14th century. The bulk of the raw material and the whole of the fuel required for this industry are produced within the Republic. All kinds of glass are manufactured, including the very fine Bohemian artistic glassware and table glass. The production of the latter, over 95% of which is normally exported, is concentrated in the district of České Lípy-Kamerický Šenov (Haida-Steinschönau). Large-scale machine production is carried out of sheet-glass, looking-glasses, and bottles—Czechoslovakia manufactures about 15 million square metres of window glass and about 120,000 million bottles each year.

A specially characteristic branch of the glass industry is that which produces artificial precious stones (Gablonz ware) and which is centred on the town of Jablonec (Gablonz). Materials other than glass, e.g. metals, bone, celluloid, and galalith, are also used for the local production of artificial jewellery. This branch of the industry produces almost entirely for export, Britain being the most important market, and is suffering a great deal from competition from Japan.

There were in 1937 about 120 glass manufactories, employing about 130,000 workers, and 100 glass works, employing about 20,000 glass workers. Many of these are in the German districts of Bohemia, but the Czech industry is now scarcely less important or less skilled than the older industry of the Germans.

(c) CHINA INDUSTRY. Czechoslovakia inherited practically the entire china industry of Austria-Hungary, which is mainly concentrated around Karlovy Vary (Karlsbad). This industry, like the glass industry, is based on raw materials and fuel

produced within the Republic. The principal manufacture is crockery for everyday use, most of which, again, is exported (largely to France), but there is also an important manufacture of porcelain for insulators and for sanitary purposes. Considerable quantities of bricks are produced in the same district; these are chiefly intended for the home market. Refractory goods are another important product, of which the annual output (170,000 tons) could easily be increased if the demand were greater. The china industry consumes about 50,000 tons of china-clay yearly, as compared with the 200,000 tons of china-clay which are exported.

(d) **THE HEAVY INDUSTRIES.** About 50 % of the pig iron produced in Austria and about 30 % of that which was produced in Hungary prior to the collapse of the Habsburg Empire was produced in districts which are now in Czechoslovakia.

The production of pig iron is almost entirely concentrated in Bohemia and Moravia-Silesia, the principal blast-furnaces being in the Bohumín-Vítkovice district, close to the Ostrava-Karvinná coal basin. There are blast-furnaces also in Bohemia which obtain some of their coke in Germany. The production is concentrated in the hands of a few great combines (*Hüttenzechen*), which unite the blast-furnaces with coal and ore mines. Comparatively little of the pig iron produced in Czechoslovakia is exported, about 83 % of it being used in the country for the manufacture of steel and malleable iron.

The iron manufacturing industries, on the other hand, produce very largely for export. Thus the enamelled ware industry exports some four-fifths of its production and the agricultural machines and implements are produced mainly for export—a great many of these go to the Soviet Union.

Among a considerable number of important engineering works, by far the most important are the world-famous Škoda Works, which have absorbed numerous smaller concerns and now carry out a very large proportion of the country's total engineering production. These works are famous, of course, for their armaments, but they produce many other things besides, such as equipment for breweries and sugar-refineries, of which there is a considerable export, and motor-cars, of which, too, considerable numbers are exported.

The motor industry is rapidly growing in importance; there are now about twenty works, some of them producing on a large scale. The three principal makes of car are the Škoda, made by the Škoda Works in Plzeň; the Praga, made by the Böhmisches-Mährische-Kolben A-G Daněk in Prague, and the Tatra, made by the Ringhoffer-Werke A-G in Prague. These three firms concentrate on the production of good, low-priced cars, and produce also motor lorries and omnibuses.

(e) **CHEMICAL INDUSTRY.** The chemical industry is another which originated a long while ago. As early as the 17th century, Bohemia was exporting sulphuric acid. There is now a very large production of hydrochloric acid (used in the sugar industry), of nitrates and nitric acid, of potassium compounds, and especially of potash. The great demand for fertilisers, consequent on the development of agriculture in Czechoslovakia, has been more than met by domestic production, there being now a considerable export of fertilisers. The production of tar and tar derivatives is very considerable, as is also the extraction, by carbonisation and dry distillation, of wood vinegar and other preparations.

(f) **LEATHER AND LEATHER GOODS.** Production of leather and leather goods, including boots and shoes, is one of the Czechoslovak industries which supplies the world market. Its principal production is every sort of sole leather and leather for uppers. Besides this there is an important manufacture of leather for straps and driving belts.

An important section of this industry is the *glove industry*, which exports very largely to Britain and the U.S.A.

By far the most important branch of the leather industry, and probably the best known abroad, is the boot and shoe industry, which is very largely represented by the factories of Bat'a at Zlín. Only a very small proportion of the boots and shoes which are made here are for use within the country.

(g) **TIMBER AND PAPER.** The enormous forest wealth of Czechoslovakia, especially of Slovakia and Subcarpathian Ruthenia, has given special importance to the country's timber trade. It is also the basis of a very important wood-working industry and a well developed paper and paper goods industry. A great deal of timber is exported, as is also bentwood furniture.

The first paper mills set up in Bohemia (in the 14th century) were the work of Italian immigrants. The industry has developed considerably since then and now exports a large proportion of its production. A considerable proportion of the production of cellulose and wood pulp is also exported. The bulk of the actual paper manufacture, especially the production of cardboard, is carried on in Bohemia, but part of the industry is located in Silesia and, more latterly, in Slovakia. A side-line of this industry is the manufacture of artificial flowers, which is done mainly in the north of Bohemia.

5. Finance.¹

(a) **BANKING.** Banking in Czechoslovakia is conducted by the National Bank of Czechoslovakia and a number of Private and Joint Stock Banks, together with the Post Office Savings Bank and numerous Popular Banking Institutions. Since 1934 there has been a change in the position of the Governor of the National Bank, who is henceforward to be appointed by the President of the Republic, on the recommendation of the Government, for a term of five years, and who may be removed from his post on the motion of the Government. Closely connected with the work of the National and other banks is the Czechoslovak Re-discount and Lombard Institute which was established by Act of Parliament in 1934 as a measure for stabilising and controlling the money market. The assets of this Institute are represented by a deposit of 100 million Kč. made by the State on its foundation, a subsidiary State guarantee up to 500 million Kč. for the loans granted by the Institute and also for the Treasury Bills, writing off debt and mortgage bonds authorised by the Institute, and compulsory deposits made by every Czechoslovak financial house, by the Central Social Insurance and General Pensions Offices and by every life assurance corporation in the country. The main function of the Institute is the re-discounting of bills of exchange and the Lombarding of securities, but it also plays an important part in the regulation of investment.

The *Post Office Savings Bank* was established on November 20th, 1918, to run a postal cheque service. This was done in

¹ Table XXIV. See also Tables XXV and XXVI.

order to check the flow of money to Vienna after the foundation of the new Republic which resulted from the continued use of the Austrian postal cheque service. It was not until 1931 that it began to accept savings and changed its name to the Post Office Savings Bank.

Its cheque service is used, not only by private persons, but by the vast majority of banks, financial institutions and industrial and commercial concerns. The Treasury and other State Departments and the State Enterprises also make use of this service, so it is not surprising that in 1936 the turnover on cheque accounts was 269 million Kč.

Savings accounts amount to more than 430 million Kč., shared between some 550,000 depositors, interest on these accounts being paid at the rate of $2\frac{1}{2}\%$.

The Post Office Savings Bank has also an extensive deposit service, which is used not only by its private clients but also by various departments of the State Administration.

The Bank is run on commercial lines as a State Enterprise, with representatives of the Ministries of Finance and Posts and Telegraphs on its governing body.

The popular banking institutions, as represented by the *Co-operative Credit Societies*, play a very important rôle in Czechoslovak banking—a rôle which seems likely, moreover, to become increasingly important.

The deposits in the Co-operative Credit Societies represent no less than 33% of the total deposits in the country, and are steadily growing as the number of these Societies increases, notably in Slovakia, and Subcarpathian Ruthenia.

It is interesting to note that after the advent of the World Economic Crisis, the commercial and general banks in Czechoslovakia decreased in number between 1925 and 1933 from 190 to 108, whereas during the same period the number of Credit Co-operative Societies increased in Slovakia alone by 511, and in Bohemia and Moravia-Silesia the number of Agricultural Credit Societies increased by 271 and the number of Civic Loan Banks increased by 167. The drop in the deposits in commercial and general banks fell between 1931 and 1933 from 47,007 to 38,156 millions of Kč., while those in the popular banking institutions dropped only from 55,216 millions to

48,370 millions of Kč. Between the years 1929 and 1933, when, owing to adverse conditions, the difference between interest received and interest paid by the commercial and general banks fell from 992 millions to 640 millions of Kč. and their reserve fell from 208 to 167 millions of Kč., the popular banking institutions went ahead; the difference between the interest received and interest paid in their case increased from 648 to 735 millions of Kč., and their reserves increased from 1,660 to 2,451 millions of Kč.

(b) **INSURANCE.** The first two Czech insurance offices—First Czech Mutual Insurance Company and Moravo-Silesian Insurance Company—were established over a hundred years ago, but for many years they did nothing but fire insurance. During the 1860's, however, several new insurance companies were established, among them being the Slavia Mutual Insurance Bank, which is now the largest insurance company in Czechoslovakia. These companies did various kinds of insurance, but particularly fire, hail and life insurance.

It is of interest to note that all these Czech insurance companies were established as mutual insurance companies. This was due to the fact that the greater part of the Czech nation belonged to the less wealthy classes. The first insurance company to be founded on a proprietary basis did not come into existence until 1899. Since 1918, however, there have been founded 24 insurance companies, most of which are on a proprietary basis, i.e. joint-stock companies—these took over the business of foreign companies which left the new Republic. There are to-day in Czechoslovakia 68 insurance companies, of which 49 are Czechoslovak and 19 are foreign.

After the foundation of the Republic, most of the Czech insurance companies extended their activities to Slovakia, which had hitherto had no insurance company of its own. Several Slovakian insurance companies were also founded to take over the business of Hungarian companies that had gone away.

The administration of insurance companies was regulated in 1934 by two important acts:

1. The Insurance Contract Act, which modernised and unified throughout the Republic the regulations regarding relations between policy holder and insurance company;

2. The Protection of Policy-Holders and Supervision of Insurance Companies Act, which requires insurance companies to create what are called Surety Funds, the assets of which must be administered separately from all other funds, and laid down that the accounts and activities of insurance companies shall be subject to detailed investigation by the State Authorities every three years.

The Czechoslovak insurance companies have a central organisation, the Association of Czechoslovak Insurance Companies, with sections corresponding to the various branches of insurance. They work together to reduce the incidence of accidents and sickness by issuing instructive pamphlets to their policy-holders and giving them opportunities to stay in the watering places of the country and to obtain medical treatment there at reduced rates. Considerable financial support is given by them to the promotion of general culture, social welfare and, above all, health. Their field of activity is considerably restricted by the fact that a very large proportion of the population of the Republic is covered by the compulsory Social Insurance.¹

6. Communications and Transport. The position of Czechoslovakia with regard to communications and transport is a peculiar one. Situated in the geographical centre of Europe, she is completely cut off from the sea, and yet she is extremely dependent upon overseas trade; in the years 1933-35 overseas trade accounted for about 33% of her imports and about 28% of her exports.

(a) **RIVERS AND CANALS.** Communication with the sea-ports through which this trade must pass is by water in the case of only three of them. Hamburg is reached by the Elbe (Labe) which rises in Czechoslovakia and the navigable portion of which extends for some ninety miles into the Republic. Stettin is reached by the Oder, but in this case direct sailings are impossible because the river does not become navigable within Czechoslovak territory. Galatz, at the mouth of the Danube, may also be communicated with by water along that river, which for some ninety miles near Bratislava

¹ See pages 161-168.

forms the frontier of the Republic. The other sea-ports used for Czech trade, e.g. Gdynia and Trieste, are served by rail.

Owing, however, to the fact that the natural resources and industrial centres of the country are not always close to the rivers mentioned, the importance of the latter is less than might be supposed; in 1929, for instance, only 8% of the imports and only 9% of the exports of Czechoslovakia were carried by water, all the rest passing over the railway. The trade along the Elbe is far greater than that along the Danube, the Elbe carrying five times the weight of imports and three and a half times the weight of exports as the Danube. It was because of this that Czechoslovakia was granted by the Treaty of Versailles special rights with regard to traffic along the Elbe and through the port of Hamburg, as well as on the Oder. These rights were considered by Hitler to be an insult to Germany and negotiations were initiated by him during the summer of 1936 for their modification in accordance with his own ideas. While these negotiations were still in progress, however, on November 14th, 1936, he unilaterally denounced the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles. Although he at the same time gave an assurance to Czechoslovakia that he had no intention of worsening conditions for the passage of her trade along the German rivers, and that he unreservedly recognised the validity of the Treaty concluded in 1929 between Germany and Czechoslovakia establishing Czechoslovak zones in the ports of Hamburg and Stettin, it is obvious that by his denunciation of international guarantees of the rights of Czechoslovakia he has provided himself with a means whereby he can exert considerable economic pressure on the Republic. This possibility can be more fully appreciated when it is realised that in 1935 three-quarters of the imports which passed into Czechoslovakia by water (393,000 metric tons) and almost two-thirds of her water-borne exports (309,000 metric tons) passed through the port of Hamburg, and from the table below, showing the volume of Czechoslovak overseas trade which passed by rail to and from Hamburg, Trieste and Gdynia during the years 1931-35:—

<i>From</i>		<i>In thousands of metric tons.</i>				
<i>Czechoslovakia</i>						
<i>to</i>		1931	1932	1933	1934	1935
Hamburg . .		234·3	146·7	153·7	230·6	265·7
Trieste . .		266·2	146·9	98·7	159·5	181·3
Gdynia . .		18·9	37·5	61·8	111·5	126·6

<i>To</i>						
<i>Czechoslovakia</i>						
<i>from</i>						
Hamburg . .		596·5	297·2	292·9	501·5	500·6
Trieste . .		335·6	197·6	241·7	125·8	175·6
Gdynia . .		113·8	72·8	185·0	270·5	444·7

Czechoslovak traffic to and from Trieste by rail is now, of course, since the German annexation of Austria, subject likewise to Nazi interference by means of prohibitive tariffs or by force.

Owing, as said before, to the inconvenient situation of the industrial centres with respect to the navigable rivers, the latter can play but a small part in the transport of internal trade. In the year 1935, for instance, the tonnage of internal trade which passed over the railways was fifty times as great as that which passed by water. Efforts are now being made, however, to develop the use of internal water transport by improving the waterways and extending their navigability to districts where they will tap centres of agricultural or industrial production. Public works in connection with this development have received particular attention since 1931 as part of the national scheme for dealing with the industrial crisis. A special Waterways Fund has been created which handles about 523 million Kč. a year. Water communication between Prague and the frontier has been improved by the construction of 13 dams and locks, the largest of which, near Střekov, cost 280 million Kč. The navigability of the Elbe has been improved by the construction of 12 similar dams, and a further 4 are being constructed, while on the Vltava (Moldau) above Prague the navigability has been improved by the construction of a dam at Vrané. A very

ambitious canal scheme which will link up the rivers Oder, Danube and Elbe has already been embarked upon and it is estimated that the total expenditure on this will be about 760 million Kč.

(b) **RAILWAYS.** Czechoslovakia inherited its railway system from the Austro-Hungarian Empire, of which it had formed the northern provinces. So far as the western parts of the Republic were concerned the system was more or less adequate, but the eastern parts were very much under-equipped, and communication from east to west of the Republic required considerable improvement. The fact that the Austro-Hungarian railway system, based on Vienna and Budapest (the capitals of the Dual Monarchy), did not make sufficient provision for the rapidly increasing needs of Prague or for its position as capital of the new Republic, necessitated its reorganisation at considerable expense. The permanent way and rolling stock which was taken over from its former owners had been very much neglected during the war years, and an extensive programme of reconstruction and replacement had therefore to be undertaken. Further work was entailed in connection with the standardisation of several private railway lines which were taken over at the same time. As a result, however, of considerable capital outlay Czechoslovakia has to-day some 14,000 kilometres of railway (as compared with 33,000 kilometres in Great Britain) over which pass every year more than 350 million passengers and well over a million tons of freight. The railway network is unevenly distributed among the provinces. In Bohemia there are 13 kilometres of line per 100 square kilometres of area; in Moravia-Silesia 10 kilometres; in Slovakia and Subcarpathian Ruthenia 6 kilometres. Slovakia and Subcarpathian Ruthenia, although constituting about 44% of the total area of the Republic, possess only about 30% of the railways. This is explained, of course, by the different stages of economic development which obtain in the eastern and in the western provinces respectively, a difference which is gradually being reduced as Slovakia is industrialised.

The modernisation of the railway system and its extension in Slovakia and Subcarpathian Ruthenia were also parts of

the Government scheme for dealing with the industrial crisis. Besides giving work, directly and indirectly, to a very large number of people, the improvement of the railway system served to bring money into the country by making its numerous beauty spots more easily and more economically accessible to foreign tourists. *Czechoslovakia was able to embark on this policy because, unlike the neighbouring small States, she had next to no financial obligation abroad, and could therefore devote all her resources to such forms of national development.*

For a long time after the foundation of the Republic there was a certain amount of overlapping across her frontiers of the railway system which she had inherited, as well as of the systems of neighbouring countries. This was especially marked in the districts along the German frontier, where the existence of such "sally ports" was exploited to the full by the Nazis—the terminal stations of the German railway line at places such as Podmokly (Bodenbach) being used, under privileged conditions assured by previous agreement, as distributing centres for Nazi propagandist literature and as sanctuaries for Nazi agents. This unsatisfactory situation was not brought to an end until February 10th, 1937, when a new German-Czechoslovak agreement was concluded.

The whole railway system is run by the State on the lines of a private concern as stipulated by the so-called "Enterprise Act" and various accompanying regulations, which govern also all other State enterprises. The main principle involved is that State enterprises should be self-supporting and should therefore entail no burden on the Treasury. In the organisation of the management of the Czechoslovak State Railway, the "Enterprise Act" established a Board of Management, analogous to the Board of Directors of private railway companies, to decide upon all questions concerning the working of the railways. The decisions of this Board are not effective, however, without the assent of the Minister of Railways (at present a Social-Democrat, Rudolf Bechyně), who is responsible, in accordance with the terms of the "Enterprise Act", that the interests of the general public are preserved, subordinating to these, where necessary, the purely commercial interests of the Czechoslovak State Railways.

The capital value of the Czechoslovak State Railways is estimated to be about £150 million, after due allowance for depreciation; their debts in respect of productive investment amount to about £50 million; so that two-thirds of the capital may be regarded as the liability of the State. The balance-sheet appears always to indicate an unsatisfactory state of affairs by showing a deficit, but it should be noted that, in contrast to other countries, no charge is made for carrying mails—if such charge were made, the deficit would be considerably reduced. Another item which is responsible for a considerable portion of the deficit is the provision of pensions for former officials and employees (including about 27,000 who served on the Austrian and Hungarian railways before the Revolution) which is met out of current income. From a purely commercial point of view it might be argued that the deficit should be wiped out by increasing the rates for the transport of freight and passengers, or by a reduction of wages. The Minister of Railways has, however, on the whole successfully opposed any proposals of this nature, on the grounds that their adoption would be contrary to the interests of the masses. It is because of this consistent defence of the rights of the railwaymen that during all the years which have elapsed since Czechoslovakia achieved her independence there has never been a railway strike.

(c) **ROAD TRANSPORT.** Owing to the heavy commitments of the State in connection with the railways, the development of road transport has been discouraged except where it did not compete with the State Railways. In such places the State Railways own and operate some hundreds of bus services. Where the service is run by private enterprise, State supervision is exercised to ensure (a) that freight rates do not undercut those of the State railway and bus services, and (b) that the passenger rates are not excessive. Transport by private lorry is made subject to a surtax for lorries of medium and large loads on the existing licence fee.

(d) **ROADS.** By far the greater part of the road system of Czechoslovakia consists of the State roads, the construction of which was begun as far back as the first part of the 18th century under the rule of the Emperor Charles VI. The road

system, like the railways, was very ill-used and neglected during the period of the Great War. This entailed considerable outlay by the Ministry of Public Works by which the roads are administered. Here again a great deal of extra work was necessary owing to the fact that Prague, Bratislava, Košice and Užhorod had become of more importance than Vienna and Budapest in the life of Czechoslovakia. Furthermore, the development of motor traffic and of freight transport by road has necessitated a great deal of reconstruction of roads and, even more, of bridges. The State is responsible for 6,410 kilometres or 70·82% of the total length (8,660 kilometres) of roads in the Republic. It meets its responsibilities out of a Road Fund, created in 1927, whose revenue comes from taxes and duties levied on motor traffic. Out of this Fund a proportion is allocated annually to the Local Government Authorities (Provincial, District, and Communal), who are responsible for the non-State roads.

(e) **AIR TRANSPORT.** Commercial aviation should have a great future in Czechoslovakia owing to the central position in Europe which she occupies, and to her geographical configuration, which makes travel from west to east by rail excessively slow. There are airports now at Karlovy Vary (Karlsbad), Mariánské Lázně (Marienbad), Liberec (Reichenberg), Brno, Piešťany, Bratislava, Zlín, Košice and Užhorod, as well, of course, as at Prague. Service between these airports is maintained by the Czechoslovak State Airline, the larger of the two commercial air lines operating in Czechoslovakia, which is run as a State Enterprise, on the same lines as the Czechoslovak State Railway. The Czechoslovak State Airline already runs several services to foreign countries and intends to run many more in the future. The airports in Czechoslovakia are used also by several foreign air lines and in this connection it is interesting to note that the shortest route from Great Britain to India passes over Czechoslovakia, this route being actually used by the Royal Dutch Air Line (K.L.M.) for its East Indian services.

(f) **CO-ORDINATING COMMISSION.** The co-ordination of the various systems of transport and of the work of the various Government Departments and others concerned is effected

by a special Co-ordinating Commission, which was set up in 1935 on the suggestion of the Minister of Railways. This Commission, which is composed of representatives of Government Departments and of the economic interests concerned, is responsible for deciding what new transport services are required and for determining the most suitable nature of such services.

7. State Enterprises. All State Enterprises have, since the "Enterprise Act" of 1924, been run on the same lines as any commercial enterprise, subject only to control, by the Ministry to whom they are entrusted, in the interests of the public. They comprise, in addition to the State Railways and Air-line, already described, the Posts and Telegraphs, the State Mines and Metallurgical Works, the State Forests and Estates, the State Tobacco Factories and the Spas and Health Resorts. (a) **POSTS AND TELEGRAPHS.** The postal, telephone and telegraph services are, as in Britain, a State monopoly, administered by the Ministry of Posts and Telegraphs. As a State Enterprise it enjoys a high degree of autonomy, though it is always subject to criticism and control by Parliament.

The Czechoslovak Republic took over the services of the former Austro-Hungarian Empire in a very neglected and unserviceable condition. It found itself hampered, moreover, by the shortage of Czechoslovaks among the postal workers, and even more by the lack of experienced higher officials among their own nationals—these had formerly all been either Austrian or Hungarian. In addition to this, the re-orientation of the system to suit the requirements of a State in which Prague replaced Vienna and Budapest entailed very considerable further capital expenditure. Czechoslovak postal officials were, however, sent abroad to study the latest technical improvements in service and administration, and the initial difficulties have now been more or less completely overcome.

The services mentioned above, for which the Enterprise is responsible, include also the maintenance of telegraph and telephone lines belonging to the State Railways and did include the State Road Transport Services until 1932, when these were transferred to the State Railways. The Post Office

Savings Bank, despite its name, is run as an entirely separate service.

The annual balance-sheet of the Enterprise usually shows a net profit, which is not, however, handed over to the Treasury. The Enterprise contributes, nevertheless, considerable sums to the State, for, in addition to meeting all its own working expenses (including those of the Ministry), it carries mails for the State Departments and other Enterprises at a fraction of the actual cost and pays to the State a 20% duty on its telephone receipts. Apart from this it hands over 38% of the sums received for wireless licences to "Radio journal", the semi-official broadcasting organisation.

(b) **STATE MINES AND METALLURGICAL WORKS.** The Czechoslovak Government took over from Austria-Hungary a considerable number of mines and metallurgical works which are now run as a State Enterprise under the Ministry of Public Works.

The State Mines and Metallurgical Works, which had absorbed investments to the extent of 412 million Kč. by the end of 1935, comprise the following:—

- (1) The lignite mines at Most (Bruex) in north-west Bohemia, which yield about 2 million tons of lignite each year and which have recently been equipped on the most modern lines.
- (2) The coal mines at Petřvald (Petrswald) in the Ostrava coal-field, which produce 500,000 tons annually. Attached to these mines is a coke works, which also produces tar, pitch, sulphate of ammonia and benzine, and a plant for the production of benzol.
- (3) The silver and lead mines at Příbram, together with a factory for making lead cables and other leaden goods.
- (4) The uranium and radium works at Jáchymov (Joachimsthal), which has an annual production of 2–3 mg. of extremely pure radium. Here are also produced uranium dyes which are used mainly for colouring porcelain and glass.
- (5) The gold and lead mines at Banská Štiavnica (Schemnitz), which have an annual output of about 150 kg. of gold, 7,000 kg. of silver and 8,000 q. of lead.

- (6) The gold mines at Kremnica (Kremnitz), which produce about 250 kg. of gold each year. The hydro-electric works which supply these mines are also State-owned, and it is intended that they shall be extended so as to produce 16 million kwh. annually and to supply private consumers.
- (7) The iron-fields in Rožňava and Železník, which produce ore for the State blast furnaces at Tisovec, which in turn supply the raw material for the State iron and steel works at Podbrezová.
- (8) The iron and steel works at Podbrezová, together with the auxiliary works at Tisovec, Hronec, and Banská Bystrica. The electrolytic works at Banská Bystrica produce pure electrolytic copper and blue copperas. At Podbrezová there is also a refinery where fine salt is produced and there will shortly be a refinery for refining oil from the State oil-fields.
- (9) The salt refineries at Prešov, which refine rock salt from the Slatinské Doly mines mentioned below.
- (10) The salt mines at Slatinské Doly, which produce about 166,000 tons of pure rock salt each year.
- (11) The oil-fields at Gbely, which yield raw oil and natural gas, the latter being used locally in the workings. The output of this small field was 117,000 q. in 1935.

Most of these works were in a primitive state of development, and had been very much neglected, when they were taken over by the State. Their re-equipment and further development since 1918 has increased their estimated value to over 600 million Kč., and enable the Enterprise to be run at a profit.

(c) **STATE FORESTS AND ESTATES.** The Czechoslovak State Forests and Estates administer an area of 1,137,431 hectares (about $2\frac{3}{4}$ million acres) most of which is forest land. To facilitate the development and administration of this area it is divided up into sections on an economic basis, e.g. forestry, farming, fisheries, grazing, forestry industries (saw mills, wood yards), agricultural industries (sugar manufactories, breweries, distilleries, dairies, etc.), and so on.

The Enterprise is administered by a General Management Board in Prague, under the supervision of the Ministry of Agriculture. There are twelve local administration sections scattered throughout the country, while the Forestry School Estate at Kostelec, the Agricultural and Forestry Technical College in Prague, the "Masaryk Forest" Forestry School Estate and the Agricultural Technical College at Brno have each their own Board of Management.

Forestry and its allied industries constitute the most important section of the Enterprise. It is estimated that the State forests are capable of a yearly output of 3,500,000 cubic metres of timber, 60% of which is carpenter's wood and 40% wood for fuel. The Enterprise owns 72 saw-mills, many of them with their own electric power supply.

All sales are conducted through the subsidiary "Czechoslovak Central Timber Selling Company Limited" in Prague, in which the State has a 51% interest.

Of the agricultural land belonging to the Enterprise by far the greater part is used for growing sugar beet (51%) and grain (46%). The produce is consumed by agricultural industrial concerns (sugar manufactories, breweries, distilleries) —State sugar manufactories consume 932,000 q. of sugar beet each year and the State breweries produce about 110,000 hl. of beer.

Of the remaining land, 3% is devoted to pasturage, almost exclusively for milk production. The State owns 18,000 to 19,000 head of cattle and produces 29 million to 30 million litres of milk each year. Only a small part of this production is, however, absorbed by State dairies, the greater part going to dairies run by private enterprise.

The fisheries, comprising 843 lakes and ponds, are mainly concentrated in Southern Bohemia. They produce about 11,000 q. each year, of which 90% is carp. As all waterways, whether navigable or not, are State property, so also are the fishing rights. These are leased by the Provincial Authorities on a licence basis, the income being used to re-stock with young fish.

Hunting is also a State monopoly. The hunting in the State forests, which is particularly good in Subcarpathian

Ruthenia, may be leased by individuals. Elsewhere huntsmen pay a special tax to the State.

(d) **STATE TOBACCO MONOPOLY.** The Czechoslovak Tobacco Monopoly is one of the larger industrial enterprises in the Republic. It has 20 factories, which produce tobacco of all sorts for the whole Republic, and 13 offices (10 in Southern Slovakia and 3 in Subcarpathian Ruthenia) for purchasing the local tobacco crop. Native tobacco is successfully used in the manufacture of cigarettes, as well as for some of the pipe tobaccos. The production of this tobacco has increased from 226,300 kg. in 1919 to 17,200,000 kg. in 1936, the latter representing a value of 59 million Kč. The home production of tobacco now represents about 60% of the total domestic requirements of the Republic, and gives employment to about 5,000 cultivators.

The tobacco factories manufacture cigarettes, cigars, pipe tobacco and snuff. They also manufacture a tobacco extract which is used extensively, particularly by hop growers, as an insecticide, and a tobacco powder which is used as a fertiliser.

The Czechoslovak Tobacco Monopoly is administered, under the control of the Minister of Finance, by a permanent Board of Management. The main object of the Monopoly is fiscal, that is to say, to provide as large an income as possible for the State. Its profits are counted among the indirect taxes—these amount to about 2 milliard Kč. yearly, about half of which passes directly to the Exchequer.

The Monopoly provides employment for about 700 officials and about 9,000 regular workers (one-third male, two-thirds female) in addition to which it employs about 4,000 seasonal workers in the purchasing offices at the time of the tobacco harvest.

CHAPTER III

THE PEOPLE

ACCORDING TO THE most recent census (December 1st, 1930) the total number of persons within the Republic of Czechoslovakia was 14,729,536. Bohemia contains about half of that total, Moravia-Silesia about a quarter, and the remaining quarter is in Slovakia and Subcarpathian Ruthenia.

1. Density of Population. In density of population Czechoslovakia ranks seventh among the States of Europe (City States excluded) with 108 inhabitants per square kilometre of area (Great Britain and Northern Ireland have 192). The population is fairly evenly distributed on the whole, but there are thirty-three districts in the mountains in which the density is less than 50 per square kilometre, these being balanced by eleven districts in Bohemia and Moravia-Silesia with densities of over 500 per square kilometre.

2. Urbanisation. The aggregation of the population in towns is far less advanced than in the countries of Western Europe, 52% of the population living in communities of less than 2,000 persons, while only 10% live in towns with more than 100,000 inhabitants. The Republic has only five towns with more than 100,000 and only two others with more than 50,000 inhabitants.¹

3. Foreign Residents. Ignoring for the moment the racial composition of the population, it is of interest to note that at the time of the 1930 census there were resident in the country only 249,971 foreigners, representing about 1·7% of the total number of residents. Most of these foreigners live in the frontier regions and are nationals of the neighbouring countries, thus there were 74,248 Polish citizens, i.e. in addition to the Polish-speaking minority, mainly in the neighbourhood of Těšín.

¹ See Table I.

4. Occupational Distribution. The population is divided into two approximately equal groups, those who earn their living by work and those who live on the earnings of others, the latter including wives and children, students and soldiers doing their military service. There are therefore actually 1,150 persons living on the surplus production of each thousand persons who work. The occupational distribution of the population is shown in detail in Tables II and III.

5. Social Structure. Czechoslovakia is fortunate, though she probably did not appreciate it at the time, in that the Bohemian nobility was virtually annihilated after the Battle of the White Mountain,¹ in 1620, while the Slovaks were long since prevented by the Magyars from developing an aristocracy of their own. The political revolution, which freed the Czechoslovak Nation from the Habsburgs, was therefore at the same time a social revolution, for it dislodged completely the former ruling class. Power was transferred to leaders who were sprung from the people, and their actions have been on the whole untrammelled by the interference of industrial and financial magnates, who were not numerous or powerful enough to oppose the united middle and working classes.

Class-distinctions, such as exist in most of the European countries, are not great in Czechoslovakia, and where they exist are of comparatively recent development. Nor is it likely that the advent of a wealthy bourgeoisie since the foundation of the Republic will materially alter this state of affairs, unless there is deliberate intervention from without. Where the whole population has equal access to free State education, even in the Universities, the cultural differences, on which class-differences are established, cannot easily come into existence, and the seats of power will remain accessible to any man or woman. It may be regretted by some that this process of democratisation should have swept away the refinements of the Habsburg days, and that Czech society lacks the polish which makes life more agreeable elsewhere for the few who have leisure to cultivate it. It seems, however, a small price to pay for removing a cancer which threatens to poison our

¹ See pages 37-38.

Western civilisation to death, and already, as the Czechoslovak educational system takes effect, there is a perceptible diminution of that boorishness which sometimes shocks the stranger. It would appear foolish, moreover, to deplore a trend which has so greatly diminished, though it cannot of itself remove, bitterness between man and man.

6. Nationalities. The ethnical composition of the population is very mixed indeed, as shown in Table IV. Nationality is determined, as a rule, according to the mother-tongue of the individual. This rule may be departed from only where the person concerned can prove that he does not use his mother-tongue in his family circle and that he is completely conversant with some other language. An exception is made, however, in favour of the Jews, who may elect to adopt the nationality indicated by the language (other than Yiddish) which they speak, or to declare for Jewish nationality.

(a) **CZECHOSLOVAKS.** The Czechs, Moravians and Slovaks, who are grouped together as Czechoslovaks, probably number by now some 10 millions, about 3 millions of whom are Slovaks. They constitute a substantial majority of the population in every Province except Subcarpathian Ruthenia. Descendants of the same Slav immigrant tribes, they are essentially members of one and the same race. Such differences as can be detected between them may be ascribed to the effects, direct and indirect, of the different environment in which the western and the eastern branches of the Czechoslovak race have developed during the past thousand years. Inter-marriage with the Germans on the one hand and (less frequently) with the Hungarians on the other, prolonged segregation from each other under the influence of two different cultures, and widely differing economic and political conditions, have developed differences of character which are sometimes striking, but which are probably not fundamental or permanent.

The Czechs have usually, even during the worst days of the Austrian domination, enjoyed some measure of national recognition and representation, so they have developed into democrats of a most determined character. The industrialisation of their country and the growth of their town-population have

fostered the development among them of the will and the capacity for organisation. Their general level of education is high, and political-consciousness is well-developed among them. They are a studious and industrious people—very thorough and efficient in their work, but rarely brilliant. They are eager to learn from other nations, and are excessively modest, as a rule, about themselves and their achievements. Their shyness and diffidence are apt to give foreigners a false impression that they are off-hand or unfriendly, while an equally false impression of meanness is sometimes created by the frugal habits which their poverty, compared with corresponding classes in Western Europe, necessitates. In many respects they may be said to resemble the Scots, though their critics in Slovakia and Ruthenia, when enraged at the meticulous bureaucratic methods of their officials, describe them as “Slavonic Prussians”.

Emotional, gay and often irresponsible, almost embarrassing in their hospitality, the Slovaks have full measure of that charm which renders the Slav so attractive to most foreigners. They are, however, politically far less mature than their cousins in Bohemia and Moravia, and appear sometimes neither to realise the responsibilities of democracy, nor to appreciate its dangers. This is not surprising, when it is realised that they were for a thousand years under an alien yoke, engaged until 1918 almost solely in agricultural work of a primitive type, deprived of secondary and higher education and granted no political freedom or responsibility. What is surprising, indeed, is that they should so rapidly have shaken off the effects of several decades of intensive “Magyarisation” and of centuries of cultural neglect, so that to-day their younger generations, grown up under the Republican régime, differ little from, and are in no respect inferior to, their Czech contemporaries. Different in temperament, however, they seem likely to remain, if only because they drink the light wines of their country, while the Czechs drink their Pilsener beer.

(b) RUTHENES.¹ The Ruthenes, although numerically weak, numbering rather over half a million, should not be considered as a “minority” within the Republic, since they are free and

¹ See also Chapter X.

equal partners in it with the Czechs and the Slovaks. They are a Slav people, closely allied by race and language with the Ukrainians of Galicia in Poland and the Soviet Union. They are almost all concentrated in Subcarpathian Ruthenia, where they form 63% of the population. Having been the most neglected and most suppressed race in the former Hungarian Empire, they have had vast arrears of cultural, economic and political development to make good, and are only now showing signs of having reached national maturity. Their progress has been, and still is, hampered by linguistic and religious controversies, both of which are closely connected with internal and external political forces. In character and temperament they resemble the Russians, rather than the Slovaks or the Czechs.

(c) GERMANS. The Germans, who number about $3\frac{1}{4}$ millions, constitute by far the largest racial minority in Czechoslovakia, representing over 22% of the total population. Their greatest strength is in the provinces of Bohemia and Moravia-Silesia, where they constitute 32% and 23% respectively of the population. They are the descendants of German colonists who settled in Bohemia first during the 12th century and who were subsequently reinforced and expanded their area of colonisation, isolated groups pressing eastwards into Slovakia and even into Subcarpathian Ruthenia. The main areas in which they have for centuries been settled, eight in number, are along the frontiers of Germany and Austria, these areas being separated from each other by broad belts of land inhabited largely by Czechs. There are, moreover, German enclaves scattered throughout all the provinces of the Republic, the largest of these, round Moravská Třebová, having a German population of 51,000.

Centuries of close economic and social contact with the Slavs have powerfully affected the character (and frequently even the physical appearance) of these Czechoslovak Germans. Since their districts have never been a component part of the German Empire, and have not formed an independent element in Austria-Hungary, they have developed an independent German type, with its own tendencies in art and literature, its own traditions and customs, its own dialects. They have, as a rule, little in common with the German of present-day Germany, resembling rather the Austrian type.

(d) **HUNGARIANS (MAGYARS).** The Hungarians of Czechoslovakia number rather less than 700,000, and are almost entirely confined to southern parts of Slovakia and Subcarpathian Ruthenia where they represent $17\frac{1}{2}\%$ and $15\frac{1}{2}\%$ respectively of the population.

The policy of "magyarisation" pursued by Hungary in pre-war days with regard to her Slav subjects must have had the effect also of checking any possible tendency among the Hungarians towards assimilation with the Slovaks or Ruthenes. No attempt has been made by the Government of Czechoslovakia to "denationalise" the Hungarians within the Republic, but democracy appears to be acting as a catalytic agent between the Magyars and the Slavs, and signs are discernible that racial integration (extending perhaps across the frontier into Hungary) may be spontaneously achieved.

(e) **JEWS.** The Jews in Czechoslovakia are at liberty to declare themselves as belonging to any of the national groups or to declare themselves Jews. It is not surprising, therefore, that the figure shown in Table IV of 186,642 for the total number of Jews in the Republic is very considerably smaller than that shown in Table V of 356,830 for the number professing the Jewish faith. A comparison of the figures in these two Tables reveals that the proportion of Jews who claim non-Jewish nationality is very much higher in the West than in the East, and that it is in the eastern provinces of Slovakia and Subcarpathian Ruthenia that they are actually and relatively most strong. Many Ruthenian towns are predominantly Jewish, the town of Mukačevo, for instance, containing a bare 10% of non-Jews.

(f) **POLES.** The Poles, who number about 82,000, are almost all concentrated in the Těšín district in Silesia, where they constitute about 12% of the population. Many of them, though claiming Polish nationality, are actually, as their dialect often indicates, an intermediate race which might with equal justice be described as Czech, and to which the term "Šlonzak" is applied. The more purely Polish element among them is the result of the immigration of large numbers of poor workers from Galicia to meet the demand for labour consequent on the industrialisation of the Ostrava-Karvinná basin in the latter part of the 19th century.

(g) **OTHER RACES.** Besides the races already mentioned, there are smaller groups of Gypsies (mainly in Slovakia), of Roumanians, who have settlements in Subcarpathian Ruthenia, and of Croats, in Southern Moravia. These groups, though small, have preserved their language and racial customs, but, with the obvious exception of the Gypsies, will probably eventually become assimilated to the majority population.

7. Languages. As might be expected in a territory where so many different races have settled beside each other, often for several centuries, but have not mixed or lost their racial character, the language problem in Czechoslovakia is far from being simple. Its difficulty has been increased, moreover, by the fact that only too often a language is regarded as a vehicle for political or religious propaganda, rather than as a medium for the exchange of ideas.

The racial distribution of the population¹ gives only a broad idea of the linguistic distribution which is complicated by the existence, especially in the mountainous frontier districts, where communications are difficult, of numerous local dialects.

The Czechoslovak language, being the language of the majority population, is the official language of the State, but every attempt is made to satisfy the reasonable cultural requirements and the convenience of those who prefer to use some different mother-tongue.

The language law of Czechoslovakia permits the use for official purposes of a minority language (even sometimes of a local dialect) in any district where the minority concerned represents more than 20% of the population. In districts where the minority numbers more than two-thirds of the population, the minority language is used for all oral or written official communications and transactions. Where the minority represents less than two-thirds, but more than 20% of the population, everything is conducted bi-lingually, and only where the minority is less than 20% of the population is its language not officially recognised. Even in this last case, however, when it is found that a citizen is hampered by ignorance of the Czechoslovak language, every effort is made

¹ See Tables III and IV.

to help him out of his difficulty. The extent to which this language law meets the reasonable requirements of the minority races is indicated by the following figures from the census of 1930 :—

	<i>Minority Population</i>		
	<i>Germans</i>	<i>Hungarians</i>	<i>Poles</i>
Uni-lingual Minority districts. (i.e. with more than two-thirds minority population)	2,338,000	393,000	20,000
Bi-lingual districts. (i.e. with 20-66·6% minority population)	632,000	213,000	51,000
State Language districts (i.e. with less than 20% minority population)	250,550	85,000	10,000

So far as education is concerned, every effort is made to provide the children of the minority races with schools in which they are taught by members of their own race in their own language and with the use of text-books written in that language. Efforts are made even to provide in this respect for the requirements of minorities using any of the numerous local dialects, and we find that in 1934-35 in Subcarpathian Ruthenia, where the diversity of languages and dialects reaches its maximum, instruction for some 125,000 children was provided in eleven different tongues!

The **Czech** language, from which the **Slovak** differs only in minor details, is laid down by statute as the language of the State. It is a Slavonic language, somewhat akin to Polish, and uses Latin characters supplemented by accents as necessary to cope with its sonic requirements. Being the official language, it is taught in all schools, and must by now already be understood by almost every Czechoslovak citizen of the rising generation.

German is recognised as the second language of Czechoslovakia. It is spoken, of course, by the members of the German minority, many of whom, however, use dialects which are only locally understood. It is spoken also by the majority of the non-German population of Bohemia and Moravia-Silesia and, though less universally, by the non-Germans in the eastern provinces.

Hungarian, used by the Hungarian minority, is spoken also by most of the non-Hungarians of Slovakia and Subcarpathian Ruthenia, some of whom indeed, victims of Hungarian denationalisation in pre-war days, even now find it difficult to use their own mother-tongue.

Ruthenian, in one or other of its numerous dialect forms, is spoken by such of the Ruthenes as do not use the Great Russian language. It is closely akin to the language used by the Ukrainians of Poland and the Soviet Union. Many of the Ruthenes, however, especially the more cultured among them, use Russian as their medium of expression, and the use of that language, which presents obvious advantages owing to its rich literature and wide usage elsewhere, would probably develop considerably were it not opposed by religious and political interests.

The other, smaller minorities enjoy the use of their respective languages within the districts in which they live, and where they are grouped together in sufficient numbers¹ are granted facilities for the education of the children in their mother-tongue. In many cases, however, notably in that of the Jews, parents prefer that their children should receive their education in the majority language, i.e. Czechoslovak, in order not to be handicapped in their later life.

8. Religions. The religious distribution of the population of Czechoslovakia is shown in Table V. Although, as will be seen, an overwhelming majority (73·54%) of the people are professedly Roman Catholics, nevertheless the Constitution, which guarantees complete liberty of conscience and confession, declares all religious professions to be equal in the eyes of the law and recognises none as the State Church. The State is considered as being neutral in religious matters, and undertakes not to meddle in the internal affairs of any Church, except where it is considered that the existence of the State is in some way menaced, or where the minority rights are infringed.²

Every Church that complies with the law receives official recognition, and the State, in accordance with the Kongrua

¹ A minimum of forty children is necessary.

² See page 229.

Act (Ecclesiastical Emoluments Act) of 1926, makes financial contribution to all Churches that are thus recognised. It does not follow, however, that the State contribution is therefore in like measure and like manner in each case. State contributions are provided mainly for the payment of the emoluments of the clergy, but contribution is also made towards the costs of administration and training the oncoming priesthood (in so far as this is done in Church, not State, Institutions), and sometimes even towards the cost of erecting or restoring church buildings.

Under the former Austro-Hungarian régime, with its strong bias towards Roman Catholicism, although certain other Churches were granted State recognition, non-Catholics were to a certain extent penalised. Free thought was tolerated, but the public services, the teaching and other professions were open only to church-members, with the result that only 13,000 persons dared to register themselves as free-thinkers. It is not surprising, therefore, that the liberation of the Czechs and Slovaks from Austro-Hungarian domination was followed by a strong movement "away from Rome", which had too closely identified itself with the Habsburg dynasty. Between 1918 and 1930 about 1,900,000 people (most of them Czechs) changed their religion, the majority being deserters from the Roman Catholic Church. Some 800,000 of these, all of them Czechs, formed themselves into a new Czechoslovak Church, which represents a kind of reformed Catholicism, independent of Rome, and is therefore untainted by memories of the hated Habsburg connection; about 150,000 became Protestants of one kind or another; the remainder, close on 854,000 in number, openly declared themselves agnostics and successfully urged the complete separation of Church and State, as was done in France early in the present century.

This "away from Rome" tendency, together with the territorial redistribution of Central Europe, changed very considerably the numerical proportions of the various religious confessions within the new Republic. The revival of the Orthodox Church in Subcarpathian Ruthenia contributed also to this effect. Nevertheless the Roman Catholic Church, especially when grouped with the Uniate (Greek Catholic) Church, has remained by far the strongest in membership and in influence.

The State, being neutral in religious matters, has had no cause to struggle with the Roman Catholic Church except with regard to the provisions of the Land Reform Law which affected, among others, the large estates owned by Roman Catholic dignitaries and religious Orders, a matter upon which there has been a compromise in return for a "*quid pro quo*". The Holy See was among the first to accept the "*fait accompli*" of the Czechoslovak Revolution in 1918 and to recognise the new Republic. Realising, moreover, that the tide of popular disfavour in Czechoslovakia could be arrested only by complete renunciation of all support for the revisionist claims of Austria and Hungary, the Vatican diplomacy did all in its power, despite religious disputes in Subcarpathian Ruthenia, to cement the bonds of unity between the eastern and the western Slavs.

A certain amount of friction was experienced, as might have been expected, in reconciling the conservative views of a highly centralised and powerful Church, jealous of its privileges, with those of a virile new democracy, no less jealous of its own rights. Trouble was caused by certain aggressive pastoral letters of the Slovak bishops, threatening all those who were members of Liberal or Socialist organisations with church punishments, and matters came to a head in 1925 over the character of the Czech celebrations of the anniversary of Jan Hus.¹ The Papal Nuncio in Prague at that time, now Cardinal Marmaggi, considered that these celebrations of the death of a "heretic" were an offence to Roman Catholic feelings and left the country. After two years of diplomatic coldness, during which Prague remained without a Nuncio, normal relations were resumed. Ill-feeling soon arose again, however, owing to the part played in connection with the resignation of the Archbishop of Prague, Dr. Kordač, by the new Nuncio, Monsignor Ciriaci, now serving in Lisbon, where he doubtless feels more in his element.

The clear indications that the people of Czechoslovakia would not tolerate the flouting of their democratic feelings, and the maintenance by the Czechoslovak Government throughout these disturbances of a correct attitude of non-intervention, were not without effect on the Vatican. In 1928

¹ See page 26.

a "*modus vivendi*" was concluded whereby, in return for considerable concessions with regard to church-owned land in Czechoslovakia, the Vatican agreed to certain measures which the Czechoslovak Government considered important from the point of view of the security of their Republic and its immunity from foreign intervention, notably by Hungary, in its internal affairs. Years passed, however, without the Vatican taking any steps to carry out its share of the agreement and eventually, in the summer of 1935, the Czechoslovak Government attempted to speed matters up by itself complying with the main condition demanded by the Vatican. The Church domains in Slovakia, sequestered by the State in 1918, were handed over to be administered by the Papal Plenipotentiary, Bishop Monsignor Pavel Jantauch, and the necessary Decree was drafted for the formal annulment at short notice of the sequestration. It was not until September 2nd, 1937, that the Holy See responded and reaped its reward. The Circumscription Bill of Pope Pius XI, for Czechoslovakia fixed anew the diocesan boundaries in such a manner that, except in the north-east portion of the Republic, they coincide with the frontiers of Czechoslovakia as defined by the Treaties of Versailles, St. Germain and Trianon. The organisation of the Catholic Church in Slovakia and Subcarpathian Ruthenia was thus completely severed from that of Hungary, nine Catholic districts being withdrawn from the suffragan jurisdiction of the Archbishops of Estergom and Eger. The Bull also proclaims the institution at an early date of two new metropolitan sees, a Roman Archbishopric for Slovakia and a Greek (Uniate) one for Subcarpathian Ruthenia. The importance of the final execution of this "*modus vivendi*" is not only that it has committed the Vatican to official recognition of the Czechoslovak frontiers, but also that it will enable the State in Czechoslovakia to ensure that the leadership of the Catholic Church and appointments to high ecclesiastical posts are henceforth roughly in proportion to the numerical strength of the nationalities and do not clash with the interests of the State.

The adherents of the Protestant Churches represent only a small proportion (7.67%) of the total population, but are

relatively more numerous in Slovakia (16·69%) and Subcarpathian Ruthenia (10·23%). They are divided to a considerable extent along racial lines, though also, of course, according to confession. As opposed to the Catholics, who have their own political parties, the Protestants make no attempt to mix religion and politics, though the racial basis of certain sects would appear to favour such abuse.

In the western part of the Republic a more important element than the Protestants is the new Czechoslovak Church which was established in 1920 as the outcome of a movement for reform among the Roman Catholic priesthood. The membership of this Church is almost exclusively Czech, which is perhaps the explanation why it has failed to make progress in Slovakia and is but little known abroad.

In Subcarpathian Ruthenia one finds once more that religion and politics are closely interlocked. The Uniate (Greek Catholic) Church has the widest support, thanks largely to past encouragement by the Hungarian authorities, and is the confession of almost half the population. Its main rival is the Orthodox Church, which has made considerable progress since the Republic was founded and now has the support of some 15% of the Ruthenes. Politically these two churches represent the Ukrainian and Great Russian tendencies in Subcarpathian Ruthenia, while the higher ecclesiastics of the former have frequently been the agents of Hungarian revisionism.

Finally there are the Jews, who, from a religious point of view, are almost twice as numerous as would appear from the statistics of nationality (Table IV). This apparent discrepancy is explained by the fact that many Jewish parents exercise their right of option with regard to nationality in order that their children may benefit by being instructed in Czechoslovak rather than in Jewish schools. Since the foundation of the Republic the Jewish communities of Bohemia and Moravia-Silesia have, on their own initiative, formed local Federations, which are represented collectively by a central organisation in Prague. In Slovakia and Subcarpathian Ruthenia, the Jews have severed their former connection with the two Federations in Hungary, and have set up two independent Federations of their own.

CHAPTER IV

CONSTITUTION, POLITICAL PARTIES AND GOVERNMENT

1. Constitution. Czechoslovakia is declared by its Charter of Constitution to be a "Democratic Republic", based on the principle that "the people is the sole fountain of state authority" within it.

It is a unified, not a federal, State, within which Subcarpathian Ruthenia alone is destined, in accordance with the Peace Treaties, to enjoy a special position at a later date.

Legislative power is likewise unified, the legislative body, the National Assembly, being composed of two chambers: the **Chamber of Deputies**, and the **Senate**. Both chambers are elected by direct and secret popular ballot on a basis of equal and universal suffrage and of absolute equality of the sexes. Any man or woman whose name is inscribed on the list of a recognised political party may seek election to the Chamber of Deputies, and the same applies as regards the Senate except that the candidate must be at least 45 years of age. Deputies are elected for a period of six, and Senators for a period of eight years.

The Chamber of Deputies has very much more power than the Senate, which exercises the functions of critic and moderator. The Chamber of Deputies alone has the power, by a vote of non-confidence, of compelling a Government to resign. The Budget and Army Bills must first pass through the Chamber of Deputies, but any other measures, even Government Bills, may be introduced in either chamber—this is different from the practice in other countries.

In order that the Government shall at no time be without the aid and control of the legislative body, it is laid down in the Constitution that whenever the National Assembly is not in session, there shall be set up a Permanent Committee—two-thirds of the members of which are appointed from

the Chamber of Deputies and one-third from the Senate—to take its place.

The President¹ is elected indirectly, by both chambers assembled in joint session. He holds office for a period of seven years, and may not serve for more than two such periods.² It is he who appoints the Cabinet of Ministers to conduct the government of the country, and through which alone he can exercise influence on the affairs of the State. He has the right to refer back for reconsideration any law which is passed by the National Assembly, but the President of the Assembly may promulgate the law nevertheless in its original form with the assent of an absolute majority in both chambers.

Parliament is convoked, prorogued, terminated and dissolved by the President of the Republic, who is bound to convoke it at least twice a year to regular sessions, and who may convoke it to extraordinary sessions as the need arises. Parliament (both chambers) may at any time, however, be convoked by the Presidents of the two chambers to assemble, without regard to the wishes of the President of the Republic, on the request of a qualified majority of *either chamber*. Even parliamentary minorities have the right to demand of the President of the Republic the convocation of Parliament, and if he does not comply with their demand within a certain period of time, Parliament will automatically be assembled by the Presidents of the two chambers.

The Constitution of the Republic may be changed only by a two-thirds absolute majority in both chambers in favour of such a change. It is placed under the protection of a Constitutional Court, whose duty it is to declare null and void any law which is in conflict with the Constitution. The Constitutional Court is also responsible for seeing that the rights of minorities, racial or religious, are not infringed.

The Charter of the Constitution stipulates that Government decrees may be issued only on the basis of a law and within its terms. The Courts are responsible that this principle

¹ A candidate for the Presidency must be at least 35 years of age.

² A special exception in this respect was made by law in the case of the late Dr. Masaryk, who resigned in December, 1935, after serving as President continuously for seventeen years.

is observed, and are empowered to declare null and void any decree which does not conform to the law.

The fundamental rights and liberties of citizens are laid down and guaranteed by a special section of the Charter of the Constitution, whereby privileges derived from sex, birth or calling are not recognised, and private ownership is declared inviolable. These rights are protected by the Supreme Administrative Court, which deals with all complaints from citizens or groups of citizens that the Administration is infringing their rights.

2. Electoral System. For purposes of parliamentary election the Republic is divided into electoral districts to which mandates in the Chamber of Deputies are allotted on a basis of one for each 21,000–28,500 voters.

The Ballot is direct and secret, women and men alike enjoying equal and universal suffrage as from the age of 21 for the election of Deputies, and as from the age of 26 for the Senate. More than half the population thus possess the right to vote—e.g. 8,231,412 people actually voted in 1935—and they are compelled, subject to a fine, to exercise that right unless they can prove that they were more than 100 km. from their homes on Polling Day!

In order, mainly, to provide adequate representation in Parliament for the racial minorities, a system of **Proportional Representation** has been adopted, collective lists of candidates being used. This presents certain obvious disadvantages, not the least of which is that it places undue power, subject to no direct democratic control, in the hands of the party officials who decide what candidates shall be inscribed upon, or erased from, the lists, and their sequence on those lists. It presents the disadvantage, too, of being liable to lead to excessive fractionisation of the electorate—at one time there were as many as 39 parties—but this has been mitigated by the inclusion in the electoral regulations of a provision whereby any party which fails in some electoral district to obtain what is called the "*electoral quota*" (i.e. the number of votes required for a mandate) obtains no mandate at all, whatever may be the total number of votes which it secures in the other electoral districts. Furthermore, when a party does not obtain

a certain fixed number of votes (the "*quorum*") in the entire State, it is granted the number of mandates due to it at the first scrutiny, but receives no further mandates at the second scrutiny, when the mandates are distributed among the remaining parties. In the second scrutiny consideration is given only to the parties which have secured at least 20,000 votes in the electoral district and at least 120,000 in the whole State (for the Senate, the party must secure at least 35,000 votes in the electoral district). Subject to the foregoing, the system of Proportional Representation is always rigidly enforced. Thus in an electoral district with an electorate of 300,000, to which is allotted 10 mandates, a party polling 160,000 votes secures seats in Parliament for the first 5 candidates on its list. The surplus votes (10,000) are then combined for the second scrutiny with similar remainders in other districts to provide seats for the next name, or names, on its list. The third scrutiny allots the few remaining seats, more or less arbitrarily, in proportion to the already determined strengths of the parties.

The complex diversity of interests which affect the Czechoslovak electorate is revealed by the multiplicity of the political parties (14), which exists despite the obstacles already described. Whereas in Britain class-interest (or ignorance) decides which way a man or woman will vote, and a choice between comparatively few parties will satisfy his, or her requirements, in Czechoslovakia this interest is cut across by, or interwoven with, interests of race or religious creed. Thus there are Czech, Slovak, German and Hungarian Roman Catholic Parties (which call themselves, strangely enough, Christian Socialist or People's Parties!), Czech and German Social-Democrat Parties, and Czech and German Agrarian Parties. The Communist Party alone transcends all barriers of race and religious creed.

It may be noticed, in passing, that there is no Conservative Party in Czechoslovakia. This is not because there are no Conservatives there, but rather because, in the revolutionary atmosphere which marked the birth of the Republic, no one dared confess himself a Conservative—the result is that, although the more outspoken reactionaries have grouped

themselves and been segregated in the various Nationalist Parties or in the Fascist Party, there are Conservatives to be found on the lists of almost every party, notably in the Czechoslovak Agrarian Party, and even among the Social-Democrats.

Owing to the multiplicity of parties, no one party has yet commanded, nor is one likely to command, an absolute majority in Parliament. Government is always, therefore, by a coalition of such parties as can agree to work together along certain broad lines. This presents the disadvantage that every measure must be made acceptable to each of the six or seven parties in the government coalition, and that as these parties often have widely divergent views on social and economic issues the measure becomes somewhat emasculated in this process. From the elector's point of view, moreover, it presents the disadvantage that he never knows, when he votes for a party, to what extent it will feel impelled to compromise with regard to the programme whereby it wins his vote. On the other hand, the necessity for compromise prevents radical and arbitrary changes of policy between elections, but permits of minor changes in the composition and policy of the government without a general election—if a party feels that it can concede no more, it merely joins the Opposition, its place in the Coalition being taken (where this is necessary in order to maintain a majority) by some party which is more in sympathy with the measure or policy under discussion.

Another deplorable feature of the Czechoslovak political system is the gradual establishment of a tradition that certain parties shall occupy certain ministerial posts. It seems indeed to have become accepted that the Agrarian Party shall provide the Ministers of Agriculture, Defence and the Interior, that the Social-Democrats shall provide the Minister of Social Welfare and that the Czech National Socialists shall provide the Ministers of Education and the Posts. It tends to follow from this, moreover, that political patronage affects, though owing to the examination system it cannot govern, the appointment of permanent officials in the Government departments. Although, since Government appointments are permanent and cannot be terminated as the result

of a general election, there is no danger of serious development of the evils which mar American administration, it cannot be said that this feature is conducive of good-feeling or of efficiency.

On the whole, however, despite its weaknesses and drawbacks the Czechoslovak Constitution appears to function very satisfactorily and to be capable of meeting any emergency which may arise, as at the present time. That this is so is due very largely to the comparatively small class-distinctions which exist among the Czechoslovak people, to their dogged loyalty to democracy, and to their sturdy common sense.

3. Political Parties.

(a) CZECHOSLOVAK PARTIES.

(i) *Republican (Agrarian) Party.* Still better known familiarly by its pre-revolutionary name, as the Czechoslovak Agrarian Party, the Republican Party represents the farmers, agricultural workers and peasants. At the first parliamentary elections in 1920 it obtained 40 seats, a number which later increased to 46 and which now stands at 45. It has been the strongest party since 1925, and has kept in its possession the posts of Prime Minister and Chairman of the Chamber of Deputies. It has also provided, as might be expected, an uninterrupted series of Ministers of Agriculture, and usually also the Ministers of Defence and of the Interior.

It was this party which, after the revolution, promoted and carried through the great measure of Land Reform¹ that has so transformed the structure of rural society in Czechoslovakia. Since then it has concentrated its efforts on mitigating the effects on the rural population of the slump in the prices of grain, at first by a protective duty, then by the formation of an intervention syndicate and finally, in 1934, by the erection of a Grain Monopoly Corporation.²

It has done much to consolidate its position in the countryside by building up a vast network of agricultural credit banks, associations and co-operative societies.³ These organisations, representing a considerable economic power, have

¹ See pages 137-141.

² See pages 70-72.

³ See pages 186-192.

emancipated the country districts from the influence of other capital, but have made them economically dependent upon the Agrarian Party to such a degree that their power might be used to frustrate the normal functioning of political democracy. The danger of such an occurrence has been increased during recent years by the fact that reactionary elements of the urban population, regarding the Agrarian Party as incurably anti-socialist, and impressed by the stability of its supremacy in Parliament, have joined that party, doubtless with the object of utilising it for ends which are contrary to the interests of most of its supporters. There are signs already that such a process is taking place and that the Agrarian Party no longer cares enough for the welfare of the peasantry. This has caused large numbers of the peasants, especially in the poorer, eastern provinces, to transfer their allegiance to the Social-Democrats, and even more often to the Communists. The tendency is for the Agrarian leadership, instead of realising why they are losing their mass support, to become even more anti-socialist than before, and thereby to make matters worse from their own point of view. Some idea of the lengths of folly to which the Agrarians can go may be gained when it is realised that certain reactionary Agrarians encouraged the formation of Henlein's Sudete German Party, now greater than the Agrarian Party as regards representation in Parliament. This was done because those responsible feared that the economic distress which was prevalent in the German districts might drive the population into supporting the parties of the Left!

In foreign affairs the numerically few, but nevertheless influential, reactionaries of the party have developed tendencies scarcely less suicidal than that already described above. They have agitated for the abandonment of their defensive Pact with the Soviet Union, thinking, no doubt, thereby to recover their electoral losses in the eastern provinces, and for the adoption of a policy of compromise with the Third Reich. Fortunately the Prime Minister, Dr. Hodža, though himself an Agrarian, has recognised the danger which the adoption of such a policy would represent to the independence of the Republic and has withstood the pressure of

his colleagues. The fate of Austria has opened the eyes of the Czechoslovak public to what would be their fate if they were to exchange their guarantee for Herr Hitler's peaceful assurances, and Dr. Hodža's recent declaration of a policy of no surrender has found so widespread an echo in his country that his Right-Wing colleagues have judged it politic to renounce publicly the defeatist policy which they had formerly advocated. Apart from Dr. Milan Hodža, the Prime Minister, who is leader of the Slovak section of the Party, the notable personalities are Rudolf Beran (President of the Agrarian Party and proprietor of the Party's daily paper *Venkov*), J. Malypetr (an ex-Premier and now Chairman of the Chamber of Deputies), J. Zadina (Minister of Agriculture), and František Machník (Minister of National Defence). Its unofficial organ, *Národní Politika*, has an important circulation.

(ii) *Czechoslovak Social-Democrat Workers' Party.* The first traces of a conscious Labour Movement in Bohemia appeared in the revolutionary year 1848, when the workers in Prague fought against their reactionary rulers and were suppressed. In its inception this movement was essentially one of the industrial workers of the towns, in which the peasants and intellectual elements of society played little or no part. The defeat of Austria by the Prussians in 1866 led to some relaxation of the repression of the masses, Trade Unions were formed and the organised workers, at any rate, began to imbibe Marxist ideas from Germany and Austria. The Czech workers were not unprepared for Socialism, having already been moved in that direction by the Christian Socialist doctrine of the Táborites, and the outlook which they developed was of a type half-way between that of the German Socialists and that of the British Labour Movement.

It was not until 1878, however, that the Czechoslovak Social-Democrat Workers' Party was founded, and even then it was forced for many years to remain a secret and illegal organisation. Not until 1896, when the workers were at last granted the vote, could it come out into the open and win 5 seats in the Austrian Parliament. It was in that year also that appeared the first number of its paper, *Právo lidu*.

From that time onward it developed steadily, advocating always a policy of social reform which received but scant attention from the Austrian Government. Profiting by the favourable atmosphere of 1905, it successfully agitated for universal and equal suffrage, as a result of which, at the next elections, in 1907, its parliamentary representation shot up to 24. By that time it was already, with its 130,000 members, the strongest political organisation of the Czech nation.

In its struggle on behalf of the under-dog the party became inevitably the main champion of the oppressed Czechs against their Austrian rulers and exploiters, and found itself presently in opposition to the Czech bourgeoisie, and in rivalry with the Czech peasantry, who were just awakening to class-consciousness. Despite the community of the nationalist aims of these three sections of the Czech people, the clash of their class-interests could in no way be ignored. The Czech bourgeoisie even went so far as to attempt to bring confusion into the ranks of their proletariat by creating a new workers' party, the Czech National Socialist Party, which, however, lacking the support of trade union and co-operative organisations, made but little headway, and which eventually turned against those who had helped to create it.

Persecuted and suppressed throughout the period of the Great War, the Social-Democrats preserved intact their ideals of national liberation combined with social revolution. They played a great part in the revolt of 1918 and in the foundation of the Czechoslovak Republic, which placed them in a difficult position. In spite of the increased development of class-consciousness among their proletariat after the Russian Revolution, they felt incapable as yet of taking power into their hands. Should they therefore bide their time, in opposition to their bourgeoisie? Or should they avail themselves of the favourable atmosphere to obtain for the workers concessions which might later be more difficult to obtain? They decided to adopt the latter course, and consented to co-operate from the first in coalition with the bourgeois parties.

Having started with three Ministers in the first Provisional Government of Dr. Kramář, they improved their position

rapidly, their leader, Vlastimil Tusar, becoming Prime Minister in July, 1919, when Dr. Kramář resigned. During the first eighteen months of the existence of the new Republic they were able to use their influence to secure the adoption of a series of valuable measures for the betterment of the conditions of the workers. The adoption of the Eight-hour Day, the payment of Unemployment Benefits, the institution of Health Insurance, the passing of the Tenants' Protection Act, the imposition of a levy on capital, the granting to miners of a share in the control and profits of the mines—these and many other less important reforms might have been considerably delayed if the Social-Democrats had merely remained in opposition.

It is not surprising, therefore, that the first elections, in 1920, returned the Social-Democrats to power, with 74 out of 300 seats in the Chamber of Deputies, as by far the largest single party in the State. Tusar was again Prime Minister, but the very success of his party had weakened his position. On the one hand the bourgeois parties began to feel afraid and to unite in opposition to the Social-Democrats, while on the other, the Left Wing of his party agitated for the adoption of a more radical policy of the class-struggle. It seems possible that the Social-Democrats might have successfully pressed forward at this time with the class-struggle, but the situation was complicated by the "negativist" attitude maintained by the German Parties (including the German Social-Democrats) and by the risk of foreign intervention if a revolutionary policy was adopted. The situation rapidly became untenable, for the Left Wing of the party (23 Deputies) broke away from the leadership of Tusar and later formed itself into a Communist Party affiliated to the Third International. In September, 1920, therefore, it was decided by the Executive that the party should resign from the Government, since it now represented but a fraction of its former supporters.

During the next five years, while carrying on a ceaseless and losing struggle against the Communists, the Social-Democrats played a minor role in support of a series of more or less reactionary Governments, but were now less able to

gain appreciable advantages by such co-operation. At the next elections, in 1925, they won only 29 seats, as opposed to the 41 of the Communist Party, but were nevertheless once more included in the Government, in which the leading position had passed to the Agrarians, who have ever since retained it. Four years later, the Communists having become somewhat discredited owing to their constant tactical changes of policy, there was a slight recovery in the Social-Democrat position, their parliamentary representation being increased to 39, and that position has subsequently been materially maintained. Since 1925, the co-operation with them of the German Social-Democrats has rendered possible the adoption of a stronger policy within the Government and a resumption of their successes in social reform. More recently, however, the deterioration of the international situation and the advent of a strong German opposition in Parliament has enabled the Agrarians to bluff the Social-Democrats, by threats of making common cause with the German reactionaries, into considerable diminution of their demands. In point of fact, however, it seems probable that though the defection of any large number of Agrarians from the Coalition would dangerously have reduced the Government's majority, such defection was unlikely to have taken place. Apart from the fact that it would mean political suicide for an Agrarian deputy to ally himself openly with the pro-Nazis, it is difficult to conceive what possible coalition other than the present one could command sufficient popular support to be able to govern. This seems, indeed, to have been realised at last by the Social-Democrat leaders, and has been reflected in the more militant tone of some of their speeches during the past nine months. It is probably on account of this change of attitude that the Prime Minister, Dr. Hodža (a democrat, though reactionary, and above all a sincere patriot with a sense of "realpolitik"), has felt emboldened to withstand the pressure of his more reactionary colleagues and to make his courageous speech of March 4th, 1938, in answer to Hitler's challenge.

The party is led to-day by Antonín Hampl, President of the party, other notable personalities being Rudolf Bechyně (Minister of Railways and Deputy Prime Minister), Jaromír

Nečas (Minister of Social Welfare), Alfréd Meissner (ex-Minister), in addition to the Slovaks, Ivan Dérer (Minister of Justice) and Ivan Markovič. The central organ of the party is the daily *Právo lidu*, published in Prague.

(iii) *Czechoslovak National Socialist Party.* The Czechoslovak National Socialist Party (which bears no resemblance to its counterpart in Germany) celebrated its fortieth Anniversary in 1937. Founded by J. F. Klofač, now Senator, with the support of the Czech bourgeoisie, it was intended to withdraw the Czech proletariat from its Marxian doctrines and international associations, resembling somewhat, therefore, the National Labour Party in Britain to-day.

It seems to have failed completely to fulfil the function for which it was intended, for it finds its support mainly among the more snobbish sections of the black-coated workers. In policy and character it resembles somewhat the Radical Socialist Party of France, though on account of the existence of an Agrarian Party it has not the same support in the rural districts. Like the French Radical Socialist Party, it is sounder with regard to international affairs than it is with regard to social problems, tending rather to sit on the fence where internal affairs are concerned.

The influence of this party on public opinion is far greater than its numerical strength would appear to warrant; this is because of its remarkably active and effective propaganda, and of its Press—the party organ, *České Slovo*, has a circulation of over half a million copies for its evening edition, which is exceptional in Czechoslovakia. Its unofficial organ, *Lidové Noviny*, has a reputation corresponding to that of the *Manchester Guardian*.

President Beneš, in the days when he was Foreign Minister, was co-leader with Senator Klofač of the party. Other notable persons in the party are Emil Franke (Minister of Education), F. Zemínová (Leader of the Women's Section), K. Moudrý (General Secretary of the Party) and Alfréd Tučný (Minister of Posts and Telegraphs and Chairman of the party's Trade Union Organisations).

(iv) *Czechoslovak People's Party (Catholic Party).* Founded under the Austro-Hungarian régime, this party remained

loyal to Austria until shortly before the Revolution, when it decided to throw its weight on the side of the Czech National Movement.

It makes an appeal to the Catholic sentiments of the workers, with varying success. It won 21 seats in 1920, 31 in 1935, 25 in 1929 and has now, since the elections of 1935, 22 representatives in the Chamber of Deputies.

The party carries on extensive propaganda through its press organ, *Lidové Listy*, through its sports organisation (Orel), and through the lower clergy who have privileged direct access to the workers and their wives. Prominent among its representatives are Monsignor Jan Šrámek (President of the Party), Monsignor Bohumil Stašek, Josef Šamalík (Director of the Agricultural Group), Senator Houban, J. Dostálék (ex-Minister of Commerce) and Monsignor Methodius Zavoral (Abbot of the Strahov Monastery in Prague). This Party, though in the Government, has recently shown signs of succumbing to the anti-Socialist propaganda of the Nazis.

(v) *Slovak Populist Party (Catholic Party)*. Though originally working side by side with, and on the same lines as, its Czechoslovak counterpart, this party has since considerably diverged from the latter, and has tended to assume the character of a Slovak National Party. From an electoral point of view at least, the change seems to have proved beneficial, for whereas, while working on the old lines, in 1920, it secured only 12 seats, in 1925 it secured 23 seats, and 20 seats in 1929. In the last elections, in 1935, fighting in open alliance with the Slovak National Party, the Autonomist Agricultural Union (a Ruthenian party) and the Polish *bloc*, it won only 22 seats, of which 3 were allocated to its allies.

This party, led by Monsignor Andrej Hlinka, Vicar of Ružomberok, represents the strong opposition to unification which has existed in certain Slovak circles since the foundation of the Czechoslovak Republic; it acts as spokesman also for Catholicism and Conservatism in Slovakia. Its chief complaint has always been that Slovakia has not obtained the autonomy which, it claims, was promised by the Convention of Pittsburg, and that it has been treated as a "colony" by the Czechs. It is true that in the early days of the Republic,

owing to the absence of a sufficient number of educated Slovaks, the administration had to be conducted very largely by Czech officials, and that Slovak industry, deprived of its markets in Hungary, wilted, before the Central Government could come to its assistance. These conditions have already, however, corrected themselves considerably, and the main conflict now between Czechs and Slovaks is due to their difference of disposition and tradition. Slovak opposition to the Czechs is inspired also by the resentment of the clergy towards the secular character of the State, and in particular towards the creation in Slovakia of secular educational establishments. It is felt by the Catholic priesthood that the improved educational facilities that have been placed by the State at the disposal of the Slovak people are a menace to their privileged position, and their demand for autonomy is now very largely inspired by a desire to obtain control once more of all sources of learning. It is interesting, though depressing, to observe that the Slovak clergy, finding less popular response now to their anti-Czech agitation, and anxious, for reasons already explained, to keep alive the question of autonomy, have had to find new "enemies" against whom public feeling may be aroused: the slogan "Slovakia for the Slovaks" has been given an anti-Jewish and anti-Hungarian implication, with results that threaten to arrest, if not indeed to reverse, the process of racial integration which has hitherto been progressing very satisfactorily. This Party has recently been invited to join the Government in order to present a united front against the German menace. It has refused this invitation, however, preferring to try to "blackmail" the Government into making concessions.

(vi) *National Union.* The National Union is a new party of a distinctly reactionary tendency which was formed in 1935 by the fusion of the National Democrat Party with two minor semi-Fascist groups, the National Front (led by Professor Mareš) and the National League (led by Jiří Stříbrný).

The National Democrat Party came into existence shortly before the Revolution. It was composed of various bourgeois elements of which the only one of any importance was the National Liberal Party (Young Czechs) led by Dr. Karel

Kramář and Dr. Alois Rašín, both extremely able men in their own way and time. In the first Provisional Government of the Republic these two old reactionaries, Kramář and Rašín, assumed the posts of Prime Minister and Finance Minister respectively. It soon became apparent, however, that the arbitrary allocation of seats in the Provisional Government was in accordance with the self-esteem of the National Democrats, rather than with public sentiment, and at the first elections, in 1920, the National Democrat representation in Parliament fell from 46 to 19. After putting up violent opposition to the progressive policy of the Social-Democrat-Agrarian Coalition which succeeded it, the National Democrats rejoined the all-national coalition which was formed when the Social-Democrats were temporarily eclipsed. Rašín, who became once more Minister of Finance under an Agrarian Prime Minister (Švehla), proceeded ruthlessly "to put the Czechoslovak currency on a firm basis", and was assassinated by a young Communist who was incensed at the consequences of this operation for the workers.

The National Union fought vigorously in the 1935 election on an anti-socialist platform, but succeeded in securing only 17 seats. After over two years in opposition, it has recently been accepted into the Government Coalition in the hope that the Slovak Catholics might thereby be induced to join the united front against the German menace.

This party enjoys the support of the *Národní listy*, press organ of the former National Democrats and the oldest of the Czech daily papers.

(vii) *Czechoslovak Small-Traders' Party.* This party rather ineffectually represents the interests of the artisans and traders, who find their livelihood threatened by the growth of big combines and the extension of the activities of the Co-operative Societies. It has presumably been responsible for the legislation restricting the development of multiple shops and one-price stores, but can obviously do nothing to save its trustful supporters from their fate.

At the 1920 elections the party secured only 6 seats, in 1925 it secured 13, and 12 in 1929. A party which will solicit public support for a policy which it must realise can never be

carried out cannot be overburdened with scruples. It is not surprising, therefore, to observe its recent tactical manœuvres. Having during the greater part of the last administration formed part of the Government Coalition, and realising its impotence to help its supporters, who were suffering severely from the effects of trade depression, it withdrew from the Coalition shortly before the 1935 elections. It thus exonerated itself from blame in the eyes of those to whom it appealed, and was fortunate enough to profit thereby to the extent of 5 seats, increasing its representation in Parliament to 17. No sooner, however, were the elections safely over for another six years, than the party joined the Government again and its leader, V. J. Najman, became once more the Minister of Commerce.

(viii) *Fascist National Community.* This party, the smallest of all Czechoslovak parties, managed, thanks to the "quorum"¹ to obtain 6 seats in Parliament at the 1935 elections.

The party professes the usual Fascist beliefs and is led by Rudolf Gajda whose chief claim to fame is that he was deprived of the rank of General and dismissed from his post as Chief of the General Staff on account of his intimate relations with a foreign Power.

The Fascists find a certain amount of support among the "intellectual proletariat", and have many sympathisers among the students of the University of Prague, but not so many in the other universities.

(b) GERMAN PARTIES.

(i) *German Social-Democrat Party.* This party met with enormous success in the first elections, in 1920, when it secured 34·5% of the German votes and thus won 31 seats in the Chamber of Deputies. At the next elections, in 1925 however, it experienced a severe setback, obtaining only 17 seats; this was due partly to the effects of the secession of the Communists, and partly to a reactionary tendency in the electorate. In 1929 it was starting to recover the ground which it had lost, its parliamentary representation being increased to 21, but this was more than lost again in 1935, when it managed to hold only 11 seats.

¹ See page 118.

The German Social-Democrats, although they did not join the German National Union, were for a long time unable to reconcile themselves to adopting a policy of co-operation within the Czechoslovak Republic. It was not until 1929, which was four years after the German Agrarians and Christian Socialists had agreed to participate in the government of their State, that they were willing to adopt an "activist" attitude. Since then, however, they loyally collaborated within the Czechoslovak Government in opposition to the menace from Nazi Germany, until March, 1938, when, after Hitler's annexation of Austria had scared all other German parties into the Opposition, they felt obliged, for tactical reasons, to leave the Government Coalition. They intend, however, to continue their policy of co-operation with the Czechoslovaks.

Their chief newspaper is the *Sozialdemocrat*, published in Prague, and their leader is Wenzel Jaksch, who was recently elected, to succeed Dr. Ludwig Czech, the retiring Minister of Health.

(ii) *German Agrarian Party.* This was the first of the German parties to adopt an "activist" policy of co-operation with the Czechoslovak Government. It has also been the first to renounce that policy.

Representing the farmers and peasants, this party started in 1920 with 12 Deputies in the Chamber. In 1925 it increased this number to 15, who were shortly afterwards joined by 3 Artisans and 5 Members of the Magyar Nationalist Party. At the next election, however, in 1929, this time in conjunction with 4 Deputies of the German Union and Labour Party, it had in all only 16 seats, and in 1935 it lost 7 of these to the Sudete German Party. It had therefore only 5 representatives in the Chamber of Deputies and no representation in the Senate when it passed out of existence in March, 1938.

The leader of the party, Franz Spina, was in the Cabinet from 1926 until March, 1938, when his party decided to cease co-operation with the Czechoslovaks. He is reported to be retiring from public life, and will doubtless have no successor, since his party no longer has any independent existence.

(iii) *German Christian Socialist Party.* This mildly humanitarian, but on the whole conservative, party was established

in 1919. It aims at promoting religious teaching in the schools and at protecting the workers from exploitation, but as it is not anti-capitalist one finds it difficult to imagine how it hopes to achieve the latter aim. Starting with 9 Deputies in 1920, it made some progress (to 13) in 1925, but was back again at 9 in 1929. In 1935, together with the other "activist" parties, it lost still further, securing only 6 seats in the Chamber of Deputies and 3 in the Senate.

Its leader is Hans Schütz, and its party organ the daily *Deutsche Presse*.

In 1925 it was one of the two German parties which abandoned their "negativist" attitude of non-co-operation, but abandoned the Government again in 1929. After some hesitation in 1935, it rejoined in the Government Coalition until March, 1938, when it was terrorised into joining the Opposition and sacrificing its independent existence. The intellectual elements of the party are reported to remain true to the former policy of the party, and to be forming a new party.

(iv) *German Small-Traders' Party*. This party corresponds exactly to the Czechoslovak party of similar name. Its 3 Deputies joined the German Agrarians in 1925 and the German Christian Socialists in 1929, but lost their seats in 1935.

(v) *Sudete German Party*. Founded on October 1st, 1934, by Konrad Henlein, till then Head of the German Turnverband (Gymnastic Federation), this party represents itself as a United German Party, appealing to the national sentiment of all loyal Germans in Czechoslovakia.

Its original and most energetic supporters are the members of the former German National Socialist Workers' Party, which avoided compulsory dissolution by voluntarily liquidating itself and joining the new party.

It has so successfully exploited the hysterical nationalist fervour which has seeped across the frontier from Germany and the economic distress in the German industrial districts of Czechoslovakia, that in the elections of May, 1935, it secured 57% of the total German vote (if those cast for the Communist Party are excluded), and has therefore obtained 44 seats in the Chamber of Deputies and 23 in the Senate. It thus became the second largest party in the Republic;

only very slightly smaller than the Agrarian Party. After Hitler's successful *coup de force* in Austria, this party adopted a more threatening attitude towards the other German parties, both in Parliament and in the country. It succeeded by this means in terrorising the German Agrarians and Christian Socialists into leaving the Government Coalition and merging themselves into the United German Party.

The Sudete German Party, with 55 seats, has thus become the largest party in the State. It cannot, however, claim to represent all the Germans of Czechoslovakia, for there remain outside it still that proportion of it which is represented in Parliament by 11 Social-Democrat and 5 Communist Deputies.

Its programme, which is dealt with more fully later is generally one of obtaining benefits for the German minority, the two main planks in its platform being local autonomy for the German districts along the Czecho-German frontier and the abandonment of the Czecho-Soviet Pact of Mutual Assistance against Unprovoked Aggression.

The party professed to be democratic and loyal to the Czechoslovak Republic, but at the same time advocated as much as it dared in a democratic country of the Nazi principles, refusing, for instance, to recognise any of the other German parties. Its close connection with the National Socialists of Germany was thinly veiled and is now openly declared.

The organ of the Sudete German Party is *Die Zeit*, published in Prague.

(c) CZECHOSLOVAK COMMUNIST PARTY. The Czechoslovak Communist Party came into being in September, 1920, as the result of a split in the Czechoslovak Social-Democrat Labour Party on the question of collaboration with the bourgeois parties.

At the general election held in April of that year the Social-Democrats, led by Vlastimil Tusar, had been returned to Parliament as by far the largest party. They obtained 74 seats in the Chamber of Deputies and 41 in the Senate, as compared with the 40 and 20 seats respectively of the Agrarians, who were the next in size. Since the German and other minority representatives were adopting an attitude of non-co-operation, government devolved on the Czechoslovak parties, among

whom there was a very slight preponderance of power in favour of the Socialists—actually the Socialists held 50·6% of the seats in both Houses.

Encouraged by this indication of popular sentiment, the Left Wing of the Social Democrats, led by Šmeral, who had recently returned from Moscow, urged that a purely Socialist Government should be formed, leaving all the bourgeois parties in opposition. The more cautious elements, for reasons which have already been explained, opposed this proposal, arguing that substantial progress had been achieved already in coalition with the bourgeois parties, despite the initially weighted representation of the latter, and that their electoral success should be interpreted rather as an endorsement by the people of a policy of class-collaboration.

As a result of this dispute, 23 of the Social-Democrat Deputies broke away from their party and commenced a struggle for power against their reactionary leaders. The Left-Wing elements took possession for a while of the Party Headquarters and of the Party Press, but were forcibly ejected by the civil authorities. Thereafter they carried on a bitter struggle in every branch and section of the Labour Movement, so weakening their party in the process that it could not maintain its position in the Government and lost the office of Prime Minister, which it has never since then regained.

A Government of officials under the Premiership of Jan Černý, the reactionary Head of the Provincial Administration of Moravia, assumed office owing to the disturbed political situation. Strong measures were taken to preserve order, and a general strike called by the dissident Social-Democrats as a protest against these was put down by Černý with great severity.

In May, 1921, the Left Wing formed themselves into a Communist Party, affiliated to the Third International, and in the next elections, in 1925, this party secured no less than 943,243 votes, which was almost as many as were cast for the Agrarians. The Communists thus obtained 41 seats in the Chamber of Deputies and 20 in the Senate (the Agrarians obtained 45 and 23) and were considerably stronger than the Social-Democrats, who had only 29 Deputies and 14 Senators.

This proved, however, to be the peak of the Communist power, which declined thereafter to such an extent that in the elections of 1929 they had only 30 Deputies and 15 Senators, a position which has since then remained substantially unchanged. At the present time they are the fourth largest party in the Republic, finding their main support, not in the industrial areas of the West, but among the more poverty-stricken populations of Slovakia and Subcarpathian Ruthenia. Recently, however, owing to the weak policy of some of the Social-Democrat leaders, and because of the changed policy of the Comintern, there has grown up a tendency among the industrial workers to look to the Communist Party for a lead.

The party has always been handicapped by its constant internal dissensions, and has lost much public confidence on account of its tactical vagaries of policy in accordance with the changing decisions of the Comintern.

The main organ of the party is the *Rudé právo*, published in Prague, but it publishes journals also in other large towns.

Prominent personalities in the party are Senator Bohumil Šmeral, Klement Gottwald (Leader of the Party in the Chamber of Deputies), Josef Haken (Leader of the Party in the Senate) Jaromír Dolanský (active in connection with the I.P.C.) and, outside of Parliament, the well-known Professor of Music, Zdeněk Nejedlý.

(d) MINOR NATIONALITIES. The minor nationalities enjoy full proportional representation in both Houses of Parliament, but it is not always practicable for their representatives to be returned as members of some national party; many of them obtain their mandates through one or other of the larger political parties—Agrarian, Social-Democrat or Communist.

Even the Magyars, who number close on 700,000, find it possible to have only two parties of their own, the Christian Socialist Party and the Nationalist Party. These two parties, which are both in the Opposition, obtain between them only a portion (probably about 60%) of the total Magyar votes, as the remainder are distributed among those Czechoslovak parties which have Magyar candidates on their lists. Altogether there are ten Magyar Deputies in the present Parliament,

including one who is granted a mandate by the Communist Party in respect of Subcarpathian Ruthenia.

The Polish Minority contains a large proportion of Communists and is therefore granted a mandate on the list of the Communist Party. They obtain further representation by working in conjunction with the Slovak Populist Party and with the Jews.

(e) SUBCARPATHIAN RUTHENIA. Up to the present time the population of Subcarpathian Ruthenia has been represented in Parliament by 9 Deputies and 5 Senators, 2 of the Deputies and 1 of the Senators representing the Magyar parties. The Deputies hold mandates as follows in the present Parliament, elected in 1935:—

Communist	3
Agrarian (ČS)	2
Autonomist Agricultural Federation	1
National Union	1
Social-Democrat (ČS)	1
Magyar Opposition	1

The low level of cultural and political development of the people, especially of the Ruthenes, and the multiplicity of racial and religious currents cutting across normal class divisions, have resulted in exaggerated fractionisation of the electorate. Many of the political parties do not, in fact, represent any programme or ideology, and several of them are of an ephemeral character. As the "electoral quota"¹ is relatively high, these political parties are compelled, for election purposes, to lean on one or other of the bigger parties covering the whole Republic.

4. Composition of Present Parliament (May, 1938). The composition of the present Parliament is shown in the Table below, from which can be seen also the composition of the Government Coalition. The latter has been slightly changed since the Government was first formed, in 1935, the German Agrarian and Christian Socialist Parties having gone into opposition, while the Czechoslovak National Union has been

¹ See page 112:

received into the Government and the German Social-Democrats have left the Government, though not to join the Opposition. These changes leave the Government still with a substantial majority.

DIVISION OF POLITICAL PARTIES AS SHOWN IN THE CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES

<i>Government</i>		<i>Opposition</i>	
Agrarian	45	Sudete German	44
Czechoslovak Social-Democrat	38	Slovak Catholic	22
Czech National Socialist	28	Hungarian Opposition . .	9
Czechoslovak Catholic . .	22	Fascist	6
Small Traders	17	German Agrarian	5 ³
National Union	17 ¹	German Christian Socialist	6 ³
<hr/>		<hr/>	
167		92	

Conditionally in Support

Communist	30
Independent	2
German Social Democrat	11 ²
<hr/>	
43	

The composition of the four Parliaments which have been elected since the foundation of the Republic is shown below :—

	<i>April,</i> 1920	<i>November,</i> 1925	<i>October,</i> 1929	<i>May,</i> 1935
<i>Czechoslovak Parties</i>				
Agrarian	40	46	46	45
Social-Democrat . .	74	29	39	38
Progressive Socialist	3	—	—	—
National Socialist . .	24	28	32	28
National Democrat . .	19	13	15	17
National Union . . .	—	—	3	—
Small Traders	6	13	12	17

¹ Entered the Government in March, 1938.

² Left the Government in March, 1938.

³ Left the Government in March, 1938, and now merged in the Sudete German Party.

	<i>April,</i> 1920	<i>November,</i> 1925	<i>October,</i> 1929	<i>May,</i> 1935
<i>Czechoslovak Parties</i>				
Czech Catholic .	21	31	25	22
Slovak Catholic .	12	23	19	22
Fascist . . .	—	—	—	6
	199	183	191	195
<i>Other Parties</i>				
Communist . .	—	41	30	30
Sudete German .	—	—	—	44
German Social-Democrat . .	31	17	21	11
German Agrarian .	13	24	16	5
German Christian Soc.	9	13	14	6
German Nationalist	12	10	7	—
German National Soc.	5	7	8	—
German Democratic.	2	—	—	—
German Small Traders .	—	—	3	—
Hungarian National.	1	—	4	9
Hungarian Christian Soc.	5	4	5	
Hungarian-Ger. Soc.-Dem.	4	—	—	—
Independent . .	—	1	1	—
	281	300	300	300

5. Local Government. All Local Government bodies are elected in a similar manner to Parliament. The period for which they are elected is somewhat vague, and is in fact determined by the Central Government. Local Elections may be held at any time, and are not necessarily held simultaneously all over the Republic.

These bodies enjoy a considerable degree of local autonomy with regard to administration, thanks to which national minorities can have the satisfaction of themselves deciding and managing what most concerns their daily lives.

CHAPTER V

SOCIAL CONDITIONS AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION

1. General Survey. Despite the fact that the Czechs are the most hard-working, the most thrifty, the most energetic and the most rationalistic people in Central Europe, the standard of living is generally low—very low in some sections of the population—and Czechoslovakia has the lowest consumption per head of her people among the industrial nations. There has been less improvement in this respect since the Revolution than might have been expected, owing partly to the fact that agrarian reform has not yet led to intensified cultivation, and partly to the fact that industry has been deprived of many of its former markets.

Wages and salaries are low by British standards, though substantially higher than those in the other small States of Central Europe, but the prices of food, clothing and other necessities are also low, and the money value of the various forms of social insurance is considerable, though difficult to assess. The range of difference between the earnings of various classes of people is small as compared with that in Britain, and this makes generally for contentment—even if it is at a lower level because it is not subsidised by the fruits of exploitation in colonies and other countries. The class which seems to come off worst is the intellectual class—journalists, writers, doctors, and even to some extent lawyers—who are remunerated at so low a rate that they, and frequently also their wives, can afford but little leisure.

Against this must be weighed the fact that the Czechoslovak people may be said, more than most, to own their country. Apart from the Land Reform,¹ which gave land to the peasants, they actually do own, through their "State Enterprises",² a considerable part of the country, and they it is who own the royalty rights of their great mining industry.

¹ See pages 137–141.

² See pages 92–96.

The fact of this public ownership has not been without effect on the lives of the people, for it has been taken into account by successive Governments and by the Administration when developing the resources of the country and regulating their use. Railway travel is made cheap so that the masses may see their country; the mountain resorts and other holiday centres have been developed primarily with a view to satisfying the needs and requirements of comparatively impecunious Czechoslovak citizens, and only recently, when those have been satisfied and amply safeguarded, has it been sought to exploit them further as sources of national income from foreign visitors.

The political revolution of October 28th, 1918, opened the way in Czechoslovakia for the development of new ideas on social progress. While primarily a national revolution, it was also, because of the social structure of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, a social revolution. The former ruling class, being almost entirely Austrian or Hungarian, was removed from political, though not entirely from economic, power, while the national genius of the Czechs and Slovaks, freed at last after centuries of repression, sought and found means of self-expression in social legislation of a highly enlightened and progressive nature.

This reformist fervour found warm support and inspiration from the late President Masaryk, who held that humanitarian democracy should be not merely political, but also economic and social. The main credit, however, for the social legislation which has placed Czechoslovakia in the first rank among the progressive States is due to the Social-Democrat Labour Party, which was in control of the Coalition Government during the important period (July, 1919—September, 1920) when the new Republic was settling down. The influence of the Social-Democrats, though diminished since the secession from it of the Communist Party, with whom united action is still refused, remained very strong and perceptible, even after the advent of the world economic crisis, until the sharpening of the international situation rendered them perhaps too susceptible to "blackmail" on the part of some of their more reactionary colleagues in the Government Coalition.

There was opposition, of course, to this radical transformation of conditions in a country which had hitherto been noted for the backwardness of its labour conditions and for its dearth of social services. Such opposition was easily overcome, however, during the first years of the Republic, for national feeling was running so high that the reactionaries among the Czechs and Slovaks (who existed, though not in large numbers) dared not make common cause with their Austrian and Hungarian colleagues against the destruction of their position of prestige and power.

Class-distinctions between worker, peasant, tradesman, manufacturer and the professional man are generally not great among the Czechoslovaks, with the result that the masses have been able to achieve by democratic means, and to maintain, a bloodless victory. It was without exaggeration, therefore, that President Beneš was able to say, in a speech delivered at Liberec (Reichenberg) on August 19th, 1936: "Our State has the good fortune to live in a condition of having already achieved much that is elsewhere still the subject of struggle and controversy."

The development of political reaction in every one of the neighbouring countries, and more particularly the development of German National Socialism, whose international intrigues flourish in the freedom of democratic Czechoslovakia, together with the financial stringency consequent on the economic crisis and the increased demands of the defence forces, has stiffened the opposition to social progress, bringing it sometimes almost to a standstill. The progressive elements remain predominant, nevertheless, in the Legislature, warmly and openly supported by President Beneš, and it would still be political suicide for any party or politician dependent on popular support to propose yielding an inch of the ground which has been gained by the people. The prolongation, however, of the existing state of international tension, which may be regarded as a constant threat to the independence of Czechoslovakia, presents a danger that class-interests may be submerged by national feeling to such a degree that the workers will not effectively oppose reactionary encroachment on their privileges.

2. Land Reform. The first reform to be undertaken by the new Republic was one which would give land to its land-hungry peasantry. This measure was of prime importance not only because of the security and increased prosperity which it offered to a large section of the population, but also because it robbed the Austro-Hungarian ruling class of the principal economic basis of its power.

According to the last census before the war, there were in Bohemia and Moravia-Silesia 401 estates of over 2,500 acres each, while in Slovakia and Subcarpathian Ruthenia there were 935 estates of over 1,000 acres each. In many cases one individual or family owned several of these large estates,¹ so that there were actually perhaps a thousand individual owners who owned 9,129,838 acres of land—this included most of the best agricultural land—or 26% of the total area of the Republic. As a contrast to these there were countless small-holdings, too small to render a family independent, in the ex-Austrian territories² (Bohemia and Moravia-Silesia), while in the ex-Hungarian territories, as in Hungary to this day, the peasants had practically no land at all.

Social justice, no less than economic need, demanded, therefore, a radical redistribution of the land, and if further justification was required one may recall that a large proportion of the land represented by these huge estates had passed into the hands of the ancestors of those who then owned it as a result of the wholesale sequestration of Czech lands following the Battle of the White Mountain³ and the reinstatement of the Roman Catholic Church in power. In Slovakia and Subcarpathian Ruthenia the estates had been acquired by conquest and robbery. Besides which, as said before, the dislodgement of the landed gentry was absolutely essential if the Republic were to survive in the democratic form which its founders and its people desired.

¹ The Schwartzenberg families owned 187 estates with a total area of close on half a million acres. The wealthier bishops and religious Orders also owned several estates, one bishop being lord of a property measuring 114,394 acres.

² In these territories 1,049,457 small farmers (70·7% of the landowners) with holdings of under 5 acres each, owned only 6·5% of the land area.

³ See pages 37–38.

Even before the Constitution was drawn up, therefore, the revolutionary Constituent Assembly passed the first instalment of the Land Act whereby the social structure of the countryside was to be transformed. The sale, transfer or mortgaging of any estate of more than 625 acres, or of more than 375 acres of arable land, was prohibited. Later, on April 27th, 1919, a Land Act was passed whereby no proprietor might own more than 625 acres of land (375 acres of arable land and 250 acres of pasture-land or forest), any land in excess of that figure being compulsorily sold to the Czechoslovak Government at a price corresponding to its pre-war, not to its inflated post-war, value. The estates of the Habsburg dynasty were confiscated by the State without compensation.

The State thus assumed the right to take over some 10 million acres (out of a total of about 42 million acres) and at the end of 1935 had actually distributed about 4,400,000 acres.¹ A Land Office was set up to supervise the execution of this transfer of ownership and to deal with applications from those who wished to take over portions of it. The Land Office was also required by law to make provision for those who had been employees on the estates which were broken up: managers, clerical staff and agricultural labourers. These were compensated with allotments of land (29,295), or with cash bonuses (31,612) and 4,647 of them were granted State pensions, so they cannot be said to have been victimised.

Applications for the sequestered lands were dealt with, each on its own merits, by the Land Office, preference always being given, when making an allocation, to those who had actually been working the land in question or adjacent land, and to Legionaries who had fought for their nation's liberation. The guiding principles were that the amount of land held

¹ Part of the land not yet distributed will eventually be distributed, as demands come in and are dealt with. Considerable areas are unsuitable for distribution; these, together with much of the sequestered lands of the Habsburgs of a similar type, are administered as a State Forestry Enterprise (see pages 94-95). Part has been left in the hands of its foreign owners (mostly Hungarian nobles), as a result of pressure exercised on their behalf by their friends in Britain. The remainder was for some time administered as a separate estate on behalf of the Roman Catholic Church, pending the conclusion of a "*modus vivendi*", and has now been restored to that Church in return for concessions made by that "*modus vivendi*" (see page 108).

by an individual should be enough to support a family, but should not be more than a family could work without regular help from outside, and that the individual must depend upon that land for the main source of his income. As a general rule 15 to 25 acres was considered a suitable holding, or, if it was of poor quality, perhaps as much as 40 acres—this included any land which the owner might wish to use for some small industry (to be worked by his family only) or for his dwelling. Care was taken to prevent the creation of large properties by each member of a large family applying for his quota; members of a family resident in a common household were allowed no independent claim for land. The land was either given in lease, or sold outright, according to the wishes of the individual and the judgment of the Land Office.¹ Land which was sold might not be re-sold for at least ten years without the consent of the Land Office. Land which was sold might be redeemed and land which was leased might have its lease cancelled by the Land Office if the owner or lessee—

1. acquired by purchase, inheritance or other means, an estate which was twice as large as any other in the neighbourhood;
2. did not live on it and work it himself, with the aid only of his family;
3. became more than three years in arrears with his payments;
4. cultivated his fields badly;
5. led an irregular life; or
6. set a bad example to his neighbours.

A departure from the foregoing principles was allowed in the case of those portions of an estate which could not be split up without considerable loss, the so-called "remnant farms". Examples of such farms are those in which there existed already a distillery for the conversion of potatoes into alcohol, or a cheese or butter factory. The original owners

¹ The Social-Democrats wished all land to be leased, not sold, but were compelled to compromise with the Agrarians, who believe in individual ownership.

were allowed to preserve these if they wished, provided that they surrendered in exchange a corresponding acreage of land suitable for splitting up. Otherwise they were leased to organisations or to individuals "especially capable of managing large agricultural enterprises and able to make them models". The Social-Democrats wanted them to be leased to co-operative organisations only, but were again over-ridden by the Agrarians, some of whose protégés subsequently proved far from "especially capable of managing" these farms. These "remnant farms", together with pasturage, forest land and fish-ponds (which could obviously not be split up) were eventually disposed of as follows. The farms went mostly to individuals, but occasionally to co-operative organisations; a few were taken over by the Board of Agriculture, to serve as experimental stations, and a few were taken over by joint-stock companies for growing beet and producing sugar. Pastures were given to communities, and to individuals only if there was no community to use them, or if a community did not apply for them. Forest-land was either kept by the State or given to communities, as were also fish-ponds. Most of the factories situated on such lands were left in the hands of their owners, individuals or companies.

By the end of 1935 the Land Office had distributed 4,465,300 acres of land to 639,000 applicants, of whom 235,000 were new farmers and 404,000 increased holdings which were too small. It had also allotted 362,540 acres of forest land and pasturage to communities, and 296,250 acres to co-operative organisations. Where the applicants had not the means to pay for what they acquired, they often borrowed from the co-operative credit organisations,¹ failing which the Land Office lent them the money on easy terms for the purpose and also for the purchase of equipment, etc., to start themselves off as farmers. The loans made by the State in this connection amounted to about £15 million, of which over £9 million had been repaid by the end of 1934.

The radical change in the distribution of land will be appreciated by comparing the figures already quoted for pre-war days with those shown below.

¹ See page 188.

LAND DISTRIBUTION (1930)

	<i>Percentage of total number of farms</i>	<i>Percentage of total land</i>
Farms up to $2\frac{1}{2}$ acres .	28·1	2·3
„ from $2\frac{1}{2}$ – $12\frac{1}{2}$ acres .	42·7	20·8
„ „ $12\frac{1}{2}$ –25 acres .	15·7	19·9
„ „ 25–75 acres .	11·4	31·1
„ „ 75–250 acres .	1·5	10·4
„ over 250 acres .	0·6	15·5

The cost of this amazing transformation would, of course, have been negligible if the Social-Democrats had had their way and merely confiscated the land, without compensation, and given it to Peasant Co-operatives. As it was, it had to be met, for the time being, by a State Loan. Not long afterwards, however, the burden was largely transferred back onto the shoulders of those who should have borne it from the first. The inflationary effect of floating such a large loan and of lending money to the peasants created a currency crisis, and in April, 1920, the Social-Democrats, then at the head of the Government, “stabilised the national currency”, by levying a tax on capital and on capital increases which produced about £67 million.

The Land Act affected directly perhaps 8% only of the industrial workers, but their claims were not in any degree neglected.

3. Working Hours. Prior to the Revolution it was customary to work 11 hours a day (9 hours in the mines). One of the first Bills to be passed by the National Assembly was that of December 19th, 1918, establishing an eight-hour day and a forty-eight-hour week for all workers, including agricultural workers, but excepting domestic servants, for whom it is difficult to legislate effectively.¹ Overtime was allowed in seasonal work, such as building and agriculture, but is strictly limited to a maximum of two hours a day and must not cover

¹ The provisions of this Act apply to nurses and others employed in hospitals, and may not be departed from without special permission from the Local Government Authority.

more than 20 weeks in a year. It is interesting to note that the adoption of an eight-hour day was advocated in Czechoslovakia as early as the 17th century by Komenský,¹ and later, in 1900, by Dr. Masaryk, who eventually, as President, had the satisfaction of signing the Eight-Hour Day Bill to make it law.

Subsequently the Forty-Hour Week has been adopted by many employers, and Czechoslovakia is now one of the strongest advocates at the I.L.O. of its standardisation.

4. Women and Children. Further laws forbid the employment of women or of persons under 16 in mines or in other dangerous occupations (e.g. work with lead), the employment of boys under 16 or girls under 18 at any heavy labour, and the employment on night work of women and minors. Children under 14 and those attending school may not be employed in any work to which the eight-hour day applies. The militant feminists protest against legislation of this nature on the ground that it is contrary to the Constitution of the Republic, which affirms the absolute equality of the sexes!

5. The Liberty of the Worker. The Czechoslovak Constitution guarantees to all employees (*including those employed by the State*) unrestricted right of association for the purpose of collective negotiation of wages and working conditions. Any action to restrict this right is prohibited, as is also the victimisation of an employee for exercising this right or for the free expression of opinion. A special law provides for the infliction of severe penalties on an employer who tries to take advantage of the dependent position of a worker. No special regulations are laid down regarding the formation of Trade Unions or Co-operatives.

6. Factory and Works Inspection. The generally unsatisfactory organisation of factory and works inspection under the Austro-Hungarian régime has had to be completely reformed and modernised. The number of inspectors has been substantially increased, and they have been organised in 34 regional groups, each supervised by an engineer with a degree. These inspectors are responsible not only for the carrying out

¹ See pages 38-39.

of the measures laid down by law for the safety and health of workers (*including those laid down for home workers*),¹ but also for the correct conduct of disputes and other negotiations between employers and employees in connection with collective contracts or large-scale dismissals.² Their work has been enormously increased during recent years on account of the development of social legislation and of the widespread rationalisation of industry, which have entailed much reconstruction of factories and the adoption of new methods of production.

7. Works Committees. Works (or Wages) Committees of the employees, recognised by law, were instituted for the miners³ in 1920, for all industrial concerns in 1921, and for banks and financial houses in 1932. These Committees, which *must* be set up in any business employing 30 or more persons, have proved a success in fulfilling various functions in the conduct of relations between employer and employees. They may insist on the adoption of safety and hygienic measures, and are responsible for the due observance of the conditions laid down in the collective contracts, representing the employees in the event of any dispute. They may approach the management on behalf of any employee whom the latter may wish to discharge.

The Works Committee is entitled to have its representative on the administration of the mine, factory or office, and to demand that the employer consults it regarding his actions. The employer is called upon to render a report every six months to his Works Committee.

These Committees are rightly regarded by the Social-Democrats as of very great importance, not merely from the immediate practical point of view, but also as a training-ground for the preparation of those who must take over and run the concerns when they are nationalised by a Socialist Government. It was for this reason that the Bill prescribing the universal establishment of these Committees was opposed in Parliament by all the bourgeois parties, and was allowed

¹ Czechoslovakia has ratified all the social-hygienic resolutions and recommendations of the I.L.O.

² See pages 152-154.

³ At the same time it was decided that the miners should share in the control of the mines and should receive 10% of the profits.

through eventually (in August, 1921) only as the result of a bargain whereby the Social-Democrats withdrew their opposition to certain (to them) unwelcome measures of fiscal reform.

8. Labour Courts. Each large town and every district has its Labour Court, set up by law, to which an employee may appeal if he cannot obtain satisfaction by direct negotiation with his employers. Most of the cases which come before these courts relate to hours and conditions of work, deductions from pay, or illegal discharge. The employer is compelled to attend, when called before this court, and if found in the wrong may be heavily fined and made, in addition, to pay the court costs. It is quite understood that these courts exist for the protection of the worker, and employers frequently complain that their decisions are biased in favour of the employee. As a rule, however, no case is given a hearing until the Court has thoroughly investigated it and is satisfied that the employee's complaint seems valid: it is not surprising, therefore that few employers called before the Labour Court escape punishment.

9. Wages and Salaries. Owing to the lowered exchange rate of the Czechoslovak crown, which has enabled Czechoslovakia to compete more effectively with her rivals in the export markets of the world, wages and salaries are comparatively low in terms of gold. Real wages, however, in terms of purchasing power, are about 120% of the pre-war level, and are higher than those in Germany, Italy, Poland, France or Belgium, and much higher than those in the other small States of Central Europe and the Balkans. Wage rates are generally fixed by negotiation between the Trade Unions and the employers and are embodied in the Collective Contract to which every employee is entitled.

The salaries of civil servants, and more especially of teachers, were substantially improved early in 1920, but are still in many cases lamentably low. The democratisation of education seems to have had the effect of reducing its market value to an excessive degree. As almost everyone is pensionable, either because he or she is in State employment, or through

one of the pension insurance schemes, the necessity for having a surplus to save is less urgent than in many countries.

10. Family Allowances. The payment of family allowances is general now in all types of employment.

State employers, including Railway officials, are paid at the following rates:—

	<i>1 child</i>	<i>Several children</i>
Higher Officials and Teachers . . .	1,800 Kč a year	3,000 Kč a year
Lower Officials . . .	1,200 Kč „	2,100 Kč „

These rates are payable in respect of children up to the age of 18, but payment is prolonged until the age of 24 in respect of a child who undergoes higher education (i.e. at University or Technical College), and indefinitely in the case of an infirm child.

All collective agreements¹ provide for the payment of a family allowance in some form or another, either in cash or in kind, varying in different districts. Agricultural workers get no extra wages, but get benefits in kind representing a 25% increase, if they have a family.

11. Holidays with Pay. Holidays with pay, which were instituted as far back as 1910, under the Austro-Hungarian régime, for clerks, and which were secured by the miners in 1921, have been since 1925 the established right of every worker. One week's holiday with pay in the summer is assured by law to all persons in any employment (even to those employed as domestic servants or in hotels and restaurants), while many collective contracts provide for longer holidays. Office workers have paid holidays of one to four weeks according to their length of service.²

12. Housing. The housing crisis, which was due primarily, as elsewhere, to the cessation of building construction during the war, was aggravated in Czechoslovakia after the Revolution by the commandeering of many extra buildings for service as

¹ Including those of agricultural workers.

² See page 156.

provisional Government offices. Landlords attempted to take advantage of the crisis by putting up their rents, and contractors likewise, by demanding prohibitive prices for new construction.

A *Tenants' Protection Act* was passed on December 27th, 1918, prohibiting the increase of rents for existing apartments or houses or the ejection of their tenants until other suitable accommodation was available. This was extended later to limit strictly the rent chargeable for various types of accommodation. These Acts have been gradually relaxed as the housing crisis has eased, but still apply with regard to one-room apartments.

In order to provide rooms immediately for those who had not a roof over their heads, the Government assumed for a time the authority to commandeer, for the use of such people, any surplus accommodation in the apartments or houses of private individuals.

The State itself did not attempt to build flats or houses, except, where necessary, for its own officials. From 1920 onwards, however, the State has encouraged building by remitting the taxation of property owners who renovate their houses or who build new ones, and by granting liberal subsidies, amounting in some cases to as much as 80% of the building costs. In 1929 all previous legislation was embodied in one Act, which also provided for the establishment of a Housing Fund. This State assistance made it possible for the establishment of numerous *Co-operative Building Societies* (Municipal Employees', Post Office Workers', Teachers', and so on) which have provided good housing on moderate terms for their members.

Legislation has also been passed regulating the prices of building materials in the interests of the builder (and consequently in the interests of the public), and providing for the setting up of *People's Price Courts*, on which the Trade Union organisations are represented, to see that profiteering does not go on.

Up to the end of 1936, 982,642,000 Kč (about £6,500,000) had been expended by the State for the erection of 1,224 houses to accommodate 10,945 families. Plans are in execution now for the construction, with State aid, of 11,000 flats, each with a kitchen and two living rooms.

Despite these efforts the housing problem has by no means been solved as yet—even in the more “civilised” parts of the country. The behaviour of the Government with regard to this state of affairs is typical of Czechoslovakia: instead of trying to pretend that all is well, it organised in Prague a public exhibition showing in harrowing detail the conditions in which some of the unemployed were still compelled to live, even in the capital city. Such an exhibition was intended to shame the public into availing themselves more fully of the help which the State is ready to give to private building enterprise. One wonders, however, as one notes—and one cannot but note—the striking contrast between the splendid school buildings (State-built) and the homes from which their pupils come, that the moral pointed by that contrast is apparently not yet appreciated. How many schools, and what sort of schools, would Czechoslovakia have to-day if she had left the task of their creation to private enterprise?

13. Unemployment. Unemployment in Czechoslovakia has been a serious problem ever since the world economic crisis began to take effect on her exporting industries, most of which are in the German districts of Bohemia.

Apart from fiscal and financial measures designed to mitigate these effects, the Government has spent a great deal of money on Public Works of all kinds, notably in connection with the State Railways and the roads, and has encouraged Local Authorities to do likewise. The money to pay for this has been obtained partly from the profits of the State Enterprises and partly by taxation, the deficit having been covered by a State Loan. During the first half of 1936 the Ministry of Public Works spent 290,600,000 Kč. on Public Works for purposes mainly of relief, and in 1937 the Ministry of Finance spent similarly 5,249,621,600 Kč.

As a result of these measures and of the improvement of world trade conditions, the situation is now substantially improved, in the sense that more people are in employment, but the number of unemployed remains at an unhealthy level. Under a system of capitalism and under existing world conditions, the situation could be improved only by extensive

alterations in the distribution of the population between agriculture and industry, which would probably be accompanied by a fall in the standard of living. Such alterations are opposed by the organised workers (as represented by the Social-Democrat Party and Trade Unions) and the rural population (as represented by the Agrarian Party), and the unemployed, most of whom are unorganised workers, are left to suffer. There is, however, a strong argument against such redistribution—which would in any case provide only a partial solution of the problem—in that it would create conditions which would militate against the fruition of the idea of economic co-operation between the Central European States. Such co-operation depends on Czechoslovakia being able to import cereals and other foodstuffs from the other States and to have a surplus of manufactured goods to export to those States in payment.

14. Labour Exchanges. The allocation of labour is carried out through State Labour Exchanges and Trade Union Labour Exchanges; all private Labour Exchanges have been abolished. All applicants for work are required to register themselves at the nearest State Labour Exchange, even if they are also registered with their Trade Union. An unemployed worker is compelled to report at the Labour Exchange at which he is registered *unless it is more than 3 kilometres (about 2 miles) from the parish in which he lives*, in which case he may report instead to his Local Administrative Office. He is obliged to accept any employment which is offered to him at the Labour Exchange or at his Local Administrative Office, if it is suited to his strength and state of health, unless it is such as might prevent him from resuming his normal employment at a later date. When filling vacancies preference is given to those who are drawing assistance direct from the State (the others are already provided for by the Trade Union Labour Exchanges), and to those who have many dependants. Employers who want hands are compelled by law to obtain them only through the Labour Exchanges, but are not bound to take those who are proposed by those Exchanges: it is thus possible for an employer to refuse man after man on the waiting

list until he reaches one of whose political views he approves—a practice which is common in the German districts, where most of the employers are pro-Nazi.

15. Unemployment Centres and Camps. The plausible, but pernicious system of Unemployment Centres and Camps has been developed “for saving the younger unemployed workers”. Where this is done under conditions which permit the youths and young girls to live at home, as frequently occurs, the objections become less strong.

16. Unemployment Assistance. Czechoslovakia has no scheme of State Unemployment Insurance. When the Republic started there were about a quarter of a million persons unemployed, and within six weeks, on December 10th, 1918, an Act was passed whereby they should receive from the State financial support amounting to as much as 60% of their last rate of wages and varying with the cost of living.

This system of non-contributory insurance, whereby the State accepted the principle of “Work or Maintenance”, was continued until 1925¹ in the teeth of all opposition from the bourgeois elements in the Government, but was eventually superseded, under pressure from the Trade Unions, by the Ghent system.

The change, though it served to increase the membership and influence of the Trade Unions, through whom unemployment assistance was thenceforward administered, may be counted a set-back from the Socialist point of view. In practice, moreover, since large numbers of young workers are unable (owing to the industrial crisis) to qualify for membership of a Trade Union, it has excluded many workers from assistance which they might otherwise successfully have claimed.² In addition to that it has led to a certain amount of abuse resulting from the competition for increased membership between the Trade Unions of rival parties.

The Ghent system is based on the schemes of unemployment insurance run by the various Trade Unions for their members.

¹ At a total cost, up to that date, of 1,200 million Kč.

² This has hit the German workers particularly severely, because when the German Nationalist and National Socialist Parties were dissolved, their Trade Unions also were dissolved.

The benefits paid out by the Trade Unions are supplemented by a State contribution which is normally twice as great. If the unemployed trade unionist is married but with no children, or if he is a bachelor with one dependant, the State supplement is increased to two and a half times the Trade Union payment. If he is married and has a child, or if he is a bachelor with two dependants it is further increased to three times the Trade Union payment. A mild form of "Means Test" is enforced, in that if the unemployed trade unionist has an income from other sources *which is at least equal to what he would normally be earning*, the State supplement is reduced to equal merely the Trade Union payment. The total amount paid, i.e. by Trade Union and State combined, was originally limited to two-thirds of what the worker would normally be earning; it is now increased to equal what he would earn if he were in full-time employment at his normal work.¹ State contributions are continued for 3 months only.

Payment is made through the Trade Unions, who pay out the total benefit and recover the appropriate amounts from the State. This practice has been turned to advantage by the big Social-Democrat Unions against their smaller or poorer rivals, notably against the "Red" Trade Unions in the past, in the following manner. They have used their political influence, which extends into the administrative departments, to cause delay in the payment to the Trade Unions of sums advanced to their members; to the Social-Democrat Unions, who have large reserves, such delay is immaterial, but to the smaller or poorer Unions it sometimes means that they have not the ready cash to pay out on the appointed day—the disappointed unemployed man or woman is thus disposed to seek the security of the larger and more wealthy Social-Democrat Unions.

In order to qualify for unemployment assistance, the worker must have been a member for 6 months, or an affiliated member for 12 months, of a recognised Trade Union. The Unions vary as to the qualifying period of unemployment which they prescribe, but the State supplement is payable only after 7 days of unemployment. In the event, however, of a trade

¹ Unemployment benefits under this scheme vary for the most part between 60 and 150 Kč. a week (8s. to 23s.)

unionist being unfortunate enough to become unemployed again within a year of his previous period of unemployment, this waiting period is waived.

The number of persons thus insured, as represented by the total membership of the Trade Unions, was 2,107,720 in 1935, but those who thus benefit under the Ghent System represent only a half to one-third of the total number unemployed. The remainder receive State assistance on a very much lower scale¹ through the Labour Exchanges. In addition, however, to the small cash payments, the latter receive a good deal of assistance in kind; this varies according to the season, and in various districts, but in the winter of 1936 a German or Czech non-Union unemployed worker in the Karlovy Vary (Karlsbad) district received weekly 3 lbs. of bread, 7 half-litres of milk, 15 kg. of potatoes, together with some flour, meal, margarine and coffee and a supply of coal. Special provision is made for the children of the unemployed, especially for those of the uninsured.

The extent of the relief measures carried out by the State in connection with unemployment may be appreciated from the following figures which cover the period 1930-1935 inclusive.

	<i>To Czechoslovak Trade Unions² or in Czecho- slovak Districts</i>	<i>To German Trade Unions or in German Districts</i>
Amount paid to Trade Unions under the Ghent system	958,976,750 Kč.	704,940,948 Kč.
Supplies of food, potatoes, etc., at Christmas-time	507,702,570 Kč.	520,729,280 Kč.
Free distribution of milk .	59,777,270 half-litres	56,215,265 half-litres
Groceries (i.e. sugar, coffee, fats, butter, etc.) . . .	399,464 quintals	375,215 quintals
Coal	368,600 "	301,750 "
Bread	1,355,760 loaves	1,379,050 loaves
Potatoes	142,600 quintals	135,600 quintals

17. Child-Relief. The administration of special relief to the children of unemployed and other needy parents is entrusted to Provincial Relief Centres. These are not State organs, but are Societies formed on a nationality basis, i.e. are Czechoslovak, German, etc., and enjoy complete autonomy. Thus for Bohemia there is a Czechoslovak Centre in Prague, and a

¹ 10-20 Kč. a week (1s. 6d. to 3s.)

² The Czechoslovak Trade Union Federation incorporates also the German Social-Democrat Trade Unions. (See page 184.)

German Centre in Liberec (Reichenberg). The Provincial Relief Centres work through District Child-Relief Societies, which are also formed on a nationality basis.

The State contribution for child-relief, which amounts to about 750 million Kč. a year, is allocated to each Province in proportion to its total population, and is shared between the Relief Centres in proportion to their respective shares of that population.

The Provincial Centres then allocate to the various District Committees in proportion to their needs. As the District Child-Relief Committees already have some money, received from the Local Government Authorities or by voluntary subscription, the amounts which they need from their respective Provincial Centres must obviously vary considerably. A Czech District Committee in a German district will receive comparatively little from local sources, and will therefore have greater need of State assistance from the Centre.

District Committees are encouraged to organise Clubs, as distinct from the Unemployment Centres and Camps (which serve a limited purpose), at which young people of both sexes (14-21 years) will be properly fed and amused as well as taught. If the local authorities provide a building for such a Club, the Ministry of Social Welfare meets the cost of food and supervision.

Special attention is paid to the health of the children, warm clothing and extra fuel being distributed in winter-time. In the summer, arrangements are made for them to pass the day-time on farms outside the towns in which they live.

18. Protection of Workers Against Thoughtless Dismissal. In addition to having enacted the measures which are usual in other progressive countries for the protection of workers, Czechoslovakia has taken steps to protect them against inconsiderate or irresponsible action by their employers.

By Decree-Law No. 78/1934 of April 20th, 1934, an employer who intends to suspend work in his factory for more than a fortnight, or to carry out wholesale dismissal of his workers, is obliged to give notice of his intention in writing at least 14 days beforehand to the Local Administrative Authority, and to the Department of Factory Inspection, explaining his

reasons and the actual state of affairs. He is compelled to tell the truth and to suppress nothing.

Wholesale dismissal of workers means, in factories employing up to 700 persons, the dismissal of at least 15% of the workers, with a minimum of 10, and in factories employing more than 700 persons, the dismissal of 10% of the workers.

The Local Administrative Authority will at once call a meeting of the employer and the Works Committee of the factory, inviting representatives to attend from the Department of Factory Inspection, the Trade Union or Unions concerned and the professional body to which the employer belongs. In the first place the Local Administrative Authority will try to arrive at some compromise and to discover whether it would not be possible to continue work as before, or on a reduced scale.

If it is impossible to arrive at a friendly agreement which is satisfactory, the Central Administrative Authority will have to decide within 14 days from the date of its notification what is to be done.

If the Central Administrative Authority decides that the wholesale dismissal is unjustified, he advises the employer not to go on with it.

If the employer wishes, nevertheless, to suspend work in his factory for *more than a fortnight, but less than 3 months*, the Local Administrative Authority will merely try again to dissuade him.

If the employer is thinking of closing down for *more than 3 months*, he is obliged to notify in writing, at least 14 days beforehand, the Ministry of Social Welfare as well as the Ministry concerned with the work, explaining the reasons for his proposed action. After an enquiry has been carried out, the Ministry concerned with the work will decide, together with the other Ministries interested, if the proposed suspension of work is justified or if work should be continued. In the event of *force majeure*, any suspension of work for more than a fortnight or wholesale dismissal must be announced to the Administrative Authority within 14 days by the employer. The authority responsible will decide, in accordance with the principles already described, what action should be taken.

If the employer does not notify the authority responsible, that authority will carry out an enquiry on its own initiative.

If the Administrative Authority decides against the proposal of the employer to close down or to carry out wholesale dismissals, the employer is bound to pay to those employees who have lost work through his measures their wages for 2 weeks in the case of wholesale dismissals, or for 3 weeks in the case of closing down, this period not exceeding that during which work was suspended.

In the event of a definite and final closing down of a factory, the notice of dismissal runs as from the day on which the decision is made, or, if the Administrative Authority has not decided, from 3 weeks after the notice was sent to the Ministries. Notice will be as follows :—

- (a) 2 weeks—for wage-earners who have been employed for less than 5 years, plus a week for each further period of 5 years' service, up to a maximum of 6 weeks.
- (b) 2 months—for salaried employees who have been employed for less than 15 years ;
- 3 months—for employees who have been employed for more than 15 and less than 20 years ;
- 5 months—for employees who have served for more than 20 years.

Notice may only be given at the end of a month.

This notice, which is longer than the normal, applies equally to workers who have been dismissed during the 3 months preceding the final closing down. This decree does not affect workers taken on temporarily, if, before they are taken on, the employer informs both them and the authority responsible that he is engaging them for at most 4 weeks. This exclusion does not apply in a case where the employer has taken the same man on temporarily three times in the same year.

By the end of 1935 :—

330	suspensions (of over 3 months)	had been delivered :
		affecting 32,590 workers.
226	„ „ „ „ „	actually took place :
		affecting 19,429 workers.
104	„ „ „ „ „	prevented :
		affecting 13,161 workers.

19. Protection of Home-Workers. In some industries, notably those of producing artificial jewels and jewellery (Gablonz ware), toys and clothing, a great deal of the work is done at home. The workers so employed were at first left unprotected, but in 1926 legislation was passed setting up Local Committees, District Committees and Central Committees to fix minimum wages and prices, to arrange collective contracts and to regulate the conditions of labour and the delivery of work at the homes of workers.

A further Act, passed in the same year, prohibits the opening of a new clothing factory or the replacement of home-work by the manufacture of clothing in factories without the prior authorisation of the Ministries of Industry and Commerce and Social Welfare.

20. Non-Manual (Blackcoated) Workers. The interests of non-manual (blackcoated) workers are particularly well safeguarded in Czechoslovakia.¹ The laws governing their treatment cover clerks and clerical workers in any kind of office, commercial travellers, shop assistants, theatrical and musical entertainers, factory foremen, and in general all employees who are primarily brain workers and who are not covered, *except as regards sickness*, by the Social Insurance schemes for manual workers.

By a Law which was passed in 1934—which does not, however, relate to apprentices or to employees of railways, public tramways, agricultural or forestry concerns, and which is modified in its application to State and local Government employees—every non-manual worker is entitled to claim from his employers a written contract which guarantees him the following minimum conditions:—

- (1) The employee has the right to demand that his privileges and obligation under the contract shall be written.
- (2) Salaries must be paid by the end of each calendar month.
- (3) An employee who is prevented by sickness or accident from doing his work has a right to draw full pay for a period of 6 weeks; this period is prolonged by a fortnight after 10 years of service, and by a further week after each subsequent 5 years of service.

¹Thanks to the fact that they are organised.

- (4) An employee has the right to absent himself for a period of not more than 3 days, at his own discretion, without losing any pay.
- (5) Such absences, if they amount to more than 14 days in a given year, may be deducted from his annual holiday. Only if they amount to more than 30 days in a given year may he be dismissed.
- (6) An employee is entitled to full pay if he is kept from work by public duties, e.g. service on a jury, or as a witness.
- (7) If he cannot carry on his normal work while doing military training, he may claim one month's pay, except during the compulsory period of 18 months' service or during any other period of more than 6 months.
- (8) He has the right to a fortnight's holiday on pay. This is increased to 3 weeks after 5 years, and to 4 weeks after 15 years.
- (9) When his contract is terminated, he is entitled to a period of holiday or to compensation in lieu as laid down by statute.
- (10) The employer must install and maintain all that is necessary for the safety and health of his employees.
- (11) The employee must not accept similar work elsewhere, or handle transactions on behalf of any third person in the same line of business as his employer. If he does this he may be summarily dismissed.
- (12) The contract may be terminated at the end of any quarter, 6 weeks' notice being given. The period of notice is extended to 3 months after 15 years of service, and to 5 months after 20 years.
- (13) An employee under notice of dismissal must be given time—normally two half-days a week—in which to seek a new post.

Note. Employees in hotels and restaurants are not entitled to more than one week's holiday in the year, however long they may have served.

21. Protection of Small-Traders Against One-Price and Chain Stores. The protection of small-traders against the menace

of One-price and Chain Stores has been provided for by a series of legislative measures as shown below.

A law passed in December, 1933, laid it down that:—

“No retail-business selling goods of widely different classes at prices graduated after the manner of so-called ‘One-Price’ Stores may be opened, unless a special licence is granted by the competent Authority. No such licence shall be granted in the course of the next two years. Existing businesses of this kind may neither extend their activities to other classes of goods, nor add further rooms to their premises, nor move to another town, nor open auxiliary establishments. Names such as ‘One-Price’ Stores, ‘Sale at Uniform Prices’ and similar titles are forbidden. Collective agreements or local custom hold good with regard to the salaries of employees in such stores. No restaurant or refreshment-room may be kept in connection with these businesses.”

On April 26th, 1935, an Extraordinary Government Decree was passed providing still further protection for the small-trader as follows:—

“Sanction for the formation of ‘One-Price’ Stores may not be granted during the period up to March 31st, 1936. Existing ‘One-Price’ businesses may not be extended in respect either of the goods in which they deal, or of the number of their branches and the number of the rooms constituting their premises. They may transfer their address only to places within the same municipality, and only with the consent of the competent provincial authority.”

This was followed on March 27th, 1936, by a further Extraordinary Government Decree which stated that:—

“No licences for the formation of ‘One-Price’ businesses may be granted up to June 30th, 1937. The trading rights are subjected to drastic limitations; in particular, ‘One-Price’ businesses are permitted to deal only in those classes of articles which they were selling prior to December 1st, 1933. The sale of certain goods specified in the Decree is prohibited; in small provincial towns this prohibition is extended to all victuals. The premises of ‘One-Price’ businesses may not be extended, and the establishment of subsidiary activities is prohibited.”

22. Protection of Consumers. Law No. 142 of July 12th, 1933, which did away with the Food Ministry, also conferred on the Minister of Social Welfare some authority for ensuring the protection of consumers. This protection is, however, rendered somewhat insufficient by serious gaps in the organisation which have been only partially filled by the creation of a Consultative Committee of Consumers' Co-operatives.

This Committee is primarily concerned with questions of consumption which touch especially the manufacture and distribution of consumable goods of an essential type, and the function of the Consumers' Co-operatives is to help consumers to organise themselves and to present to the Minister of Social Welfare advice and proposals regarding the protection of consumers. This Consultative Committee is a provisional organisation to fill the gap until an independent Economic Council of Consumers' Co-operatives has been constituted, and until the creation of independent Chambers of Work and of Consumption, which alone can effectively protect the consumers' interests.

Practically speaking, the Minister of Social Welfare has provided for the protection of consumers by collaborating in the drafting of legislation and orders in council which deal particularly with consumers, e.g. flour, animal products, vegetable fats, milk and milk products, cereal monopoly, manufacture of faecula, dextrine, yeast, customs duties, exports and imports (principally of raw materials), unfair competition, cartels, mining, one-price shops.

Special attention has been devoted to the question of prices, notably for flour, bread, pastry, milk, and animal and vegetable fats. Representatives of the Ministry have attended all discussions regarding the reduction and stabilisation of the prices of essential foodstuffs, and have intervened with regard to very varied economic measures taken by the State (increases of customs duties on cereals, live stock and meat, reform of the food-stuffs list, feeding of the public).

CHAPTER VI

SOCIAL SERVICES

1. Division of Responsibilities for Social Services. Responsibility for the social services is shared by three Ministries: Public Health and Education come under their respective Ministries, while all else, with the exception of certain items deputed to the Ministries of Railways and Public Works, come under the Ministry of Social Welfare. A glance at the Budget Statements of 1936 and 1937 (Table XXVI, page 383) will show the relative importance of the work of these Ministries.

2. Social Welfare. The sums allocated to the Ministry of Social Welfare since the foundation of the Republic represent about one-tenth of the total State expenditure during that period, and have averaged some 850 million Kč., (about £6½ million at par) each year. Even in 1937, when the expenditure on defence had increased to 12% of the total, the allocation to the Ministry of Social Welfare, though no longer representing 10%, but only 8%, was increased from 836 to 878 million Kč.

3. Responsibilities of Minister of Social Welfare. The Ministry of Social Welfare is generally responsible for:—

1. Child Welfare and the Care of Abnormal People.
2. Poor Relief.
3. Housing.
4. Labour Legislation and Contact with the I.L.O.
5. Labour Exchanges.
6. Unemployment Assistance.
7. Factory Inspection and Supervision of Home-workers.
8. Arbitration in Labour Disputes.
9. Emigration and Repatriation.
10. Assistance to Disabled Ex-Servicemen.
11. 'State Aid for Consumers' and Producers' Co-operatives.

¹ Formerly the responsibility of the former Food Ministry.

12. Social Insurance.

- (a) Accident.
- (b) Sickness.
- (c) Disability and Old Age.

The actual administration of all these services is divided according to no uniform system between the Central and Local Government Authorities and certain unofficial Public Institutions. Thus certain forms of insurance (e.g. the assistance of Disabled Ex-Servicemen) are controlled entirely from the centre, and others (e.g. Poor Relief) are principally the concern of the Local Government Authority, while yet others (e.g. Social Insurance) come under the administration of independent Public Institutions. In certain cases, such as Unemployment Assistance, the State and some Public Institution (in this case the Trade Unions concerned) share the responsibility. Ultimately, however, the whole administration and control is vested in the State, through the Ministry of Social Welfare, which co-ordinates the work of the various bodies concerned.

(a) **CHILD-WELFARE.** Child-welfare, which has been described in the previous chapter¹ when dealing with Unemployment Relief, is a matter which has engaged the attention of the Authorities since the earliest days of the Republic. It has received particular attention during recent years owing to the increased incidence of poverty and unemployment.

Welfare work is shared between Local Government Authorities and various voluntary organisations, such as the Czechoslovak Red Cross and the Masaryk League against Tuberculosis, money being contributed towards meeting the expenses incurred by the Ministry of Social Welfare, which also organises training courses for social workers.

Some idea of the extent of the activities which are undertaken in connection with child welfare may be conveyed by the following statistics regarding the province of Moravia-Silesia, where there were in 1937:—

¹ See pages 151-152

- 1,309 milk stations in schools
- 360 clinics for mothers and babies
- 31 free dispensaries
- 51 children's summer colonies
- 37 day nurseries
- 11 children's convalescent homes
- 44 orphanages (with 2,200 occupants)
- 55 children's homes, where small groups of orphans are looked after by trained workers until they can be placed in families (with 5,578 orphans)
- 3,410 local workers in 2,630 communities, supervising the family life of 38,032 children threatened by economic, health or moral difficulties.

(b) **POOR RELIEF.** Poor Relief is financed and administered by the District Government Authorities, who may appeal to County (Okres) Authorities if they need further assistance. In Bohemia, the activities of all these bodies is co-ordinated and supervised by a Provincial Board. In Slovakia and Subcarpathian Ruthenia both the Provincial Authority and the State give assistance.

Relief work does not merely confine itself to the maintenance and medical care of the poor, but also devotes particular attention to the education and training of their children.

With the exception of Social Insurance, which is described below, the other functions of the Minister of Social Welfare have been dealt with in the previous chapter.

(c) **SOCIAL INSURANCE.**¹ Social Insurance, which includes accident, sickness and disability insurance and old-age pensions, is run by Social Insurance Institutions under the control of the Minister of Social Welfare. These Social Insurance Institutions are autonomous bodies and juridical persons; they are conducted by representatives of employees and employers, subject to control of their finances by the State, which contributes also towards the financing of payments in respect of disability and old age.

(i) The oldest form of Social Insurance in Czechoslovakia is *Workmen's Compensation Insurance*, which gives the worker compensation in case of accident suffered while at work.

¹ See Appendix I.

This system has been in existence since 1877 and is administered by the Workers' Accident Insurance Unions in Prague, Brno, and Bratislava and by the Slovak Pokladnica, which covers the whole of Slovakia, the Post Office workers having a separate Accident Insurance Fund. Contributions for this form of insurance, *which covers also agricultural and forest workers*, are paid entirely by the employers.

(ii) *Sickness Insurance.* Sickness insurance is administered by some 600 different organisations, most of which come under the control of the Central Office for Social Insurance in Prague, which has 6 provincial branches and 40 sub-branches, and which is generally in charge of most forms of Social Insurance. Acting as independent bodies, there are four Clerks' Insurance Societies (supervised by the Minister of Social Welfare), Miners' Friendly Societies, the Medical Fund for Post Office Workers, the Sick Club of the Czechoslovak State Railways, the Sick Club of the State Tobacco Factories and the Clergy Sick Club at Prostějov.

It is estimated that out of a total of 4,449,800 employed persons, 2,781,400 are covered by this insurance. Contributions, which are based on a sliding scale corresponding to between 2% and 3% of the weekly or monthly wage, are shared equally between employees and employer. The maximum contribution is limited by law to 5.5%. Benefits are extended to cover the parents, wife, children and grandchildren of an insured person and provide for free medical and dental attendance, including, where necessary, the service of a specialist. The provision for maternity is particularly generous; *a woman is entitled to full benefits for six weeks before, and six weeks after, the birth of her child and for benefits at half the full rate for a further twelve weeks' weaning period*, in addition, of course, to free medical care during child-birth. The Sickness Insurance Societies vary in their treatment as regards the provision of prescribed medicines, some giving them free, others at reduced prices. Many of them run special institutions for the treatment of tuberculosis, to which patients may be sent for periods of from two weeks to nine months, either totally or partially at the expense of the society. The daily allowance payable to a worker during sickness is continued for

a period of 52 weeks, during which period the worker may not be discharged. Sickness insurance payments amount to over a thousand million crowns each year.

An example of the extent to which the State interests itself in this form of insurance was furnished in July, 1936, when the Miners' Friendly Societies found their Central Fund sadly depleted owing to the effects of unemployment, which reduced contributions and increased the incidence of sickness. Though insisting that the rate of benefit should be temporarily reduced, the State undertook to make good part of the deficit by augmenting the revenue of the Societies as follows: a special tax is levied on coal and coke, the produce of which is to be used for retrieving the financial situation of the Central Fund, the contributions of the employers and of the insured are to be increased, and the State has undertaken to pay an annual sum of 90 million Kč. during the next ten years.

(iii) *Disability and Old-Age Pension Insurance.* Disability and Old-Age Pension Insurance is administered entirely by the Central Office of Social Insurance, the State contributing liberally to its funds. As in the case of Sickness Insurance, contributions are on a sliding scale, and are shared equally between employees and employer. This insurance scheme originally covered all workers, but recently it was found that agricultural workers were experiencing difficulty in paying their contributions, owing to the fact that they were not in regular employment, and they were therefore excluded. Independent workers (artisans, small factory owners, shopkeepers) have not the option of participating in this insurance scheme, as they have in the case of Sickness Insurance.

Benefits are payable in respect of disability, old-age, widows', orphans', widowers' and parents' pensions, and grants are made for "furnishing" and burial. These benefits are payable after a minimum period of 100 weeks, except in the event of death or disablement resulting from an accident in the execution of duty. In the event of death before the completion of the preliminary 100 weeks, a lump sum payment is made to the dependants. The scale of benefits varies according to the wage of the insured and is made up of various components as shown in Appendix 1. Extended insurance covering a period

of 24 months is granted to unemployed men and women, it being optional for these to continue their contributions in order to avoid reduction of the benefits to which they will eventually be entitled.

Pensions to a widower or a widow are proportionate to the Disability Pension to which the insured person would have been entitled had he or she survived. Orphans' pensions are regulated in a similar manner, on a lower scale, which is doubled if both parents are dead. The aggregate pension of survivors is limited, however, to a total corresponding to the amount of Disability Pension to which the insured person is entitled at the time of death.

The "Furnishing" Grant, or Marriage Bonus, is an interesting innovation. It is payable to insured women on marriage, and amounts to one years' Disability Pension to which the woman is entitled at the date of marriage (400-600 Kc., according to wages earned).

Several of the larger industrial concerns still run their own pension insurance and have their own pension fund; these, are however, placed under rigid control of the Minister of Social Welfare. In addition to this, there is a special insurance scheme for miners (established in 1899 and amended in 1936),¹ and there are special insurance schemes for certain State employees.

The strain on the funds of this insurance scheme has been very much increased during the present economic crisis, owing to the fact that fewer people are in employment and contributing and that many people who would normally have preferred to go on working now take their Old-Age Pensions (payable to men and women alike at 65). The Government has faced up to the situation, however, and has actually encouraged old people to retire and make way for their successors, by increasing the pensions payable in respect of old age.

NUMBER OF PERSONS INSURED

	<i>Contributing</i>	<i>Drawing Pensions</i>
1930	2,172,857	14,224
1931	2,062,475	36,803

¹ The miners now qualify for Old-Age Pensions at the age of 55.

	<i>Contributing</i>	<i>Drawing Pensions</i>
1932	1,881,244	73,461
1933	1,710,383	117,203
1934	1,680,787	161,901
1935	1,682,104	207,063

A similar insurance scheme, described later, covers the black-coated workers.

The importance of Social Insurance in Czechoslovakia may be appreciated from the fact that *the number of persons, including dependants, covered by the various insurance schemes is more than 7 million*. The premiums for Social Insurance for 1935 amounted to about 2,400,000 Kč. and the assets of the institutes concerned exceeded 14,300,000 Kč.

(iv) *Non-Manual (Black-coated) Workers*. Since non-manual workers, though covered by the Sickness Insurance Scheme, are not covered by the normal Disability and Old-Age Pension Insurance scheme, a similar scheme has been made *compulsory* for them. This scheme is based on one which was introduced under the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy in 1906 and which came into force on January 1st, 1909, on a voluntary basis. The original scheme has been considerably amended and extended in its application, and has been made compulsory.

Insurance is effected through the General Pensions' Institute of Prague. In addition, certain Subsidiary Institutes are allowed to administer this insurance under special licence from the Minister of Social Welfare on terms precisely defined by the Pension Insurance Law. There are 33 of these Institutes; three of them act for a number of enterprises, the rest dealing each with one particular large enterprise. *It is estimated that at the present time 464,807 non-manual workers, out of a total of 475,891, are covered by this insurance scheme* about three-quarters of these being men, and one-quarter, women.

The scheme is based on the principle of dividing the insured into eleven classes, according to their salary, the highest class being those with annual salaries of over 42,000 Kč. (roughly £300). Any excess of salary above this figure does not disqualify the employee from insurance, but has no effect on the contribution which he is required to make or on the benefits

which he receives. Time served in the army is counted for purposes of pension, the premium being paid by the State.

Pension Insurance covers disability, old-age, widows', orphans', widowers' and parents' pensions, and "furnishing" and burial grants. Benefits are payable after a minimum period of 60 months, except in the event of death or disability resulting from an accident to the insured person in the execution of his duty. In the event of death before the completion of the preliminary 60 months, a lump sum is paid to the dependants. The method by which benefits are determined is shown in detail in Appendix 1. In the case of a man or woman whose salary exceeds 42,000 Kč. a year, and who has completed 40 years of insurance, the Disability or Old-Age Pension amounts to 27,600 Kč. (roughly £200) a year.

A claim to Disability Pension can only be admitted in the event of incapacity for service—either the service that the insured person last performed, or an alternative service which may reasonably be regarded as suitable. This pension insurance differs notably from that of the manual workers in that payment of pensions is not conditional on incapacity *for any sort of service*.

Old-Age Pensions are payable unconditionally to men on their sixtieth and to women on their fifty-fifth birthday, provided that the insured person is no longer occupied under the terms of the Pension Insurance System or of any other disability or old-age pension insurance system.

Since July 1st, 1934, in order to alleviate the situation of elderly persons of this class who are unemployed, there has been introduced a regulation whereby what is called "*Social Income*" is payable to men on their fifty-sixth and to women on their fifty-fourth birthday. This "*Social Income*", which corresponds to the Old-Age or Disability Pension to which they would be entitled at that time, is payable to the insured person provided that:—

1. He has paid at least 120 monthly contributions.
2. He has for at least 12 months not been in pensionable employment.
3. He does not (and so long as he does not) occupy any post which is pensionable.

The Widows' Pension is paid unconditionally to the widow of an insured person, and amounts to about one-half of the Disability Pension to which he is entitled at the time of death. The Orphans' Pension is paid to orphans up to their eighteenth year and amounts to about one-quarter of the Disability Pension of the deceased parent, or to one-half, where both parents are deceased. The claim of a widower or a parent is only allowed where it can be proved that the deceased maintained them. The aggregate pension to the survivors of an insured person may not exceed in all the amount of Disability Pension to which he was entitled at the time of death.

The "Furnishing" Grant or Marriage Bonus is payable to insured women on marriage, and amounts to one year's Disability Pension at the rate to which the woman would have been entitled at the date of her marriage.

The General Pensions Institute carries on various voluntary services, in particular expending considerable sums on a Health Service, the aim of which is to give appropriate medical care to any insured person who is threatened with disablement and to restore as soon as possible the health of any insured person who is ill. It has its own sanatorium in the High Tatra Mountains with 212 beds, and two convalescent homes, one in Luhačovice, with 180 beds and one in Mariánské Lázně (Marienbad), with 42 beds. It also ensures that all its pensioners receive free medical treatment (including hospital treatment) and medicines, though no money allowance. It also sometimes makes unemployment grants to its insured members.

The amount of the contributions payable by the insured depends on the class in which he or she is. In the lowest class it amounts to 12 Kč. (1s. 9d.). and in the highest to 250 Kč. (36s.) a month. Contributions are shared equally between employees and employers.

The General Pensions Institute is administered autonomously by representatives of the insured employees and of their employers presided over by a Government Commissioner, as President. Four-fifths of the members of the governing body are elected, the remaining fifth being nominated by the Government.

(v) *Journalists' Insurance.* In addition to the General Pensions Insurance, the General Pensions Institute administers a special *compulsory insurance scheme for Journalists*. The terms are much more advantageous than those of the General Pensions Insurance, not only with regard to the amount of pension paid but also to the conditions governing their payment. The system is roughly the same as that of the General Pensions Insurance, but contributions are higher, being fixed at 15% of the salary, and pensions are consequently higher. The Old-Age Pension may be as much as 100% of the salary, up to the limit of 42,000 Kč. (about £300) a year. This insurance was introduced by law in 1929, the State providing a sum of 20 million Kč. to start it off. Only persons in actual employment as journalists may be covered by this insurance; the number insured is therefore comparatively small.

4. Public Health. In order that the Government of the day may be constantly and correctly advised on questions relating to the health of the people, there has been set up an *Advisory Council of State for Public Health*.

5. Responsibilities of Minister of Public Health. The administration of public health is entrusted, however, to the Ministry of Public Health and Physical Training. This Ministry has been engaged, ever since the foundation of the Republic, in four great tasks:—

- (1) The revision of the antiquated and defective health legislation of Austria-Hungary.
- (2) The re-organisation of the Public Health Services to provide for prophylaxis, for the prevention of contagious and social disease, and for the manufacture and sale of medical remedies.
- (3) The provision and organisation of facilities for physical training.
- (4) Child-Welfare.

For purposes of administration the various Provinces of the Republic are divided into Sanitary Areas, which in turn are

subdivided into Sanitary Districts, each with its District Medical Officer and his Staff, who are responsible for every kind of work within the competence of their Ministry. Certain activities, which in other countries are undertaken by the Public Health Department, are deputed to the Ministries of War, of Railways and especially of Social Welfare. The State Health Institute, created with the aid of the Rockefeller Foundation, also does a great deal of valuable work in connection with research and analysis, bacteriology, epidemiology, serum therapy, etc.

(a) **VOLUNTARY HEALTH ORGANISATIONS.** There are also various semi-official voluntary organisations—the Czechoslovak Red Cross, the Masaryk League against Tuberculosis, the Mothers' and Children's Welfare Association and many more besides—which undertake certain special functions usually indicated by their name. All these organisations are grouped together, in order that their work and their claims may be co-ordinated, in either the Czechoslovak Union of Voluntary Social and Public Health Associations or the German Union for Public Health in Czechoslovakia.

Some idea of the work which is done by these voluntary organisations may be obtained from an examination of the activities of the Czechoslovak Red Cross. It runs 288 First-Aid Stations, 105 Children's Health Stations, 13 Tubercular Stations, 33 Dental Stations, 3 Sanatoria and 3 Children's Convalescent Homes. Its 30 odd Summer Colonies cater for over 2,000 children each year. The charges are made as low as possible and are varied on a sliding scale in accordance with the patient's means, two to three shillings a day being asked for board and medical attention. Summer colonies and camps are conducted also by schools, trade unions and political parties, and these provide for some 40,000 children annually.

(b) **HOSPITALS.** A great deal of constructive work has had to be undertaken, especially in Slovakia and Subcarpathian Ruthenia,¹ in connection with the service of Public Health. A State Institute of Hygiene has been built in Prague and also a State School of Hygiene and Social Welfare. New wards have been added to the State hospitals in Prague, Moravská-Ostrava, Bratislava, Žilina, Mukačevo, Košice and Užhorod,

¹ See Chapter X.

and have been equipped in the most modern manner. Special hospitals for dealing with epidemics have been built in Brno and Užhorod, a Research Institute has been built in Petrovice and a hospital for children at Dolní Smokovec, in the Tatra Mountains.

Hospitals and infirmaries are as a rule built and maintained by the Provincial or by the Municipal Authorities, assisted sometimes by the State, but the State itself has provided hospitals, e.g. in Subcarpathian Ruthenia, where the local authorities have not been financially in a position to fulfil their responsibilities in this respect. There are also several hospitals and sanatoria which have been built and which are maintained by certain Insurance Organisations for the use of their subscribers.

(c) **SICKNESS INSURANCE.** Sickness Insurance is compulsory for *all* wage and salary earners,¹ the contributions being equally divided between employers and employees and being limited by law to a maximum of 5·5% of the daily wage. Benefits are extended to cover the parents, wife, children and grandchildren of the insured person, and are paid to mothers before, during, and for a weaning period after, the birth of a child. Medicines also are frequently, though not always, provided free.²

(d) **DOCTORS.** The Czechoslovak doctors and surgeons are noted for their skill and for the very low fees which they are enabled to charge to uninsured patients thanks to the fees which they receive from the Health Insurance Companies.

(e) **PREVENTIVE EDUCATION.** A great deal of medical education and preventive work is carried out both by the voluntary organisations already mentioned and by the State Medical Service. It is thanks to this, in the main, that the standard of public health has been substantially improved during the lifetime of the Republic³ and that chronic disease, which was rampant in the eastern parts after the Great War, is gradually being abolished.

(f) **PHYSICAL CULTURE.** Special attention is paid to the question of physical culture by the State, as well as by voluntary organisations such as the famous Sokol Association.⁴

¹ In 1935 there were 2,700,000 persons insured.

² See Tables VII and VIII.

³ See page 162.

⁴ See p. 192.

GYMNASTIC ORGANISATIONS IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA
(1935)

	No. of Branches	TOTAL MEMBERSHIP			WOMEN		
		Adults (over 18)	Adolescents (14-18)	Pupils (under 14)	Adults (over 18)	Adolescents (14-18)	Pupils (under 14)
Czechoslovak Sokol Commune	3,209	385,219	91,809	282,888	117,104	45,230	153,560
Czechoslovak Workers' Gym- nastic Union	1,312	64,880	19,730	57,725	18,374	9,675	29,846
Czechoslovak "Orel" (Catholic)	1,325	76,374	22,562	61,352	32,653	10,813	29,657
Proletarian Gymnastic Union (Communist)	1,136	119,404	Statistics are unobtainable		30,199	10,954	34,827
German Gymnastic Union . .			22,645	67,796			
Workers' Gymnastic and Sports Union (Social Democrat) . .	481	23,540	4,206	14,792	5,850	1,764	8,130
Christian German Gymnastic Union (Catholic)	140	7,988	1,791	6,980	2,203	798	3,430
German Sports Union	22	2,967	346	1,287	780	162	701

The State educational authorities arrange special courses for theoretical and practical training of physical training Instructors: in 1935 these courses were attended by 3,284 Czechoslovaks and 1,199 Germans. Games and physical culture are encouraged in all schools and universities, but a far more widespread influence in this respect is exercised by the various gymnastic organisations which are peculiar to Czechoslovakia.

6. Education. Democracy is the keynote of Czechoslovak education, just as it may be said that Education is the keynote of Czechoslovak democracy. "There is no democracy without education", said the late Dr. Masaryk, and it is because most of the Czechoslovak people endorse his belief that there is generally current in Czechoslovakia an almost reverent attitude towards education—an attitude which dates from the days of Komenský (Comenius),¹ who was the first advocate of universal compulsory education for all children without distinction of class or sex, and who also stressed the extreme importance that children should be instructed in their mother-tongue. The popular enthusiasm for education is due also to the teachings of Miroslav Tyrš, founder of the Sokol Movement,² who urged that the Czechoslovaks must make up for their small numbers by their individual excellence—intellectual and moral, as well as physical.

The basic principles upon which the educational system is founded are essentially those which Komenský propagated in the 17th century as shown below:—

- (1) Education is to be secular and non-sectarian;
- (2) Equal opportunities are to be enjoyed by all, rich and poor, boys and girls, alike;
- (3) Punishments are to be rare, example and kindness being the methods of correction;
- (4) The importance of play is to be recognised;
- (5) The importance of pre-natal influences and first impressions is to be considered;
- (6) Schools are to be made attractive, with bright, cheerful class-rooms and, wherever possible, with gardens;

¹ See pages 38-39

² See pages 192-197.

- (7) Instruction is to aim at the development of the reasoning faculties, rather than at burdening the memory with facts.

Its aim, according to Dr. Emil Franke, Minister of Education, "is to produce an educated and cultured type of Czechoslovak citizen, who is a conscious democrat and a convinced Republican, who recognises and respects the convictions of others, who labours willingly and devotedly for his own State and for a better future for it, and is ready to collaborate with all peoples for the welfare and progress of mankind."¹

To-day already the dream of Komenský has been realised. Universal compulsory education in the mother-tongue for all children without distinction of class or sex is already an established thing for all but a very small proportion of the people.² It is provided almost exclusively by the State³, and is free so far as elementary education is concerned. Secondary and Higher Education, also provided mainly by the State, is placed within the reach of all because of the very low fees charged and of a system whereby even those small fees are reduced, or even waived, in the case of worthy children whose parents cannot afford to pay.⁴

The sums expended by the State in execution of this programme of popularising education have been very considerable; nor have they been in any degree reduced on account of increased expenditure on defence. Further large sums are also expended by provincial, municipal, communal and Church authorities. The criticism is sometimes made that too great a proportion of this expenditure is devoted to the education of the masses, and too small a proportion to the encouragement of advanced studies and research. It may be argued against this, however, that the first essential is to raise the general cultural

¹ *Manchester Guardian Commercial*, March 25th, 1937.

² See Tables IX and X.

³ But is administered by Local Education Committees, constituted on a basis of nationality, which are autonomous.

⁴ In most cases the "family allowances" payable to workers in addition to their wages, though normally ceasing when the child reaches the age for leaving the elementary school, are continued if the child goes on to a secondary school, and sometimes still further if the child goes to a higher educational establishment.

level of all the people, and that only after this has been completed should the State begin to endow the studies of the few. In the meanwhile, of course, all the universities of the world are open to those who wish to go further than Czechoslovak universities can take them, and the State assists suitable citizens to pursue their studies abroad.

The magnitude of the task which the Republic has so successfully undertaken may be appreciated fully only by seeing it against the background of what was before. Although Bohemia and Moravia-Silesia were culturally well-advanced even under the Habsburgs,¹ the cultural situation elsewhere in the Republic was lamentable. When independence was achieved, Slovakia was so subdued by the process of ruthless "magyarisation" that her national culture was almost killed, while in Subcarpathian Ruthenia the mass of the people led a half-animal existence. In 1918, two million Slovak people had only 390 Slovak teachers for their children, only 276 Slovak elementary schools and no other Slovak educational establishments. The situation in Subcarpathian Ruthenia was even worse, for there the Ruthenes had no schools at all! By 1930, however, the State had provided Slovakia with 2,652 elementary schools, 39 secondary schools, 13 technical colleges and a university—not bad work for only twelve years.² The State and Local Government Authorities have built, on an average, 100 new school buildings each year,³ and during the first fourteen years of the life of the Republic they built between them 1,381 new elementary schools and enlarged and modernised a further 2,623. During the same period the State built 2 new universities, 9 new technical colleges and 45 new secondary schools. The new school buildings are well designed on the most modern lines and soundly built. They are well, but not lavishly, equipped. Their most remarkable feature, perhaps, is their cheerfulness and homeliness, which makes

¹ Thanks mainly to the efforts of the Czechs.

² It is worth noting that it is only since the birth of the Czechoslovak Republic that the Germans in Slovakia have schools. Under the Hungarians they had none at all.

³ *Note.* Elementary schools are built and maintained as a rule by the Local Authorities. The State, however, provides elementary schools for minority communities which have 40 or more children. The State builds and maintains all secondary schools, technical and training colleges and universities. A few State-aided educational establishments are run by the Churches.

them places to which children like to go—and in which, therefore, children work willingly and develop favourably.

7. The School System. The Czechoslovak school system is based upon three steps of education:—

- (1) *Elementary Education.* Crèches, Infant Schools, Kindergartens, Schools for Abnormal Children, Elementary Schools and Upper Elementary Schools.
- (2) *Secondary Education.* Secondary Schools, Teachers' Training Colleges, Technical Schools and Continuation Schools.
- (3) *Higher Education.* Universities, Colleges of Technology and Art.

(a) ELEMENTARY EDUCATION.

(i) *Crèches, Infant Schools and Kindergartens.* There are 2,592 of these institutions in Czechoslovakia, with 111,489 pupils—1,762 of these, with 72,827 pupils, are Czechoslovak, and 659, with 20,780 pupils, are German.

(ii) *Schools for Abnormal Children.* These number 103, and have 7,128 pupils.

(iii) *Elementary and Upper Elementary Schools.* Attendance at these schools is compulsory for children from 6 years of age during a period of eight years. The Elementary Schools deal with younger children, between 6 and 11 years of age, while the Upper Elementary Schools deal with those between 11 and 14 or 15.

The organisation of elementary education was taken over from the two sections of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy on the existing legal bases. A definite unification of the system was carried out in 1922, a uniform school period of eight years was introduced, and the maximum number of children in a class was reduced from eighty to sixty, and in single-class schools to fifty. Under this law the elementary school system grew enormously, as the following figures show:—

CZECHOSLOVAK ELEMENTARY SCHOOLS

<i>Year</i>	<i>Schools</i>	<i>Classes</i>	<i>Children</i>
1917-1918	13,887	30,020	1,987,789
1936-1937	19,865	56,190	2,387,982

Ample provision is made for children of all the nationalities, including the national minorities, to be educated in their mother-tongue; this is evident from the numbers of elementary and upper elementary schools in which the teaching is done in languages other than Czech.¹

(b) SECONDARY EDUCATION.

(i) *Secondary Schools.* These are of two types: gymnasia (grammar schools), with eight classes, and realky (modern schools), with seven classes. All the secondary schools have a four-year lower school and a four-year (in the realky, three-year) upper school.

Boys and girls of 10 years of age who have passed through four forms of the elementary schools are admitted to the first form of the secondary schools of all types, but only on the basis of the results of an entrance examination.

It is in the secondary schools that Czechoslovak educational reform has been most extensive, and from which it is hoped will emerge the right type of citizen for a State which is unique in that it is held together less by bonds of national sentiment than by bonds of common loyalty to the great ideals of democracy and of service to mankind. Several schools of an experimental nature are in existence.

In 1936-1937 there were altogether 345 secondary schools. Most of these are co-educational, and most of them are run by the State.

(ii) *Teachers' Training Colleges.* Special training colleges for elementary teachers, and the technical schools associated with them are provided for all nationalities. In the school year 1936-37 there were 61 of these institutions in Czechoslovakia, the total number of their pupils being 10,181, of whom 5,499 were girls.

(iii) *Domestic Science and other Women's Colleges.* There are 18 institutions for the training of women teachers of Domestic Science and Handicrafts, with 551 pupils; in 14 the instruction is given in Czech, and in 4 in German. There are also 13 institutions for the training of girls for the profession of teachers in the kindergarten schools and of governesses in private families: the language of instruction in 9 of these

¹ See Tables IX and X.

institutions is Czech and in the remaining 4 German. These have altogether 389 students.

(iv) *Technical Schools.* The technical schools are divided into (1) industrial and technical schools; (2) trade continuation schools; (3) commercial schools; and (4) technical schools for women's occupations.

The industrial and technical schools were carried on under the old Austrian Empire by the State. Czechoslovakia has had to expend large sums on the renovation of schools, buildings, workshops, laboratories, and equipment. The Republic set up electrical trade schools, a foundry school, a school for fine porcelain and optical instrument manufacture, schools for household arts, a printing school, a school for training in glass manufacture, and schools for the timber, coachbuilding, tanning, tailoring, milling, and building industries. In Slovakia, where there were formerly no industrial training schools, four industrial schools and workshops have been set up since the revolution.

The industrial training schools are divided into higher industrial training schools, with four-year courses, in which the studies end with an optional examination, and two-year lower schools. Pupils who have passed through the higher industrial training schools go into employment as technical officials; those from the lower industrial schools as foremen.

The trade continuation schools (apprentice schools) are divided into general schools, destined for workers in various trades, and technical schools for a particular trade or a number of allied trades.

The commercial schools and the technical schools for women's occupations have had to be reconstructed almost from the foundations by the Czechoslovak Government. The Government placed these schools on a standard basis, took over all the expenditure on the staffs for the commercial colleges and schools, gave them substantial grants for the provision of teaching equipment, and gave assistance in the building and extension of school premises.

There are four types of commercial institutions: the commercial colleges, with four classes; the commercial schools, with two classes; the one-year commercial course; and technical

continuation schools of commerce for apprentices and shop assistants.

At some of the commercial colleges there are matriculation courses for pupils who have passed the school-leaving examination of the secondary schools.

The technical schools for women's occupations prepare girls for the work of women in domestic life in various types of schools distinguished by the scope of the teaching; the training is complete in every type. There are the one-year house-keeping schools, the two-year technical schools for women, the five-month schools for housekeeping, the five-month courses in cookery, continuation schools for girls and women, and short courses of evening instruction for women, girls, and maidservants.

(c) **HIGHER EDUCATION.** At the time of the overthrow of the Austrian State in 1918 there were in the territory of the Czechoslovak Republic a total of 11 higher educational institutions. Of these, 2 were soon abolished and 7 new colleges were erected. The colleges taken over were poorly equipped and needed a great many improvements. To-day there are 16 State institutions of higher education, including the Charles University in Prague, the Masaryk University in Brno, the Comenius University in Bratislava, the German University in Prague, the Hus Czechoslovak Evangelical Theological Faculty in Prague, the Czech and German Technological Institute in Prague, the Mining College in Píbram, the Czech Polytechnic in Brno, and the Academy of Fine Arts in Prague. It is intended to establish in the very near future a Slovak College of Technology in Eastern Slovakia.

8. Adult (Popular) Education. The enthusiasm of the Czechs for adult (popular) education dates from the days of Jan Hus and the Reformation. Towards the end of the 18th century, however, as national consciousness revived among them, their educational activities drew away from religion and became more rationalistic and nationalistic. The educational movement was immensely strengthened and made more purposeful by the work of the late Dr. T. E. Masaryk and by the foundation, in 1897, by the Trade Unions and Labour Party, of the

Workers' Academy (Dělnická akademie). "Through culture to liberty" was the slogan of the day, which has since the Revolution been changed to, "Through culture to democracy", the aim of adult education to-day being the development of civic ideals.

Very early in the life of the new Republic, laws were passed regarding the organisation of free courses in civic instruction throughout the State, at the expense of both the communities and the State, and the establishment of local public libraries. Orders for putting these laws into effect were issued by the Ministry of Education during the years 1919-21, and in 1921 it was laid down by law that teachers should be obliged, in addition to their normal class-work, to devote four hours a week to local adult education work.

(a) THE MASARYK INSTITUTE FOR ADULT EDUCATION. As a result of this and subsequent legislation there have been erected over 500 *Popular Education Boards*, scattered from end to end of the Republic, which operate through 12,260 municipal or communal committees. This vast organisation, which has since 1925 been directed, under the auspices of the Ministry of Education, by the *Masaryk Institute for Adult Education*, conducts general educational and technical lectures and courses, gets up amateur theatricals and arranges lantern-lectures and instructive cinema displays. It is the intention of the Ministry of Education to supplement the foregoing by a system of popular schools in which every adult citizen may supplement and complete his education.

The Masaryk Institute conducts an educational film and lantern-slide exchange, providing also notes for lectures, and organises short courses for local organisers of adult education.

Most of the political parties have organisations which carry on similar activities, and of course the Sokol Movement¹ works on parallel lines.

A very great number of public libraries have been set up at no small expense, and a system of travelling libraries has been devised for providing literature to the smaller communities. There are to-day in the Czechoslovak Republic 17,089 public libraries, which in 1935 loaned eight and a half

¹ See pages 192-197.

million books to close on a million readers. Two State Library Schools—a Czech one in Prague and a German one in Ústí nad Labem (Aussig)—have been established, for the training of librarians for towns with more than 10,000 inhabitants.

The cost is shared between the Central and Local Authorities, and the organisation is based on the principle of nationality. A strong desire for culture and instruction, which has long been characteristic of the Czechs, is now perceptible among all the other races of the Republic.

(b) **THE WORKERS' ACADEMY (DĚLNICKÁ AKADEMIE).** The Workers' Academy celebrated the fortieth Anniversary of its foundation in 1936. It is a body which applies itself to three functions:—

- (1) The teaching of Socialist ideas.
- (2) General education and culture.
- (3) Technical training.

It has branches in every community of appreciable size and works on the same lines as the Civic Adult Education organisation already described, in close collaboration with which it operates. Its lectures and courses were attended by 575,000 people in the year 1935.

A subsidiary of the Workers' Academy appeared on the scene in 1926 in the shape of the *Czechoslovak Workers' Wireless Association*. This Association was established by the two Socialist parties, i.e. Social-Democrat and Czech National Socialist. It arranges for lectures and speeches to be broadcast by representatives of the workers' movement, and broadcasts about 1,500 of these each year.

9. Religious Training. In Czechoslovakia there is a statutory guarantee of religious freedom for every inhabitant. The past differences made between the Churches in regard to their claims on the State for the payment of priests have been settled by the enactment of the new inter-confessional law. Independent Church administrative bodies were set up in the Czechoslovak Republic. The State has also made provision for priests to receive their training in Czechoslovakia and

has founded new theological colleges for this purpose. Religious training abroad has also been made possible.

10. General Culture. The Ministry of Education is responsible also for everything concerned with cultural needs. It is particularly concerned with the arts, with the maintenance of memorials of cultural and art history, with adult education, with the maintenance of scholastic and cultural relations with Czechoslovak citizens abroad, and with certain European States, and, finally, with the social conditions of students of all categories.

The Ministry encourages literature, journalism, the theatre, the fine arts, and music. It is concerned in this field not only with the maintenance of treasures from the past (collection of folk-songs, protection of monuments, art galleries, archæological research, preservation of natural beauty) but also with support given to intellectual workers, State prizes for outstanding work, and the support of aged artists. Direct influence is exercised by the Art Schools and Institutions, e.g. the State Conservatories of Music in Prague and in Brno, the Academy of Fine Arts in Prague, the School of Industrial Art in Prague, and the State-supported National Theatre in Prague. As regards monuments, the Ministry works through the authorities responsible for the maintenance of monuments in Prague, Brno, and Bratislava (the Archæological Institute, the School of Archivists, the State Historical Institute, and museums), which it subsidises.

A social welfare organisation looks after students of all categories without distinction of nationality or religion; it has in all 23 branches. Clothing is provided where needed, pupils in boarding-schools are assisted, help is given to students' associations, sickness grants are made, and social institutions subsidised.

CHAPTER VII

PEOPLE'S ORGANISATIONS

1. Trade Unions. Under the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy the workers enjoyed the Right of Association and Assembly as from 1867, and the Right of Combination as from 1870. There were, however, only 16 Trade Unions formed during the 'seventies, and most of these were of a local character. Owing to internal political quarrels within the movement and to Government obstruction, little real progress was made until 1889.

To begin with, the Trade Union Movement in Austria-Hungary was of an international character, i.e. it embraced Germans and Czechs alike, but on January 31st, 1897, the Czech Unions separated themselves from the main body in Vienna and established the Odborové Sdružení České, which comprised 68 Unions with a membership of 5,230. By 1906, this Czech Trade Union Federation had grown until it embraced 1,000 unions with a membership of 60,000.

There were constant inter-racial disputes between the rival national sections of the Trade Union Movement in Vienna, the I.F.T.U. being called in on several occasions to arbitrate between them. These disputes, which were doubtless regarded with favour, and even perhaps inspired, by the Habsburg Monarchy, continued right up to the time of the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Empire.

In 1898, the bourgeois sections of the Czech people, alarmed at the internationalist ideology of their trade unionists, attempted to split their ranks by setting up rival unions of a purely nationalist type (Česka Obec Dělnická) on the lines of the Czech National Socialist Party. The number of these unions had grown merely to 68 by 1905.

The development of the Trade Union Movement in Czechoslovakia went ahead very rapidly immediately the Republic achieved its liberation, with the result that *by the end of 1935 it had a membership of 1,170,470 manual workers (out of a*

total of 1,919,000) and 987,250 clerical workers, as compared with 246,902 and 124,976 respectively in 1918.

The important part played by the Trade Union Movement in the political life of the Republic was immediately made apparent by the nature of the extensive legislation which was passed during the years following the Revolution. The influence of the Movement has, however, been considerably reduced since then as a result of disunity (due to national or political differences) within its ranks. The defection of the Communists from the Social-Democrat Party in 1922 was paralleled in the Trade Union Movement, Red Trade Unions being set up. These Red Trade Unions were dissolved in February, 1930, their members joining Social-Democrat Unions, but for some time after that the dissident Communists ran so-called "Industrial Unions", which too are now almost all dissolved for the sake of unity.

The bulk of the Czechoslovak Trade Unions belong to the Social-Democrat Party, but there are, in addition to the Czech National Socialist Unions already mentioned, Unions belonging to the Christian Socialist (Catholic), and even to the Small-Traders' Party. After the foundation of the Republic the German Trade Unionists formed themselves into a distinct body (Social-Democrat) as the Central Trade Union Committee of the German Trade Union Federation (Zentralgewerkschaftskommission des deutschen Gewerkschaftsbunds) with 23 Unions, which was not affiliated to the I.F.T.U. These German Unions amalgamated themselves with the Czechoslovak Federation, and thus entered the I.F.T.U. in 1926. A wider and more universal unification of the Trade Union Movement, on a basis of joint non-political action in the industrial field, was effected in February, 1935.

The Trade Unions are represented on the governing bodies of the Insurance Institutions and on the Unemployment Assistance Committee. They are also represented on the Trade Price Association and on the People's Price Courts,¹ on the Arbitration Committees to regulate conditions for the metal industry, on the Mining Arbitration Courts, etc., including the three Provincial Advisory Councils on the conditions

¹ See page 146.

of employees in the sugar industry. *In all these bodies the workers', i.e. Trade Union, representation is equal in numbers and status with that of the employer.*

The membership and constitution of the Trade Union Movement as it was in 1935, and substantially as it is to-day, is shown below.

TRADE UNION ORGANISATIONS AND MEMBERSHIP,
1935

	MANUAL WORKERS		CLERICAL WORKERS	
	No. of Branches	No. of Members	No. of Branches	No. of Members
I. Federated Trade Union Organisations				
1. Joint Central Headquarters, Czechoslovak Trade Unions, including:—	47	442,739	26	213,897
(a) <i>Federations.</i>	34	297,764	20	156,828
(b) <i>Central Commission of the German Trade Union Federation.</i>	13	144,975	6	57,069
2. Czechoslovak Workers' Union .	30	169,983	36	148,965
3. Republican Employees' Federation .	17	137,873	26	52,876
4. Christian-Socialist Trade Union Council, including:—	35	93,861	21	24,300
(a) <i>Czech Federations.</i>	29	57,481	18	23,741
(b) <i>Federation of German Christian Trade Unions.</i>	6	36,380	3	559
5. Federation of the Czechoslovak Union of Clerks and Officials' Organisations .	—	—	78	108,587
6. Czechoslovak Christian-Socialist All Trades Commission .	7	29,123	2	11,190
7. National Union of Trade Union Organisations' Federation .	8	39,480	1	300
8. Federation of Slovak Trade Union Organisations .	1	11,530	5	19,584
9. Federation of German Trade Unions .	2	13,778	6	17,087
10. "Střed" Central Body of Private Clerks and Shop Assistants .	—	—	8	18,071
11. Secondary Schools' Federation .	—	—	14	14,242
12. University and High Schools' Federation .	—	—	41	13,655
13. Association of German Trade Unions .	1	6,421	1	862
14. Federation of German State-Employees' Unions .	—	—	14	6,316
15. Czechoslovak Employees' Federation, Central Office of Trade Union Federations, Sections and Organised Employees in Czechoslovakia .	3	2,620	1	740

II. Unfederated Trade Union Organisations

16. Organisations under joint leadership: Associated Industrial Unions (Czech and German) formerly Central Bodies of the Communist Trade Unions .
17. Others, including:—
 (a) *Czechoslovak.*
 (b) *German.*

TOTAL :

MANUAL WORKERS		CLERICAL WORKERS	
No. of Branches	No. of Members	No. of Branches	No. of Members
10	173,648	1	5,219
33	49,414	228	281,409
26	29,412	166	190,663
7	20,002	62	90,746
194	1,170,470	508	937,250

2. Co-operatives. The character of the earliest co-operative organisations in Czechoslovakia was dictated by the conditions which led to their foundation in the years 1850–1860.

At that time it had begun to be apparent that the abolition of serfdom might well be followed by the enslavement of the rural population to the usurer. At the same time, in the towns, the effects of industrialisation were beginning to be felt by the small-traders and artisans, who were ready, therefore, for the suggestion that by co-operation only could they save themselves.

(a) **CO-OPERATIVE CREDIT SOCIETIES.** The oldest co-operative organisations were, therefore, Civic Loan Banks and Urban Credit Institutions of the Schultze-Delitsch type, promoted by a man called Šimáček, and Mutual Savings and Loan Societies of a similar type, still called *Kampeličky*, in memory of their founder, *Kampelik*. It was not until about 1890 that other forms of co-operative enterprise began to be developed to any appreciable extent.

(b) **CO-OPERATIVE DISTRIBUTING SOCIETIES.** Almost simultaneously with the formation of the Popular Banks, a man called Chleborad began actively to urge the formation of Co-operative Distributing Societies like those of the Rochdale Pioneers. This section of the Movement, after a weak beginning, faded away about 1870, and did not reappear until towards 1890, when conditions had completely changed. They exist now chiefly in the great industrial centres of Bohemia and Moravia-Silesia, and are organised on a basis of nationality. They have

their own Co-operative Wholesale Society, with headquarters at Prague, and those of them which are Social-Democrat are federated in the Central Union of Czechoslovak Co-operative Societies in Prague. The greater part of the Co-operative Distributing Societies are Social-Democrat, but the Czech National Socialist Party has also formed several of these. The Communist Party has a powerful co-operative organisation, and most of the other political parties run co-operative societies rather as recruiting offices for new members.

(c) **ARTISANS' CO-OPERATIVE SOCIETIES.** A large number of co-operative societies, usually small and of a local character, have been set up by artisans for the collective purchase of raw materials for their trade, and for the collective sale of their products. Similar societies have been set up for the purchase of machinery for the collective use of their members.

(d) **CO-OPERATIVE BUILDING SOCIETIES.** Co-operative Building Societies were already numerous and successful even before the war. Since the Revolution, owing to the housing prices, their number has increased considerably, an increase which has been encouraged by the State.

(e) **CHARACTER OF CO-OPERATIVE MOVEMENT TO-DAY.** In addition to the Co-operative Credit Societies already mentioned, there has been a growth, especially since the establishment of the Republic, of other forms of co-operative enterprise among the agricultural classes. These Co-operative Societies deal with the sale of crops and other agricultural produce, the purchase of domestic requirements and of requirements in connection with farming, and the joint purchase and joint use of plant, etc., on farms.

The enormous part played by the Co-operative Movement in the life of the people of Czechoslovakia and in the life of the Republic will be appreciated when it is realised that the deposits in the 5,596 Co-operative Credit Societies in 1935 represented 33% of the total deposits in the country, and were very nearly equal to those in the Post Office Savings Bank, which held 35%. *Over one-third of the people actively engaged in agriculture are members of some kind of co-operative society, while the Co-operative Distributing Societies have a membership of about 886,000 in the cities and towns.*

The political effectiveness of the Co-operative Movement is very much reduced, however, by the divisions within the ranks of its members—divisions which are often of a fundamental character, for whereas the Co-operative Distributing Societies (Consumers' Co-operatives) are already mildly Socialist in their outlook, the Agrarian Producers' Societies, and even more the Co-operative Credit Societies, are decidedly anti-socialist. One wonders sometimes that the latter have apparently learnt nothing by observing the fate which has befallen their counterparts in Italy and in Germany.

As the characteristics of Consumers' Co-operatives are familiar to British readers, it is not proposed to describe in detail the organisation of this branch of the Czechoslovak Co-operative Movement. The following outline of the agricultural section of the Movement may, however, be considered of interest.

(f) AGRICULTURAL CO-OPERATION. At the end of 1935 there were in Czechoslovakia 11,454 agricultural co-operative societies, as shown below:—

- 5,364 Savings and Credit Societies ;
- 737 Agricultural Deposit Banks ;
- 329 Co-operative Exchanges ;
- 483 Co-operative Dairies ;
- 74 Co-operative Mills and Bakeries ;
- 357 Co-operative Distilleries and Starch Factories ;
- 32 Co-operatives for drying chicory ;
- 30 Co-operatives for growing flax and weaving linen ;
- 234 Other producing co-operatives ;
- 288 Co-operatives for stock-raising ;
- 2,138 Co-operatives for the production of electricity and for the collective use of machinery ; -
- 150 Building Co-operatives ;
- 1,003 Purchasing Co-operatives ;
- 315 Various.

These co-operatives are organised on a regional basis, the local Societies being affiliated to their respective regional Co-operative Unions, of which there are 12 (8 Czechoslovak,

8 German, 1 Polish). The Co-operative Unions are, in their turn, affiliated to the Federation of Agricultural Co-operative Unions ("Centrococooperativ") in Prague, which thus links up 11,454 local Co-operative Societies.

The functions of the Co-operative Unions are organisation, financing and auditing. Originally they also performed the functions of buying what was required by their affiliated Societies and of selling the agricultural produce of those Societies. Since 1924, however, it has been prohibited by law for bodies engaged in banking to engage in commercial operations, so this buying and selling is now carried out by Co-operative Commercial Centres which are attached to the Unions (there are 11 of these Centres). The Unions organise all the necessary propagandist work in their districts, and co-ordinate and direct the work of their affiliated Societies, for whom also they act as central deposit banks.

(g) CREDIT CO-OPERATIVES. These co-operatives are the very basis of the Co-operative Movement in the countryside, for it is through them that the rural populations learnt to believe in Co-operation, and thus became disposed to embark on the other forms of co-operative enterprise. The more common type of credit co-operative is the Kampeličky (called by the Germans Raiffeisen Banks), to which reference has been made earlier in this chapter. The Kampeličky receive the savings of the rural population, and are thus able to make loans to their members for various purposes, e.g. reconstructing their buildings, or constructing distilleries, etc. They use their regional Co-operative Unions as banks. The interest rates on loans are limited by law to a maximum of $4\frac{1}{2}\%$ for mortgages and of 5% for other loans (in Slovakia and Subcarpathian Ruthenia the rates allowed are $5\frac{1}{2}\%$ and $6\frac{3}{8}\%$ respectively). These easy credit facilities enable the farmer to sell his produce more advantageously, instead of being obliged to sell immediately.

The Kampeličky have their branches in almost every village, however small, in Bohemia and Moravia-Silesia, but are not yet by any means so widespread in the eastern part of the Republic. Their officers are elected by the members and, with the exception of the accountant, are not paid.

The Agricultural Deposit Banks, which are far less numerous than the *Kampeličky*, are merely Mutual Savings Banks.

(h) CO-OPERATIVE EXCHANGES. (Buying and Selling Co-operatives.) The Co-operative Exchanges buy for their members seed, fertilisers, agricultural implements and machinery, fuel, and anything else which they may require. They receive from their members and sell, not necessarily in the form in which they are received, the products of their farms. They also provide their members with storage, if required, for their grain, potatoes, etc.

There are 335 Co-operative Exchanges with a membership of more than 200,000, of whom 90% are independent farmers. They are, as already stated, affiliated to the Co-operative Commercial Centres, the most important of which is the "Co-operativa" in Prague. The "Cooperativa" sold 1,105,590 tons of agricultural produce of various sorts in 1935 and in addition a further 355,210 tons through its subsidiary, the "Agrasol", a purely commercial enterprise which has been set up for the purpose of evading the law restricting the sales of Co-operative Societies to their own members. The sales turnover of these two organisations in that year represented a sum of 1,330,973,000 Kč. (about £9 million).

The Co-operative Commercial Centres play an important part in the operations of the Grain Monopoly, handling over 60% of the grain which is bought by that Monopoly, as compared with the 26% which passes through the hands of private corn dealers.

(i) CO-OPERATIVE DAIRIES. Co-operative Dairies were first started in Moravia, where they had, for the first twenty years of their existence, the advantage of being able to sell their produce in Vienna, as well as in the Moravian towns. Their foundation was encouraged by the Provincial Administration and they received valuable advice and assistance from the Dairy School at Kroměříž. Their development has been considerable also in the western part of Bohemia, owing to the excellent market represented by the industrial towns there.

There are in Czechoslovakia 419 Co-operative Dairies which either sell milk for drinking purposes or turn it into butter and cheese. Their membership amounts to 84,073.

They originally had Central Unions in Prague and in Brno, but these are now united into one Commercial Society of Co-operative Dairies in Prague. The effect of this unification has been that the Co-operative Movement, having thus made itself one of the main suppliers of butter for the Prague market, can influence the price considerably in its favour. In 1935 the Society sold butter, cheese and eggs to the value of 30,409,000 Kč. (about £250,000).

(j) CO-OPERATIVE DISTILLERIES. These Distilleries, which transform potatoes into alcohol, are numerous throughout Bohemia and Moravia-Silesia. A great many of them were formerly owned by big land-owners (Austro-Hungarian), and were transferred to Co-operative Societies when carrying out the Land Reform. The production of alcohol is encouraged by the State, it being laid down that a certain proportion of alcohol must be mixed with all petrol before use, thus aiding home industry and at the same time reducing imports of petrol.

(k) CO-OPERATIVE MILLS AND BAKERIES. The Co-operative Mills and Bakeries are at the same time producers' co-operatives and consumers' co-operatives. They take the corn brought in by their members and turn it into flour and bread, which they eventually sell back to their members.

(l) CO-OPERATIVES FOR DRYING CHICORY. These Co-operatives are formed mainly in the Elbe region. They dry chicory and sell it for mixing with coffee.

(m) CO-OPERATIVES FOR STOCK-RAISING. These Co-operatives have not hitherto proved a great success. They conduct their sales through the Agricultural Federation for the Sale of Cattle in Prague. In 1935 this Federation handled over 41,000 head of cattle representing a value of 29 million Kč. (about £200,000).

(n) CO-OPERATIVES FOR THE USE OF MACHINERY. This type of Co-operative has been in existence since 1908-1911. It buys agricultural machinery, e.g. mechanical threshers, which it lends to its members. The idea of co-operative utilisation of machinery is progressing slowly.

(o) ELECTRICITY CO-OPERATIVES. There are three types of Electricity Co-operative in existence:—

1. Small power stations, with a limited radius of distribution, and dealing only with their members.
2. Large power stations, which supply considerable areas in which the population consuming electricity is only partially composed of co-operators.
3. Distributing co-operatives, which buy electricity from privately or publicly owned power stations and distribute it to their members, for whom also they carry out the work of electrical installation.

Two-thirds of the so-called Electricity Co-operatives, i.e. about 1,500 of them, are not, strictly speaking, co-operatives at all, except in so far as that their members have collectively invested money in the local Electrical Company.

There were in 1930 only 30 co-operatives which actually produced electricity, and these will eventually be absorbed in the big Public Utility Electricity Company which is to be established.

(p) CO-OPERATION IN SLOVAKIA AND SUBCARPATHIAN RUTHENIA. In the time of the Hungarian domination, Co-operation was an artificial product of joint action between Local Authorities and the State. The composition of the rural population was totally different from that in the Czech provinces which were under Austria. The land was almost entirely in the hands of the nobility, alongside of whom existed, or rather vegetated, small cultivators with miserable scraps of land. There was no moderately wealthy class of peasant. In addition to this all commerce, the liberal professions and public offices were in the hands of foreigners. The situation was particularly bad in Subcarpathian Ruthenia. Since the Revolution things have been changed very radically, but the progress of Co-operation has been hindered by the fact that the population, whose education had been almost completely neglected by the Hungarians, have found it difficult to understand what Co-operation means. This situation should improve rapidly, however, as a result of the educational reforms of the Republic.

Credit Co-operatives existed to a limited extent even before the war, but they found themselves very badly placed after

the Revolution owing to the fact that all their reserves had been deposited in Budapest, and that the Hungarian Government would not allow them to go out of the country. It was only thanks to liberal assistance by the Czechoslovak Government that these Credit Co-operatives have nevertheless been able to resume their operations and are now playing an important part in the liberation of the peasant from the hands of the money-lender.

3. Sokols.¹ The Sokol Movement is one of the largest in Czechoslovakia and is symbolic of the Czechoslovak nation. Originally merely a gymnastic association, it has developed into a prominent and powerful nationalist organisation which has, from its inception, assumed wider functions than that of physical training.

The movement is essentially associated with the name of Dr. Miroslav Tyrš, its founder, who conceived the idea that if the Slavs of Central Europe were ever to liberate themselves from German domination they should prepare themselves physically, intellectually and morally for victory in the struggle through which they must pass. So far as the Czechoslovak nation was concerned, he felt that it must make up for its numerical inferiority, as compared with the Germans, by the individual superiority of its members and by co-operation with the other subject Slavs.

Having first enlisted the support of several influential Czech nationalists, among them the founders of the first Czech daily paper, *Národní listy*, and using as a nucleus for his organisation the members of Malýpeter's private gymnastic institute in Prague, Tyrš founded, on February 26th, 1862, the Prague Physical Culture Union, which took as its emblem the falcon (in Czech: sokol), symbolic among the Slavs of nobility of character.

Thus launched, the Sokol Movement (as it soon came to be called) found a ready response, for it offered satisfaction for the needs of the recent effervescence of national self-consciousness among the Czechs. By the end of its first year it had 800 members in Prague alone, and Sokol Societies

¹See pages 170-171.

had been set up in eight other towns in Bohemia and Moravia. This example inspired the establishment, not long afterwards, of similar organisations among the Croats, Slovenes and Poles of Austria-Hungary, and Tyrš' dream of an international movement linking the Slav races of Central Europe was thus realised.

This initial enthusiasm might have waned and the Sokol Movement have died if it had not been consolidated by Tyrš and by its first president, Jindřich Fügner, who sacrificed his private fortune to it, and who gave it an intellectual character. The collaboration of these two men was very salutary, for each, in a sense, complemented the other. Tyrš, whose aesthetic mind was inspired by Greek culture, strove by his original system of exercises to develop agility and dexterity, to increase bodily strength and endurance, and thereby to develop physical beauty. Fügner, on the other hand, inspired the movement with the idea of developing the self-conscious, democratic, progressive man, who devotes his services to the general welfare of his nation.

When war broke out, in 1866, between Austria and Prussia, Tyrš promptly conceived the plan of turning the Sokol Movement into a military organisation. He began even to form a Volunteer Corps, which he offered to place at the disposal of the Government for purposes of home defence. The Austrian Authorities declined his offer and forbade any further development of his plan, for it was already realised that the growth of the Movement represented a menace to the Habsburg rule and would frustrate the attempts at germanisation of the Slavs. After this war, however, despite all efforts on the part of the Austrians, the Movement went ahead even more rapidly, and soon the number of its Societies had increased to 130. The Authorities had not the moral courage to ban "gymnastic clubs", but they took measures now to reduce their subversive influence: all public demonstrations were forbidden, meetings and conferences at which members of different Societies might meet were not allowed to take place, and it was intimated clearly that the continued existence of the movement would be tolerated only on condition that it confined itself to gymnastics.

Political oppression was followed by economic difficulties, for the membership of the Sokol Societies became reduced by the defection of those who were timid or who had joined for selfish motives. Tyrš never lost faith, however, in the ultimate triumph of his great movement. He tried to strengthen it by organising the Societies in one Union, but was not allowed by the Government to bring this about; he succeeded, however, in establishing a link between all his followers by starting in 1871 the publication of a monthly organ, the *Sokol*, in which he propagated his views on the mission of the movement.

On the twentieth anniversary of the foundation of the first Society permission was obtained, with some difficulty, to celebrate the occasion by holding in Prague the First All-Sokol Slet or Congress. This was attended by 1,600 members of 76 Societies, and there were 800 participants in the gymnastic display. Official opposition continued, however, on the ground that pursuit of physical exercise had nothing to do with the unity of a nation or with its language, but the movement was by then too firmly established to be suppressed. Even after the death of its founder, in 1884, it continued to extend its influence, devoting its attention more particularly to youth. It was found necessary, in order to meet the requirements of wider sections of the public, who had no free time during the day, to develop a modified system of exercises which occupied less time and which could be carried out indoors, but exercise in the open air still remains the ideal of the movement.

In 1888 permission was at last obtained to form District Associations of Sokol Societies, the first of which was instituted in Bohemia in the following year. The object of this local unification was not only to strengthen the movement by giving it a more corporate character, but also to foster initiative and sense of responsibility, by delegating certain functions to the District Associations. It had the effect also of leaving the Central Office more free to devote itself to larger problems.

The present-day organisation of the Sokol Movement has grown from these foundations and is as follows:—

“Members, male and female, over eighteen years of age may join their local Sokol Societies, of which there are more

than three thousand. The administration of these Societies is carried out by the Annual Meeting, that is, an assembly open to all members, held regularly once a year for the approval of reports on what has been accomplished and of plans for future activity. This annual meeting elects the Chairman, Officers and Executive Committee for the coming year, and appoints an Arbitration Court for the settlement of any disputes which may arise between members. The Executive Committee carries out the resolutions of the Annual Meeting and directs all further activity. Additional members may be co-opted to this Committee as required. The Chairman and the Secretary sign all correspondence from the Society and act as its official representatives when occasion arises.

Physical training and all public demonstrations are conducted by male and female Leaders, each responsible for the adult and juvenile members of his or her sex, while educational activities are conducted by an Educational Director. Each of these three officers is assisted by an elected Subcommittee, the members of physical training sub-committees being required to pass an appropriate examination as qualification for election.

Young people up to 14 years of age are classed as Pupils, those between 14 and 18 as Adolescents, the two groups working separately. They are not full members of the movement.

Physical training is carried out in the communal gymnasium and consists of mass drill, exercises with clubs, etc., or on apparatus, and light athletics. Other forms of exercise, such as riding, fencing, rowing, swimming, skating, skiing and indoor games are run as separate sections under the control of trained instructors. Those who wish to take part in the activity of any special section, as mentioned above, are obliged also to take part in the exercises in the communal gymnasium. Various types of intellectual activity are catered for by independent sections subordinate to the Educational Committee, and finally the Executive Committee may set up as required special working sections, e.g. economic section, building section, and so on.

When it is wished to introduce the Sokol Movement in some new place an independent society is not founded immediately. A provisional organisation is set up by some neighbouring society, by whom it is administered until such time as its membership has become sufficiently large for it to carry on alone, and in any case for a period of one year. Those wishing to join the Sokol Movement may do so only after a probationary period of six to twelve months during which they must attend a school for new members and must take the oath of membership. Those under 26 years of age are obliged also to go through a course of training. During this probationary period they may not wear badges or uniform, and may not vote or be elected to any office, these being privileges reserved for full members.

Sokol Societies are grouped together on a regional basis in units known as District Associations, of which there are now 52. The administration of a District Association is conducted in a manner similar to that of a Society, as already described, only the members of a District Association are, of course, the representatives of its component Societies. The rôle of the District Association is to assist the Societies and to co-ordinate their activities. It organises schools, meetings, mass drills and public demonstrations, etc.

The District Associations are federated in the Czechoslovak Sokol Commune administered by a Committee, representative of the District Associations, and a Presidium composed of the Presidents, their three Deputies, the Leaders, Educators and 27 Members. This Presidium directs the activities of the whole Sokol Movement in accordance with the direction made by the Committee. It has headquarters at the Tyrš House in Prague.

The Czechoslovak Sokol Commune has its own Press Section which issues seven periodicals. It has also a press and a bookshop, as well as a shop for Sokol equipment. There is a permanent school for male and female Instructors at Tyrš House, and special schools, for Educators and other specialists, are held from time to time. Tyrš House contains also hotel accommodation ("Sokolský Domov"), a restaurant, "the Old Armoury", and a winter swimming bath.

The whole of this huge organisation is maintained almost entirely by members' contributions and by the profit from various undertakings of the Societies, District Associations or Commune. Members' contributions vary between 12 and 70 Kč. and average about 36 Kč. a year. These contributions go to the Societies, who pass on 5 to 6 Kč. to the District Associations and 5-10 Kč. to the Commune per head of their membership. A little less than half of the Societies have their own gymnasia and more than two-thirds have their own sports grounds; these are provided, maintained and equipped out of the resources of the members themselves.

The Sokol Movement, which before the war had 128,000 members, has to-day a membership of over 385,000, of whom 117,000 are women. These belong to 3,209 local Societies organised into 52 District Associations. It has also about 92,000 Adolescents and about 283,000 Pupils. At the Tenth All-Sokol Slet (Congress), which will take place in Prague during June and July, 1938, there will be a formal procession of 50,000 members, and there will be 30,000 male and 25,000 female participants in the gymnastic displays.

Having been severely repressed during the war years 1914-1918, the Sokols came to the fore after the Revolution as the first and almost the sole guardians of law and order and the only defence force of the young Republic. They formed, moreover, the nucleus of the new Czechoslovak army.

Since then they have resumed their educative functions, under very changed circumstances, of course, concentrating now mainly on the moral and physical welfare of the poorer children from the time when they leave the elementary schools. The Movement professes to be non-sectarian and non-party, like the Boy Scout Movement in Britain (which in many ways it resembles), but it is essentially nationalist and bourgeois in character—at one time workers were excluded on account of their Socialist views—and its leadership is reactionary.

CHAPTER VIII

MINORITIES

1. General. The pre-war political map of Central Europe, which represented it as composed of two great States, Germany and Austria-Hungary, bordered to the East by the Russian Empire and to the South by Italy and the Balkan States, gave no indication to the casual observer of the complex medley of nationalities which inhabited that area, many of them struggling for self-expression against rigorous imperialist domination.

The Austro-Hungarian Empire alone contained among its 50 million inhabitants minorities numbering in all close on 32 millions, who were profoundly discontented with their cultural and political suppression. In addition to these there were a further 30 millions living under various foreign régimes who were awakening to national consciousness, making in all an enormous army whose discontent was probably responsible to some extent for the outbreak of the Great War of 1914-1918 and contributed in no small degree to the ultimate defeat of the Central Powers.

It would obviously have been desirable, when Europe was rearranged at the Peace Conference, that full satisfaction should have been given to the wide-spread desire for national unity and independence. Such, indeed, was no doubt the intention of the statesmen who assembled at Versailles, but it was found that geographical, economic and strategic considerations rendered impracticable the complete realisation of this ideal. In many places it was found that exact ethnical boundaries could not be drawn; in others, where they did exist, that their strict observance would endanger the stability and the viability of the new States. There were, moreover, scattered throughout central and eastern Europe numerous racial colonies which could clearly in no way be united with the main bodies of their respective races. The result has been that there still remain under foreign rule some 20 millions of

people, many of whom are by no means content with their fate.

Czechoslovakia, situated, as it were, at a cross-road in the geographic centre of Europe, is somewhat naturally the State in which the mix-up of races is most complete and indissoluble, and in which the racial minorities represent the greatest proportion of the total population. The census of 1930 (Table IV, page 365) showed that, out of her total population of under 15 million, only about 67% are Czechoslovaks, the remainder forming eight or more racial Minorities; the largest of these Minorities is the German, which numbers about 3¼ million and represents over 22% of the total population.

Having spent 500 years as a Minority under the Habsburg rule, the Czechs had learnt by bitter experience what troubles might be in store for them in dealing with this situation. It is therefore in no way surprising, though it should be counted to its credit, that the Czechoslovak delegation at the Peace Conference took the initiative with regard to Minorities by making public a statement of how Czechoslovakia proposed to regulate her internal racial problem. It was not until some time after this, in April, 1919, that the special "Commission for the New States" began to discuss and formulate detailed proposals for the protection of the racial Minorities. These proposals were subsequently discussed with representatives of the States concerned, and were eventually embodied in the texts of the Peace Treaties concluded with Austria, Hungary and Bulgaria. Considerable difficulty was experienced in obtaining the approval of the Polish, Rumanian, Yugoslav and Greek delegations to the Minority Clauses, but they were accepted immediately and without question by the Czechoslovak delegation. These Minority Clauses are, of course, mutually binding on each and every signatory of the several treaties in which they appear: they may, moreover, be reasonably considered as morally binding upon nations, such as Germany and Italy, with regard to the treatment of their own Minorities.

The Minority Clauses, which were also embodied in a separate Minority Protection Treaty,¹ were intended to serve

¹ See Appendix 2, pages 341-345.

two purposes. Firstly they were intended to guarantee to the Minorities certain minimum rights, without which their well-being and their cultural and political development could not be assured; and secondly, in view of the manner in which minority grievances had in the past been exploited by interested Powers, they established that minority affairs were a domestic concern of each sovereign State, but that these States should at all times be answerable to the League of Nations with regard to the strict observance of minority rights. It was perhaps unfortunate that the Minority Clauses were formulated in general terms, thus necessarily leaving it to the administration and bureaucracy of the individual States to decide upon their interpretation; the question whether a Minority is, or is not, oppressed is left too much to the subjective verdict of interested parties. These Clauses were, of course, drawn up on the assumption that the signatories were representatives of sovereign and more or less democratic States. If that assumption had been, or had remained, a correct one, it seems highly probable that the Minority Protection Treaty would have served satisfactorily as a loose guide for the solution of racial problems.¹ The assumption is true to-day, however, with regard to Czechoslovakia alone, and she appears beyond question to have granted to her Minorities *far more than the minimum laid down by the Treaty*. There is surely something strange and sinister, then, in the fact that she, more than any other State, has been, and is, subjected to criticism from abroad regarding her treatment of Minorities.

In view of the widespread and outspoken criticisms which are being made against Czechoslovakia with regard to her minority policy and of the fact that these criticisms are being treated in certain quarters as an excuse for the revision of the post-war territorial settlement at the expense of the Czechoslovak Republic, it would be well perhaps to describe in general lines what rights the racial Minorities in Czechoslovakia enjoy, and then to deal in greater detail with each of the several Minorities.

What is the situation of the Minorities in Czechoslovakia? To begin with, they, in common with all other citizens of the

¹ Otherwise, of course, *even the majority* do not enjoy the rights prescribed.

Republic, enjoy complete liberty of thought and speech with regard to politics, religion and anything else. They are guaranteed by the Constitution full proportional representation on every legislative and administrative body. They are allowed to use their own language freely in private or commercial life, as well as for religious purposes, and the Language Law provides for the official use of minority languages wherever the members of a Minority are numerous enough to make it worth while.¹ Full cultural freedom is likewise accorded to every Minority, adequate provision being made for the education of their children in the mother-tongue by teachers of their own nationality.² Education is controlled by autonomous Local Education Committees, constituted on a basis of nationality. As regards their economic life, a policy of *laissez faire* has hitherto rendered impossible much regulation in accordance with minority principles, but of recent years, as the State has come to play a greater part in the regulation of industry and commerce, it has been practicable for more to be done in this respect. It is undoubtedly true, and has been admitted by prominent Czechoslovak statesmen, that despite these constitutional provisions, and despite all legislation, there have been abuses committed by over-zealous or backward-looking officials. In mitigation of this offence it should be mentioned that in many cases the behaviour of those guilty of such abuses was in reaction to the hostile or scornful attitude adopted by certain members of the minority races. In order really to appreciate the situation, it should be recalled that the Habsburgs maintained their autocratic régime largely by a policy of "Divide and Rule": everything possible was done by them to set race against race, class against class, creed against creed, throughout their unhappy Empire, in order the more effectively to suppress them all, including the majority of the Austrian and Hungarian peoples. It is not surprising, therefore, that in Czechoslovakia it has not yet been possible to exorcise the evil spirit which was thus engendered, and that the constitution of many of the political parties on a racial or religious basis complicates the solution of the struggle for political power. There is also

¹ See pages 103-105.

² See Chapter VI.

a psychological difficulty to be overcome, due to the long subjugation of the Czechoslovak nation to Austro-Hungarian domination; this was succinctly expressed to the writer by a member of the Hungarian Minority, who might equally well have been a German of a similar type, when he asked: "What would you feel like if you were suddenly condemned to be governed by your domestic servants?"—the reaction of a Czechoslovak nationalist to such a remark is not difficult to understand! It is to some extent true, moreover, particularly in the case of some of the German Minority, that there is a fundamental difference of outlook with regard to the meaning of democracy: the German, however democratic he may consider himself, has usually a traditional respect for aristocrats and for the military, which is shared by few members of the Czechoslovak nation—aristocrats and the army are too recently associated in the minds of the latter with memories of foreign domination and oppression.

The attitude of the Czechoslovak Government with regard to the Minorities and its anxiety that they should have no just grounds for complaint was evidenced to the writer, when, during the winter of 1936–37, he spent two months studying Minority conditions, first in the German districts of Bohemia and in the Těšín district, and later in the Hungarian districts of Slovakia and Subcarpathian Ruthenia.

Throughout the period of his visits he was given every assistance by the Authorities to obtain any information which he required and to go where he wished—they even went out of their way to put him in touch with their opponents, in places where he might otherwise have had difficulty in finding them, and insisted that the latter should provide their own interpreter (where required), they themselves not attending the ensuing conversations.

On completion of his investigations, the writer was invited to broadcast in Prague in English, for the benefit of English-speaking listeners throughout the world, his impressions of Minority conditions. When he suggested submitting the manuscript of his broadcast beforehand for official sanction, he was assured that this was quite unnecessary, and that the Authorities would be very grateful for any outside criticism

or suggestions, "as these would be of assistance to the Administration". Observing that the writer was known to be a Socialist and likely, therefore, to be critical of the unemployment relief measures of a Government in which the Agrarian Party was predominant, that many of the districts which he visited would in Britain be classed as "Distressed Areas", and that he went there at a period of the year when he would see them at their worst, it is clear that the Czechoslovak Government makes no attempt to conceal or to whitewash the truth. One can hardly imagine the present British Government helping a foreign Socialist in a similar manner to visit South Wales and Durham, or encouraging the B.B.C. to grant him facilities for an uncensored broadcast of his impressions!

2. Germans. The territories united by the Peace Treaties to form the Republic of Czechoslovakia contain about 3½ million German citizens. These people formed in pre-war days part of the German population of Austria Hungary, and had no independent political life of their own. Most of them are to be found in eight fairly distinct areas along the present Czecho-German frontier, but large bodies are found also in and around several of the large towns of the interior of Bohemia and Moravia-Silesia, and there are colonies of them scattered throughout Slovakia and Subcarpathian Ruthenia—the last named, it may be noticed, were subjected to considerable suppression by the Hungarians in pre-war days. The term "Sudete German", which is used to describe these people collectively, has to-day a political, rather than a geographical, signification.

The origin of these Germans is described in Chapter III (page 101). Their rôle has from the first been one of fulfilling certain important economic and cultural functions in a country of which the population was predominantly Slav, and of which, therefore, they may be considered an essential and component part. The relations between the Czech majority and the German minority in the western portion of the Czechoslovak Republic have consequently developed in accordance with a principle which has been described by Doctor Spina, leader of the German Agrarian Party, as that of "Symbiosis".

It is interesting to note, moreover, that except during the Hussite War of the 17th century there was no armed strife between the Slavs and the Germans until the period of the Great War of 1914-1918. Indeed, within a century after the Hussite War Czechs and Germans were fighting side by side against the Habsburg dynasty, and later, in 1848, the two races joined in championing the cause of autonomy for their common territory against the centralist tendencies of Vienna.

It was in 1848, however, that appeared an ideological conflict between the Czechs and the Germans regarding their respective conceptions of the State. The Germans supported the pan-German idea, and demanded the territorial division of the lands of the Bohemian crown on a basis of nationality; the Czechs, led by the historian Palacký, opposed this programme, and in order to escape inclusion in the German Reich, supported Austria, whom they regarded as a lesser evil. The Czechs looked to France and Russia (then regarded as guardian of the Slav peoples) for support in a policy of restoring the Czecho-Moravian State within a federal Austrian Empire.

The restoration of Habsburg Absolutism in the 1850's led to the complete suppression of popular and national initiative, and it was not until ten years later, when this tendency was relaxed, that further development took place. The former tendency to separatism revived among the German bourgeoisie, opposed as before by the Czechs, but now a third group, the Austrian and Czech Social-Democrats, advocated a programme of transforming the Austro-Hungarian Empire into a democratic federation of national States (the Brno programme of 1889). The Habsburgs, however, showed themselves unwilling for any reform, with the inevitable result that their Empire disintegrated under the strain of the Great War, and Czechoslovakia emerged as a new independent State.

The policy of the Sudete Germans was from the first one of open opposition to the principle of "Symbiosis". German politicians formed a separatist committee, proclaimed independent cantons which they called "Deutschböhmen" and "Sudetenland", and declared, as representatives of these cantons, their continued loyalty to Austria. It was hoped by them that this would be accepted by the Peace Conference

as a *fait accompli* and that they would afterwards, together with Austria, be able to effect an "Anschluss" with Germany.

The Peace Conference rejected this solution, preferring to support the idea of the unity of the lands of the old Bohemian crown within the Czechoslovak Republic, and rejected also a proposal put forward by the Austrian delegation (which contained representatives of the Sudete Germans) that Czechoslovakia should be bound by treaty to set up within her frontiers a cantonal system based on nationality frontiers. The political leaders of the Sudete Germans reverted, therefore, to a policy of advocating complete separation from the new Republic, and in June, 1919, the German bourgeois parties formed a group, the *Arbeitsblok*, for the furtherance of this end. The German Social-Democrats, in September, 1919, declared themselves in favour of a division of the nationalities within the framework of the Republic. Both sections of the Sudete Germans decided, however, to take no further initiative for the time being, but to wait for the Government to capitulate. It was felt by them that Czechoslovakia could not last.

This attitude of non co-operation was carried so far that the German Social-Democrats even refused an invitation from the Czechoslovak Social-Democrat Prime Minister, Tusar, to support a coalition of Social-Democrats and Agrarians in carrying through an extremely progressive programme of social reform.

It was hoped by the Czechoslovak statesmen that when the period of government by a Constituent Assembly (in which the minority elements were not represented) came to an end and the Germans, together with other Minorities, obtained full proportional representation in both Houses of Parliament, this unhelpful attitude would be abandoned. This hope was, however, not realised, for the leaders of the German political parties elected in May, 1920, announced to the Chamber of Deputies that the Czechoslovak State had been created against their will, that it was the outcome of violence, and that they did not intend to abandon their claim to the right of self-determination, which had been violated by the inclusion of their territories in the Republic. Furthermore, they declared that they did not regard the Czechoslovak Constitution, or any legislation

which had already been carried out, as binding upon them, since they had not been consulted. They still demanded racial autonomy, granting the administration of the Germans to their own representatives. At the same time their more extreme elements made contact with the Nationalist Movements in Austria and in Germany, together with whom they carried out large-scale agitation at home and abroad in favour of frontier revision.

The Sudete Germans were at this time divided roughly into two groups. On the one hand there were the bourgeois parties, who were pan-Germanist and demanded complete severance from the Czechoslovak State; on the other, there were the Social-Democrats, who accepted the idea of being included in Czechoslovakia, but demanded a change in the existing Constitution which would give them greater power and independence of action. About two years later, however, this alignment of the parties was radically changed for the better. The bourgeois parties divided themselves into the "Fighting Front" (Kampfgemeinschaft), also known as the "*Negativists*", and the "Working Front" (Arbeitsgemeinschaft), known as the "*Activists*". The former group, which consisted of the German Nationalists and National Socialists, adhered to their pan-German tendency and association with aggressive organisations abroad, while the latter group, composed of the Agrarians and Christian Socialists, adopted the more reasonable view that, since the Czechoslovak Republic had obviously come to stay, the Sudete Germans had everything to gain by collaboration with the Czechoslovak majority. The German Social-Democrats, like their Czechoslovak counterparts, were at this time too preoccupied with their internal struggle against Communist tendencies to join either group.

The next general election, in 1925, showed that public opinion was more in favour of the "Activists", who polled about 900,000 votes, than of the "Negativists", whose vote was only about 240,000. It was not only this, however, but also fear of Socialism, which induced the German Agrarians and Christian Socialists in October, 1926, to accept an invitation that they should join the Government in place of the Czechoslovak Social-Democrats, thus forming, as it were, a "United Front", against the Left.

Four years later, after a general election at which the Social-Democrats, Czechoslovak as well as German, made considerable gains, this opportunist coalition was changed.

The German Christian Socialists, together with the Slovak Catholics, left the Government and were replaced by the Czechoslovak and German Social-Democrats, the German Agrarians remaining as before.

The growth and advent to power of the National Socialist Movement in Germany was, of course, not without effect on the Sudete Germans, among whom a German National Socialist Party had already been in existence in the days of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and to whom, therefore, the ideas of racial prejudice and pan-German Imperialism were not strange. Karlsbad had for long been a hotbed of National Socialists, whose influence on the initiators of the Nazi Movement in Germany had been considerable. They made up for their small numbers (they secured only 8 out of 62 German mandates in the 1929 election) by the energy and unscrupulousness with which they carried on their anti-democratic campaign—illegal para-military organisations were set up, and collaboration with the central organisation of the Nazis in Germany was so close and so contrary to the interests of Czechoslovak independence, that the party avoided suppression only by voluntarily liquidating itself, its leader, Krebs, taking refuge in Germany, where he is now a member of the Reichstag.

The world economic crisis, which affected particularly the Sudete German districts of Czechoslovakia, owing to the dependence of their industries on export trade, created conditions favourable for the successful development of Nazi propaganda among the people. Advantage was taken of this circumstance by Konrad Henlein, head of the German Turnverband (Gymnastic Federation), who, on October 1st, 1934, issued a manifesto calling on "all true Germans" to support a new United German Party (the Sudete German Party). This party, professing as much as it dared in a democratic country of the anti-democratic Nazi doctrines, found a valuable nucleus in the members of the disbanded National Socialist Party and rapidly developed an intense attack against the "Activists". It is interesting to note that the reactionary Right Wing of

the Czechoslovak Agrarian Party, fearing that the economic distress in the Sudete German districts might prove conducive of the development of Communist ideas, was largely responsible for the initiation and early successes of the Sudete German Party, which they doubtless regarded (and possibly still regard) as a "bulwark against Bolshevism".

The success of the Sudete German Party at the election held in 1935 was not unexpected, but its extent must have been a shock, especially to its Agrarian patrons, for by securing 44 seats in the Chamber of Deputies it became the second largest party in the State, the Czechoslovak Agrarians having 45 seats. This gain, which meant that about 60% of the total German electorate were in support of Henlein, was achieved, of course, at the expense of the "Activist" parties. The representatives of the latter were, however, invited to remain in the Cabinet, while the Sudete German Party, for reasons which will be explained, remained in the Opposition.

The divergence between the leaders of the Sudete German and "Activist" parties is related to international, rather than to internal, affairs. The former hope for the realisation of a Central Europe dominated by German National Socialism, while the latter desire that Czechoslovakia should remain independent and democratic, and that she should join herself with the other small States of Central Europe in such a way that they could play a direct rôle in international affairs, uninfluenced by their powerful neighbours.

VOTING STRENGTH AND PARLIAMENTARY REPRESENTATION OF THE MAIN GERMAN PARTIES IN THE CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES

		(to nearest thousand)			
		1920	1925	1929	1935
Social-Democrats	Votes	690,000	411,000	506,000	300,000
	Deputies	31	17	21	11
Agrarians	Votes	240,000	570,000	400,000 ¹	142,000
	Deputies	11	24	12	5
German National Socialists	Votes	328,000	240,000	190,000	—
	Deputies	—	10	7	—
Sudete German Socialists	Votes	—	168,000	204,000	—
	Deputies	15	7	8	—
Sudete German Socialists	Votes	—	—	—	1,250,000
	Deputies	—	—	—	44
Christian Socialists	Votes	213,000 ¹	314,000 ¹	348,000 ¹	163,000 ¹
	Deputies	10	13	14	6

¹ Joint vote with smaller parties.

Ever since the 1935 Elections, the Sudete German Party has carried on incessant agitation, at home and abroad, against the Czechoslovak Government. It has made a series of charges against the Government, and has presented it with a series of demands, protesting at the fact that the Government has refused to discuss with its representatives the problem of the German Minority which it claims to represent. The Government has preferred, however, to discuss this problem with the representatives of the three "Activist" German parties which have collaborated loyally within it for so many years.

The obstacles to co-operation between Czechoslovak Government Parties and the Sudete German Party are of a fundamental nature, for Henlein has introduced into the political field in Czechoslovakia principles which are alien and hostile to those of democracy. Although the Sudete German Party denied any relationship with National Socialism, the ideological resemblances between the two were obvious. The Party has adopted the Nazi conceptions of "Volksgemeinschaft", "Deutsches Blut" and "Deutsches Raum", and is no less virulent than the Nazi Party of Germany in its denunciations of Parliamentary Democracy, of Liberalism and, of course, of Socialism. Henlein has, moreover, reserved for himself the position of "Leader", and as such considers himself alone entitled to nominate Deputies and to deprive them, if he thinks fit, of their seats in Parliament. He himself, meanwhile, remains outside of Parliament, in accordance with the precedent established by Hitler, wielding power, but not answering for it in the proper place.

In accordance with totalitarian principles, the Sudete German Party claims the sole right to represent the German Minority, ignoring thus what it describes as the "Splitterparteien", i.e. the "Activist" parties. *This refusal to recognise the "Activist" parties, on the ground that they represent only 40% of the German population, comes strangely from people who are so loud in their claims of the rights of a 22% Minority!* Apart from this, however, the Czechoslovak Republic, like other democratic countries, has its political parties organised on a class basis and could not digest a party which attempted to subordinate real class-interests to the artificial interest of race.

It has since become more obvious than ever that collaboration of the Czechoslovak Government with the Sudete German Party is quite impossible, for the latter has shown that it has a totally different conception from theirs of the internal and external interests of the State. It refuses to recognise a single redeeming feature in Czechoslovakia's minority policy, though that is generally admitted to be the best in Europe. It will not concede that good-will has been shown by Czechoslovak politicians and leading statesmen, and sneers at the fact that for over ten years other German parties have taken part in the Government of the Republic.

It blames the Czechoslovak Government unjustly for the effects of world economic conditions over which they can have little or no control, alleging that the consequent sufferings of the German minority are due to a "nationalist" economic policy designed to impoverish and exterminate them.

Not content, moreover, with uttering and publishing these irresponsible ideas at home, the Sudete German Party has carried out on a grand scale abroad a campaign of mendacious propaganda which has given the world an exaggerated picture of the sufferings of the German Minority in Czechoslovakia and a completely misleading conception of the causes to which they are due. It has thus done much to discredit its country in the eyes of foreigners and to diminish the good-will which Czechoslovakia has not undeservedly enjoyed ever since its establishment.

As regards foreign policy also, it has shown itself in every way opposed to the Czechoslovak Government, disapproving of its position in the Little Entente and of its relations with France and the Soviet Union. While advancing in Parliament the idea that its rôle was that of "a bridge between Berlin and Prague", its "Leader" has made speeches outside¹ which were not calculated to improve Czechoslovak-German relations.

Undeterred, however, by the hostile agitation of the Sudete German Party (which was echoed loudly and menacingly from Berlin), Dr. Hodža, the Prime Minister, in November, 1936, invited the leaders of the "Activist" parties to draw up,

¹ Konrad Henlein at Cheb on June 21st, 1936: "I prefer to be hated in company with Germany than to draw any advantage out of hatred of Germany."

as a basis for discussion, a Memorandum outlining the main complaints of the German Minority and proposing measures to be taken for their satisfaction.

In January, 1937, this Memorandum was presented to the Prime Minister, its main proposals being :—

- (1) Capital expenditure by the State on public works and State aid to Local Authorities in connection with such works should be allocated, not in proportion to the numbers of the Minorities, but in accordance with the needs of each district. In accepting tenders for such works, preference should be given to those submitted by local contractors, who should be required always to employ local labour. Special instructions should be circulated to all officials concerned, impressing upon them the necessity of complying strictly with these principles.
- (2) State expenditure in connection with social welfare and public health should no longer be made proportional in each district to the populations, but should be regulated in accordance with the amount of unemployment.
- (3) Appointments to posts in the Government Services should be distributed between the nationalities in strict proportion to their respective numbers, it being recognised that knowledge of the majority language (Czechoslovak) should be an essential qualification and that, for obvious reasons connected with the international situation, such proportionality could not be observed in connection with the Defence Forces.
- (4) Official correspondence addressed to Authorities in districts where the majority of the population was German should always be accompanied by a translation into the German language.
- (5) Expenditure on the provision of facilities for all forms of education in the mother-tongue should be made more strictly proportionate to the numbers of the different nationalities.

- (6) A Special Parliamentary Committee should be set up for dealing with questions relating to the German Minority.
- (7) The use of German, as well as Czechoslovak, should be obligatory in Parliament when Bills are presented.

After brief discussion, for some of these demands had already been conceded in principle and others already in fact, an Agreement was drawn up and signed on February 18th, 1937,¹ whereby all excepting the last two demands were granted. This event was of considerable significance for two reasons: firstly it enhanced the prestige and justified the policy of the "Activist" parties, and secondly it showed clearly that the Czechoslovaks were sincerely desirous of satisfying the legitimate demands of the Minorities. The provisions of the February Agreement were almost immediately extended to every Minority.

Henlein was furiously indignant because the scorned "Activists" had achieved by constitutional methods almost all that the Sudete German Party had demanded. He refused to recognise the Agreement as in any way a contribution to the establishment of better relations between Czechoslovaks and Germans, because it had not been concluded with him, the "Leader" of the Germans.

His indignation changed to alarm, however, when he observed the favourable reaction of world opinion to the February Agreement, especially when his emissary to London, Rutha,² was cold-shouldered by most of the British Press and Public, while Wenzel Jaksch, a German Social-Democrat, who came there as representative of the "Activists", was given a favourable reception. The reaction within his party to this expression of foreign opinion threatened to prove disastrous, for many of its members now openly attended meetings at which "Activist" politicians were speaking.

Inspired no doubt from Berlin, where the appeasement of the Sudete Germans is the last thing that is desired, Henlein now declared that the February Agreement was valueless

¹ See Appendix 4, pages 348-351.

² Later committed for trial on a charge of homosexuality, but committed suicide rather than face inevitable conviction.

except as a step towards the achievement of further aims. He now put forward a programme demanding:—

- (a) the institution of local government bodies composed of representatives of Corporations which embrace all members of each nationality in proportion to their respective numbers;
- (b) the organisation of these National Corporations in Unions covering the whole Republic and their formation, as equal units, in a governing body which would supersede the existing Parliament;
- (c) nationality frontiers within the Republic to be drawn in accordance with the racial distribution in 1918.

In April, the Party presented six Bills for discussion in the Chamber of Deputies “as an instalment of its demands in connection with this programme”, as was made clear by Henlein in speeches at the May Day, 1937, Demonstrations in several towns. Examining these Bills in detail, we find that they represent the following demands:—

- (1) National Lists are to be drawn up forthwith, recording the names of every citizen over 18 years of age according to his or her nationality.
- (2) Nationality will normally be determined in accordance with the citizen’s mother-tongue.
- (3) A citizen who is ignorant of his or her mother-tongue, but who is familiar with the language of some other nation *may* elect to be placed on the National List of that other nation.
- (4) A citizen may under no circumstances change his or her nationality once his or her name has thus been entered on a National List.
- (5) Provisions 2 and 3 above will apply also to all children who are already born, as they attain the age of 18.
- (6) Children who are born in the future will, on attaining the age of 18, automatically and under all circumstances be placed on the same National List as their *father*.

- (7) The nationalities having thus been sorted out, a nationality may, by resolution of their Deputies and Senators, be declared a National Corporation. Such a Resolution must be passed by a simple majority at a meeting attended by at least half of the national Deputies and Senators, i.e. *it may be passed by an absolute minority*.
- (8) Such a National Corporation would be empowered "to care for the progress and development of national character, and for the maintenance and prosperity of the cultural, social and economic possessions of its nation". The exact scope of this provision is, perhaps deliberately, left vague, but it would appear on the face of it to empower insignificant fractions to obstruct the efficient functioning of the State machinery, and to be likely, therefore, to lead to endless disputes. It is not clear, for instance, whether the National Corporations are to make recommendations to the existing public organs (e.g. Ministry of Education and local School Councils, Ministry of Commerce and local Chambers of Commerce), or whether they are to usurp the powers and assume the responsibilities of these public organs, leaving them merely to arbitrate when conflict arises between the National Corporations.
- (9) The proposed internal organisation of the National Corporations is indicative of the "totalitarian" spirit in which these Bills are conceived. The governing body is to be a Presidium composed of the Deputies and Senators of the nationality concerned. These are at present democratically elected representatives, but the Presidium has the unrestricted right to co-opt members, and may itself decide upon "a more effective method of constituting itself". In any case its chief function seems to be that of appointing a "Speaker" (in other words a "Leader"), to whom all executive functions are transferred. This "Speaker" ("Leader") need not be an elected public representative—and indeed Henlein himself, who refuses to stand for

election, is clearly indicated as first occupant of the post. The decisive power is nominally vested in the Presidium, to which the "Speaker" must submit his proposals, and by which those proposals may be vetoed (by a vote of no confidence), but the selection of the "Speaker" and the approval of his decisions may be decided by a simple majority at a meeting attended by half only of its members. *It is thus evident once more that important decisions may be made by an absolute minority, and moreover, that that minority may be partly or wholly composed of co-opted members who have not been democratically elected.*

Commenting further on these proposals, it may be said that local autonomy on a national basis could only be effective in certain limited areas, where nationalities are not too much mixed. In these areas, however, the State would find it difficult, perhaps, to fulfil its treaty and constitutional obligations towards the local Minorities.

The proposed organisation would increase in Czechoslovak life a separatist tendency which has hitherto been limited in its scope. National considerations would predominate over the more practical considerations of class and of local circumstances. It would, moreover, create a danger which is clearly indicated by past experiences with regard to the Jews, and which is clearly recognised by the Germans of the Reich, as is shown by the following extract from an article on German autonomy in Esthonia, published in the May, 1937, number of the organ of the German Ausland-Institut, *Der Auslandsdeutsche* :—

"The development of the relations between the individual nations in the various countries of Europe shows us ever more clearly that severance and isolation, even if they facilitate to some extent the maintenance of special national characteristics, none the less entail serious dangers in the long run. A nation, which begins with increasing intensity to restrict itself to a special existence of its own, will, sooner or later, be by the nation in command of the State to be an alien element, and the way is usually not very long from such a conception to the will to eliminate the alien element."

principles of democracy are infringed by the fact that the governing body of each National Corporation is not directly elected, but is to contain all the Deputies and Senators of the nationality concerned. Because the principle of the determination of nationality accepted by the Czech National Socialists (that is free adoption) is other than that which it is proposed should govern the drawing up of the National Lists, and because the political parties recognised for parliamentary electoral purposes are not legally (and indeed not even in fact) nationally water-tight, it is possible that a Deputy or a Senator elected by the electors of one nationality may become a member of the governing body of another National Corporation.

Secondly, the governing bodies of the National Corporations are to enjoy unlimited powers of co-option (i.e. of members who have not been elected).

Thirdly, neither the governing bodies of the National Corporations, nor even their Chairmen have any executive power, but fulfil only a restricted advisory function. Executive power is vested in the "Speakers", who, as has been shown, may be selected and maintained in office by members of the governing body who have merely been co-opted. The mass of people on the National Lists have no rights whatever; they would only be the object, not the subject, of national autonomy.

The principles of the Bill concerning national membership are also opposed to the principle of the equality of the sexes, since the nationality of the father decides the nationality of children of both sexes born to parents of different nationality.

A further extension of the "totalitarian" idea is that Parliament should be replaced by a new body on which the National Corporation would be represented on terms of equality by their respective "Speakers". The objections to this are too obvious to require description, but it is evident that the proposal is definitely anti-democratic and that it is in contradiction to the principle of granting rights to minority groups. The utter hypocrisy of Henlein's pretended democracy and solicitude for the observance of the Minorities Treaty thus stands revealed.

The Bills submitted also propose new penal prescriptions for the protection of nationality. The existing legal code already contains such prescriptions. Thus for instance the law of 1921 concerning Factory Councils protects employees against dismissal on the ground of their nationality, and grants them the right to compensation in the event of such dismissal, while the law for the Defence of the Republic (1923) stipulates that whoever publicly incites to violence or other inimical acts against individual groups of the population because of their nationality, language or race, will be deemed guilty of an offence. There are numerous similar provisions in other laws. So far as the suggestion of the Sudete German Party contains an extension of these legal sanctions to cover further misdemeanours there can be no basic objection. The proposal, however, introduces new offences in connection with national possessions and of employment. It makes it an offence for anyone to induce a citizen of Czechoslovakia, by the offer of increased wages, or by threatening injury, or by promises, or the offer of advantages, to transfer his rights of ownership in property to a Czechoslovak citizen of another nationality or to an association of such citizens, or to reserve the tenancy rights of his property to such persons or such associations, or to leave such persons or associations in the enjoyment thereof, or to alienate his trade or enterprise, or share therein, to Czechoslovak citizens of another nationality or to associations thereof.

The obvious objection to this is that it is practically impossible to petrify, as it were, property rights within the Republic to such an extent that their passage from the hands of citizens (or organisations) of one nationality to the hands of another nationality—not even, be it noted, to the detriment of the person who alienates his property, but even to his advantage—should be the subject of prosecution. This would mean the creation of a very unnatural barrier, which would hinder the natural development of commercial intercourse. National property can be reasonably protected without injuring economic relations only by the general prevention of any exploitation of one person by another, of any impoverishment of the one by the other. To prohibit exchanges, even

lucrative exchanges, of economic property, only on the grounds that it diminishes "national property", is unrealistic and impracticable.

Finally the Bills propose also the institution of new guarantees against the illegal exercise by public organs of their powers. It is already stipulated in the Constitution that the extent to which the State is responsible for damage caused by the illegal exercise of public power shall be determined by law. A law to this effect has not yet been promulgated, and in this respect the Constitution has not yet been carried out. The existing legal order, it is true, by the institution of administrative judicature, affords citizens the opportunity of obtaining the cessation of illegal acts on the part of the Administration, but it does not provide for the making of claim to damages arising therefrom. There is nothing new or original about this proposal, for similar proposals have on several occasions been made by other, more democratic parties. The reason no measure has been introduced is that the economic crisis and the resulting crisis in State finances has hitherto made difficult the carrying out of the Constitution on this very vital matter. The present proposals of the Sudete German Party in this respect are copied from these former proposals.

The presentation of this programme came as a shock to many of Henlein's supporters who had innocently believed his repeated assertions that he had no connection with Berlin and was a democrat. Local autonomy under such conditions of "undemocracy" as were proposed ceased to seem attractive. The exposure of the homosexual scandal in which the late Rutha and other prominent Henleinist officials were involved reduced still further the popularity of the Party, and indeed it seemed for a time as though German "Activism" might regain the strong position which it once had held. The inevitable time lag in the benefits of the February Agreement becoming perceptible made it seem, however, that what Henlein said about its worthlessness was true and that the "Activists" had been fooled by the Czechoslovak Government. This fact and the growing fear of Nazi aggression have enabled Henlein to keep his followers together and to work them up into a state of ever-growing hysteria.

The advance of the German Nazis into Austria in March, 1938, and the summary incorporation of that country into the Third Reich, have produced conditions favourable to the extension of the influence of the Sudete German Party within the German Minority. The familiar tactic of declaring the party lists open to new members only until a certain date has been employed, accompanied by threats of punishment in the near future for those who would not take the hint. As a result of this the German Agrarians left the Government, followed soon by the German Christian Socialists, the former being merged with the Sudete German Party, its representatives (with the notable exceptions of Dr. Spina and Herr Zajiček) taking the oath of allegiance to Konrad Henlein.

The Sudete German Party has thus become the largest single party in the State, but is unlikely, owing to its extreme nationalism and to its attitude towards the Republican Constitution, to be able to find enough allies to form with it a majority in Parliament. Its future programme and actions will continue, of course, to be directed from Berlin, and to depend very largely, therefore, on the international, rather than on the internal situation.

These changes left the German Social-Democrats as an isolated German party within a Czechoslovak Coalition whose nationalist character was likely to be made more pronounced by the inclusion of the Czechoslovak National Union. They therefore, probably wisely, decided to withdraw from the Government, though it is, of course, inconceivable that they should ever join the Opposition.

Feeling runs high in the German districts, but it seems probable that, whatever may be the designs of Henlein and his masters in Germany, many of those who support the Sudete German Party do so in order to exploit their "nuisance value"—hoping to "blackmail" the Czechoslovak Government into granting them privileges to which they feel entitled as a "superior race", and which they know they could not win under normal conditions.

3. Hungarians (Magyars). The Magyars form the second largest Minority in Czechoslovakia, numbering in 1930 about

692,000, and representing 4·78% of the total population of the Republic. The greater part of them live in Slovakia and Subcarpathian Ruthenia, where they constitute 17·58% and 15·44% respectively of the population. There are also resident in Czechoslovakia a further 27,646 Magyars, most of whom are in the unhappy state of having no citizenship because after the Revolution, persuaded that their inclusion in the new Republic would prove only temporary, they refused to declare themselves Czechoslovak citizens within the statutory period of grace allowed. A Bill which will enable these last and any others in Czechoslovakia who find themselves in a similar plight to obtain Czechoslovak citizenship will shortly be placed before Parliament.

The inclusion of so many Magyars within a Slav State was due to the necessity of granting Czechoslovakia direct access to the Danube and to the geographical configuration of Slovakia, which would otherwise have rendered communication from east to west more difficult even than it now is. It was due also to the fact that these Magyars had in the past forced their way into Slovak territories as part of the deliberate policy of pre-war Hungary, which aspired to the establishment along the Tatra and Carpathian mountains of an impregnable frontier against "the Slav menace", and which aimed at the "magyarisation" of the intervening territory.

The Magyars suffer to some extent because of the sins of their forefathers, for they live among a majority population which suffered exceedingly under the former Hungarian régime. The attitude towards the Republic which was adopted and has been maintained by those among them who were beneficiaries under that régime, and the extensive agitation which has been conducted from Budapest in favour of a revision of the territorial settlement made after the war, have done much to keep alive in Czechoslovakia a feeling of hostility towards the Magyar Minority. This regrettable tendency has been augmented, moreover, by the pro-Magyar utterances of Lord Rothermere, Mr. Garvin, Sir Robert Gower, M.P., and others, which have increased the risk of an outbreak of hostilities between Hungary and Czechoslovakia, and have consequently made some Czechoslovaks

regard their Magyar Minority as a menace to their national security.

Both in Slovakia and in Subcarpathian Ruthenia the Magyar bourgeoisie occupies a leading position in finance, industry and commerce. It supplies also, owing to its generally higher cultural level than that of the Slovaks and Ruthenes, a relatively large proportion of the personnel of the professions.

The economic situation of the masses, just like that of the Germans, has been rendered more difficult by circumstances for which the Czechoslovak Government cannot be held entirely responsible. The industries of Slovakia found themselves excluded by tariff barriers from the Hungarian market upon which they had been built up, and were unfavourably situated, on account of the difficulty and the cost of transport, to compete in the new Republic with the industries of its western parts. They withered away, therefore, sometimes completely, and their workers, mainly Magyar, have only slowly been absorbed by the development of agriculture and of new industries in the centre and north of Slovakia. It is complained that the Magyars did not benefit in the same degree as the Slovaks by the Land Reform. To the limited extent to which this complaint is justified, the blame should be attached, however, not to the Czechoslovak Government, but to the priests and other agents of Budapest, who advised the Magyars not to take advantage of the measure, telling them that it would shortly be annulled when the Hungarian administration was restored, and that those who ignored their advice would then be treated as traitors.

From a cultural point of view, they are much better off than they were under the Hungarian régime, or than are most of their compatriots in present-day Hungary, but there is undoubtedly still room for improvement in this respect. When one takes into consideration the fact that the Hungarian Government had provided the Slovaks with only 276 Elementary Schools and not a single Secondary School, and that therefore the new Administration has had enormous arrears to make good for the majority population, it should not be surprising that the requirements of the Magyar Minority have not yet been fully satisfied. Actually, in the year 1934-35,

out of a total of 129,733 Magyar children attending State Elementary and Secondary Schools, only 17,470 (13·5%) were unable to receive instruction in their own language; in that year the State had provided for the Magyars a Teachers' Training College, 5 Secondary Schools, 13 Upper Elementary and 843 Elementary Schools, and 35 Kindergartens. That there is no Hungarian University is understandable, in view of the small numbers who would benefit by it, and observing that the Republic has only 3 Universities for its majority population (i.e. about 1 per 3 millions of population). The Magyars have, however, some ground for complaint in that the Heads of the Magyar schools are often Slovaks, though they know the Magyar language, and in that the Education Committees, provided for by Statute for the local control of education, have never in fact been constituted.

Adequate provision is likewise made for the cultural requirements of the adult population. There are 623 Magyar Public Libraries in Slovakia, and 34 in Subcarpathian Ruthenia, while numerous lectures are delivered in the Magyar language. Facilities are also given, where practicable, for the presentation of Magyar drama, but in connection with this the attitude of the Authorities is sometimes foolishly unreasonable. Thus, in the town of Košice, the one theatre is allocated to different nationalities in accordance with their respective numbers. The Magyars, therefore, are entitled to the use of the theatre on 110 days in the year, and, being keen theatre-goers, take full advantage of that privilege. The Slovaks of the town, however, who are culturally less advanced or are less enthusiastic about drama, left the theatre idle during 120 of the days on which it was allocated to them. When, however, the Magyars politely requested that they might be allowed to make use of the theatre whenever the Slovaks did not require it, they were curtly reminded that the proportion of the year during which it was allocated to them was already greater than the proportion which they represented of the population of the town! As regards the Press, they publish 150 periodicals in their own language; 40 of these are of a political character and 10 of them appear daily. The freedom of the Press which is such a striking feature generally in

Czechoslovakia appears to be somewhat more restricted, at least with regard to Hungarian papers, in the eastern parts of the Republic. It would seem, however, that any undue rigorousness on the part of the Censor is due to local initiative, rather than being a matter of Government policy, for his restrictions are constantly being avoided by the Magyars, by the simple, though inconvenient expedient of publishing their paper in Czech territory, e.g. at Moravská-Ostrava, after which its circulation is unimpeded.

Strenuous efforts are made by reactionary politicians, working in more or less patent collusion with Budapest, to exploit the economic distress and general dissatisfaction of the Magyars along racial and irredentist lines. The fact that seven out of the nine Deputies who represent them in Parliament are members of the Opposition Parties (Christian Socialist and Magyar Nationalist) should not, however, be considered indicative of the success of such subversive agitation. The Christian-Socialists (Catholics) of Slovakia, whether Slovak or Magyar, make common cause against the Czechs, and often, therefore, the Slovak priests make the ignorant Slovak peasants vote for a Magyar candidate who is their class-enemy. The failure of reaction is due less, however, to Government action in satisfaction of local grievances, than to the influence of the Social-Democrats and Communists, who point out that the Magyars are little, if at all, worse off than their Slovak comrades, that both are the victims of the reactionary elements in the Government, and that it is politically possible for the two races, if they work in unison, to improve their situation. The Magyars receive a mandate in the Social-Democrat, and two in the Communist Party (one in respect of Subcarpathian Ruthenia), and in addition receive one from the Agrarians.

One gets the impression, in conversation with the Magyar people of the towns and countryside, that they are staunch individualists and intensely democratic. Most of them seem, therefore, to feel themselves attached to the Czechoslovak Republic by bonds which no propaganda of Budapest or of their reactionary political leaders could dissolve. They realise, moreover, that their economic and social condition, however

unsatisfactory it may still be, is remediable within the Constitution of the Republic, and that it is very much better than that of their counterparts in Hungary. This applies to members of the professional class, no less than to the peasants and industrial workers. It is regrettable then that one should hear authentic complaints from such loyal citizens of Czechoslovakia that life has been less agreeable for them since their Czech officials have been replaced by Slovaks and that, although their rights are on the whole most scrupulously respected, they feel themselves excluded from full participation in the life of the Republic. Lacking the democratic background and tradition of the Czechs, some Slovaks have inherited, perhaps, the less attractive traditions of their former Hungarian masters. Their reaction to Hungarian agitation for frontier revision has already been described.

These explain, though they cannot be held to justify, the maintenance of a hostile attitude towards the Magyars by the older generations of the Slovak race, but for the existence of the tendency towards a similar attitude among the younger generations one must blame largely those Roman Catholic clergy who teach the pupils in their schools to be narrow-minded reactionaries—the contrast between this policy and that, already described, which the Catholics adopt at election time is expressive of the conflict between their class-interests, and their nationalist feelings.

4. Poles. The⁶⁶ Polish Minority in the whole of the Republic numbers 81,737 and represents a mere 0·57% of the total population. The vast majority of them (79,450) live in Moravia-Silesia where they constitute 2·27% of the population, and of these again 77,309 are in the Těšín district (about 12% of the population).

Prior to the year 1848 there were practically no Poles in this part of Silesia and the racial struggle there was one between the Czechs and the Germans. The local inhabitants called themselves Moravians, the Polish language was not used in the schools, and there appears to have been no Polish literature circulating in the district. From 1848 onwards, however, a process of polonisation was conducted by Polish

priests who came from Galicia. This process was encouraged by the Austrians who were busily trying to germanise the population, and who, finding the Czechs resistant to their efforts, regarded their denationalisation as desirable. The use of various local dialects, transitional between Polish and Czech, persisted, however, as it has persisted to the present day, many of those who speak these dialects claiming an equally indeterminate nationality as Šlonzaks.

In the latter part of the 19th century, the industrialisation of the Ostrava-Karvinná Basin led to the immigration of large numbers of poor workers from Galicia, who to-day represent the more purely Polish element in Czechoslovakia. The result was that the Czechs found themselves reduced, from a numerical point of view, to a minority. The year 1900 marks the culminating point of this process, for thereafter the Czechs reacted to the threat of being completely outnumbered: the number of Czechs in the Těšín district rose from 85,113 in 1900 to 115,604 in 1910, the Czech proportion of the population increasing from 23·27% to 36·58%. This increase of the Czech proportion was carried out in spite of much discouragement and opposition, and was possible largely because the Czechs were so resistant to germanisation.

How the Polish minority came to be included in the Czechoslovak Republic is described in detail later.¹ They were included because they happened to live and to earn their livelihood in an area which was vitally essential to Czechoslovakia from an economic, and from a strategic, point of view.

Together with the remaining citizens of the Republic they have benefited considerably, as compared with their compatriots across the border, from the Land Reform and from other extensive measures of social reform introduced by the Czechoslovak Government.

The majority of them (about 45,000) are employed in industry, while a further 7,000 are in employment subsidiary to industry (e.g. transport); only some 18,000 work on the land, and many of these are now peasant-proprietors. Labour is highly organised in Unions and has a well-developed Co-operative Movement of its own, the Federation of

¹ Chapter XI, pages 284-287.

Polish Consumers' Co-operative Societies, with 180 branches and about 20,000 members. The rural population, likewise, has a strong Co-operative Movement with a membership of 28,000, which provides them with credit and organises their buying and selling on a collective basis; their interests are protected also by an Agriculturalists' Association with 58 branches.

Politically, the Poles divide themselves into four or five camps, a considerable number of them, especially in the industrial districts, supporting the Communist Party, while the remainder are divided between a Catholic Party, a Protestant Bourgeois Party, a Socialist Workers' Party and a Polish Labour Party. The last of these is a bogus workers' party (somewhat like the National Labour Party in Britain) which was created shortly before the 1935 elections by a railwayman called Lukosz who had been expelled from the Socialist Workers' Party; it is suspected that the Polish Government inspired the creation of this party, in order to split the Socialist vote and at the same time to increase the vote of the Polish *bloc*. In order to attain the "electoral quota" (about 30,000 votes) which will qualify them for a mandate, these small parties are compelled, for election purposes, to group themselves together and perhaps even with parties of other nationalities. In the elections of 1925 and 1929 the Catholics, Protestants and Socialist Workers formed the so-called Polish *bloc*, but failed, nevertheless, to secure a mandate. At the 1935 elections, however, the Socialist Workers preferred to join forces with the Czechoslovak Social-Democrats, rather than to continue collaboration with their own bourgeois parties, which had come under the influence of Warsaw. The latter, together with Lukosz' bogus party, went to the poll as part of an autonomist *bloc* which includes the Slovak Catholics, the Slovak Nationalists and the Ruthenian Agricultural Autonomist Union; they failed again, however, to achieve the necessary "quota", and were lucky that the flexibility of the electoral regulations and the generosity of their partners in the Autonomist *bloc* enabled them to obtain a mandate for their representative. The Poles obtain a mandate also through the Communist Party.

Polish cultural development is fully safeguarded by the Constitution. The bi-lingual schools, which were instruments of germanisation under the Austro-Hungarian Empire, have been abolished, and provision is now made for the elementary education of all but about $7\frac{1}{2}\%$ of the Polish children in their mother-tongue—the remainder are children whose parents live in predominantly German or Czechoslovak districts, and who therefore must attend a German or Czechoslovak school. There are few non-Poles (4 Germans out of a total of 351 in 1934) among their teachers. Nursery Schools and Kindergartens are provided for the younger children, and Secondary Education at the Polish Modern School (400 pupils) at Orlová which was made a State Institution as from January 1st, 1938. The work of the State Schools is ably supplemented by schools run by the Polish *Macierz Szkolna*, a voluntary Society, which runs 11 Elementary and 7 Higher Elementary Schools; this Society is directly and indirectly subsidised by the State. Besides the foregoing there are Polish Industrial, Agricultural and Commercial Schools, and it is only for university education that a Pole may not use his mother-tongue. As compared with the situation in Poland, or with the situation in pre-war Austria-Hungary, the situation of the Polish Minority as regards education is very satisfactory.

The cultural life of adults too is provided for by the State, either directly, or indirectly through the *Macierz Szkolna* and other Polish Cultural Societies which have a membership of some 10,000. Polish libraries are plentiful, and Polish theatricals are frequently organised. Sport, dealt with by various Youth Organisations, the most important of which is the Socialist "*Sila*".

The arbitrary division of the Těšín district left almost all the Polish Press outside Czechoslovak territory, the Socialist organ alone continuing publication at Fryštát. Since 1920, however, five or six Polish weekly papers have started publication in Czechoslovakia, and in 1934 the Polish Minority started their own daily paper, the *Dennik Polski*.

So far as religious life is concerned, full freedom of conscience is allowed and the State interferes only where minority rights are disregarded. The majority of the Poles are Roman Catholics

owing to the polonising influence of the priests in pre-war days, but there is a numerous minority of Protestants, organised since the Revolution as the Evangelical Church of Silesia. The Roman Catholic Church is, of course, officially recognised and subsidised by the State, but similar treatment cannot be accorded to the Evangelical Church until it consents to grant legitimate rights to the Czechoslovak minority of its adherents.¹ Complaints are made by the Poles, and less frequently by the Czechoslovaks, at the appointment of Roman Catholic priests whose nationality differs from that of their parishioners ; such complaints, however, should properly be directed to the Cardinal at Breslau within whose diocese Těšín is still included, even after the recent execution of the "modus vivendi" concluded between Czechoslovakia and the Vatican.

Some idea of the attitude of the Polish Minority towards the Czechoslovak Republic may be formed from an analysis of the voting in the Těšín district at the last parliamentary elections (1935):—

Czechoslovak Parties . . .	94,420
Communist Party . . .	40,275
Polish Parties . . .	28,214
German Parties . . .	14,491

It should be recalled that the Polish population of this district numbers about 77,000, of whom, we may take it, about half, say 39,000, are voters. Since out of that 39,000 there are enough Communist supporters to secure, in conjunction admittedly with the Czechoslovaks, a mandate, it would appear probable that the Poles who vote for their national *bloc* (who are, incidentally, not necessarily anti-Czechoslovak or in favour of Poland) are a minority within their Minority.

¹ See page 105.

CHAPTER IX

GRIEVANCES OF THE GERMAN MINORITY

SUCH UNDUE PROMINENCE and publicity has been, and is constantly being, given by interested parties to the grievances and demands of the German Minority, that they have quite unwarrantably, since they are a purely internal affair of the Czechoslovak Republic, become of international concern. In view of this, and of the plausible, but deliberately mendacious, reports which are in circulation regarding the conditions under which this Minority lives, it is proposed to deal with the question in considerable detail. The world has not yet learned that since the advent of National Socialism the old proverb, "There's never smoke without a fire", has lost much, if not all, of its significance; nor have we, in Britain, all realised that our own reactionaries, however responsible may be the posts which they occupy, are prepared to lie with the worst of them when they consider that their class-interests are at stake.

Let it be stated to begin with, since it has been candidly admitted by President Beneš and other prominent Czechoslovak statesmen, that the German Minority has certain justifiable grievances. It would be surprising indeed if this were not so, since the Czechoslovak Revolution and the Treaties by which it was confirmed subordinated three and a quarter million Germans to a nation they had oppressed and scorned for close on three hundred years, and since the situation has subsequently been deliberately embittered by intervention from abroad.

This done, let us examine these grievances; let us attempt to decide which of them are real, and which are not; let us take note of what steps have already been taken by the Czechoslovak Government to rectify past errors or misdeeds; and let us consider what further steps, if any, could be taken by the Czechoslovak Government to remove any remaining ground for complaint. Much valuable information and comment on this subject, some of it not hitherto published, is

contained in *Germany and Czechoslovakia*¹ by "An Active and Responsible Czechoslovak Statesman", from which extracts will be quoted from time to time.

- (1) *It is alleged that the Sudete Germans were incorporated in Czechoslovakia against their will.*

This is partially true, though as is explained elsewhere in this volume,² the Sudete Germans themselves appeared to have very divided views as regards what should be done with them. It is true also that the Czechoslovak Delegation at the Peace Conference claimed territories within the "historic frontiers" of Bohemia of which the population was predominantly German, as it remains to-day. This was done, however, because *these territories and the territories in which the majority population is Czech are mutually dependent upon each other economically, and because the exclusion of the former from the new State would therefore be economically very disadvantageous to all concerned.* It was done also because the attachment of the German territories to Germany, or their organisation as an independent entity which would inevitably be incorporated at some convenient moment into the German Empire, would have deprived the Czechoslovaks of a natural, defendable frontier, and would thus (under the conditions of Capitalism) have rendered it impossible for them to maintain their newly-won position as an independent people.

The Czechoslovak claims were considered by the experts of the Great Powers, who heard also the rival arguments of the Sudete Germans, but who were unanimously, for the same reasons as the Czechoslovaks, in favour of allowing economic and strategic interests to override those of nationality. The ultimate decision was made by the Great Powers, who, therefore, not the Czechoslovaks, bear the responsibility for it.

- (2) *It is alleged that the Czechoslovak Delegation obtained this decision by misleading the Peace Conference with false and inaccurate statistics.*³

¹ "Orbis" Publishing Co., Prague, 1937.

² Chapter VIII.

³ Op. cit. Vol. II. Chapter VI.

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"To speak of deceiving the Conference by purposely submitting inaccurate data and inaccurate 'falsified' statistics in Memorandum No. III *is an untrue assertion*. It is therefore not an *honest* assertion.

"Whenever it was a matter of data relating to the population, the Czechoslovak memoranda always on principle and consistently quoted first the official Austrian and Hungarian statistics, then added critical notes to these statistics, and only after that embodied in the memoranda the figures that before the War were current in the Czech political polemics against the official Austro-Hungarian figures which were from conviction regarded at Prague as inaccurate and as doing injustice to the Czechs. *At the same time the memoranda openly and honestly stated that these were approximate figures, based on the mere judgment of Czech factors (the Czech National Council at Prague), and always before them and alongside them were quoted the official Austrian statistics and compared with them.*

"It is possible to bring up the point that perhaps the approximate Czech figures did not always correspond fully to the actual facts, and that in this or in that case they did injustice to the Germans just as the official Austrian and Hungarian statistics did injustice to the Czechs and Slovaks. This is, however, explained by the fact that they were always *merely an approximate estimate*—which was always honestly stated. A further and decisive point, however, is that *the difference between the Czechoslovak figures and the actual facts was on the whole no large one and in view of the numerical strength of the Germans—numbering, as they do, more than 8,000,000—played no political role whatsoever as regards the definitive allocation of that population to Czechoslovakia.*

"It is therefore necessary to reject very emphatically the contention that anyone should have wished to deceive with false figures, or that indeed anyone could have been deceived. We must reveal to the authors of this criticism the fact that the Allied experts at the Conference—to the great dissatisfaction of the interested delegations—*acted exclusively on the basis of the official Austro-Hungarian and German statistics* relating to the minority population, that in the course of the discussions they submitted these statistics to the delegations,

including ours, and operated with these figures, and that thus it is absolutely impossible to speak of any misleading in this matter.

"As a proof of this—and a very eloquent one at that—we will quote at least one authority; Temperley in Volume V of his *History of the Peace Conference*, gives detailed statistics relating to the distribution of territory and the numbers of the minority population allotted to the Central European States including Czechoslovakia. He gives the population on the basis of the official Austrian statistics of the year 1910, and estimates that 3,781,000 Germans were allocated to Czechoslovakia—a number which is characteristically eloquent, which no German to-day would venture to suggest, and which of itself proves the Czechoslovak delegation to have been right in rejecting the statistics of the former Monarchy.¹

"We thus state in accordance with fact that the Czechoslovak Memorandum No. III in giving the number of the Germans who were to fall to the Czechoslovak State, *stated the precise numbers of Germans in all the lands of the Bohemian Crown according to the official Austrian returns of the year 1910* (altogether 3,512,582 German citizens), emphasised the fact that it regarded these figures as doing injustice to the Czechs for the reason that on the taking of the census pressure had been exerted on the Czech population of the racially mixed areas, produced proofs of this and declared that in the opinion of the 'Czech National Council' at Prague the actual number of Germans in the Czech lands should possibly be 800,000 to 1 million less. In giving these official Austrian figures on the one hand and the approximate estimate of the Prague 'Czech National Council' on the other the Memorandum left it to the Conference experts to come to an impartial verdict themselves after considering the two sets of figures.² H. W. Temperley's

¹ According to the official Czechoslovak census of 1921 the number of Germans in Czechoslovakia was 3,123,568, including those in Slovakia and Carpathian Ruthenia (150,000).

² To this it is necessary to add the following:—

The fact is that in 1921 there were in Czechoslovakia, that is, in the lands of the Bohemian Crown, in Slovakia and Carpathian Ruthenia (where the Germans according to the official Czechoslovak figures of that year numbered 150,000) altogether 3,123,000 Germans, and in the lands of the Bohemian Crown alone, which are the subject matter of Memorandum III and which thus were exclusively the subject of our calculations for the Conference, no more than

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book shows that the Conference arrived at its conclusions itself. Such was the procedure of the Czechoslovak delegation in this matter.

"That it is impossible to speak of any intentional or artificial under-statement of the numbers of the minority population in the memoranda submitted by the Czechoslovak delegation to the Peace Conference is also proved by the fact that the Czechoslovak memorandum on Slovakia, in giving the number of Magyars that would be left within the Czechoslovak Republic, *made an error in favour of the Magyars*, estimating their numbers at approximately 200,000 more than were ascertained at the Czechoslovak census of 1921.¹ Thus the estimates in the Czechoslovak memoranda were not merely in favour of Czechoslovakia but also *to the detriment of Czechoslovakia*. This in itself is a clear proof that there was no intention of deceiving anyone, quite apart from the fact—already referred to—that these estimates or these errors had not, nor could have, any substantial influence at all on the decisions of the Conference.

"We know that even with these clear proofs we shall not succeed in silencing people of ill-will; we speak, however, above all for people of good will, for people who are honestly concerned for agreement between Czechs and Germans and for a psychological understanding between them.

"In spreading such senseless and petty arguments about the attitude and procedure of the Czechoslovak delegation German propaganda is committing one of the main political errors;

2,973,000 Germans. At the same time the German population had increased between 1910 and 1921, so that in 1910 their numbers must have been still less. If we compare this latter number with the statement made in the Czechoslovak memorandum which says that the figure of 3,512,000 should be reduced by some 800,000, we arrive at a figure of 2,712,000 as the German-speaking population. The Czechoslovak Memorandum, basing its estimate on the views of the "Czech National Council", gave the number of Germans in the lands of the Bohemian Crown to be allotted to Czechoslovakia at approximately 261,000 less than the number probably was. On the other hand, the old official Austrian statistics gave the number of the Germans in the lands of the Bohemian Crown at approximately 500,000 more than it probably was. (Temperley even gives it at about 660,000 more than it was.)

¹ The Czechoslovak memorandum speaks of the number of Magyars in Slovakia (exclusive of Carpathian Ruthenia), who would according to Czechoslovak calculations be incorporated in Czechoslovakia, and gives their approximate strength at 860,000. The Czechoslovak official returns of the year 1921, however, give the number of Magyars in Slovakia as 637,000.

it is underrating its neighbour and partner. *So ignorant, naive, pettifogging and mean the leaders of the Czechoslovak delegation to the Peace Conference were certainly not. The outcome of their labours proves it.*"

(8) *It is alleged that the Czechoslovak Delegation at the Peace Conference undertook that Czechoslovakia should be "a second Switzerland", and that the Czechoslovak Government has failed to honour that undertaking.*

This argument is the basis of the Sudete German claim for the re-organisation of Czechoslovakia as a Federation of autonomous national "cantons"—a claim which may seem, on the face of it, a very reasonable one.

The analogy between Czechoslovakia and Switzerland is, however, misleading. The Swiss Federation was formed by a group of pre-existent economic and political entities, for their mutual reinforcement in face of threatened conquest by a menacing and powerful neighbour. The nationalities within the Czechoslovak Republic have long since ceased to represent independent economic or political entities (in the case of the Sudete Germans they never did constitute such an entity), and their organisation on such a basis is quite impracticable. Were it possible, moreover, it would, as has already been stated, weaken them all collectively in face of a powerful and menacing neighbour—not to mention other neighbours less powerful, but scarcely less rapacious.

This fact was clearly indicated in the opening paragraph of the so-called confidential Note¹ addressed by Dr. Beneš, representative of Czechoslovakia, to the Peace Conference on May 20th, 1919, in which he clearly stated that "the Government designs to make of the Czechoslovak Republic *a sort of Switzerland*, while paying regard, of course, to *the special conditions in Bohemia*". It must have been, and doubtless was, perfectly well understood by those who read this document that the Czechoslovak Government did not intend to turn Czechoslovakia into "a second Switzerland", but to adopt some of the main principles of the Swiss régime, "paying regard, of course, to the special conditions in Bohemia".

¹ Memorandum No. III. See Appendix 8, pages 846-847.

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¹"The complete text of this Note has so far not been published in Czechoslovakia; so far only a few passages have been cited, and these too have been given a tendentious and inaccurate interpretation. The fact that the Note has hitherto not been published has been interpreted, however, as if the Czechoslovak Government were afraid to make it public and as if it contained something that was purposely being withheld. It is a really important document, for the reason that *it presents a most striking proof of Czechoslovak 'fair play' not only at the Peace Conference, but also in our subsequent² internal policy.*

"When the so-called Commission for the New States (Commission de Nouveaux Etats)³ were drafting the principles of the minority treaty for Poland, some of the members of the Commission entered into direct contact with the Czechoslovak delegation in order to learn the delegation's standpoint in the matter of the minority treaties. At that time Dr. Beneš had several talks on this matter with some of the members of the Commission. After one such talk with Berthelot he was asked by the latter, as chairman of the Commission, to put in writing, in a confidential document, all he had said to Berthelot orally. Dr. Beneš thereupon put into writing the contents of the talk, and this document in the form of a protocol without address and without signature was handed to Berthelot as an elucidation of the Czechoslovak standpoint. Subsequently, on the occasion of a discussion on the minority treaties in the session of the Commission on the 20th May 1919 *this protocol—the so-called Note of the 20th May 1919*—was read in order to indicate to the members of the Commission the Czechoslovak Delegation's conception of the future minority régime of the Czechoslovak Republic. . . . From the text itself and from

¹Op. cit. Vol. II Chapter V.

²The German propaganda does not act correctly in this connection, it cites and interprets the Czechoslovak memoranda wrongly and omits the *main point*. It contends that it was said Switzerland was to be a "model" for Czechoslovakia and that the Czechoslovak delegation undertook to establish a Swiss régime, *but it omits to state* that the Czechoslovak documents submitted to the Peace Conference *substantially limited* the extent to which the model would be followed by a concrete enumeration of what would be done, and that they outlined precisely in what sense and to what extent the principles of the Swiss democratic system would be accepted.

³This Commission was presided over by Philippe Berthelot; the Americans were represented by Messrs. H. Miller and Hudson, the English by Messrs. Headlam-Morley, Carr and Leeper, and the French by Kammerer.

the elucidation of the text it is clear beyond all shadow of doubt, with what candour, precision and sincerity the Czechoslovak delegation at that time spoke even of the details of our minority policy at the Peace Conference, that *even then* they told the Peace Conference clearly not only of things calculated to win favour, or to incline particularly the English or Americans to their standpoint, *but also of measures with which we have since been reproached* (the question of the official language, the question of a special position for the Czechoslovak language and the Czechoslovak element generally in the State, the question of the reduction of the number of German and Hungarian schools, etc.) We know that no other delegation did anything of the kind at the Peace Conference, or outlined in any document in such clear, open, straightforward and unreserved terms what their State was subsequently going to do in the sphere of internal policy, as did the Czechoslovak delegation.

"The text of this Note is thus *a direct and exemplary proof of the loyal, straightforward and open conduct of the Czechoslovak delegation at the Peace Conference*. It may, as regards the ideas it embodies, be criticised by this or that politician who might have wished the Czechoslovak delegation to go a little further in their concessions to the Minorities, even if *the concessions actually made went relatively further than those of any other delegation in Paris in the year 1919*. We must indeed say that *those who were acquainted with the atmosphere existing in the years 1918 and 1919 must, if they wish to be impartial, acknowledge the courage at that time displayed by our delegation, must indeed marvel at it and agree that this was a unique example followed by no other of the victor States*. Such is the actual truth.

"It must not be asserted, however, that the Czechoslovak delegation promised things designed to captivate by virtue of their liberality, and that these promises were subsequently not fulfilled. Not only because what we said at that time has been actually carried out, but also, and this in particular, because the Note in question even at that time clearly embodied those measures which then could have been regarded as illiberal, and which are now brought up against our policy from time to time as evidence of illiberality.

"We thus regard the agitation and the propaganda with

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this so-called Note and our so-called promises at the Peace Conference to our minorities *as one of the greatest political mistakes that anyone has ever committed*. The document is itself a classic proof of this."

(4) *It is alleged that the Czechoslovak Government are attempting to change the nationality proportion in the German districts by "colonising" them with Czechoslovaks.*

That there are now more Czechoslovaks in the German districts than there were just after the war is undoubtedly true, but to suggest that this is due to Government action is a misrepresentation of fact, unless it is pretended that the appointment of Czechoslovak officials constitutes "colonisation".

During the early days of the Republic, when the Germans represented a disloyal, and possibly therefore (under the then existing circumstances) a dangerous, element, it was not unnatural that many of the posts in the State services should be allotted to reliable Czechoslovaks. For this, and for other reasons which will be dealt with later, the appointment of Czech officials to posts in the German districts has continued up to the present time and is likely to continue. This has led, of course, to the establishment of Czechoslovak schools for the children of these officials, which has meant the immigration of Czechoslovak teachers. As might be expected, the Czechoslovaks have tended to group themselves together for social purposes, thus forming colonies which are often boycotted by the hostile Germans. These colonies have sometimes been reinforced by other Czechoslovaks who have come to cater for their needs.

The growth of such "colonies" was only to be expected, of course, for they are but the product of conditions which obtained. Their persistence as "colonies" is regrettable, but for this the Germans themselves are largely to blame. It is much to be regretted, also, that owing to the continuance of strained relations between the nationalities, the atmosphere has remained favourable for the perpetuation of violently nationalist Czechoslovak organisations, such as the "Severočeská Národní Jednota", which date from Austro-Hungarian days, and the traditions of which make them

anathema to the Germans. For this, however, the Government can again not justly be blamed.

Nor can the Government be blamed for the influx into the German towns of Czechs from the neighbouring countryside, for this took place during the boom years in response to the demands of industry. *It was encouraged, moreover, by the German employers because simple-minded Czech countryfolk, not yet organised in Unions, could be used for forcing down the wages of their German workers.* This form of "colonisation" is apparently no new phenomenon, for in the town of Teplice Šanov (Teplitz-Schönau) there is what is still referred to as the "Czech Colony", which was started in Austro-Hungarian times for cheap Czech workers by the local German employers who invited them in to the detriment of their own workers.

- (5) *It is alleged that the Czechoslovak Government attempt to denationalise the Germans by exerting pressure on them to change their nationality and to send their children to Czechoslovak schools.*

In answer to this it was pointed out by the Minister of Justice, Ivan Dérer, in a speech in the Chamber on November 13th, 1936, who, as a Slovak, had personal memories of the open campaign of denationalisation conducted by the Hungarians against his countrymen, that:—

"Even though the entire State administration in former Hungary pursued this end, even though the entire scheme of administration, the courts and the schools were brought into the service of this State policy, it nevertheless failed in former Hungary, substantially at any rate, to lessen the status of the former national Minorities in that country. Though we lost a large number of our Slovaks and though a large number of persons of German nationality were magyarised in the Hungarian State, substantially we, Germans as well as Slovaks, preserved our national standing. Even that undemocratic régime, manifestly aiming at the denationalisation of all the non-Magyar nationalities, attained no successes to speak of. That is for us a political experience of such character that we should never venture in our new, and moreover democratic, State to adopt a policy of denationalisation of

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the racial minorities, for it would prove a totally vain effort and a policy that could lead to no substantial results of gains. In a State which is democratic and possesses a universal franchise in such measure as perhaps no other country in our surroundings, in a State that applies this franchise even to the tiniest Minorities so as to give them due representation, in a State which seeks on every side to bring democratic principles into practice—in such a State denationalisation is impossible, nor is it possible in view of the educational and cultural policy which our Republic has pursued from the very outset.”

It is indeed unthinkable that any Czechoslovak Government would be foolish enough to attempt a policy of denationalisation, and it seems probable that this charge is based merely on the fact that when selecting candidates for posts in the State Forestry Department in this region preference is given to those who are willing to adopt Czechoslovak nationality.

The explanation for this isolated departure from one of the basic principles governing the State Services is that the members of the Forestry Service are grouped in small isolated communities. As the Germans are mostly townsmen, the majority of the foresters are Czechoslovak, but, living in a district in which their nationality is a minority, they are not entitled to a school unless they can muster 40 children. It is obvious, therefore, why the replacement of a Czechoslovak by a German is regarded as undesirable, unless the latter is willing to adopt Czechoslovak nationality and to send his children to a Czechoslovak school!

There is evidence that some Czech employers have made the engagement of German workers conditional on their adopting Czechoslovak nationality and sending their children to Czechoslovak schools, but it seems probable that the presence of German children in Czechoslovak schools is more often due to the fact that the latter, being built and run by the State (since the Czechoslovaks are here in a minority), are more attractive and better endowed than those run for the Germans by the German Local Government Authorities.¹ The fact that school text-books and sometimes even meals

¹ For this the Germans themselves are surely to blame.

are provided gratuitously carries weight with poor parents. In any case racial discrimination by employers, if it does occur, among the Czechoslovaks, is almost universal among the German employers, most of whom are ardent supporters of Henlein.

(6) *It is alleged that the German Minority does not obtain full proportional representation in the State Services.*

That this is true is unquestionable, and is partly due to the negative character of Article 7 of the Minorities Treaty¹ and paragraph 2 of Clause 128 of the Constitution which reads as follows:—"Difference in religion, belief, confession or language is not, within the scope of the general statutes, an obstacle to any citizen of the Czechoslovak Republic, particularly with regard to entry into the public services and offices, attainment of any dignity, or to the exercise of any trade or calling."

It is due also, however, to other circumstances, for which the Germans themselves are responsible. A knowledge of the majority language (Czechoslovak) is obviously desirable, and is in some cases essential, for a public servant, yet many Germans, through laziness or for snobbish reasons ("Czech is a housemaid's language"), refuse to learn that language. Moreover, for several years after the Revolution, the Germans (together with the Hungarians) boycotted the Government Services. They thought at first that the Republic would not last, and later, when that hope was dashed to the ground, were unwilling to serve it in any way. So far as the upper classes were concerned, the writer can recall that as late as 1927 they would not consent to work for the salaries that the new State could offer—which were naturally lower than those which the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy paid to its officials—and preferred to remain in the independent professions or to go into business: it is only since the advent of the world economic crisis that anxious German bourgeois parents rail at the Government, which they hate and scorn, for not providing jobs for their precious progeny.

Whatever may be the cause, however, the fact remains, as has been candidly admitted by the Prime Minister and his colleagues in the Government, that the Germans have not got

¹ Appendix 2, pages 341-345.

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their fair share, particularly of the more important posts in the Government Services. The Government has, by the Agreement of February, 1937,¹ undertaken to remedy this situation as rapidly as possible, but it is one which no Government, with the best will in the world, could remedy for many years to come. The Czechoslovak officials are there in office and could not reasonably be removed at once, even if that would placate Henlein and Hitler (*which it would not*). Provision has been made in the 1938 budget for the compulsory retirement on pension of a considerable number of older officials, and in future the regulation of new entries into the State Services is to be as far as possible proportional to the numerical strengths of each nationality. The Prime Minister, Dr. Hodža, informing the Chamber what measures were being adopted to ensure more strict Government control in this respect, stated that:—

“On the basis of the experience acquired and of the opinions submitted from the various departments, the Cabinet Council has elaborated the draft of detailed instructions and suggestions for the acceptance of new applicants for posts in the State service with special regard to their nationality. These instructions have already (on the 3rd of November, 1937) been sent round to the central departments, and will be submitted to the Government in definitive form for approval. . . . The personnel department of the Cabinet Council has, with the consent of the Ministries concerned, been increased so that it can, in the spirit of the Constitution and of the February Agreement, closely follow the whole policy of recruiting the Civil Service. The Estimates for 1938 also allow for the possibility of the most urgent measures of re-systematisation.

“For the purpose of carrying out these principles there has been set up, in accord with the Government Resolution of 18th February last, a standing conference of representatives of all departments under the aegis of the Cabinet Council. In addition to that, all the central departments submit to the Cabinet Council regular quarterly statements showing how many new employees have been taken into the State service in that period, and how many of them are members of the various national Minorities. In future, these statements will be

¹ Appendix 4.

accompanied by information for the Cabinet Council as to the number of vacancies in the individual categories or groups of employees which are likely to be filled in the succeeding period."

It will nevertheless for many years to come be possible for Henlein and his followers to produce statistics which will seem to justify a complaint that the Germans are unfairly treated and that the Czechoslovaks are breaking the spirit, though not the letter, of the Minorities Treaty.

- (7) *It is alleged that the provisions of the Language Law are not being carried out, in that German Local Government Authorities receive written communications in Czechoslovak only from higher Authorities.*

This was due to ambiguity in the wording of paragraph 2 of the Language Law, and has been corrected by the February, 1937, Agreement. German versions of all official communications are now attached whenever the Authorities of a German district are addressed.

- (8) *It is alleged that adequate and proportionate provision is not made in accordance with the Minorities Treaty for the education of Germans in their mother-tongue.*

The statistics produced in support of this complaint are misleading, since they do not take into account the fact that the Germans have proportionately fewer children than the Czechoslovaks.

Actually the Germans in Czechoslovakia are much better served than any other minority in Europe, having a highly developed educational system in all its stages, including a German University (in Prague) and numerous Technical High Schools. In the year 1937 they had :

- 3,301 Elementary Schools
- 444 Upper Elementary Schools
- 73 Secondary Schools
- 201 Industrial, Commercial and Agricultural Schools
- 10 Teachers' Training Colleges
- 2 Technical High Schools
- 1 University.

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Ninety-seven per cent of their children were attending purely German schools, in which they were taught by German teachers in their own language and which were controlled locally by German School Committees. In every grade of school their classes were, as compared with those of the Czechoslovak schools, less crowded.

Their situation has remained appreciably unchanged in Bohemia and Moravia-Silesia, where they were favoured under the Austrian régime, but in Slovakia and Subcarpathian Ruthenia, where their national existence had received no recognition by the Hungarians, it has been substantially improved. *Indeed they are very much better off than the Germans of Prussia to whom Hitler grants only 1 school per 1,160 of population, for they have 1 school per 862 of population.*

They complain that their school buildings are inferior to those of the Czechoslovaks who live among them, but for this they should blame the Austro-Hungarian Government who built their schools, and their own Local Government Authorities who often will not rebuild them. The Czechoslovak schools, being minority schools in these districts, are built and maintained by the Czechoslovak Government, which has advanced ideas on education. The contrast is marked between what has been provided by the old and the new régimes respectively, but is notably less so in towns where the German Social-Democrats are in a majority on the Local Council.

Ample provision is made for Adult Education and for the satisfaction in various ways of their cultural requirements. German Libraries, which in 1920 numbered 458, with 282,255 volumes, had been increased by 1935 to 3,570 with 2,020,893 volumes—and the money which they received from the State for annual replacements and additions was often spent on the purchase of books of Nazi propaganda! These are supplemented by a recently founded organisation, Zentralwanderbucherei in Prague, which caters for those communities of Germans which are too small to have a library of their own and which are too isolated, perhaps, to be able to have access to that of a larger neighbour. The Zentralwanderbucherei, which was founded and is financed by the Ministry of Education, runs a system of travelling libraries and already circulates by this means a very considerable amount of literature.

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(9) *It is alleged that political liberty in accordance with the Minorities Treaty and the Constitution of the Republic is confined to the Czechoslovaks, but is denied notably to the Germans.*

Though the electoral system of the Republic has sometimes been criticised for making it difficult for small sections of the population to obtain separate political representation, this criticism, which is of doubtful validity, can scarcely affect so large a Minority as the Germans. It has never been suggested, moreover, that the elections are in any way "faked", and this is reflected in the figures given below showing the distribution of mandates in the Chamber of Deputies according to nationality.

NATIONALITY DISTRIBUTION OF MANDATES IN THE CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES

<i>Nationality</i>	1920	1925	1929	1935	<i>Proportion of Deputies %</i>	<i>Proportion of Population %</i>
Czechoslovak	199	207	208	206	68.66	66.9
German	73	75	73	72	24.00	22.3
TOTAL	281	300	300	300	100	100

Similar proportionality is observed in the Senate also, though in both cases some of the Germans receive their mandates from the Communist Party.¹

Proportional Representation applies also in the election of all Local Governing bodies, there being, in consequence, many districts, towns and communes whose government and administration is entirely in German hands.

The right of political association is restricted only by the banning of the German National Socialist Party, which was justifiably dissolved on account of its irredentist activities in collusion with the Third Reich that menaced the integrity and security of the State. The right of association is extended, of course, into the industrial field, the Germans having their own Trade Unions, and applies also to Co-operative Organisations, and to Recreational and Cultural Organisations.

Freedom of speech is, within reasonable bounds, quite unrestricted; indeed it is questionable, in view of the unscrupulous abuse of this privilege on occasion by Henlein

¹ Perhaps Henlein will not recognise these as Germans.

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and his followers, whether the Czechoslovak Government are not too generous in this respect. Meetings and Public Demonstrations are likewise unrestricted, except where they are genuinely likely to lead to breach of the peace. Here again the Government may sometimes be criticised for adopting a lenient attitude towards anti-Jewish demonstrations, which are in patent contravention of the principles of the Constitution and for allowing the Sudete German Party to exercise an unconstitutional control over the meetings of other bodies in the German districts—the writer heard apparently authentic reports in December, 1936, that the Police Authorities at Kaplice (Kaplitz) allowed the local German nationalists to stipulate, as a condition for their non-interference at an authorised Trade Union meeting (Social-Democrat), that a collection should be taken in aid of the Sudete German Party's Winter Relief Organisation (which is used as an instrument of subversive propaganda against the State).

Freedom of the Press and Publication is restricted to a certain degree, but only in cases of flagrant abuse. There is no preventive censorship, and the suppression of undesirable publications by confiscation may be authorised only by approval of a court of law. The following figures (for the whole Republic) relating to such confiscations show the decreasing extent to which freedom is restricted:—

PUBLICATIONS SUPPRESSED

	1933	1934	1935	1936	1937 (first 10 months)
Periodicals	2,905	2,138	1,825	1,653	1,193
Other publications	430			253	176

Most Nazi papers and publications coming from Germany are confiscated, if found, at the frontier. A vast amount of propagandist literature used, however, to be smuggled in over the German railways, whose terminal stations in several cases lay within Czechoslovak territory and enjoyed a certain degree of special immunity from search and control. This channel has been closed since the German-Czechoslovak agreement regarding their respective railways, but other

channels less easy to close remain. As already stated, moreover, the Germans take full advantage of the local autonomy which they enjoy as regards the expenditure of the money provided by the State for their local libraries, to put into circulation Nazi subversive literature—a loyal Librarian in a certain German town showed the writer a selection of such books, and said that the only action he could take to mitigate the effects of the abuse of privilege by his Library Committee was to lose the more offensive among the books which they made him purchase. The confiscation of Reich newspapers can, moreover, cause little embarrassment to the Nazis, for Henlein's paper, *Die Zeit*, faithfully reproduces whatever Goebbels may direct.

The intensification of Nazi propagandist activity, and the danger of direct or indirect aggression, have necessitated considerable restriction of civil liberty in the frontier regions. A Defence of the State Act,¹ passed in the summer of 1936, has placed these regions, inhabited mainly by Germans, more or less under martial law. This Act places almost absolute power in the hands of the Military Authorities, against whose decisions there can be no appeal. Industry and all popular activities in the "war zone" are strictly controlled by the Military, property may be requisitioned at a moment's notice, and anyone who protests at some prohibition or at what he considers inadequate compensation for the loss of his property is liable to summary arrest as a "traitor". Strict censorship is exercised over all publications, the only news which may be published being that authorised by the Military.

Replying, in December, 1937, in the Chamber of Deputies to criticisms regarding the application of this Act, the Minister of Justice, Ivan Dérer, pointed out that it must be obvious that, under such critical circumstances as obtained, the Czechoslovak Government could have no desire "to fabricate superfluous political trials and thus to incense the population, particularly the racial minorities". Explaining how and why this unhappy state of affairs had been created, he said:—

"Democracy of course brings it about everywhere that the masses take part in political life, and that it is essential to

¹ The "Machník" Law.

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inform these masses and in so doing to employ the idea and means of political agitation. As long as such agitation is kept within definite reasonable bounds I think we may regard it as politically wholesome, politically desirable and politically essential. In the post-war era, political agitation, as a result of the well-known development in a number of European countries, has degenerated, and such agitation has been proclaimed, I would say, as almost a principle of State. We see a whole series of countries where this principle has found expression in certain State institutions. In many European countries Ministries of Propaganda have been established—in other words, ministries of agitation, agitation conducted by the State and with public funds for the benefit of that class which has seized the political power in the particular country and have made their agitation a State agitation, a State affair. At the same time they make every other kind of agitation impossible. The result is that such agitation and propaganda has become the main means of conducting political affairs, and the broad masses of the population are continuously being influenced and unsettled by this agitation and propaganda with the object of enabling the régime that has introduced the system to maintain its hold as long as possible on the reins of power.

“There cannot be the slightest doubt that this political system, which goes beyond a healthy political development in magnifying, exaggerating and carrying out agitation, has to a certain extent been introduced into our own country, into the Czechoslovak Republic. This continuous unsettling of the broad masses of our population through excessive agitation and propaganda which it is difficult to reconcile with the reasonable principles of a democratic State, brings about the results of which the gentlemen to-day complain, namely that trials occur which we may call political trials.”

It is difficult indeed to see how the Czechoslovak Government could under such circumstances act more leniently, and it is clear that the blame for the circumstances which have forced that Government to depart from its principles should be attached elsewhere.

The construction by the Czechoslovak Government of a system of fixed defences, like the celebrated French “Maginot

Line", along the German border has not unnaturally attracted the unwelcome attention of foreign Powers—notably, of course, that of the Third Reich. The consequent development of espionage, conducted often by members of the German Minority, has made the Authorities nervous and suspicious, with the result that arrests are frequently made on mere suspicion. The charge made by Sudete Germans that "every day Sudete Germans are dragged out of their beds and flung into prison, and then haled before the courts on charges of espionage" is typical of the manner in which events are exaggerated. It was officially admitted by the Minister of Justice, however, that at the end of 1937 there were, among 926 persons awaiting trial on espionage charges, 850 Czechoslovak citizens of German nationality, as well as 73 Germans from beyond the frontier.

Such a state of affairs is calculated, of course, to embitter still more the feelings of the German Minority against their Government, but there is no likelihood of it improving so long as Germany maintains a hostile and menacing attitude towards the Czechoslovak Republic, and so long as the leaders of the Sudete German Party, by speech and action, add fuel to the flames of Czechoslovak suspicions regarding the loyalty of the German Minority.

(10) *It is alleged the economic distress in the Sudete German districts is due to the economic policy of the Czechoslovak Government.*

Henlein and his followers even go so far as to charge the Government with "wilful neglect", inspired by ill-will towards the Germans or by a desire that they should perish. An assertion that any Government would "cut off its nose to spite its face" in the manner suggested is clearly absurd.

That the former deflationary policy of the Government has reacted extremely unfavourably upon the export industries is true. This effect has been experienced likewise, however, by the export industries in the Czechoslovak districts, and cannot therefore be ascribed to a wish to discriminate against the Germans. In the main, however, the distress is due to world economic conditions and to developments in other

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countries, over neither of which has the Czechoslovak Government been in a position to exercise any control.

The German districts were highly industrialised under the Austro-Hungarian régime, when, however, they enjoyed a protected internal market represented by a population of 52 millions. Even in those days, their principal industries (textiles, glass, porcelain, mining, etc.) were dependent largely for their prosperity on export trades. The reduction of their internal market to that represented by a population of less than 15 millions, the growth of foreign competition, the widespread tendency towards aiming at self-sufficiency, and finally the industrialisation of those Succession States (e.g. Yugoslavia) which had formerly been mainly agricultural, have all contributed to reducing Czechoslovakia's export trade.

It should be added that *one of the reasons which, more than any other, has reduced the German districts to their unhappy condition is the adoption by Germany of a selfish economic policy.* Germany is Czechoslovakia's most important market, and in the peak year, 1927, she purchased from Czechoslovakia goods to the value of 4,851 million Kč., representing 24·1% of the total of Czechoslovak exports. Since the advent of Hitler, however, and the commencement of Germany's efforts to build up a war-economy, Czechoslovak exports to that country have fallen enormously, as shown below :—

<i>Czechoslovak Exports to Germany (In Millions of Kč.)</i>				
1927	.	.	.	4,851
1929	.	.	.	3,973
1933	.	.	.	1,045
1934	.	.	.	1,564 ¹
1935	.	.	.	1,183
1936	.	.	.	1,160

One can imagine what it has meant, for instance, to a town like Kraslice (Kraslitz), which lives by making musical

¹ *Note.* This slight improvement was effected at the cost of no small sacrifice on the part of Czechoslovakia, because Germany will pay for imports only with finished articles which compete with Czechoslovak products.

instruments, to be suddenly deprived of a market which formerly absorbed the greater part of its output.

Besides this, Germany, in pursuit of her policy of economic penetration into the Balkan countries, which import glass and textiles (among other things) from Czechoslovakia, has done so at the expense of Czechoslovakia by means of heavy export subsidies. She has also robbed Czechoslovakia of most of the income which she used to draw from German visitors to her spas (Karlsbad, Marienbad, etc.): currency restrictions have made it difficult for Germans to go anywhere abroad, and in addition to this Nazi propaganda has created the quite unwarranted impression in Germany that Germans will be insulted, and perhaps even assaulted, if they go to Czechoslovakia.

Thus the German Minority in Czechoslovakia, about whose condition Hitler has recently declared his personal interest, are paying the price for German autarchy!

Hitler's allies in Czechoslovakia, the Sudete German financiers and industrialists, who are the backbone of the Henlein movement, must, however, share with Germany the blame for bringing ruin on their countrymen. They denounce most vigorously the Czechoslovak Government, blaming them for the industrial crisis, but at the same time, under cover of this agitation, they impose wage-cuts on their workers, German and Czechoslovak alike, whose ability to resist they have undermined by stirring up racial antagonism and thus creating disunity within their ranks. Furthermore it would appear on investigation, that it is precisely they who are very largely responsible for the conditions which obtain.

In the early days of the Czechoslovak Republic, convinced (and hoping) that the Republic would not last, they converted their reserves and even their working capital into Austrian or German currency, and lost it all when those currencies collapsed. Having thus been without the capital which they required during the boom years 1928 and 1929, they borrowed from the Czechoslovak Banks sums which were sometimes unjustifiably large, and on which to-day the interest charges represent a severe handicap to their industrial enterprises. The process of rationalisation by which, as in other

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countries, it has been attempted to regularise the financial status of industry has led to the closing down of many factories, and consequently to the creation of mass-unemployment.

Many of the Sudete German industrialists have, moreover, in the effort to restore their financial position, taken action which is contrary to the interests of their own workers. Thus, for example, transferring machinery from their own mills in Bohemia, they have set up textile factories in Roumania and Jugoslavia, countries which formerly absorbed a large proportion of the textile output of Czechoslovakia. These factories, *run under conditions which would not be tolerated by the Trade Unions or by the Government in Czechoslovakia,* produce profits, doubtless, which more than compensate their owners for what they lose through the reduction of Czechoslovak exports, and provide them with a plausible excuse for imposing wage-cuts on their workers in Czechoslovakia and for appealing for subsidisation by the State, "on grounds of unfair *foreign* competition". The tactic is one with which we are familiar in Britain, and with which we are likely to become more unpleasantly familiar if events are allowed to take their course.

The insincerity of the solicitude which the Sudete German owning class profess with regard to their workers is further shown by the steps they have taken to evade their local financial responsibilities. Local taxation in Czechoslovakia, like the Rates in Britain, is highest in districts where poverty is the greatest. In order to avoid having to pay high rates of local taxation in the "distressed areas" in which their factories are situated, the owners have transferred their Head Offices to Prague, where the local taxation is only half as great. The effect of this action on local finances (out of which education, unemployment and poor relief, health services, etc., must largely, if not entirely, be paid) is disastrous, for Prague retains 35% of the local taxation which is levied—the Local Government Authorities are thus robbed of 67·5% of the taxes to which they have a legitimate right, and *almost three-quarters of that amount remains in the pockets of the wealthiest section of the community (most of whom are German).*

"If, therefore," wrote Jaromír Nečas, Czechoslovak Minister of Social Welfare, in the *Slavonic Review* of April, 1937,

"attempts are made by anti-Czech propagandists abroad to blame the Czechoslovak Government for the distress which exists in the German areas of the State, they are based upon a misleading presentation, and, indeed, a deliberate distortion of the facts. *Those who are really to blame are the wealthy Germans who, although they are fond of using the term 'Volksgemeinschaft,' exploit the distress of their fellow countrymen by paying them starvation wages.*"

The Czechoslovak Government has done its utmost to improve the situation by reversing its policy of deflation, and by other financial measures. The currency was devalued and the bank-rate was reduced in order that cheap money might be made available. It has spent approximately a thousand million Kč. in rehabilitating the German Banks, apart from shouldering liabilities which run into further thousands of millions of Kč. by honouring the debt represented by the Austrian War loans—*action which it was under no obligation, whether by legal enactment or under the terms of the Peace Treaties, to take, but which it took in order to save important German banking institutions from closing their doors and ruining their depositors.*¹ Commenting on December 5th, 1936, in the Chamber of Deputies on these measures of rehabilitation, the Minister of Finance, Dr. J. Kalfus, pointed out that the unhappy financial condition of the two institutions which the State saved from disaster—

¹ Note. The Central Bank of German Savings Banks in Czechoslovakia, with head office at Prague, was established in the year 1922. In addition to conducting ordinary banking business, it acted as a centre for the German Savings Banks and several other Popular Banking Institutions.

Losses in connection with the Bank appeared first in the year 1924, mainly in the item of participation in advances on War Loans, and claims on industrial undertakings. To meet these losses the Bank received a sum of 2,500,000 Kč. out of the Special Fund for mitigating losses arising from post-war conditions. In 1932, however, further losses came to light of a considerably bigger extent, and to meet these the Bank received from the above-mentioned Fund a "sanitation" aid of Kč. 44 million, as well as a State Guarantee for the Bank's credits up to the amount of 15 million Kč. Aid to the amount of 8 million Kč. was also given to the Karlsbad Bank, all the shares in which are held by the Central Bank of German Savings Banks. Despite all these measures of rehabilitation, however, the Bank was unable to regain public confidence. With the intensification of the economic crisis, and in no small measure in consequence of careless management, the Central Bank found itself in such a situation that any idea of its continued existence became hopeless, and it was necessary to proceed to its liquidation. This liquidation was carried out by the new Central Bank of all Czechoslovak Savings Banks, with the aid of public funds, and on the terms laid down in a Government Decree of December 18th, 1936.

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whose losses are estimated at nearly 300 million Kč.—was not caused by any action at all on the part of the State, and that its causes were to be sought, not so much in the economic crisis, as in “*the grave incompetence of those to whom other people’s funds had been entrusted*”.

In order to help the export industries, but without granting export or other subsidies to encourage inefficiency or profiteering, the Government have also, from 1928 onwards, introduced measures for the refund of taxes in respect of goods produced for export. These concessions relate only to those industries in which 50 % or more of the output is destined for the foreign market, and are granted only where the Czechoslovak rate of taxation (trade tax, turnover tax, coal tax, transport tax), which is levied mainly to meet the cost of social services, is higher than that in competitor countries. *The industries which are centred in the German districts have benefited proportionately more by these measures than have those of the Czech districts.*

In addition to this, official statistics show that the German districts have had their due share, indeed more than their share, of the State expenditure on Public Works, and, of course, have benefited by almost the whole of the expenditure on the construction of frontier fortifications. In connection with these there was not entirely unjustifiable complaint that an undue proportion of the State contracts were given to Czechoslovak contractors, who introduced Czechoslovak labour into districts where unemployed Germans were available. This tendency, to the extent to which it has existed in the past, has been corrected in accordance with the Agreement of February, 1937.

The success of these measures taken by the Government to counter the effects of the economic crisis in the German districts may be gauged by the fact that *in two industries in which the Germans are largely engaged (glass and textiles), the reduction of unemployment was relatively greater in those districts where more than 50 % of the population is German, than in those where Czechoslovaks are in a majority.* The same might have been said a short while ago about the metal industry, but in this industry the improvement of conditions is now (owing probably to the increased demand for armaments) more universal. The following unemployment figures serve to illustrate this point :—

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Glass Industry

Character of Area	1935	January 1936	1937	Annual increase (+) or decline (-)	
				1936	1937
Czech .	14,686	15,869	12,539	+1,183	-3,380
German .	33,897	33,983	28,774	+86	-5,209

Textile Industry

Character of Area	1935	January 1936	1937	Annual increase (+) or decline (-)	
				1936	1937
Czech .	76,779	79,589	61,142	+2,810	-18,447
German .	134,740	132,445	102,167	-2,295	-30,278

Metal Industry

Character of Area	1935	January 1936	1937	Annual increase (+) or decline (-)	
				1936	1937
Czech .	147,389	152,803	111,384	+5,414	-41,419
German .	95,073	94,309	74,725	-764	-19,584

That the incidence of unemployment, as measured by the number of unsuccessful applicants for work, is relatively greater among the Germans than among the Czechoslovaks—though not four times greater as asserted by Henlein—is due primarily to the fact that many of the latter are more recently and less completely industrialised. Quite a large number of the Czechoslovaks may be described rather as “industrialised peasants”; though employed in industry at a time of boom, they own a few acres of land near the town in which they are employed. These smallholdings are not sufficiently large for the maintenance of a decent standard of living, which is why the owner seeks industrial employment, leaving his wife and children to look after the farm. When the owner loses his employment, however, he has this small farm upon which he can retire, but only, of course, at the cost of a reduction in standard of living for him and all his dependants. The Germans, having been industrialised for a longer time, have lost all contact with the land, and cannot therefore fall back upon it at a time of crisis, as described.

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It may be pointed out, moreover, with regard to the more urbanised areas of Bohemia, that *the Czechoslovak communities are less immediately affected than the German communities by industrial crises because a larger proportion of their population work "on their own account"*.

		Total Number of workers	Number working on their own account
	— Jičín . . .	80,216	14,503
Czechoslovak	— Tábor . . .	33,505	15,919
Communities	— Pehlřimov . . .	19,745	10,021
	— Dačice . . .	20,319	9,385
	— Kraslice . . .	20,555	4,479
German	— Nejdek . . .	20,351	3,870
Communities	— Loket . . .	19,460	4,813
	— Rumburk . . .	17,390	3,647

- (11) *It is alleged that the expenditure on relief measures for the unemployed and their dependants has been made rigidly proportional to the numbers of each nationality, and that the Germans, who are (in proportion to their numbers) in greater need, have suffered thereby.*

As regards unemployment relief received from the State by the Trade Union organisations under the Ghent system for their unemployed members, the Germans seem to have no ground for complaint.

SUMS CONTRIBUTED BY THE STATE TO TRADE UNION ORGANISATIONS FOR THEIR UNEMPLOYED MEMBERS, 1930-1935

Czechoslovak Trade Union Federation (con- taining also 14% Germans)	958,976,752 Kč.
German Trade Union Organisations	704,940,948 Kč.
Communist and other mixed Trade Union Organisations (containing German mem- bers)	185,073,298 Kč.

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In addition to the relief grants under the Ghent system, other measures of relief were applied during the period 1930-85 mainly for the benefit of unorganised workers, who are not covered by the Ghent system, as shown below :

	German Districts (50 in No.)	Czech Districts (103 in No.)
Supplies of food, potatoes and Christmas gifts	520,729,280 Kč.	507,702,570 Kč.
Free distribution of milk . . .	56,215,265 half-litres	59,777,270 half-litres
Groceries (i.e. sugar, coffee, fats, butter, etc.) . . .	375,215 quintals	399,464 quintals
Coal . . .	301,750 „	368,600 „
Bread . . .	1,379,050 loaves	1,355,760 loaves
Distribution of potatoes .	133,600 quintals	142,400 quintals

These figures show clearly that the relief measures were carried out in the “distressed areas”, entirely irrespective of nationality. The amount spent on Government supplies of food, potatoes and Christmas gifts in the 50 German was 13 million Kč. more than in the 103 Czech areas, although many of these, also, are suffering greatly from the effects of unemployment.

In connection with assistance for the children of the unemployed, the following incident is an excellent illustration of the unscrupulous manner in which the liberty of the Press in Czechoslovakia is abused, and of the lengths to which German propaganda goes in the misrepresentation of the facts regarding the treatment of the German Minority in Czechoslovakia.

On November 6th, 1936, a Deputy of the Sudete German Party had published in the organ of his party, *Die Zeit*, a charge which he proposed to level against the Government, stating that—“The Czech centres for child-relief can pay out

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from the State contributions to the Czech district child-relief societies which are everywhere established in the German frontier area such high sums that, if we reckon them per head of Czech population, make two to six-hundred-and-seventy times as much as is allotted per head of German population. This means that Czech children living in the German frontier area can be fed whole months at the expense of the State, while the much lower State support in money for German children of the like district scarcely suffices for a fortnight."

On the same day the Ministry of Social Welfare informed the Editor of *Die Zeit*, as well as the Secretariat of the Sudete German Party that the data on which, it was claimed, the charge was based relating to the amount of contributions for the relief of Czech and German children was incorrect, and that the amount of relief was given strictly according to the nationality scale, that is, for example, the proportion of 2:1 was observed in Bohemia, the Czech district child relief societies receiving 1,025,000 Kč. and the German 512,000 Kč. *Die Zeit*, after several urgent reminders, published a correction of its previous assertion the next day, doing so in a few sentences among local news.

The charge was nevertheless not withdrawn or amended, but was printed and distributed in Parliament, and on Wednesday, December 2nd, again appeared in thick lettering and in prominent make-up in *Die Zeit* under a headline: "Equality in Bohemia—Subvention to the Czech Child Relief 670 times bigger than the Subvention to the German Child Relief."

As both *Die Zeit* and the Secretariat of the Sudete German Party had had their attention called in emphatic manner to the matter, *it is clear that this was a manifest intention to arouse in the German population a feeling of oppression and injustice which would react even upon underfed children.*

The charge, together with the incorrect figures on which it was based, was reported verbatim in many of the papers in Germany in order to stir up popular indignation against Czechoslovakia. Thus the Chemnitzer Tageszeitung, circulating just across the border, in Saxony, bore the headline: "Equality of Rights in Czechoslovakia—Even Underfed German Children are Oppressed."

In actual fact the State scheme for the feeding of needy children is, as explained in detail elsewhere,¹ administered by Provincial Relief Centres which are not State organs and which are based on the principle of nationality, i.e. there is one for each nationality.

The sums which the State distributes through these Provincial Centres are supplemented by such sums as the District Child-Relief Societies, through which the scheme is finally operated, can obtain from the Local Government bodies or from voluntary subscriptions. *The Czechs who live in the German districts are as a rule the financially poorer elements of population, and can therefore afford to contribute little in the way of voluntary subscriptions. Rarely, if ever, moreover, can they receive any contribution from their local (German) Council. It is perfectly comprehensible, therefore, and requires no justification, that the Czech Provincial Centres should make relatively larger allocations from the State money at their disposal to the Czech District Child-Relief Societies in districts in which the Germans are in a majority. Indeed the German Provincial Centres act likewise, for the same reason, with regard to German District Child-Relief Societies in districts in which the Czechs are in a majority.*

The feeding scheme for children in Bohemia worked out in 1937 as follows:—

Czech District Child-Relief Societies received in all from the State . . .	1,025,500.—Kč.
Secured of themselves from the Local Authorities, etc.	2,696,604·15 Kč.
<hr/>	
thus having at their disposal a total of	3,722,104·15 Kč.
German District Child-Relief Societies received from the State	512,600.—Kč.
Secured of themselves from the Local Authorities, etc.	2,635,772·15 Kč.
<hr/>	
thus having at their disposal a total of	3,148,372·15 Kč.
<hr/>	

¹ Pages 151–152.

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In point of fact, moreover, the Germans came off considerably better than the Czechs, for their children received on an average 60 Kč. per head, as compared with an average of 87·70 Kč. received by the Czech children. *This was because—and this throws the charge of injustice back on the heads of those who make it—the Germans are far less generous locally to the Czech children than the Czechs are to the German children in districts which are predominantly Czech.*

As the Minister of Social Justice very rightly remarked in the Chamber of Deputies in answering this charge—“Untruthful reports to the effect that our Germans are being oppressed—and the one-sided and tendentious character of those reports could be easily discovered by those who spread them if they showed only a little good will—naturally evoke an echo in circles in the neighbouring Reich that are unacquainted with the conditions here,¹ and frustrate the sincere endeavours of our Government to make the German Minority in our State a bridge between Czechoslovakia and the German Empire. Moreover, untrue assertions about oppression of the German Minority in respect of social welfare matters, sow bitterness in the hearts and minds of those who suffer from unemployment, make a good understanding between the Czech and German nationalities in our State all the more difficult, and thus hinder and postpone that economic recovery and that consolidation of the State which is a primary condition for relieving the distress of all those who in those areas are afflicted through being unable to find work.”

It would appear, therefore, that the complaints of the German Minority and of those who wish to make use of them for ulterior ends are very much exaggerated; that their sufferings are due very largely to circumstances over which the Czechoslovak Government has no control, but for which their self-styled friends are very largely responsible; that the Czechoslovak Government is already doing much and is prepared to do more, within reason, to improve their conditions; but that *Hitler and Henlein will never be satisfied, or let the Sudete Germans think they are satisfied, until their agitation has achieved its ends—which are ideological and international, and which are dealt with elsewhere in this volume.*

¹ See Appendix 8.

CHAPTER X

SUBCARPATHIAN RUTHENIA

SUBCARPATHIAN RUTHENIA (Czechoslovak: Podkarpatská Rus) is the easternmost part of the Czechoslovak Republic. Formerly a Hungarian province, it was tacitly earmarked as part of Russia's share of the loot if the Allies proved victorious in the Great War, and would doubtless have passed into the hands of the Tsar if it had not been for the Bolshevik Revolution.

It was desired by Tsarist Russia for strategic reasons, because its possession would have opened to her the traditional route through the Carpathians for expansion into Central Europe and the Balkans. *It is mainly for strategic reasons also that it is important to Czechoslovakia, for it is the only territorial link between her and Roumania, without which the Little Entente would fade away.*¹

In the scramble for territory which took place after the disintegration of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Subcarpathian Ruthenia, reserved for a Tsar who was no longer there to claim his prize, seems to have been rather forgotten, except by the Hungarians. Hungary hoped that by quickly dissociating herself from the dying Dual Monarchy and representing herself as a new "democratic" State she might bluff through a claim for the recognition of her "historic

¹ "Without Slovakia and Subcarpathian Ruthenia, the Little Entente would have been absolutely impossible, as also would have been any idea of an organisation of Central Europe in which our freed countries would be their own masters, without the predominant influence or domination of any Great Power. It is this great idea which forbids us to yield one atom of Slovakia, and for which we refuse all frontier revision. I would say again and stress that we will never give up Subcarpathian Ruthenia, because it is on Slovakia and Subcarpathian Ruthenia that we base our policy of the Little Entente, our whole Central European policy, and, indeed, our policy regarding the future grouping of nations and our declaration of the rights of the small nations of Central Europe in the European struggle. I repeat also what I said this autumn to the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs: 'He who wishes to lay hands on Slovak territory must come with an army, and it is with our army that we shall greet him.'"

Dr. Edward Beneš: "Lectures to the Slovaks on the Past and Future of our Nation."

frontiers", within which she included this small, but important, Slav territory that she had dominated for centuries. There was no question at that time of incorporating the territory in the new Czechoslovak Republic, and the Ruthenes themselves had been kept so subjected and so ignorant of world events that they might have been beguiled by the lavish promises made by Hungary in her desire to maintain them under her yoke, if it had not been for the intervention of the emigrant Ukrainians in the United States, many of whom were natives of Subcarpathian Ruthenia.

These Ukrainian emigrants, politically matured in their new environment, and already organised on a national basis, joined Dr. Masaryk's Central European Democratic Union and claimed successfully, through President Wilson, their recognition by the Allies as a separate nation. It was obvious from the first that the future of the Ruthenes, whom geographical and historical circumstances had separated from the main body of their race, should be considered separately from that of the Ukrainians as a whole, and it was the Ruthenes themselves who eventually decided to enter the Republic of Czechoslovakia. On July 23rd, 1918, at Homestead, they decided that if they could not have an independent Ruthenia they would like to join their fellow Ukrainians of Galicia and Bukovina, and that if this were impossible they must enjoy "*autonomy*", but without specifying in what State. At their second Congress, however, held at Scranton, in Pennsylvania, they decided that they would prefer to enter the Republic of Czechoslovakia as an independent federal State with full autonomy. This decision appears to have been in accordance with the ideas expressed to Dr. Masaryk when he visited the Ukraine by the Ukrainian leaders there.

In the meanwhile the Ruthenes in Europe, unaware of what was being done by their emigrant compatriots, became fired with the desire for national independence. Still vague and divided amongst themselves, they set up three National Councils, each advocating a different policy: the Council of Prešov was in favour of union with Czechoslovakia, that of Užhorod favoured Hungary, and that of Chust demanded incorporation in a Ukrainian State. The ultimate decision

between these three policies remained in the balance for some time while the fate of Slovakia seemed uncertain. Towards the middle of November, 1918, the Hungarians, hoping to challenge by a *coup de force* the still somewhat indefinite scope of the new Czechoslovak Republic, drove out the weak detachments of Czechs which had occupied Slovakia, and if they had succeeded in maintaining their position there they would doubtless also have secured Subcarpathian Ruthenia. As the result, however, of the strenuous efforts of Dr. Beneš in Paris, the frontiers of both Slovakia and Subcarpathian Ruthenia were defined soon after this, and the Hungarians, loudly protesting, were forced to withdraw their troops from those territories. The combination into one new State of Bohemia, Moravia-Silesia and Slovakia was definitely decided before the Peace Conference assembled, and the Conference had therefore only to decide which of the three Ruthene proposals should be accepted or whether, alternatively, Subcarpathian Ruthenia should be attached to the Soviet Union.

The establishment of this small and very backward area as an independent State was not only impracticable, but obviously would entail risk of that State being made a pawn in some competition between its neighbours or between rival Great Powers. This opinion was frankly expressed to the Ruthene delegates at the Peace Conference by President Wilson, and was endorsed by all the Allies. There was no support, moreover, for the proposal that the Hungarians, whose record with regard to their treatment of subject races was so lamentable, should be trusted to mend their ways in future as administrators of Ruthenian territory. The Ukrainian claim to a right to separate national existence, which had little support at that time except in intellectual circles in the Ukraine, was overruled in favour of the Polish claim to Galicia, which no representative of the Soviet Union was present to oppose. In any case, hatred and fear of Bolshevism, and dread of the Pan-Slav menace which the Bolsheviks had not yet proved to have vanished with the Tsars, would have made all the Allies oppose firmly any proposal which would have laid the Hungarian plain open to invasion from the north. There remained, therefore, only one solution of the

problem, that of attaching Subcarpathian Ruthenia to the Republic of Czechoslovakia with safeguards regarding her autonomy. This solution had already on May 16th, 1919, been declared acceptable by the Central National Council of Ruthenia into which M. Zatkovič, come over from America, had persuaded the three original National Councils of Prešov, Užhorod and Chust to unite, and it was embodied, after discussion, in Articles 10 to 13 of the Treaty of St. Germain¹ on September 10th, 1919. These Articles were subsequently (February 29th, 1920) embodied in the Constitution of the Czechoslovak Republic.

The province is a small one, with an area of about 5,000 square miles, only a small proportion (18·8%) of which is arable. It is thinly populated (about 145 inhabitants per square mile) and has only two towns of any appreciable size: the capital, Užhorod, with 26,675 inhabitants, and Mukačevo, with 29,361.

In no other part of Czechoslovakia, however, is the population so intricately mixed as regards both race and religious persuasion, or are its differences so accentuated and sharply revealed on account of political influence within and from without the Republic. Thus quite a small village may be divided into three distinct sections, corresponding to the Orthodox, Uniate and Jewish faiths; while in another, such as Jasiňa, one finds a small German quarter, preserving its national individuality, in the heart of a Ruthene community.

These various differences were fostered in former times by Hungary as an aid to the domination of the non-Hungarian majority, but were recognised in no way which was to the advantage of the people. They are very perceptible still, despite the solvent influence of the democratic Czechoslovak régime, and they increase the constitutional and administrative difficulties of the province.

The majority of the population (63·06%) are Ruthenes, descendants of Slav peasants and herdsmen, driven out of the Ukraine by Mongol invaders, who gradually settled on the land between the 12th and 17th centuries. They are more or less evenly distributed throughout the country, being less numerous in the larger towns, where there are many Jews and

¹ Appendix 2.

Hungarians, and in certain country districts in the South, near Užhorod and Berehovo, which have considerable numbers of Hungarian inhabitants.

This wave of Slav colonists was followed, in the 18th century, by a great influx of Jews, whose descendants to-day number about 100,000 and represent over 14% of the total population. There is a marked difference in the numbers of people who claim Jewish nationality (91,255) and of those who profess the Jewish faith (102,542). This is explained by the preference of many Jews that their children shall be educated in Czech, rather than in Yiddish, and who therefore exercise their right of option to be classed nationally as Czechs. In pre-war days the Jews of this district, for a similar reason, declared themselves Magyars. As elsewhere, the Jewish element lives mainly in the towns and occupies itself with commerce and industry; but considerable numbers of Jews are found also in the agricultural industry, particularly in the wine-growing districts.

The Hungarians, who followed soon afterwards, came as conquerors, seeking primarily to consolidate their empire by extending it northwards to a more easily defended frontier on the Carpathian Mountains. Once possessed, however, of the strategically important passes through these mountains and of the approaches to them from the plain, they placed garrisons in all the important centres and began methodically establishing colonies along the valleys which run north and south into the Carpathians. They gradually squeezed the original inhabitants out of the fertile lands up the slopes, and finally on to the arid summits of the mountains, reducing them to penury, paralysing their power to expand and threatening them with eventual extinction. To-day, though their domination is ended and their political power is limited in proportion to their percentage of the population (15·44%), they still enjoy to a great extent the economic advantages usurped under the former régime and the cultural superiority which is based thereon. They are concentrated mainly, as already stated, in the district of Užhorod and round Berehovo, where alone they represent a majority of the population.

The influx of Germans took place at a later date and was insignificant in volume, the total number of Germans in

Subcarpathian Ruthenia to-day being barely 13,000 and representing less than 2% of the population. They live in well-organised closed communities, and are found in the richer parts of the country.

Apart from these there are the Czechs and Slovaks, numbering close on 34,000, many of them officials and technicians who have come into the country since the Revolution, rather over 12,000 Roumanians living in villages on the frontier near Sighetul, a thousand or so Gypsies, and insignificant numbers of Poles and Yugoslavs.

The Ruthenes are undoubtedly of the same racial stock as the Ukrainians of Galicia and of the Soviet Union, many of their dialects resembling closely those in use to the north of the Carpathians. The process of their denationalisation was carried so far, however, during their long subjection to the Hungarians, that it seems doubtful whether they would to-day feel conscious of their Ukrainian kinship if that consciousness had not been revived and fostered by the influence of the Uniate Church. This action of the Uniate Church was taken, no doubt, in answer to that of the Greek Orthodox Church in giving support to the Great Russian Movement among the Ruthenes, and the relative success of the Ukrainian and Great Russian Movements respectively can therefore probably be deduced from a comparison of the numbers professing the Uniate (359,167) and Orthodox (112,034) faiths.

For the time being, however, the Ruthenes are citizens of Czechoslovakia, where they already enjoy full cultural and political freedom, and where they are shortly to enjoy complete autonomy "within the framework of the Republic". Their complete isolation from the Soviet Ukraine and the non-existence of an independent Ukraine State render discussion of their racial kinship a matter of rather academic interest at present.

Life is given, however, to the Ukrainian and Great Russian Movements among them by the rivalry between the Uniate and Orthodox Churches, and by the support given by reactionary elements in Poland and Hungary to the Dukhnovič Society, a bitterly anti-Czech, anti-Soviet and anti-Ukrainian section of the Great Russian Movement. So long as this struggle

goes on, the cultural progress of the Ruthenes and the progress of Subcarpathian Ruthenia towards autonomy seem likely to be retarded by the diversity of languages within a relatively small area. Supporters of the Ukrainian and Great Russian Movements each make a point of speaking only Ukrainian or Russian, while others insist on their legal right to use one or other of the Ruthene dialects, which are about as numerous as the valleys which run into the Carpathians.

The Czechoslovaks realise from their own experience that the gathering force of national revival of the Ukrainians is likely to result, some day, in the formation of an independent Ukraine, and have every sympathy with the Ukrainian Movement. The policy of their Government is therefore one of maintaining such friendly relations with the Ukrainian Movement that the ultimate disposal of Subcarpathian Ruthenia may be amicably settled in a manner satisfactory to all three parties concerned, i.e. to Czechoslovaks, Ukrainians and Ruthenes.

For practical purposes, however, amidst this maelstrom of conflicting tongues, religious and nationalist tendencies, the Czechoslovak Government preserves on the whole an attitude of indulgent impartiality, only occasionally pouncing on some flagrant case of foreign intervention.

With regard to the vexed (and vexing) question of language it would appear, indeed, to carry its impartiality and democratic principles to the verge of the ridiculous, in view of the circumstances already described, by leaving it to the democratic decision of the Ruthenes themselves, and insisting only that the Czechoslovak language shall, as elsewhere throughout the Republic, be considered as equal to whatever language they may select as their principal one. The perpetuation of any of the local dialects may be desirable from a purely pedagogic point of view, but would appear to be of little but philological interest, while the adoption of the Ukrainian language presents obvious disadvantages as compared with that of the Russian, spoken throughout the length and breadth of the Soviet Union and having so rich a literature behind it.

The political objections to action which might appear to favour Polish-Hungarian intrigue may be considered an

argument against the adoption of the Russian language at the present time, yet it would seem prudent that the Czechoslovak Government, taking a long view, should attempt to influence the Ruthenes in that direction, to their ultimate advantage.

Subcarpathian Ruthenia was formerly a province of Hungary, and it would have been difficult to find in pre-war Europe, or indeed in the civilised world, a place which reflected more discredit on its administration. Driven from the land by the great Hungarian land-owners, many of the Ruthenes were forced to emigrate,¹ while those remaining at home became the prey of Jewish money-lenders, whose brethren also monopolised all industry and trade. They were fed upon by a host of parasitic Hungarian officials and Uniate clergymen, who battered on their tithes. Culturally, no less than economically, they were oppressed and neglected most shamelessly as part of the deliberate policy of denationalisation pursued by the Hungarian authorities: 77% of them were illiterate in 1910 and when the war ended they had not a single school in which instruction was given in any of their native languages.

The ruination brought about by Hungarian misrule was completed by the havoc wrought during four years of war in which Subcarpathian Ruthenia was one of the more contested battlefields. It was in a lamentable state indeed in which the unhappy country found itself when it was taken over by the Czechoslovak Government: famine and pestilence threatened with extinction a population rendered desperate by its sufferings. The first task of the new administration was therefore to feed the people, a task which swallowed up considerable amounts of the public money, as shown below:—

1920	.	.	2,811,985 Kč.
1921	.	.	13,201,222 Kč.
1922	.	.	8,734,985 Kč.

The next task was, obviously, to attempt to make it possible for the people, and more particularly for the Ruthene

¹ No less than 300,000 Ruthenes had emigrated to the U.S.A. before the war.

peasants, to feed themselves. Forced by the Hungarian invaders into the mountain districts, which could not produce enough to feed their numbers, the Ruthene peasants had come to depend for their sustenance during the winter months on the money and grain which they earned by their services in the Hungarian plain at harvest time. The more fortunate among them, who owned small plots of land, were crippled with the burden of more or less feudal dues, such as the *robot*, the *rokovina* and the *koblina*. The *robot* consisted of a day's work in the fields and a day's work transporting wood, and was due each year from every peasant possessing a horse or an ox. Those who had no horse or ox were called upon for four days' work. The *rokovina* and the *koblina* were tithes, sometimes heavy ones, due to the priest and schoolmaster respectively, and amounted, for a peasant who owned four hectares (10 acres) of land, to as much as 40 bushels of wheat a year. The leases granted to these small-holders were similarly harsh. The land was held in common, but the tenant had to supply the seed, while the landlord had a right to two-thirds, three-quarters or even as much as five-sixths of the crop. Only where the tenant provided manure and agricultural implements was this amount due to the landlord reduced to one-half of the crop.

The hardship which such conditions entailed for the small-holders can only be appreciated in full, however, when it is realised that a bare 45% of the land, over half of it unsuitable for agriculture, was all that the Hungarians allowed for the use of 400,000 people, 90% of the population, and that the average size of the holdings was therefore only 0.67 hectares (1.66 acres). The need for a redistribution of land after the war was rendered urgent, moreover, by the fact that the Ruthenes were now prevented by the Hungarian authorities from earning their winter's keep by harvest work in the plain, so the Czechoslovak Government set about this task by widesweeping measures of Land Reform¹ as elsewhere in the Republic.

The application of this Reform was less simple in Ruthenia than in other parts, because so little of the land available

¹ See pages 137-141.

was suitable for agriculture, and because a large proportion of the land was State property, to which the Land Reform Laws did not apply. It was for these reasons, mainly, and because it was considered inadvisable to grant land to peasants until they had been trained and equipped to make good use of it, that Land Reform in Ruthenia advanced comparatively slowly at first and has not yet achieved the full beneficial effects which may be expected when it has been completed. There is reason to suspect, however, that progress would have been more rapid if these difficulties had not been exploited to some extent by vested interests, represented by the more reactionary elements of the Agrarian Party, and if the Czechoslovak Social-Democrat Party had interested itself more actively in the question. It would seem, however, that the prolongation of economic distress, which is still appalling in the Verchovina or Highlands, has made its victims despair of reformist methods and seek salvation by supporting the Communist Party, which headed the poll in the Parliamentary Elections in 1935 by gaining 25.6% of the total votes.

Naturally enough, perhaps, but regrettably nevertheless, the reaction of the Agrarians to this encroachment from the Left upon what some of them regard as their exclusive domain has been a development of repressive and discriminatory action by the Administration, the personnel of which is largely Agrarian in its sympathies, against "Communist organisations", a loose term which is sometimes applied to organisations of a solely, or at least, primarily philanthropic character.

In the meanwhile, despite the harmful and delaying effects of these party political manœuvres, the work of raising the economic, social and cultural level of Ruthenia (and especially of the Ruthenes) has gone steadily forward, and has already achieved remarkable results. Each district now has its local Agricultural Association, the members of which are elected from among, and by, the farmers, and these have their central organisation, the "Rural Proprietor", in Mukačevo. Their function is to protect agricultural interests and to unite and co-ordinate effort towards raising the agricultural standards. Besides these there has been set up by the State, as part of the civil administration, a special Agricultural Committee,

which is responsible for rural economy. This Committee, subsidised by the State, has a staff of 21 agricultural experts and 4 assistants and is intended to modernise, by propaganda or by direct intervention, the agricultural industry of Ruthenia.

The principal crops are maize, wheat, oats, barley and potatoes, smaller areas being devoted to the cultivation of rye, clover, flax and sugar-beet, the last having been introduced into the country by the Czechs. A considerable area is also devoted to fruit-growing, large quantities of apples and plums in particular being produced; the former are exported to other parts of the Republic, while the latter form the basis of an important and highly profitable distilling industry, mostly in the hands of Jews, for the production of an excellent liqueur called *Slivovica*. The vineyards of the South round Berehovo are the basis of a flourishing and growing wine industry, which is mainly in the hands of Hungarians or Jews; red and white wines are produced, the latter being particularly good.

Under State guidance and with the aid of liberal subsidies from the State great improvements have been made in Ruthenia during the past eighteen years as regards both farming and fruit-growing. Improved methods of fertilising the soil have increased the crop yields sometimes by as much as 50 %, while the provision by the State of better vines and fruit trees and of research stations to investigate problems of wine-making and of distilling has led to important improvements. The general standard of agriculture remains low, however, the crop yield per acre being still on an average one-third lower than that in Bohemia or Moravia. Even now, in spite of all the improvements, Ruthenia cannot produce enough agricultural foodstuffs to meet her own requirements and remains therefore, even in this respect, a liability to the rest of the Republic.

This unsatisfactory state of affairs may be to some extent rectified when the at present somewhat excessive area devoted to pasturage has been reduced to more reasonable proportions. The devotion of about a quarter of the total area of Ruthenia to pasture land has resulted from the primitive agricultural methods of former times. Having no fertilisers save wood-ash,

the peasants made a practice of cultivating a patch for two or three years, until it was no longer fertile, and then moving on to a new patch, leaving the old one to be used for pasturage. Stock-raising is consequently an important branch of Ruthenian farming, even the smallest farmer having a few head of cattle or buffalo, a few horses or some sheep.

Very soon after the union of Ruthenia with Czechoslovakia there was set up at Bat, near Užhorod, a Co-operative Society for the buying and selling of cattle, which has done much to protect the interests of the peasantry, and in 1924 some 40 dairies combined in a big Co-operative Union at Kvasovsky Menčul. This latter enterprise employs an expert, who advises its members on all technical matters, and an Inspector of Pasturages, who is responsible for improving and making the best possible use of the "*poloniny*", or mountain pasturages, which the Union is taking over from the State. High-grade stock has been imported by the State from other parts of the Republic or from abroad to improve the local standard, which is still low, and a State stud farm has been established at Turja Remety to revive horse-breeding, which had been badly hit by the war, when the stock had been almost completely wiped out.

Close on half the total area of the country (46·5%) is, however, still covered with forest, formerly the game preserves of the Hungarian nobility and a profitable source of income to its owners. This forest land has now been taken over by the State, which develops and exploits it systematically. Forestry and the sawmills (some owned by the State, others by private enterprise) provide work for a limited number of persons, and efforts are being made to increase this number by the formation of Forestry Co-operatives, and by the development of distilleries for the production of wood-spirit as a substitute for imported petrol—three of these distilleries already in operation employ about 6,000 hands. It seems probable, however, that the agrarian problem in Ruthenia will not be solved until considerable areas of forest have been cleared and converted into agricultural land.

This survey of the agricultural situation in Ruthenia would be incomplete without reference to the Credit Co-operative

Societies, revived and extended by the Czechs to rescue the Ruthene peasantry from the blighting clutch of the usurers. Formerly the poor peasant, when he had a poor harvest or required capital for the improvement of his farm, could get it only from the local Jewish money-lender who demanded a high rate of interest. To-day he may still go to the Jew, if he wishes, paying, however, a legally much restricted rate of interest, but if he is sensible he goes to his local Co-operative for a loan at 5% or 6½%, with reasonable terms for repayment.

The industrial development of the province has made little progress owing to lack of capital for discovery and development of its natural resources (or, to be more just, owing to enormous prior demands for capital expenditure on public works and services), to the poverty of communications, and to the atrocious physical and intellectual state of most of the population.

There are peasant industries, of course, conducted in the cottage homes of the Ruthenes, which produce attractive homespun materials, embroideries, ornate leatherwork and peasant pottery.

The State has spent a good deal of money on modernising its salt mines at Slatinské Doly and has set up a new tobacco factory at Mukačevo. Little has been done, however, by private enterprise, and the total number of workers employed in industry, including the State enterprises already mentioned, varies between 15,000 and 20,000.

Public works have been undertaken on an enormous scale and have transformed the province beyond recognition. These have been hampered by the almost complete lack of local skilled labour and raw materials. The road system, which had deteriorated to a mediaeval condition, has been restored in accordance with modern requirements, and has been considerably extended. The old wooden bridges have been rebuilt in steel or ferro-concrete, to carry heavier vehicles, and over a hundred new bridges have been built. Dykes have been constructed, to prevent the recurrent and destructive floods of former times, and water-power has been harnessed for the production of electricity, formerly almost unknown in the province. The electrification of the countryside has been commenced. Hundreds of sadly neglected Government

buildings have been restored ; hundreds more have been built, including the magnificent Diet Building at Užhorod and numerous splendid hospitals and laboratories.

The housing problem has been dealt with drastically, entire quarters of insanitary hovels being swept away and rebuilt on modern lines. Much remains to be done, of course, but the work of transformation goes on unabated, paid for by the Czechoslovak Government at the rate of 500 million Kč. a year, which represents the annual deficit of the provincial budget.

The restoration of the health of the people has also called for a tremendous effort on the part of the State. Chronic alcoholism, tuberculosis and venereal disease were rife among the poverty-stricken people, since they had no sanitation and knew nothing of hygiene, while their low resistance to disease was responsible for the outbreak of epidemics. The Czechoslovaks have set up a State Medical Service which covers the country with a network of clinics and first-aid centres. Their doctors are not permitted to stay only in the towns, far removed from the peasant masses who need their services, but are compelled to live in the village centre of their respective districts, and there to devote themselves to teaching the people how to keep well—"Prevention is better than Cure" is the principle which inspires their work.

The State Medical Service works systematically, with the aid of bacteriological laboratories, epidemiological centres and the hospitals which have been built in the main towns. Any epidemic which breaks out is nipped in the bud by the specially equipped lorry always standing ready at the epidemiological centre in Užhorod. Its work is supplemented by that of the various voluntary societies, so characteristic of the Czechoslovak State, which lecture to the people about hygiene and run welfare centres for their children. The result of their labours is already revealed by the fall in the death-rate of the province from 25·33 per thousand in 1919-23 to 16·92 per thousand in 1935, and by the perceptible wane of the chronic diseases already mentioned.

The cultural needs of the province likewise called for great effort if the people were to be fitted to take their rightful place in the Republic. The Hungarian Government did not

believe in popular education, above all for the Ruthenes, so the Czechoslovaks had to start almost from the beginning when they took over the province, paying special attention to their responsibilities towards the Ruthenes.

In Subcarpathian Ruthenia, before its liberation there were only 517 State Elementary Schools, in none of which was instruction conducted in Ruthenian. Only in the 34 Church schools was the Ruthenian language tolerated. This was in a province in which the Magyars constituted only 15% of the population. As a result of this inadequate provision of schools—for even the Hungarian schools were not numerous enough to meet requirements—over 35,000 children were unable to receive education of any kind, and illiteracy was therefore the rule, rather than the exception. Nor were the cultural requirements of adults in any degree provided for: there was no such thing as a Public Reading Room throughout the entire province, and the only Public Libraries were those run for purposes of propaganda by the Christian-Socialist Party.

By 1933 the Czechoslovak Government had already so changed the situation that there were 758 Elementary Schools, of which 459 were Ruthenian, and among which were also (in addition, of course, to those for the Magyars) schools in German, Czechoslovak, and Jewish. In addition to these there were a large number of Upper Elementary Schools, several Secondary Schools, Technical Colleges, etc., making a total of well over a thousand schools. Libraries were numerous, providing books in all the languages that are current among the population.

It will be years, of course, before illiteracy will be reduced to the satisfactorily low levels which obtain in the western parts of the Republic, but already it has fallen to 308.8 per thousand, which represents a substantial improvement.

The foregoing represents a very great achievement, for it was performed under difficult conditions. All the officials in Subcarpathian Ruthenia (as also in Slovakia) were Hungarians, and they almost all decamped directly the Republic was established. There were few Ruthenes who were educated and capable of replacing them, so the Czechs found themselves called upon, at a time when they had so much to do in their own provinces, to produce hundreds of officials and teachers

for Subcarpathian Ruthenia. They did not shirk this responsibility and the progress made under their guidance bears witness to the excellence of their services.

The situation has not always been an easy one for the Czechs, for their charges soon began to prove troublesome and critical—often unreasonably so.

As early as 1922, and on several subsequent occasions, the last of which was in 1932, complaints have been lodged by Ruthenes with the League of Nations at the delay in the granting to Subcarpathian Ruthenia the autonomy which was promised to her by the Treaty of St. Germain. *Most of these complaints were drawn up, it may be noted, for reasons which are obvious, by persons under Hungarian influence.* The main reason for this delay is stated very clearly in the Czechoslovak Memorandum of 1928, sent to the League of Nations in answer to one of these complaints: "The census of 1921 shows that Subcarpathian Ruthenia is inhabited by 370,368 Ruthenes, 108,791 Hungarians, 79,716 Jews and 10,346 Germans."¹ The population contained, therefore, even after the Revolution, one-third of non-Ruthene elements. It is important, moreover, to note that *these minority elements, more particularly the Hungarians and the Jews, owned almost all the industrial and commercial undertakings and thus formed the possessing class.*

They were politically more advanced and better organised than the Ruthene peasantry, and provided, even in the country districts, most of the traders. The Ruthenes, on the other hand, as a result of long oppression, were mostly illiterate and politically backward, and had been brought up with a traditional respect for their Hungarian or Jewish masters.

It is obvious that under such conditions any ordinary elections would have proved to the detriment of the Ruthenes. The Hungarians, Jews and Germans, intelligent and capable, would have mobilised every vote in their support, while the illiterate and backward Ruthenes would, for the most part, have remained indifferent. Many of the Ruthenes would doubtless also have been deceived by the propaganda of the ruling class, and it is probable, therefore, that a minority, representing

¹ In 1931 446,916 Ruthenes, 109,472 Hungarians, 91,255 Jews and 13,249 Germans.

only one-third of the population, would have been elected to power. This minority would have continued, thereafter to predominate in the Diet, in the Local Councils and in the Administrative Departments, and Subcarpathian Ruthenia would have gained her autonomy for the benefit, not of the Ruthenes, but of their former masters.

To have granted autonomy too soon to Subcarpathian Ruthenia would thus have meant the establishment there of an undemocratic, if not indeed of an anti-democratic, régime. The Czechoslovak Government foresaw this danger and, without renouncing its obligation to grant eventual autonomy to the Ruthenes, embarked upon a policy of preparing the people for their future responsibilities. It was necessary first of all to establish schools for the education of the masses, and then to foster the organisation of political parties which hitherto had not existed amongst them. In the meanwhile, in order that the new Administration might take over their country as a sound concern, it was necessary to develop it economically, to clear up the results of long years of neglect in its administration, and to re-organise on modern, democratic lines its health and other public services.

In pursuit of these aims, owing to the abrupt departure of the former Hungarian officials and to the almost complete absence of educated Ruthenes, it was necessary to import into Subcarpathian Ruthenia a body of Czech officials and technicians. This influx of Czechs, and the establishment of Czech schools and public libraries for their cultural needs, have been represented as parts of a policy of denationalisation or "czechisation" of the Ruthenes. One has only, however, to examine the circumstances under which they have taken place, and to note the great attention that has been paid to the establishment of schools in which teaching is conducted for the Ruthenes in Russian, Ukrainian or Ruthenian, in order to appreciate how little foundation there is for such a charge. It may be said, however, with some degree of justice, that the Czech "colonists" have developed a vested interest in the maintenance of their positions of authority in Subcarpathian Ruthenia, and that there has been created in certain somewhat reactionary circles in Praha and Užhorod a tendency

to regard the country as a "colony" of the Agrarian Party. Eighteen years of enlightened administration have produced new generations of educated Ruthenes, well qualified to occupy positions of responsibility in the economic life and administration of their country. They find, however, that most of the posts to which they aspire are already occupied by Czechs (if not by Jews or Hungarians) who show no sign of vacating them, and that the restrictive policy adopted by the Czechoslovak Government during the years of economic crisis has checked the earlier rapid development of their country, which might otherwise have provided new posts to absorb most of them. The problem of how to pension off or to absorb into other parts of the Republic the Czech officials and technicians—*who, incidentally, merit consideration in recognition of their self-sacrifice and devotion to duty during the earlier and more difficult years*—is one which presents considerable difficulty, but for which the Czechoslovak Government must find a satisfactory solution soon if it wishes to avoid a repetition of the ignominious experience of Britain in Ireland. This will involve some expense, as is shown by the increase in this year's Budget (1937-8) on account of similar action in favour of the German minority, but the fact that Ruthene claims are not backed by 70 million people outside their country should not incline the Czechoslovak Government to save money at the cost of disaffection in a place which is of such vital strategic importance to their Republic.

As regards the progress of Subcarpathian Ruthenia towards autonomy, an Act was passed by the Czechoslovak Parliament in 1937 which adjusted temporarily the position of the Governor, and the measures of re-organisation connected therewith represent a first step towards the goal. Speaking in the Chamber of Deputies on November 17th, 1937, the Prime Minister, Dr. Hodža, said: "The Government hopes that this first stage will be followed as soon as possible by the second stage—that of elections to a Subcarpathian Ruthenian Diet. As far as the Government of the Republic is concerned, the newly organised Subcarpathian Ruthenia will be ensured all the primary conditions to enable it to prepare for that important step as soon as possible."

CHAPTER XI

FOREIGN RELATIONS

1. The Basic Principles of Czechoslovak Foreign Policy. Czechoslovakia is so situated geographically with reference to other Powers of a larger size that she might easily become a vassal of one of them if she were not covered by some international agreement or alternatively by treaty agreements with other Powers. It is for this reason that she has always been a strong and loyal supporter of the League of Nations, and has always been ready to accept her full share of any obligations undertaken by the League. Owing to her small size and weakness as compared with some of her neighbours, and in view of the experience of past history with regard to the intervention of great Powers in Central European affairs, she realises the danger of her being used as an instrument of some Power. It is for this reason that she has always deemed that it would be considered in the interest of the world in general that her independence and integrity should be preserved.

For economic, as well as for political and strategical reasons, she considers it of very great importance that the smaller States of Central and Eastern Europe should be united in some form of Federation. The Federation should be composed of States of approximately the same size as each other, e.g. Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Jugoslavia, but not Germany—the reasons for this are sufficiently obvious. This Federation would, because of its very nature, be non-aggressive, but its resisting power and its bargaining power would be equivalent to those of a Great Power; it would therefore be a very valuable instrument for the preservation of peace.

Czechoslovakia is opposed to any policy which would exclude one or other Great Power from active co-operation in the affairs of Europe. She is anxious, in particular, that Germany and the Soviet Union should be actively associated in all European affairs.

Her policy is essentially one of peace, for she has no imperialist ambitions and no snobbish ideas about national prestige. She does not, on the other hand, believe in "Peace at any price", and her people are united in their determination to fight to the last, if necessary, in defence of their ideals and of their country.

2. Czechoslovakia's Relations with her Neighbours and Others.

(a) AUSTRIA (prior to March, 1938). Just as the emancipation of the Bohemian Lands from the Habsburg rule was accomplished peacefully and on the whole good-humouredly, so the subsequent development of relations between the new Czechoslovak Republic and Austria was marked by good-will and mutual understanding on both sides.

A possible source of much suspicion and ill-will was removed at the end of 1921 by the conclusion of the Treaty of Lány, whereby the two countries mutually recognised each other's frontiers, undertook not to tolerate on their respective territories any agitation for the revision of those frontiers, and agreed to settle all mutual disputes by arbitration.

In 1922, Czechoslovakia contributed liberally to the loan which was raised by the League of Nations for the financial rehabilitation of Austria,¹ and is sometimes reproached for having thus applied a palliative measure, instead of having attempted, or attempting later, to put Austria's economic position on a sounder basis by carrying out the economic provisions of the Peace Treaties.² In point of fact, however, *it was Britain's insistence on most favoured nation treatment which had prevented the carrying into execution of those provisions, and which dictated then the nature of the Geneva Protocol. Czechoslovakia, as cosignatory of that Protocol, may technically be blamed, but the fault lay rather with Lord Balfour, who was adamant in his determination that Britain's commercial interests must be safeguarded*—the net result of this selfish British policy would seem to be that Britain will now lose all her trade with Austria.

¹ She contributed 500 million Kč., representing 24½% of the total loan.

² Article 222 of the Treaty of St. Germain and Article 205 of the Treaty of Trianon provide for the establishment of a system of preferential tariffs as between Austria, Hungary and Czechoslovakia during the five years following the ratification of those Treaties.

Czechoslovakia has consistently opposed the idea of an Austro-German Customs Union, and still more that of the Anschluss, even if it were as a step to a wider Customs Union, *on the ground that it would inevitably lead to an intensification of economic war which could have but one conclusion.* She has urged, as a preferable alternative, the development of economic and financial co-operation between the Danubian States, including, of course, Austria, and claims that only by such co-operation could be secured:—

- (a) the economic rehabilitation and advance of the Danubian States:
- (b) the immunity of those States from economic, and ultimately from political, domination by Germany or Italy.

Writing in the *New Commonwealth* in May, 1937, Dr. Gerhard Schacher expressed his opinion that:—

“There seems now to be a tendency for Austria to form a Danube policy of her own and to draw closer to the Little Entente and Paris, and, indeed, Western Europe as a whole. It seems highly probable that this tendency will become even stronger in the near future since the economic and financial interests of Austria might perhaps make considerable gains by such an orientation. . . . This development should, in the near future, lead to a *rapprochement* between Vienna (and probably also Budapest) and Prague and the Little Entente. The economic and political consequences of this would be a Danube basin policy in the real sense of the word, embracing, besides the States of the Little and Balkan Ententes, Austria and Hungary and Jugoslavia’s newest ally Bulgaria. Prague has always striven to promote friendly co-operation between the Danube States, and would be likely, as far as can be seen, to welcome such a concentration of the forces of Central and South-Eastern Europe. This is the more to be expected, as the result would necessarily be the drawing together of Central and Western Europe, i.e. the democratic and peace-loving States, whose political, economic and general outlook has been very like that of the democratic Czech republic since its birth.” It is doubtless for this reason, as well as on account of the

effects which such a development was likely to have on the internal political structure and internal policy of Austria, that Hitler has taken drastic measures to prevent it.

(b) HUNGARY. Relations between Czechoslovakia and Hungary have been poisoned from the first by the attitude adopted by the latter towards the territorial settlement of the Treaty of Trianon. This Treaty deprived Hungary of all territories inhabited mainly or wholly by non-Magyars, which were in fact the greater part of pre-war Hungary, and attached these territories to the States to which ethnologically they belonged—Slovakia and Subcarpathian Ruthenia were included in the new Czechoslovak Republic.

As the result of centuries of Magyar expansion into the territories conquered by their rulers, a process which was deliberately fostered by the Government of Hungary, it was unavoidable that considerable numbers of Magyars should find themselves “on the wrong side of the border” when the new frontiers were established, and these now form greater or smaller Minorities in all the Succession States, e.g. in Czechoslovakia.

Hungarian revisionist agitation has been well organised on an international scale, and lavishly financed, by the great land-owners of Hungary, whose estates were first cut through by the new frontiers and later were drastically reduced in size by the Land Reform measures adopted by the Succession States—measures which are long over-due in present-day Hungary, and the adoption of which elsewhere is therefore doubly anathema to the Hungarian land-owning class.

Abroad, and notably in Britain, this agitation has limited itself to a plausible demand for the rights of Magyar communities in certain areas bordering on Hungary to be reunited with their fatherland. The true significance of frontier revision, as envisaged by a Hungarian reactionary, was openly avowed, however, by the late Count Bethlen, for ten years Hungarian Premier, in the foreword to the collection of his political speeches, as follows:—

“The existence of the Magyar nation to-day depends upon its ability to ensure dominion over the territory *which is bounded by the Carpathians* and which forms the Danube-Tisza basin. Within the present frontier of the Hungarian State

this nation perishes if timely control is not achieved over those lands without which the country's independent existence is unthinkable."

The people of Czechoslovakia—and particularly the Slovaks and Ruthenes, who had sad memories of long years of Hungarian misrule and oppression—were naturally alarmed by this menacing agitation, especially when it won the approval and open support of Lord Rothermere and a group of interested or misguided British Members of Parliament. The formation of the Little Entente¹, though inspired by a wider ultimate aim, was expressive of this alarm.

The situation might have become less strained thereafter if Hungary had not enlisted the support first, of Italy, and later, of Nazi Germany, for her revisionist claims, and had not started plotting with Poland the establishment of a Polish-Hungarian frontier—in Subcarpathian Ruthenia.

During 1937 however, as Hitler's designs in Central Europe became more concrete, and as Hungary came to realise that frontier revision in collaboration with the Nazis could be achieved only at the cost of her own sovereignty, there was a tendency on the part of Hungary to adopt a more friendly attitude towards the Little Entente, and in particular towards Czechoslovakia.

Czechoslovakia, despite her fear that Hungary might attempt frontier revision "by blood and iron", has always been anxious to establish more friendly relations with her, and has always hoped to include her also in a Federation of mid-European states, of which the Little Entente was conceived as a nucleus. She has always been anxious, moreover, to improve economic conditions in both countries by the removal of obstructions to extended commercial intercourse between them. This change of heart on the part of Hungary was well received, therefore, in Prague and may lead to a great relaxation of the long-standing state of tension between two countries who have everything to gain, and nothing to lose, by adopting a policy of friendly co-operation.

Germany, however, is for obvious reasons, desirous that this happy development should not take place, and her agents

¹Chapter XII.

in Budapest are doing their utmost to prevent it. The success of Hitler's coup against Austria has brought the situation to a head—Hungary must decide soon whether she will quietly allow herself to be merged into, and assimilated by, "Greater Germany", or whether she will grasp the hand of friendship held out by Czechoslovakia and range herself with the forces of peace.

(c) POLAND. Relations between Czechoslovakia and Poland are profoundly influenced by two important factors: the difference of the social structure of their respective peoples, and the difference of their attitude towards the Soviet Union.

The structure of Czechoslovak society, as described earlier in this volume,¹ is very different from that of Poland, which is cursed with an arrogant and reactionary land-owning class and is dominated by the Roman Catholic Church.

With regard to the Soviet Union, the difference of attitude dates back to the days before and during the Great War when the Czechoslovaks, hating Austria-Hungary, regarded Tsarist Russia as their friend, while the Poles, hating Tsarist Russia with good cause, regarded Austria-Hungary as the lesser evil. The change of régime in Russia consequent on the Bolshevik Revolution has not materially altered the situation, for the progressive democratic Czechoslovak Republic has no reason to fear Bolshevism, while Poland, with her starving and oppressed millions, has every reason to feel very differently about it.

It is important that the foregoing should be realised, for it serves to explain much that would otherwise be inexplicable in the course of Czecho-Polish relations since 1918. It should be realised also that the character and behaviour of the statesmen of a country which dare not grant democracy to its people must differ widely from those of their counterparts in a country where democracy is almost a cult.

Trouble broke out between the two countries almost as soon as they achieved their independence, over the question of the ownership of the Těšín district in Silesia. It is debatable whether, from the point of view of nationality or of history, this district should be Polish or Czechoslovak, and indeed

¹ Chapter III.

the question seems to have been debated inconclusively at some length before 1918 by the rival claimants. Masaryk and Beneš were anxious that the matter should be amicably settled beforehand, pointing out that the district was of importance to Czechoslovakia because it supplied coal to the industrial region round Moravská-Ostrava and Vítkovice, and because the main (and only) line of railway communication between the east and west of the future Republic passed through it. Masaryk indeed writes that he even went so far as to invite the Polish leader, Dmowski, to draw up a proposal which would satisfy the reasonable requirements of Czechoslovakia without sacrificing too many Poles, but that Dmowski took no action on his suggestion.

Nevertheless it was agreed beforehand between the leaders of the Czechoslovak and Polish national movements that the existing frontier between Galicia and Silesia should be respected, pending the decision of the Peace Conference, and that in the meantime every effort should be made to arrive at some mutually acceptable compromise. Immediately after the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian régime, however, the Poles set up a Polish National Council at Těšín and established a military occupation of most of the surrounding district, to which they formally then laid claim. The very next day there was set up in Ostrava a rival National Committee, which made a counter-claim to Silesia in the name of Czechoslovakia. To avoid the risk of armed conflict, two agreements were concluded locally whereby the areas to be administered by the Czechoslovaks and Poles respectively were provisionally defined.

The Poles soon realised, however, that the question of Těšín was unlikely to be dealt with for some time by the Peace Conference, and that for the time being they enjoyed military superiority in the district. They determined, therefore, regardless of all agreements and of the wishes of the local population, to consolidate and extend the ground that they had gained. By January 11th, 1919, the situation had become so critical that an outbreak of hostilities was imminent and the representatives of the Czechoslovaks and Germans wired to Prague asking that troops should be sent to occupy their

territory and save them from the Poles. Meanwhile the Poles declared that their parliamentary elections, due to take place on January 26th, should cover also that part of the Těšín district which they held, hoping thereby to establish a stronger claim for its ultimate incorporation in their State.

On January 21st the Czechoslovak Government sent off to Warsaw a Note, demanding the withdrawal of Polish troops. This Note never reached its destination, however, for the bearer was arrested and detained at Cracow. Two days later a group of Czechoslovak and Allied officers, on their own initiative, called on General Latínik, commanding the Polish Army of Occupation, demanding the withdrawal of his troops within four days; when this demand was not complied with, Czechoslovak forces marched into Těšín, driving the Poles before them, and advanced right up to the River Vistula, where they were halted by order of the Peace Conference on January 31st.

The Peace Conference, thus made aware of the gravity and urgency of the situation in what had been Austrian Silesia, persuaded the Governments concerned to come to a new Agreement and sent an Interallied Commission to investigate and report back on the situation. This Agreement, which gave Czechoslovakia the whole of the coal basin, together with a strip of territory to the north of the important Bohumín-Košice railway, satisfied neither party; the Czechoslovak Army was loth to abandon the strategic frontier which it had wished to establish on the Vistula, while the Polish Authorities now agitated for a local plebiscite, which they hoped would go in their favour.

Towards the end of May the Prime Minister of Poland, Paderewski, visited Prague to open negotiations with Czechoslovakia with regard to the proposed plebiscite. He proposed that, since certain parts of Austrian Silesia were unquestionably either Polish or Czechoslovak in population, the plebiscite should be confined to the mixed districts of Těšín and Fryštát. This was opposed by the Czechoslovak Government on the ground that the whole area was one historic and economic entity, and that it would therefore be ridiculous to differentiate the treatment of its component districts. The Peace

Conference decided this matter in favour of Czechoslovakia, and appointed an International Commission composed of important representatives of Great Britain, France, Japan and Italy. All Polish and Czechoslovak troops were withdrawn, and a division of the French Army, reinforced by an Italian force, was sent to ensure law and order.

It was agreed beforehand that the plebiscite should be merely of an informative character, serving as a rough guide to the International Commission when it defined the Czechoslovak-Polish frontier. This did not serve, however, to mitigate the passions that were aroused. The intense campaign conducted by the Poles, accompanied sometimes by acts of terrorism, aroused an equally intense reaction among the anti-Polish elements of the population, German as well as Czechoslovak, and it soon became obvious that the plebiscite would lead to bloodshed and would serve no useful purpose. It was proposed, therefore, that the matter should be submitted to the neutral arbitration of King Albert of Belgium. The Poles agreed at once to this proposal, but the Czechoslovaks were unwilling to abandon the idea of a plebiscite, which they felt certain would go in their favour.

For the sake of peace, however, Beneš, against the opposition of his Prime Minister, Kramář, eventually consented to the settlement of the dispute by the Council of Ambassadors. Thus at last, on July 28th, 1920, Poland received half the disputed territory (including the richest coal deposits) while Czechoslovakia was granted the Ostrava-Karvinná coal basin and the vital railway line and junction, the strategic value to her of the latter being, however, almost completely destroyed owing to the close proximity of an open frontier with Poland. It was a veritable "Judgment of Solomon", for the town of Těšín itself was so divided that the greater part of it became Polish territory, while the smaller part, including the railway station, passed into the hands of Czechoslovakia!

There was further friction between the two countries almost immediately, in connection with the Soviet-Polish war, with regard to which Czechoslovakia remained neutral. The Poles complained that, despite what they were pleased to call "their concessions" at Těšín, the Czechoslovak Government main-

tained a hostile attitude towards them during this critical period. What actually happened was first that the Czechoslovak Government very rightly refused to compromise its neutral status by allowing a force of 20,000 Hungarian cavalry to pass across its territory to the assistance of the Poles. Later on the workers in the Ostrava district took independent action in defence of the Soviet Union by refusing to allow munition trains from Italy, France and Hungary to pass into Poland over their railway lines. The Czechoslovak Government, which was at that time led by a Social-Democrat, Tusar, saw no reason why it should interfere with the wishes of its main supporters, and indeed could not have forced the munition trains through districts which were completely controlled by the workers without provoking a civil war. Eventually, moreover, Beneš, who was in Paris at the time, was compelled by Marshal Foch to make arrangements for munitions to pass into Poland by an alternative route through Slovakia, where the workers were less class-conscious and less well-organised.

As a result of this unfortunate beginning Czechoslovak-Polish relations remained cold and formal until 1925, when Beneš, then Czechoslovak Foreign Minister, visited Warsaw and concluded arbitration and commercial Treaties, setting up also a special Commission for the mutual settlement of disputes regarding Minorities. The situation improved still further in May of the following year when Beneš, in order to enable the Germans' conditions for their entry into the League of Nations, voluntarily surrendered to the representative of Poland, his seat on the League Council.

The change of Foreign Minister in Poland in 1927, however, marked a reversal of this happy process of reconciliation. Poland now developed an ill-concealed hostility towards the Little Entente, regarding it as a first step towards the realisation of a Danubian Federation which would reduce her relative importance in Eastern Europe. Poland has never ratified the Treaty of Trianon (which established the frontiers of the Succession States) on the ground that it does not concern her, but it now became clear that there were more concrete reasons for her non-ratification. Zaleski, the new Polish Foreign Minister, developed a policy of open friendship with Hungary

and set about trying to detach Roumania from the Little Entente. The obvious objectives of this policy were the diminution of Czechoslovak influence and the creation of a "frontier against Bolshevism". For the effective realisation of this latter objective it was deemed essential that a common frontier should be realised between Poland and Hungary, and this could only be achieved by an alteration of the status of Subcarpathian Ruthenia, which was attached to the Czechoslovak Republic by the Treaty of Trianon.

This trend of Poland towards a policy of scarcely veiled hostility with regard to Czechoslovakia was accentuated when Colonel Beck became Polish Foreign Minister, in the autumn of 1932. Early in 1933 Beneš proposed the conclusion of a Pact of Friendship between the two countries, a proposal which has been made again on several occasions since then, but the Polish response has always been unfavourable. The reason for this was made apparent when Poland refused to be party to the Eastern Pact proposed by Barthou because she "*wished to preserve her freedom of action with regard to Lithuania and Czechoslovakia*". The Franco-Polish correspondence in which this momentous declaration was made has not yet been made public, and the authenticity of reports regarding its contents which appeared in the Swiss Press has sometimes been denied, but Poland's recent high-handed action with regard to Lithuania, and her behaviour towards Czechoslovakia since this time, would seem to indicate that the reports were substantially correct.

Poland and Germany have obviously, as indicated by their Ten-Year Pact of Non-Aggression, agreed that for some time to come their interests will not clash, and it is patent that the two countries are now working in close collaboration. The Pact which has been mentioned was concluded without the knowledge of Czechoslovakia, although the Czechoslovak Government had always in the past taken pains to consult with the Government of Poland before taking any international action. It was preceded by a violent anti-Czechoslovak campaign in the Polish Press, and was followed immediately by officially inspired public demonstrations against Czechoslovakia in the Těšín district, in which a Polish Consul abused his diplomatic

privileges. A clear indication of Poland's ambitions is revealed by Studnicki, who was for several years in the service of the Polish Foreign Office, in his book *The European Political System and Poland*, which was published at the beginning of 1935. This book must, in an authoritarian State like Poland, have received official sanction and was published by a firm (Gebetner and Wolf) which has unofficial connections with the Polish Government. It may be assumed therefore that Studnicki was not merely indulging in fantasy when he forecast a Polish-German hegemony over Central Europe, and described Czechoslovakia as a "geographical freak" which must submit to "partial dismemberment" in favour of Poland and Hungary, "who must have a common frontier". The joint activities of Hungarian and Polish agents in Subcarpathian Ruthenia, and their intrigues with Fencik and his followers among the local population seem, however, to achieve but little success. It must, nevertheless, strain the tolerance, even of a Czechoslovak, when the Polish Consul at Užhorod (*who, by the way, would find it difficult to justify the necessity of his presence in a town where Poles and Polish commercial interests are almost nil*) writes openly in the Press the most virulent criticisms of the Government of the country to which he is accredited and threatens them in no measured terms.

The campaign against Czechoslovakia conducted by the Polish Government in its official Press and through the broadcasting station at Katowice, continues unabated to this day. It is based in the main on quite unjustifiable criticisms of the treatment by the Czechoslovak authorities of their Polish Minority. The writer, during a brief visit to the Těšín district in December, 1936, was unable to find any justification for these complaints, with regard to which, moreover, the action of the Czechoslovak Government seems to have been most reasonable. Finding that the normal procedure of diplomatic protest did nothing to check the stream of Polish abuse directed against them with regard to the "oppression" of Poles, the Czechoslovak Government offered to refer the question to the League of Nations, undertaking in advance to accept unconditionally any decision which the League might make. Poland refused. They then proposed that, in accordance

with the terms of the Polish-Czechoslovak Arbitration Treaty of 1925 the matter should be submitted to an international tribunal. Again Poland refused, arguing that a local matter should not be taken before an international body. They therefore made a third proposal, that the matter should be placed in the hands of the special Commission set up in 1925 for dealing with Minority questions. This request also was refused, and yet the Polish campaign of slander continues unabated. *The only conclusion that can be drawn is that Poland knows perfectly well that her charges against the Czechoslovak Government cannot be sustained, but wishes merely to stir up ill-feeling in the frontier-districts, to attempt to discredit Czechoslovakia in the eyes of the world, and to provide herself with a specious pretext for aggression against her inoffensive and long-suffering neighbour.*

Since, however, the Polish Government often claims that the majority of the people of the coveted Těšín district would like to be "delivered from Czechoslovak misrule", and calls for a plebiscite to be held, the following analysis of the voting at the last Parliamentary Elections is of interest, and seems to provide sufficient answer to the Polish contention.

ANALYSIS OF VOTING AT PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION, MAY, 1935.

	<i>Czechoslovak Parties</i>	<i>Polish Bloc</i>	<i>German Parties</i>	<i>Communists</i>
Whole Těšín Dis- trict . . .	94,420	28,214	14,491	40,275
Areas claimed by Poland:—				
Český Těšín . . .	17,440	14,472	4,954	7,983
Fryštát . . .	32,438	13,189	6,438	16,438

(d) GERMANY. Czechoslovak good-will towards Germany was evidenced even during the last war by the conspicuous absence in the speeches of such men as Masaryk and Beneš of slanderous and insulting reference to Germany and the Germans, such as was at that time very much in vogue. It

was appreciated that German culture had made great contributions in the past to the development of the Czechoslovak nation, and that it would continue to play an important part in the future development of independent Czechoslovakia.

Being philosophers, moreover, and not mere demagogues, the Czechoslovak statesmen realised that no useful purpose could be served by rousing righteous resentment in the hearts of their future neighbours. They were anxious, also, to assert that their nation was fighting beside the Allies in order to achieve its own liberation, *not in order to serve as an instrument of their imperialist ambitions.*

When the war was ended by the defeat of the Central Powers, Czechoslovakia was wise enough to realise that a policy of magnanimity on the part of the victors was essential for the establishment of a lasting peace. She exerted, therefore, what little influence she had, in order to bring about a moderation of claims of reparations (in which, incidentally, she did not share), and in 1921, on her own initiative, she renounced the right, accorded to her under the Treaty of Versailles, to confiscate all German property on her territory, thus sacrificing tens of millions of pounds in the interests of peace.

Germany, however, despite these gestures of friendship continued to regard Czechoslovakia with hostility because of her associations with the hated France. It was for this reason that Czechoslovakia strove always to act as mediator between France and Germany, in order to bring about a reconciliation without which European peace must remain uncertain. It was for this reason also that Czechoslovakia hailed with enthusiasm the conclusion of the Rhine Pact (Treaty of Locarno) and took steps to make it a more important contribution to the cause of peace.¹

Almost immediately afterwards, in 1926, when there was a crisis regarding Germany's entry into the League of Nations over the question of seats on the Council, Beneš placed at the disposal of the Great Powers the seat which he occupied as representative of Czechoslovakia.

¹ Czechoslovakia was among the States which demanded that the entry of Germany into the League of Nations should be one of the conditions of the Pact, and furthermore changed the nature of her alliance with France as described on page 299.

Despite all these friendly actions, the German official attitude towards Czechoslovakia remained formal and cold, while that of her Nationalists was already outspokenly hostile. There was, however, no real disagreement between the two countries until 1931, when Germany tried to spring on the world an Austro-German Customs Union. Czechoslovakia firmly opposed this Union, on grounds which have already been explained,¹ and declined the invitation which she received to join it. The subsequent resumption of more friendly relations when this disagreement was forgotten was prevented by the gradual growth of National Socialism in Germany.

The advent to power of Hitler marked the end of all pretence of good-will on the part of Germany, but Czechoslovakia has nevertheless continued to be conciliatory to the verge of excess—*each concession which she has made has been the signal for new German demands*. Even after Germany had withdrawn from the League of Nations, on October 14th, 1933, Czechoslovakia made it quite clear that she would not be provoked into changing her attitude towards her neighbour. "Live, and let live" was the spirit in which Dr. Beneš, then Foreign Secretary, on October 31st, 1933, spoke in Parliament, saying:

"In this difficult and complicated situation our policy has not the slightest hesitation or doubt. It will not change in any way its course pursued in the past fifteen years, nor will it change anything in its practice and methods, nor in its theories. In the same way we shall not change in any respect the friendly and correct relations which we have up to now maintained with our neighbour, Germany, in whatever way matters turn out there; *and we hope that the situation will be similar on the other side. We do not at present and never shall interfere with the domestic concerns of any of our neighbours.*"

How little the exemplary behaviour of Czechoslovakia was appreciated, or at least how little it was officially appreciated, will be realised from the following comments of "An Active and Responsible Czechoslovak Statesman"²:—

"Dr. Beneš, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, never omitted any opportunity of publicly speaking of the 'correct', the

¹ See page 281.

² *Germany and Czechoslovakia*, Orbis Publishing Co., Prague, Vol. I, pp. 79-86.

'good', the 'normally friendly' and finally even 'friendly' relations between Czechoslovakia and Germany.

"This was our programme, but it was at a time when Germany was at her weakest, and when there was but little understanding elsewhere for this policy. Nevertheless, throughout the seventeen years during which he was Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dr. Beneš never had the satisfaction of hearing a single public utterance in the same sense on the part of Germany. Apart from Stresemann's speech in Geneva (when he publicly praised Czechoslovakia's self-sacrifice in surrendering her seat on the Council), no public reference was made in Berlin, in the German Parliament or by the official German circles—even of Weimar Germany—to all these declarations and acts. Not a word at any time! . . . *Why did neither official nor unofficial Germany, why did not Weimar Germany show more recognition of Czechoslovakia, why did they not acknowledge even a limited measure of recognition, why did they not respond just once throughout seventeen years to the proffered hand, and why did they always look exclusively on the negative side, only at things where our interests were opposed, why did they not bring themselves to see good will at least where it actually existed?* . . . *It would seem as if post-war Germany knows nothing, or almost nothing positive about Czechoslovakia.* The little she knows is either of negative or unfriendly character, and—it may in particular be emphasised—unjust, exaggerated or untrue. . . . Germany has not yet, in our opinion, arrived at a just and objective knowledge of Czechoslovakia, her nearest and most immediate neighbour . . . it is assuredly disconcerting to note that in post-war Germany there has not yet been published by any German author a single book on Czechoslovakia and the Czechoslovaks that is objective, truthful, and not permeated with hostile prejudice and inimical tendencies.¹ Even under the Weimar régime German public opinion was fed as it were by daily hostile reports from Czechoslovakia. In Catholic and Socialist circles where there was, and still is, less prejudice, but little

¹ It seems that the first attempt has recently been made in Berlin. A little book which tries to be more objective than the previous publications has been published by H. Singule: *Der Staat Masaryk's*, Berlin, 1937.

interest on the whole was displayed in Czechoslovakia, and so German public opinion was exclusively informed by German-Nationalist circles—tendentious, hostile, prejudiced. Since 1933 when the National-Socialists assumed the power, the position has become still worse. Formerly what was written in the Reich about Czechoslovakia was written merely in the spirit of the former German-Nationalist or National-Socialist Parties (Kallina, Jung, Krebs, Baeran), who could hardly be impartial; to-day all this has become intensified into a systematic campaign nourished, if not mainly, at least in part, by political exiles from Czechoslovakia.

“We repeat, we understand that in Germany they should criticise us, that they should interest themselves in the fate of our Minorities, and that they should inform their public of the oppositional policy of our Germans against the Government. . . .

“It is also well known throughout the whole world that the conditions enjoyed by the Minorities in Czechoslovakia, alongside those obtaining in Switzerland, are of the fairest, that it is impossible in many other countries to speak of anything like the measure of liberty of the press, of conviction, of opinion and of free intellectual development that exists in Czechoslovakia. *In private conversation even the German opponents of Czechoslovakia are ready to admit that the position of the Minorities, including the German Minority, is incomparably better than for instance in Poland, Hungary or Italy. They will even acknowledge that Czechoslovakia has saved 150,000 Germans in Slovakia and Subcarpathian Ruthenia from national extinction by giving them what throughout the whole 19th and 20th centuries Hungary refused, and still refuses, to give them. . . .*

“The position is as if nothing at all may be written about this in Germany; not only the reporters and correspondents of the daily press in the Reich, who live more or less on the negative and tendentious work of the daily reporting of polemics, but even serious politicians, economists, diplomats, savants, University professors and the like, write nothing about it. And even from this they draw no just conclusion for their relations to Czechoslovakia. To be merely negative everywhere and in all things and to refuse to recognise anything

positive is no sign of strength. We in Czechoslovakia are not afraid of recognising the true strength of Germany whether material or intellectual—even of present-day Germany, whose national theories are well-known amongst us, and are even systematically propagated in fairly open fashion in the press of the Sudete German Party. Czechoslovakia is not afraid of this propaganda either. The results which may be perhaps expected of it here and there will not materialise since the primary conditions therefor do not exist in our country.”

Since the winter of 1934–35 Germany has subjected her inoffensive, and on the whole passive, neighbour to a campaign of calumny for which it would be difficult to find a parallel (even in recent history, when Ananias has been surpassed). Its effect upon the German public, who have for decades been denied all positive knowledge, can be imagined as being far from conducive of good-will or peace. Its effect abroad may be equally dangerous on the public in other countries, who have access to positive information about Czechoslovakia, but who find Goebbels’ negative material more “spicy”. Familiarised with horrors by the authentic accounts of Nazi violence and tortures, the man-in-the-street is not unready to believe that Czechs (who can spell their name so “barbarously”) are guilty of barbarity; he may even mix up the lies now in circulation with the true stories of torture in Yugoslavia which have appeared in the Press sometimes in the past.

Ever since 1936 this campaign of propaganda has been intensified and extended in order to isolate Czechoslovakia from her allies and to discredit her in the eyes of her sympathisers. It is conducted by every means at the disposal of a modern State with a complete disregard alike of veracity and of the normal standards of decency in international relations.

This propaganda may be divided into three types, each calculated to serve a particular end:—

- (1) Czechoslovakia is represented as “the spearhead of Red Imperialism pointed at the heart of the Third Reich”. This is said in order that the German people may learn to regard Czechoslovakia as a menace to their national security!

- (2) Czechoslovakia is represented as "a breeding place for Bolshevism". This is intended to serve several purposes. Firstly it provides additional reason why a patriotic Nazi should hate the Czechoslovaks, secondly it may shake the internal solidarity of the Republic by sowing the seeds of suspicion and fear of revolution in the hearts of Czechoslovak reactionaries, thirdly it may incline the reactionaries in Britain and elsewhere to view with favour any Nazi action against a "plague spot", and fourthly it may serve, together with propaganda of the first type, to make the Governments of Roumania and Yugoslavia regard Czechoslovakia with suspicion, thus weakening or perhaps even disrupting the Little Entente.
- (3) Czechoslovakia is represented as being unjust and harsh in the treatment of the racial minorities within her borders. Here again the object is partly the stirring up of racial enmity between Germans and Slavs, within and without the Third Reich, but is mainly the alienation of the sympathy which is generally felt in Britain and the U.S.A. towards a State whose democracy is modelled on their own.

It is almost incredible that it should have been possible to go on month after month serving up for public consumption such obvious and demonstrable untruths, but it still goes on despite the periodical protests of the Czechoslovak Government, and is reproduced at length in Czechoslovakia in *Die Zeit*, the organ of the Sudete German Party.

Visitors to Germany are liberally dosed with it, more particularly nowadays with pathetic stories about the oppressed and starving Germans of Czechoslovakia, the authenticity of which they are apt to accept without question—if they visited the homes of the "oppressed" they would discover how the truth is perverted and exaggerated, but most of them seem to be so moved with sympathy that they rush straight into print.

The calm and prolonged forbearance of the Czechoslovak Government under such circumstances can only be explained

by "a quiet conscience and good nerves". *It is clearly impossible for them, however, to embark usefully on any discussion of Czecho-German differences until this campaign of slander ceases.*

(e) ITALY. During the early post-war years relations between Czechoslovakia and Italy, both enemies of the Habsburgs, were extremely cordial. The advent of the Fascist régime in 1922 had at first no adverse effect on the situation, for in the following year there was concluded a Treaty of Friendship between the two countries.

After 1926, however, the deterioration of Franco-Italian relations and the development by Italy of an imperialist policy with regard to Central Europe and the Balkans changed matters considerably, and this prevented the renewal of the Treaty of Friendship.

The open expression of Italian sympathy with Hungarian revisionist aims antagonised Czechoslovak public opinion, and indicated that Italy was in opposition to the fundamental policy of Czechoslovakia, the integration of the Danubian States.

There have been times, such as in 1931, when an attempt was made to form an Austro-German Customs Union, at which Italian and Czechoslovak interests have corresponded with each other, and at which, therefore, relations between the two countries have become less hostile, but such improvements have been ephemeral. The development of the Little Entente in the direction of closer association between its member-States was met with disfavour by Mussolini, who countered by proposing the Four-Power Pact in 1933 and by the Rome Protocols in 1934.

It was hoped by Czechoslovakia that the improvement of relations between Italy and Yugoslavia, though on terms which were not conducive to the further development of the Little Entente, and the growing menace of German expansion in Central Europe, would make Italy feel more well-disposed towards her. Signs of such a development have, however, been conspicuous by their absence, and *it is now clear, since the annexation of Austria by Germany, that Italy will not move a man or a gun to support Czechoslovakian opposition to German expansion.*

The recognition by the Czechoslovak Government, on April 20th, 1938, of the Italian annexation of Abyssinia, and various friendly references to Italy in the semi-official Press of 'Czechoslovakia and in President Beneš' message to the Czechoslovak Legionaries, can therefore scarcely have been inspired by serious hope of weakening the Berlin-Rome axis. The Czechoslovak Government must have found it extremely distasteful to sacrifice its principles by recognising Mussolini's dubious conquest, and have realised how their action would be used as propaganda and perhaps some day quoted as a precedent against them, but they would otherwise find themselves in an awkward position with regard to the Little Entente, of which the two other States-Members had already recognised the conquest of Abyssinia, when the matter came before the League of Nations. The States of the Little Entente have agreed to speak with one voice at Geneva, and Czechoslovakia cannot afford at the present time to take action which might isolate her from her allies. It is unfortunate that these circumstances were not explained at the time in the British Press, and that a false impression may therefore have been created by such "splash" headlines as those of the *Daily Herald*, "CZECH FRIENDSHIP OFFERED TO DICTATORS."

(f) FRANCE. Memories of the hospitality which the Czech National Council enjoyed in Paris during the war, community of political outlook, and bonds of common interest have combined to make relations between Czechoslovakia and France particularly cordial and sincere, even when, as at the time of the occupation of the Ruhr, their policies have diverged. It was a French Military Mission, moreover, which trained the new Czechoslovak Army. It cannot with justice be said, however, that Czechoslovakia is "a vassal of France".

A Treaty of Alliance was concluded in 1924 between the two countries, but any misconception regarding the nature and purpose of this Treaty was removed in October, 1925, when, concurrently with the conclusion of the Rhine Pact (Treaty of Locarno), the alliance was changed into a guarantee of a German-Czechoslovak Arbitration Agreement. *Both the Arbitration Agreement and the Treaty of Guarantee were signed in the presence of, and with the consent of, all who were*

present at the Locarno Conference (including Austen Chamberlain, Stresemann and Mussolini).

This Treaty of Guarantee is of importance in connection with the Pact between Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union, because the latter does not become effective, i.e., the Soviet Union is under no obligation to act, until France has begun to carry out her treaty obligation.

Franco-Czechoslovak relations would be considerably improved, at least so far as the general public in Czechoslovakia is concerned, if France would adopt a more helpful economic policy with regard to her ally. French tariff policy at present seriously embarrasses Czechoslovak export trade.

(g) SOVIET UNION. Czechoslovakia's attitude towards the Soviet Union has been as a rule one of consistent non-intervention. As early as May, 1918, Masaryk urged the Allies to recognise the Soviet Government, and was opposed to intervention, which he rightly estimated would prove ineffective and also injurious to all parties concerned. He was opposed also to any excessive dismemberment of the former Russian Empire, as disturbing the balance of power in Europe.

There was present in Russia at the time of the Revolution a Czechoslovak Army Corps, composed of Czechoslovak prisoners-of-war, who had volunteered to fight for their national independence on the side of the Allies. It was agreed between the Czech National Council in Paris and the Kerensky Government that they should continue to fight as an autonomous unit within the ranks of the Russian Army, but should observe strict neutrality in internal disputes.

After the Bolshevik Revolution these volunteers decided to make their way via Siberia to France, in order to continue their fight for independence. The Soviet authorities sanctioned this exodus, but later, under pressure from Germany, an attempt was made to disarm the Czechoslovak Legion. This led to armed conflict. The Czechoslovak Legion was then compelled to remain in Siberia, by the Allies who refused to provide it with transports for leaving the country. The Allied High Command attempted to use it as part of Admiral Kolchak's counter-revolutionary army against the Bolsheviks, a policy which was endorsed by the Czechoslovak bourgeoisie,

but which was scarcely carried into effect owing to the opposition of the Social-Democrat Party in Czechoslovakia.

Similar conflicts of policy between the Czechoslovak and Allied Governments, and between the bourgeois and Socialist elements in Czechoslovakia occurred with regard to the Soviet-Polish War in 1920. The Czechoslovak Government did its best to dissuade the Allies from participation in the hostilities on behalf of Poland, and itself preserved an attitude of strict neutrality for which it seems to have earned the undying hatred of Polish reactionaries. The passage across Czechoslovak territory of 20,000 Hungarian cavalymen to reinforce the Poles was not sanctioned by the Czechoslovak Government, then under a Social-Democrat Prime Minister, Tusar. Even more effective, however, was the direct action of the Czechoslovak workers in the Ostrava district in preventing the transit of trains laden with munitions destined for Poland; this action met with the tacit approval of the Prime Minister, whose hands were somewhat tied by his association in the Government Coalition with powerful bourgeois elements, but was eventually annulled by an arrangement, forced on Czechoslovakia by the French High Command, whereby munitions passed by an alternative route, through Slovakia.

Bolshevik ideas are anathema to the humanitarian liberalism of most Czechoslovaks. Their development in Czechoslovakia, as marked by the growth of the Czechoslovak Communist Party in 1920, was an obstacle to the development of friendly relations with the Soviet Union. The strong anti-Communist sentiment of the Social-Democrats later forced them into the same camp as the bourgeois parties who opposed such development. Trade relations developed rapidly, however, and this would doubtless have led sooner to a general *rapprochement* between the two countries, if Czechoslovakia had not been anxious to avoid action which would antagonise Poland.

Ever since the Genoa Conference, 1922, Czechoslovakia has made every effort to bring about an improvement of relations between the Soviet Union and the rest of the European States, and she helped to bring the Soviet Union into the League of Nations. She has consequently opposed, and refused

to associate herself with, any attempt to set up an anti-Russian or anti-Soviet Front.

Czechoslovakia did not formally recognise the Soviet Government until the spring of 1934, acting then with the concurrence of her allies in the Little Entente, one of whom, Roumania, promptly followed her example.¹ Ever since that date she has been subjected to a campaign in certain sections of the European, and especially of the German, Press which strives to misrepresent her as "a sally-port for Bolshevism".

This campaign was extended and intensified when on May 16th, 1935, she concluded a Pact of Non-Aggression and of Mutual Assistance Against Unprovoked Aggression with the Soviet Union. A similar Pact was concluded about the same time between France and the Soviet Union. *These Pacts are strictly within the scope of the League of Nations, and Czechoslovakia's action was carried out with the knowledge of Great Britain, and the acquiescence of the other States of the Little Entente. The defensive system represented by these Pacts is open to the adherence of any other State or States.* The action of Czechoslovakia and the other States concerned in concluding these Pacts was dictated by the growth of an aggressive tendency in Germany, by the unquestionable sincerity of the Soviet Union's policy of non-aggression and collective action in defence of peace, and by the failure which had attended the attempt to conclude a wider Eastern Pact, on a basis similar to that of Locarno, to include Germany and Poland. *It was hoped by Czechoslovakia that the conclusion of her Pact with the Soviet Union would pave the way for the conclusion of an Eastern Pact, but the negative attitude maintained by Britain towards this initiative has contributed to the frustration of that hope.*

¹ Yugoslavia has not yet done so in 1938, and still has a "White" Russian Legation in Belgrade!

CHAPTER XII

CENTRAL EUROPE SINCE THE GREAT WAR

“THE GREAT WAR was a great historical turning point, *one of the greatest events in the history of Europe*. It created a vast zone of new independent States stretching from the North of Europe to the South, and fortified the existing small States by unifying them nationally.”¹

For the peoples of Central Europe, the Peace Settlement which concluded it was more than a mere agreement for the transfer of land from the vanquished to the victors—more even than a long-overdue attempt to re-draw the map of Europe in accordance with the ethnographic distribution of its population. For them, whether they had been subject races within the Habsburg Empire, or had been nominally independent races in the adjacent territories, it marked the end of an epoch, and the establishment of conditions for which they had longed during centuries.

At one fell swoop there were swept away four Empires that had oppressed them—Germany, Russia, Austria-Hungary and Turkey—defeated by Powers who professed to have fought “to make the world safe for democracy”. The smaller nations would be free at last to develop along such lines as their national genius might indicate.

This fundamental transformation was not accepted, even by the beneficiaries, without certain misgivings. It was asked whether the creation of a considerable number of small and medium-sized States would not prove economically disastrous, and further, whether the “Balkanisation” of Europe would not lead to an extension of the area susceptible to the intrigues of rival Great Powers.

1. The Masaryk Plan, 1917. The dangers and difficulties of this situation had been clearly foreseen by the late Dr. T. G.

¹ *Germany and Czechoslovakia*, by an Active and Responsible Czechoslovak Statesman, Vol. I, p. 29.

Masaryk, who as early as 1917 submitted to the Allies a plan for meeting them. This plan, which was presented in the form of a book entitled *New Europe*, envisaged the establishment of a Federation of autonomous Republics stretching from the Baltic to the Black Sea and Mediterranean. The plan did not meet with the favour of the other States concerned—possibly because their rulers did not like the republican flavour—so it never materialised.

The seed was sown, however, and Czechoslovakia has consistently striven ever since for at least a partial realisation of the Masaryk Plan, in the shape of a Federation of the Danubian countries—which might, of course, subsequently be expanded. Even in the Declaration of Independence, made at Washington on October 18th, 1918, the idea of national independence was not allowed to swamp entirely that of international co-operation.¹ At the same time, Czechoslovakia has never accepted the view, which is widely held, that the realisation of her plan is essential for the preservation of her own independent status or that of other similar States, and has always been prepared to wait until the day when that plan may be realised with the approval of all parties concerned—notably of Germany and Italy.

In the meanwhile, realising that she was situated in an exposed position at the crossroads of various possible trends of political expansion, she has regarded the League of Nations as the keystone of her foreign policy. From this attitude she has never wavered, however much the League has failed in its functions, and *she has always most scrupulously herself observed, and tried to obtain universal recognition for, the principle that treaties of alliance may be concluded only to facilitate putting into practice Article 16 of the Covenant of the League.*

2. The Little Entente, 1920-1921. Thus it was that, by concluding, and by causing to be concluded, a series of defensive Pacts between herself, Yugoslavia and Roumania in 1920-1921 she brought about the creation of the Little Entente

¹ It was stated that absolute liberty was the only basis of a federal union to which the peoples of Central and Eastern Europe could attain, should the need for such union be felt.

which has played such a great, and may yet play a greater, part in the preservation of European peace.

These Pacts, and the Little Entente which they brought about, were primarily inspired by a desire for mutual defence against the menace of a Habsburg restoration or of attempts by Hungary to revise by force the frontiers established by the Peace Treaties. *There can be little doubt, however, that in Czechoslovakia at least the Little Entente is regarded as potentially the nucleus of a wider and closer federation.* This is made clear by the fact that the idea of an "Economic Little Entente", which was first raised by the Czechoslovak Foreign Minister, Dr. Beneš, in 1927, and which has been pursued ever since, is one which the originator has himself pointed out cannot of itself produce an effectual solution of the problems of Central Europe, but which requires the co-operation of other Central European States, and the consent of the neighbouring Great Powers (Germany and Italy). It was hoped that the economic benefits accruing to members of this Entente would persuade Austria and Hungary to swallow their hurt pride.

3. The Hantos Plan, 1925-1927. At this time there was already a general desire among the States of Central Europe for such economic co-operation, and indeed a plan had already been formulated in 1925-1927 by M. Hantos on behalf of Hungary. The Hantos Plan proposed a customs and monetary union between all the Danubian States, and the abolition of the most favoured nation clause. The adoption of this plan—or of any similar plan, such as the Hodža Plan which will be dealt with later—would increase the security of all the States involved, by reducing the risk of a Great Power obtaining predominant control over one or other of them—and it was for this reason that it was brought to nought by Italian and German opposition.

4. The Rome Bloc. Italy, who was dissatisfied with her share of the loot at the end of the Great War, was then already planning a programme of expansion in Central Europe, and regarded therefore with disfavour the existence, and even more the possible extension, of the Little Entente. Italian

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diplomacy did its utmost to prevent any *rapprochement* between the Little Entente and its former enemies, by encouraging Hungarian claims for frontier revision, and Lord Rothermere showed his colours even then, by running a scandalous campaign on behalf of those claims. Thus encouraged by the hope that Mussolini might prove powerful enough to help them to their ends, and later rewarded by special financial concessions, Austria and Hungary drew away again from the Little Entente, and formed with Italy what was known as the Rome bloc.

5. The Austro-German Customs Union, 1931. Germany likewise countered, in 1931, by trying to present the world with a *fait accompli* in the shape of an Austro-German Customs Union, into which she invited Czechoslovakia to come. This Union was opposed by France and Italy, probably mainly for political reasons. It was opposed by Czechoslovakia and the Little Entente on the ground that it would disturb the economic balance of Central Europe. It was supported only by Britain, who after the war had refused to sacrifice her most favoured nation rights in Austria in order that the terms of the peace treaties might be carried out,¹ and was eventually rejected by the Permanent Court of International Justice to whom it was submitted.

These two offensives opened the eyes of the States of the Little Entente to the danger of the situation, stiffened their resistance to any proposals of frontier revision and welded them closer together even than before. It had become evident that what was at stake was not merely some slight adjustment of frontiers, where they may have been unjustly drawn, but the preservation of the new European order, of which the Peace Treaties were a concrete expression, and the preservation of European peace.

6. The Tardieu Plan, 1932. As the economic crisis in Central Europe rose to a climax, M. Tardieu submitted to the Great Powers of Europe a plan for the establishment of a system of

¹ The Treaties of St. Germain and Trianon provided for the establishment of preferential customs treatment between Austria, Hungary and Czechoslovakia for five years after the conclusion of the Peace Treaties.

preferential tariffs between the five Danubian States, i.e. the Rome Bloc as well as the Little Entente, all nations abandoning their claims to most favoured nation treatment in those States.

In presenting his plan, M. Tardieu pointed out that the States in question, despite their post-war frontiers, constituted an economic unit which was potentially in a state of equilibrium. Ethnological frontiers, marked with high tariff walls, had reduced, but not destroyed, their natural economic intercourse, which was based on their mutual interdependence.

The plan was discussed in London, was opposed by Germany, Italy and Great Britain, and was consequently rejected.

7. The Stresa Conference, 1932. At the Stresa Conference, which took place later in 1932, the problem of rehabilitating the whole of Europe was discussed. A draft convention for the revalorisation of cereals was drawn up, and a Committee was set up for the Study of Central and Eastern European problems. As, however, there was no willingness to abandon the most favoured nation clause, the net practical result of the Conference was nil.

8. Re-organisation of the Little Entente, February 17th, 1933.¹ As these various plans followed each other into the waste-paper basket, the States of the Little Entente decided to do what they could to improve at least their own position. They re-organised themselves therefore by a statute of February 17th, 1933, whereby were set up:—

1. A permanent council of the Little Entente,
2. A permanent economic council, and
3. A permanent secretariat.

The statute established further that the States-Members should decide upon and pursue a common foreign policy, and should speak as one body at the League of Nations. The Little Entente was declared open for any other States to join.

9. Proposed Four-power Pact, March, 1933. Mussolini promptly attempted a counter-measure by proposing the

¹ See Appendix 5, pages 352-354.

conclusion of a Four-Power Pact between Italy, Germany, France and Britain. The intention of this Pact was to place Europe under the control of a Directory of the four Powers mentioned, among whom France would have found herself in a minority, and excluding the Soviet Union. Under such conditions Italy would have been able to re-draw the map of Central and South-Eastern Europe in accordance with her aspirations.

The proposal was firmly opposed by Dr. Beneš and was subsequently defeated. It had the indirect result, however, of giving such offence to Poland that she concluded a separate Pact with Germany in January, 1934.

10. The Mussolini Plan, Autumn, 1933. This plan proposed a system of preferential tariffs between the five Danubian States so far as agricultural produce was concerned, and for Austria alone to receive preferential treatment with regard to industrial exports. It made provision also for increasing the exports of all five States concerned, and for amelioration of transport conditions.

The plan was opposed by the Little Entente, and by Czechoslovakia in particular.

11. The Balkan Pact and League, February 9th, 1934.¹ After four preparatory Balkan Conferences during the years 1929–1933, a Pact was concluded in Athens on February 9th, 1934, whereby Yugoslavia, Roumania, Greece and Turkey linked themselves together for purposes of economic co-operation and mutual protection. This Pact differed from those connected with the Little Entente in that it merely guaranteed the existing frontiers of the signatory States as amongst themselves. It did not bind the signatories to go to the assistance of one of their co-signatories who might happen to be the victim of revisionist aggression on the part of some other State, e.g., Bulgaria (who, like Hungary, was dissatisfied with the post-War territorial settlement). The economic side of the “Balkan League” could not be agreed upon until after a further Conference, at Ankara from October 30th to November 2nd, at which was adopted a constitution resembling very closely

¹ See Appendix 6, pages 355–356.

that of the "Little Entente". Among other things, it provided for the foundation of a Balkan Bank to finance exchanges of goods between the signatory States, to provide credits for agriculture and industry, to facilitate the transfer of payments and finally to finance the raw material requirements of the States. Further important developments were envisaged, such as the foundation of an Inter-Balkan Chamber of Commerce and the establishment of a Balkan Customs Union. The former has subsequently been realised, but the realisation of the latter is likely to be delayed indefinitely by the obstruction of vested interests which are concerned with maintaining their profits from protected—and frequently economically indefensible—industries.

The fact that two of the members (Jugoslavia and Roumania) of the Balkan League are also members of the Little Entente is of very great importance, for it facilitates the co-ordination of its economic policy with that of the Little Entente, and thus enables both bodies to become more effective. From the Czechoslovak point of view this is of particular importance, as her prosperity depends very largely on her finding outlets for her industrial production—the reduction of Czechoslovak exports to Germany, caused by the efforts of that country to achieve autarchy, made it imperative that Czechoslovakia should find new markets.

12. The Rome Protocols, March 17th, 1934.¹ Alarmed lest this extension of the influence of the Little Entente might attract away his puppets, Mussolini went to considerable lengths to buy their continued allegiance. By a series of three Protocols, two of which were trilateral and one of which was bilateral between Austria and Italy, he attempted to carry into effect the principles which he had proposed in the autumn of the previous year, but of course with regard only to the States of the Rome Bloc. These Protocols, which were political, as well as economic in their nature, *were not registered with the League of Nations.*

For Hungary this meant the revalorisation of her grain crops, which Mussolini undertook to buy at a price which was

¹ See Appendix 7, pages 357-359.

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well above the world price at that time; for Austria it meant preferential treatment for her industrial produce, again, to some extent at least, at considerable cost to Italy. In exchange, however, for financial sacrifices, which he doubtless transferred to the backs of his workers, Mussolini achieved the power which he desired, by reducing Austria and Hungary to a vassal status.

The States of the Rome Bloc repeatedly affirmed that their agreements were open to the adhesion of other States, but it was made very evident that Mussolini would allow a Danubian Federation to come into being only on terms which he would dictate—terms which would be incompatible with the independence of that Federation.

In view of the weak condition of Italy's finances at that time, it was evident that she could not for long continue such costly subsidies to her allies. The Governments of Austria and Hungary must have been informed of this, and one wonders therefore that they should have adopted such a short-sighted policy as to sign these Protocols. Their countrymen would be far better situated to-day,¹ and their countries would be in a more secure position, if they had joined instead the States of the Little Entente and Balkan League.

13. Attempted Anschluss—Murder of Dollfuss, July, 1934. In the meanwhile National Socialist Germany had been methodically carrying out a carefully-planned programme of economic penetration and political expansion towards the east. Mussolini's manœuvres had been regarded with favour on the whole, because, by creating disunity in Central Europe, they reduced the resistance to Nazi penetration. The Rome Protocols, however, brought an end to this policy of tacit co-operation. The Nazis attempted to recover their position by planning to bring about the Anschluss by a *coup d'état* in Austria. But Dollfuss, the Austrian Chancellor, was murdered, so the Anschluss had to be postponed.

14. Barthou's Balkan Tour—Assassinations at Marseilles, October, 1934. France now stepped into the arena, feeling that her

¹ By 1937 Italy was paying Hungary for her wheat with more oranges than she could digest and with vast quantities of mouth-organs!

position was being dangerously undermined. M. Barthou paid a round of official visits to the Balkan countries and was hailed everywhere with popular demonstrations of joy and goodwill. It was evident, however, even at that time that there was a divergence of views in some countries between the people and their rulers, who were more susceptible to Nazi influence.

Out of these visits, and of the return visit paid to France in October by King Alexander of Yugoslavia, there might have resulted some considerable improvement of the situation, but, as will be recalled, King Alexander and M. Barthou were assassinated in Marseilles. It was later established that the assassin had been trained and prepared in Hungary, and that the assassination was inspired from Italy in order to embarrass the French.

After this Italy began to busy herself with preparations for her aggression in Abyssinia. Mussolini tried in 1935 to consolidate his position in Austria by means of a Danubian Pact of non-aggression and non-intervention. He failed, however, to get this accomplished before war broke out in Africa.

15. Revival of Hope in the League, September, 1935. The decisive, though tardy, action of the League of Nations against Italian aggression, and more particularly the apparent abandonment by Britain of her isolationist attitude, had important effects in Central Europe. The States of the Little and Balkan Ententes loyally stood by their obligations under the Covenant, feeling that by doing so they were establishing a precedent which might some day, perhaps soon, stand them in good stead. Austria, powerless in the grip of Mussolini, was unable to apply sanctions, but she began to put out feelers for a *rapprochement* with Czechoslovakia as soon as circumstances would permit. Hungary alone reacted in the opposite direction, thus proving, if further proof were needed, the incurably reactionary nature of her present régime—it was a Hungarian Premier, the late M. Gömbös, who invented the idea of the Berlin-Rome axis.

16. Disillusionment, 1936. The subsequent treachery of Britain, leading to the abandonment of League action against

Italy, was a shock and a disappointment, creating everywhere a feeling of increased alarm. It removed, however, any illusions that had hitherto been entertained—the smaller States realised that they must depend upon themselves and upon each other for their salvation, and tended to draw more closely together. This was commented on by the Czechoslovak Foreign Minister, Dr. Kamil Krofta, in a speech to his Chamber of Deputies on October 22nd, 1936 :—

“At Geneva I was able to note the great power of attraction which the Little Entente exerts upon other countries whose representatives frequently expressed a desire for joint action with us on various questions. In addition to the two States of the Balkan League, Turkey and Greece, who, though they are not members of the Little Entente, are accustomed to arrive at agreement with the Little Entente delegates on all general questions dealt with in the League Assembly, I am thinking particularly of *Bulgaria*, whose Prime Minister, M. Kiosseivanov, in repeated conversations with me manifested a decided determination to labour for permanent *rapprochement* and systematic collaboration with the Little Entente. The representatives of the Baltic States, too, make no secret of a desire for permanence in their collaboration with the Little Entente in questions of general character.”

17. The Hodža Plan. The atmosphere was favourable, therefore, for the reception of the most recent plan for Danubian co-operation which was then presented by Dr. Milan Hodža, Prime Minister of the Czechoslovak Republic.

The Hodža Plan is by far the most comprehensive and, at the same time, the most realistic of all those which have been proposed. Going back to the original conception of the late President Masaryk, it proposes the establishment of an economic union which would embrace not only all the Danubian States and Balkan States—i.e., Little Entente, Balkan League (plus Bulgaria), and Rome Bloc—but also Poland and the Baltic States.

This plan is still under consideration and open for discussion, but international conditions render it unlikely that progress will be made towards its realisation at present.

18. The Socio-Political Background. In order to form a correct appreciation of the situation as it then stood it is necessary to consider the course of events within the various countries of Central Europe and the Balkans since the end of the war.

The defeat of German militarism and the disintegration of the autocratic Austro-Hungarian Empire were followed by a reorganisation of Europe in accordance, to a greater or less extent, with the ethnographical distribution of the various races. Millions of people found themselves released from centuries-old foreign domination, millions more from long-established autocracy, and one saw everywhere the adoption of democratic forms of government and administration. The accumulated effects of long years of neglect by undemocratic rulers were enhanced by the havoc wrought, directly and indirectly, by four years of war, and the new Governments everywhere found themselves faced with a tremendous task of reconstruction in accordance with modern democratic demands. Burdened with enormous debts, inherited from their predecessors (which were increased in the cases of those who had fought against the Allies by reparations claims), they found themselves compelled to turn to foreign financiers for aid.

Such aid was forthcoming at once, in order to stave off the threat of revolution and because the Western financiers were only too glad to find new outlets for the profits which they had accumulated during the War.¹ The aid took the form of loans and credits, and of capital investment—the first placed the borrower politically under the control of the lender; the second delivered into foreign hands the industries, natural resources, and sometimes even the land.

By these means, the smaller States were one by one reduced to the status of "finance colonies", owing to the stupidity or the venality of their rulers. The effects were not slow in becoming apparent, though it was not generally appreciated—either there or abroad—to what they should be ascribed.

¹ In Britain the National Debt had been increased by some £7,000 million, much of which was held by those who had received the payments whereby that increase had been incurred.

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The widespread and urgent need for economic development and social reform could not be satisfied by administrations which were crippled by the demands of greedy moneylenders abroad, and growing popular indignation was expressed first through, and later against, the democratic organs of which the liberated peoples had expected so much.

If the "democratic" statesmen had had the honesty or the courage to tell their people what had taken place and had, as in Mexico to-day, taken drastic steps to stop the sapping of their economic and political independence, all might have been well. The statesmen in charge, however, were "the old gang", who had assumed the mantle of democracy merely in order to retain their position. To have told the truth and led their people to freedom would have entailed revolutionary action, and this they were unwilling to do because of their respect for property-rights and of their sense of class-solidarity with foreign investors and creditors. They were afraid, moreover, that the development of democracy in their countries would rob them of their positions of privilege and power. They were not averse, therefore, to conniving at the destruction or emasculation of a democratic system with which they were out of sympathy, *even if it cost them their national independence.*

International finance-capital, possessed of the Press and aided by politicians whom it had bribed, proceeded therefore to discredit political democracy, which was clearly incompatible with the continuation of their ruthless exploitation of natural wealth and labour. The public was prepared by bitter experience to believe in the corruption of its politicians, but it did not realise to what lengths of infamy those politicians would go. Unversed, also, in the wiles of "Big Business", it was willing, therefore, to abandon its democratic form of government, and thus to place the yoke of capitalism more firmly upon its own shoulders.

The governmental organs thus set up have little or no popular support, and rule, therefore, by terrorism. They are composed of groups of amoral opportunists who, in return for a substantial "rake-off", fulfil the rôle of bailiff, and whose psychology and methods differ in no respect from those of the Chicago racketeer.

Their function is to provide cover (and protection) for the foreign exploiter. They instruct their factory inspectors to turn a blind eye to infringements of laws protecting the safety and comfort of workers in factories or in mines. They prevent the workers from organising themselves for their protection against such infringements or for obtaining better wages. They censor the Press and all publications, and they severely restrict freedom of speech.

Extreme examples of this process of "colonialisation" are seen in Hungary, where the feudal system has been reintroduced in a new guise (with the Banks in place of the former feudal Lords), and in Yugoslavia, where some 80% of all industry and private banking is in the hands of foreigners, who reap a rich harvest from the suffering workers.

In all these countries there are growing millions of people who are beginning to realise that many of their more serious social, economic, racial, cultural and religious problems can now be solved only by drastic measures against their rulers and their foreign patrons.

The result has been that their Governments, which were already very much subject to foreign control in international affairs, have now become so dependent on their patrons that their freedom of action is even more restricted. One can appreciate, therefore, the irony with which Dr. Stojadinovitch, Prime Minister of Yugoslavia, described by our Tory Press as "the greatest financier of the Balkans", but known in those parts by a more suitable nickname, when interviewed by Reuters during a visit to London in 1937, said that "he was pleased to note that the foreign policy of the British Government was exactly the same as that of his own country"!

In contrast to the countries which have just been described, and alone among them in her independence, is the Republic of Czechoslovakia.

More favoured than the remainder in that she inherited a highly developed and fairly well-balanced economic system, and in that she possessed capital of her own, very largely held and administered by Co-operative Banking and Credit Organisations, she was able to remain comparatively untouched by the blighting tentacles of foreign capital.

She was fortunate too in that she had none of "the old gang" left in charge. Instead, she had as her first President the late Dr. Masaryk, a fervent democrat, backed by Dr. Beneš and many other true democrats. Finally, moreover, she had a well-developed Social-Democrat Party and a strong Trade Union Movement.

Thanks to these circumstances, and to the fact that her people were confirmedly democratic, she has maintained and developed her democratic institutions, has developed her economic resources, and has carried out a remarkable programme of social reform, but has not got into debt. One reads, indeed, in *Lloyds Bank Monthly Review* of October, 1937, that *already the external debt of Czechoslovakia "is less than 18% of the total State indebtedness", and that "a very large part of the external debt has now been acquired by Czechoslovaks and thus been repatriated", while Czechoslovak private industry "has not borrowed at all heavily abroad"*.

Czechoslovak foreign policy is therefore not controlled from abroad—nor is it biased in any direction by fears of internal revolution. It is for this reason that her influence is predominant in the counsels of the Little Entente, and that where the policy of the Little Entente diverges from that of Yugoslavia or Roumania, it is usually the former which represents the policy that the peoples themselves would choose.

Czechoslovak ideals and principles find many devotees in the other countries of the Little Entente, and indeed their extension throughout Central Europe and the Balkans will probably be necessary before Federation can in any real sense be accomplished. The ideals of Federation and of the Little Entente are not new ones, born of the exigencies of the post-war situation—they were born in the Universities of Prague and Vienna in the days of the Habsburg domination, when T. G. Masaryk was a professor there.

19. The International Peace Campaign, 1936-1938. The *rapprochement* already referred to between the Governments of the smaller States is, of course, in many cases, of an opportunist character. It reflects, however, the wishes of the broad masses of the peoples, especially in Czechoslovakia.

The intense desire of all progressive sections of the public for united and resolute action in defence of peace was evidenced by the widespread response to the International Peace Campaign.

People of every class and creed were conscious of the fact that League action in defence of Abyssinia had been abandoned "because it was going to prove decisively effective". The launching of the International Peace Campaign, which indicated that large and influential bodies of the people in France and Britain were determined to make the League effective, therefore sent a wave of hope throughout Central Europe and the Balkans. The International Peace Campaign has given the Public something concrete upon which to concentrate its hopes and efforts, thus making it more difficult for reactionary and war-minded politicians to stampede their peoples into a policy of despair.

It is important that this strong undercurrent of international solidarity of the working and professional classes should be borne in mind, when one notes signs of disruption of the Little Entente. Oligarchic Governments may respond to bribes and threats in a manner which is contrary to the interests of their peoples, but they cannot then expect popular support for their policy and they may anticipate popular resistance to it. Thus Yugoslavia may flirt with Mussolini, and Roumania with Poland—as they have done—but Czechoslovakia is not gravely perturbed, for she still has reason to hope that in a crisis the peoples of Yugoslavia and Roumania would otherwise direct their rulers' policy.

20. German Expansionism, 1935–1938. The usurpation of power in Germany by the National Socialists on January 30th, 1933, heralded the advent of a new phase in Central European affairs. Hitler's plan of expansion towards the East was clearly enunciated in *Mein Kampf*, and was equally clearly in accordance with the interests of the big financiers and heavy industrialists who had helped him into office.

This plan is no new one, for it has been sedulously propagated by pan-German writers and politicians for the past eighty or ninety years. It entails the creation, by a process

of German expansion over Central and Eastern Europe, of a "Greater Germany", extending from the Baltic to the Black Sea and Mediterranean, and eastwards right up to (and perhaps even beyond) the frontiers of the Soviet Union.

The realisation of this pan-German dream is rightly regarded by German imperialists as an essential preliminary to challenging France and Britain for colonial empire overseas and to the establishment of Germany as a World-Power.¹ It was for this reason, among others, that France and Britain fought Germany in the last war, and it is not always sufficiently appreciated in Britain to-day how fortunate it was that Germany was already too far spent by 1917 to take full advantage of the temporary realisation of her dream by the Treaties of Brest-Litovsk and Bucharest. If Germany's resources and morale had not already been irrevocably undermined at that time, as a result of the naval blockade, she might well have rendered herself invincible, as she now aspires to do.

Earnest endeavours were made, notably by France and Czechoslovakia, during 1934 and 1935 to dissuade Germany from the pursuit of a policy which could but lead to war. Attempts were made to stabilise the European situation by the conclusion of an Eastern Pact, similar to the Rhine Pact of Locarno, but these were frustrated by the stubborn opposition of Hitler and his Polish jackal, Colonel Beck.

In the meanwhile, signs were not lacking that, at any rate so far as Germany was concerned, this opposition was already more than merely negative in character. In reaction, therefore, to the growing menace of Nazi aggression, France concluded with the Soviet Union on May 2nd, 1935, a Pact of Mutual Assistance against Unprovoked Aggression. On May 19th of the same year a similar Pact was concluded between Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union. These two Pacts cannot justly be considered, as they are described by the Nazis, as being hostile to Germany, because they would become effective only if one of the signatories was the victim of unprovoked aggression, and because Germany, far from being excluded from their benefits, was forthwith invited to join them—as she is free to do at the present time. Taken, however, in

¹ "Germany will be a World-Power, or nothing at all." (*Mein Kampf*).

conjunction with the Guarantee Treaty of 1924 between France and Czechoslovakia, they created a strong defensive system against German expansion in any direction.

Driven on by his insane conception of the nobility of the German race and its messianic mission, and by the inexorable pressure of economic distress caused by his huge outlay in war preparations in connection with that mission, Hitler gambled successfully on French and British pusillanimity. On March 7th, 1936, he re-occupied, and commenced immediately to fortify, the de-militarised Rhineland zone, thus rendering Germany less vulnerable to attack from the West whenever she should decide to embark on her "*Drang nach Osten*" (Drive to the East). At the same time his agents began to pursue a policy of intense economic, political and ideological penetration into all the countries of Central and Eastern Europe which he aspires to dominate. The German settlements which are scattered throughout these countries came to be regarded as "advance posts" of the future German army of occupation, and a new organization, under the special patronage of German heavy industry, was created at Stuttgart for the direction and co-ordination of the subversive activities of these and other "Germans living abroad".

So effective, indeed was this campaign of "peaceful penetration", conducted regardless of cost or of any normal standards of decent morality, that "Greater Germany" might already have come into being if it had not been for the existence of the Czechoslovak Republic. So long as Bohemia, long since recognised by Bismark as the strategic key to the mastery of Europe, is not under Nazi control, any German drive to the East would be fraught with danger for the invading army,¹ and the hold which Germany might establish upon the territories which she covets would be precarious. The continued existence of the Little Entente, and its possible development

¹ It was probably because the German General Staff was too insistent about this that Hitler found it necessary to dismiss several of his generals before attempting his *coup de force* in Austria. The advance of the German army into Austria was announced two hours before it actually took place, and during those two hours the Germans repeatedly asked the Czechoslovak Government anxiously whether it had ordered mobilisation. It would seem at least possible, therefore, that if Czechoslovakia had mobilised at that time, Hitler's bluff would have been called, and Austria would still be independent.

in accordance with the Hodža Plan, present further obstacles to the realisation of Hitler's aims; unless, of course, Czechoslovakia were "nazified". For ideological, no less than for military reasons, therefore, Hitler is determined that Czechoslovakia must change her character or be destroyed, and to that end he has done, and is doing, his utmost to isolate her from her allies and friends.

A description has already been given of the campaigns of virulent and mendacious propaganda which were conducted for this purpose by the Nazis in 1936 and 1937, and which continue unabated at the present time. The net result of this propaganda would seem, however, to have been to the benefit of Czechoslovakia, for it has provided her with opportunities, which she might otherwise not have enjoyed, of answering lies with calm statements of fact, that can easily be verified, and the result should serve to confirm her faith in the Hussite motto which she has adopted, "Pravda Vítězí" ("Truth Wins"). It has also helped Czechoslovakia, in that it has interested people throughout the world in her internal affairs, and has thus given publicity, which she would have been too modest herself to seek, to her splendid achievements in social reform. The foregoing comments apply, of course, only to those countries in which lies and truth enjoy equal freedom of publication and statement, and to a varying degree in different countries of that type. In most of the Central European countries, however, and above all in those which have a Fascist Government, the truth about Czechoslovakia has little or no circulation, and the most exaggerated lies about her are believed.

Concurrently with this campaign for the moral isolation of Czechoslovakia, the Nazis have endeavoured to effect her military isolation. There can be little doubt, as is pointed out by E. N. Dzelepy in his book *The Spanish Plot*, that German intervention in Spain is intended to isolate France, to keep her tied down within her frontiers, and thus to paralyse any possible action on her part in fulfilment of her obligations towards Czechoslovakia or the Soviet Union. The heroic resistance of the Spanish people has so far frustrated the intentions of the Nazis, despite the apparent willingness of

France to commit suicide as a first-class Power, and their defeat would very greatly reduce the security of Czechoslovakia.

The Spanish war has already, however, had effects in Central Europe which are advantageous to the Nazis, for it has obliged Italy to renounce her interests there. Mussolini has found himself bearing the brunt of the war which is to paralyse France for Hitler, and while he is thus so engaged that he cannot send troops elsewhere, his gallant ally has profited by the impotence of France and annexed Austria.

The annexation of Austria has undoubtedly made the Central European situation more dangerous, for it has placed Hitler in a position to exert still greater pressure than before on Czechoslovakia, as well as on Hungary and Poland, whom he doubtless hopes to use as his allies before swallowing them up. The balance of power still remains, however, in favour of the democratic States—Hitler's strength depends upon the weakness or determination of their policy.

CHAPTER XIII

THE PRESENT SITUATION

LET US ATTEMPT now to appreciate the situation with regard to Czechoslovakia, to consider in what different ways it may develop and to estimate the international effects of the various possible developments.

The existence of pan-Germanism and the *Drang nach Osten* is a fact which the Nazis themselves make no attempt to conceal. It is self-evident, moreover, that German expansion into Central and Eastern Europe would rob many peoples of their national independence, and is likely, therefore, to be met with strong popular disapproval. The extent, if any, to which this popular disapproval expresses itself in armed resistance to the invader is, however, uncertain; it will depend on many internal and external factors, not least among which is whether there exists among them a people which has the courage and the independence to give a lead to the remainder. It would be no exaggeration to say that—with the possible exception of the Hungarians, who show signs of a tardy realisation that a pro-German policy is likely to cost them their national independence—the Czechoslovaks (including, of course, the democratic elements of the racial minorities among them) alone are likely to give that lead. It is obvious, therefore, that Czechoslovakia is ideologically, as well as geographically, the keystone of the “barrier” against the *Drang nach Osten*. This is a rôle which situation and circumstance have thrust upon her, not one which she has sought or could avoid, so it is ridiculous for her opponents to interpret it as a sign of hostility towards Germany. It sheds an interesting light, therefore, on the “pacific” character of Hitler’s policy to read that Henlein, in his speech at a meeting of the Sudete German Party in Karlovy Vary (Karlsbad) on April 24th, 1938, said that “if the Czech statesmen really desire a better understanding with the Germans, they must correct the unfortunate opinion that it is the particular task of the Czech people to form a bulwark

against the so-called German *Drang nach Osten*”—in other words, “The Czechs may have peace if they surrender their national independence!”

The *Drang nach Osten* commenced, rather precipitately, on March 10th, 1938, with the advance of German troops into Austria. It was preceded by a speech by Hitler on February 10th, in which he declared that among the interests of the Reich was “the protection of the 10 million Germans who live in two States on the German frontier”, and it took the form of “intervention”, at the request of a pro-Nazi Austrian Minister, “to suppress disorder”. If Hitler had thought that intervention would mean war with Austria, and that the war so started would develop into a general war, he would not have dared to intervene. Assured beforehand, however, that Britain, and therefore France, would not move in the matter, and that Schuschnigg had been notified to that effect, he gambled on a virtual certainty, and won. Even then, as was mentioned in the last chapter, he was nervous about Czechoslovakia, and it seems probable, therefore, that he will not dare to advance much further unless, and until, he has made sure that Czechoslovakia will remain inactive.

There are two ways in which Czechoslovakia could be rendered inactive. One is by invasion and conquest, and the other is by conquest from within; both present considerable difficulty to the Nazis.

Czechoslovakia, though surrounded now on almost every side by enemies or potential enemies, is not yet politically isolated. Her Pacts with France and the Soviet Union guarantee that she will receive assistance in the event of unprovoked aggression against her. The efficacy of these Pacts depends in the first place upon France, since the Soviet Union is not bound to take action until France has mobilised and is carrying out her obligations. Under normal conditions there could, of course, be no doubt about France's action if Czechoslovakia were attacked by Germany—if only because her vital interests are there at stake. French statesmen have, moreover, on several occasions during the past year reaffirmed their determination to honour France's obligations towards Czechoslovakia, but it seems not improbable that, by their suicidal policy with regard to Spain,

they may have rendered their country incapable of doing this—*except with the approval and support of the British Government*. French action would depend very largely on the character of the French Government at the time, and on whether France had a Foreign Minister who would have the courage to take Britain at her word with regard to her “frontier on the Rhine”. The action of the Soviet Government, in the event of French hesitation, would probably be determined by the character of the Czechoslovak Government—the Red Army would doubtless be willing to shed its blood to save democracy from Fascist conquest, but not to save a reactionary Czechoslovakia from its deserts.

Czechoslovakia is also linked by treaty with Roumania and Jugoslavia (the Little Entente), but these States are bound to come to her assistance only if she is attacked by Hungary, and the Yugoslav Government is very much under the influence of the Nazis. In both these countries, on the other hand, public opinion is strongly anti-German and pro-Czechoslovak. It might prove difficult, therefore, under existing conditions, for the Governments of these countries to resist popular pressure in favour of going to the assistance of Czechoslovakia in the event of ^{Nazi aggression}. The attitude adopted by Britain ^{in the possible} might, in this case also, prove decisive.

From a military point of view, Czechoslovakia would prove a hard nut to crack. She has a well-trained and well-equipped army and air force; she has a great armament industry of her own, which is largely independent of foreign supplies of raw materials; and she has fortified extensively her frontiers. The Nazi annexation of Austria may appear to have weakened her military position, since it has increased her German frontier from 957 to 1,292 miles, but in actual fact this is not of great significance, because the Czechoslovak General Staff had always counted on the possibility of a German attack being delivered via Austria and had taken the necessary precautions. Patriotic feeling is very strong throughout the Czechoslovak population and there is no difficulty in obtaining recruits—it is notable that, although the Slovak Nationalist Party will not consent to co-operate in the Government, the

Slovak people are flocking to the colours. The Republic could obviously not hope to withstand indefinitely an attack by Germany, but it could certainly resist effectively alone for long enough to make it probable that the war would not be localised. Its resistance would oblige Germany to mobilise to an extent which could not leave France unmoved, and would inspire the democratic forces in Roumania and Jugoslavia to revolt, if necessary, against their rulers in order to oppose Nazi expansion.

It would seem probable, therefore, that the assurances given by Goering and von Neurath to the Czechoslovak Minister in Berlin at the time of the Austrian annexation, that Germany had no aggressive designs against the Czechoslovak Republic, are, *for the time being*, true. They will remain true, however, only for so long as the alliances of Czechoslovakia remain even partially valid, and for so long as the morale of the Czechoslovak people remains unbroken—in other words, for so long as Hitler fears the consequences of aggression. It is notable that Hitler made no reference to these assurances when he addressed the Reichstag after his Austrian *coup*, though even if he had, his reiteration would have no more value than the engagement which he voluntarily undertook with regard to the independence of Austria barely twenty days before he destroyed it. Yet Mr. Neville Chamberlain attempted in the House of Commons on March 14th, 1938, to represent them as binding engagements!

The Nazis are, therefore, concentrating their efforts on trying to undermine Czechoslovak democracy and the morale of the Czechoslovak people using for this purpose the Sudete German Party, whose membership has expanded and whose activities have become more violent and more pointed even than before. Henlein is trying by every kind of propaganda, by open and secret terrorisation, by boycotting and by blackmail, to force the entire German-speaking population to line up behind him, in order to exert more effective pressure on the Czechoslovak Government. At the same time he is doing his utmost to destroy all democratic institutions, such as Trade Unions and Co-operatives, over which he cannot establish his control. Workers are threatened with dismissal

or with the direst punishment "when the Führer comes" if they do not leave the Social-Democrat or Catholic Trade Unions and join those of the Sudete German Party. Co-operative stores are picketed by agents of Henlein who try to terrorise customers by taking cinema photos of all who go in "so that they may be marked down for punishment at a later date". Prominent democrats, such as Senator Kostka, Mayor of the town of Liberec (Reichenberg), are threatened with violence if they do not resign. Anti-Semitism is already prevalent, and is likely to become more violent after the Municipal Elections held in May and June.

By these and other means the German-speaking population has been reduced to a state of hysteria which must be seen to be appreciated. People exchange Nazi salutes in the streets, swastikas and Nazi slogans are painted on the walls and pavements, and everyone looks forward to the thrill of seeing German troops march in—everyone, that is, excepting the Socialists and the Communists, and the industrialists, who were all for Henlein, but who now have visions of their factories being "rationalised" out of existence by Goering!

The Czechoslovak Government has remained amazingly calm despite all provocation¹—almost too calm, indeed, for it has done little, if anything, to protect its remaining supporters (usually of the Left) from the violence of the excited Henleinists, and by allowing its authority to be undermined it may have encouraged Henlein to be more exigent in his demands and less ready to compromise.

Dr. Hodža, the Prime Minister, replying to Hitler's speech of February 20th, which hinted at possible Nazi intervention on behalf of the Sudete Germans, made a magnificent speech before the two Chambers of Parliament on March 4th in which he stated that the Germans of Czechoslovakia were in a position to secure by their own efforts their general human, political and ideological rights and that he would tolerate no interference from outside in what was a domestic affair of the Republic. This speech made it quite clear to the Nazis

¹ "Since the union of Austria and Germany no Government could have been more generous, more patient, more sympathetic towards a troublesome minority than the Czech Government to the Sudete Germans." *Manchester Guardian*, Editorial, April 25th, 1938.

that intervention would mean war¹ and Hitler is understood to have warned Henlein subsequently to be prepared to put up with less than he wanted—for the time being—because he could not count on any support from Germany which might lead to a European war.

Since then, he and his colleagues have been busily engaged in drawing up a *Minority Statute*, which will embody all the numerous existing Minority Regulations, clearing up any ambiguities and correcting any anomalies. It is probable that, although the existing Minority Regulations grant to the Minorities considerably more than is stipulated by treaty, the new Statute will embody still further concessions—as a gesture of good-will.

Pending the publication of the Minority Statute and despite the hostile attitude adopted by Henlein because he was not allowed to have a special General Election “in order to show the people in Czechoslovakia and abroad how matters really stand”, approval has been given for the holding of Municipal Elections in 11,000 municipalities² out of a total of 15,000 in three instalments, on May 22nd, May 29th and June 12th, the elections in some of the smaller Czech municipalities being deferred to the Autumn. At Easter, moreover, the President granted an amnesty to nearly 3,000 political prisoners, of whom 1,200 were Germans. These concessions were coldly received, however, and it is probably fortunate, although it prevented the holding of any public meeting in connection with the National Congress of the International Peace Campaign early in April, that the Government’s ban

¹ “We should do an ill service to the future development of affairs in Central Europe, and the worst service of all to relations between Czechoslovakia and Germany, if we failed to declare most clearly that Czechoslovakia and her people will never under any circumstances allow of any interference in her internal affairs. . . . The Czechoslovak Government therefore leaves no one in any doubt that the people of this country will defend all the attributes of its independence as a State, with all the forces at their command, should those attributes be infringed upon. . . . We seek peace. The present situation of Europe, however, compels us to say that should Fate some day make it necessary for us to defend ourselves, Czechoslovakia, in reliance upon her whole technical and moral forces will defend herself—defend herself to the very last. . . . A thousand years we have not been afraid, nor have we any fear to-day, certain as we are of the unity of heart and mind of all sections of our people and of collaboration with that Europe which, like ourselves, has no wish for conquest or aggression, but desires tranquillity and peace.”

² Including Prague and all the larger towns in the Sudeten German Districts.

on public meetings has given an opportunity for feelings to cool down. This ban was relaxed for the May Day Demonstrations, but only as the result of great pressure from the workers, and again shortly before the first instalment of the recent Municipal Elections.

The attitude adopted by Henlein and his Deputies has become more and more overbearing and unhelpful. In order to placate public opinion abroad, they have ceased, *for the time being at any rate*, to ask for union with the Reich, but it was soon apparent that this access of "moderation" is not unconditional and that their policy is directed entirely from Berlin. As early as March 17th the Henleinist Senator, Enhuber, was demanding in a menacing manner that Czechoslovakia should change her domestic policy in accordance with the Swiss example and adapt her foreign policy to that of Switzerland and Belgium "before it is too late". It was hoped by some that, as the effects of the annexation of Austria wore off, the Sudete German Party would become more reasonable, but Henlein's speech at his Party Congress in Karlovy Vary (Karlsbad) on April 24th made it quite clear that what he—or rather what Hitler—wanted was the surrender of Czechoslovakia.¹

Henlein began by rejecting in advance the Minority Statute, *which he had not seen*, on the ground that it "meant the perpetuation of injustice and violence". He then demanded a complete revision of Czechoslovakia's foreign policy "which up to to-day has ranked Czechoslovakia among the enemies of the German people". Next he openly declared his Party to be a National Socialist Party—a fact which he had categorically denied on many occasions, notably when speaking at Chatham House in London—and presented a series of eight demands:—

1. Full equality of status between Czechs and Germans.
2. Guarantee of equality by recognition of the Sudete Germans as a legal personality.

¹ Even *The Times*, in an editorial article in which it slurred over and toned down Henlein's extravagant demands, felt compelled to say: "It is to be hoped that his claims are to be regarded as part of an electioneering speech and as representing his maximum rather than his minimum expectations: for one or two of them promise at first sight to be sure of rejection by the Czech Government."

3. Determination and legal recognition of the German regions within the State.
4. Full self-government for those German regions.
5. Legal protection for every citizen living outside the region of his own nationality.
6. Removal of injustices inflicted upon us since 1918. Reparation of the damages caused thereby.
7. Recognition and realisation of the principle "German region and German officials".
8. Full liberty to profess German nationality and the German political philosophy.

His speech also contained a demand for the introduction of anti-Semitism on German lines, though all reference to this was deleted by his Censor before the Press communiqué was issued, and a curious demand for a wholesale revision of the erroneous Czech myth of their own history.

It is obvious that, apart from the first of these demands, *which requires no granting since it is already a fact*, no Czechoslovak Government could accept this programme.¹ What Henlein has demanded is that the Czechoslovak Republic should loosen its internal structure at a moment when unity is of vital importance, and should abandon its allies, in exchange for German friendship—in other words to become a vassal-State of Germany. As regards demand No. 8, *The Times* pointed out that "the logical consequence of the adoption of the Nazi *Weltanschauung* would be an agitation for the union of the German-speaking parts with Germany and for the disruption of Czechoslovakia". It is not surprising, therefore, that the Czechoslovak Government should have rejected these demands severally and *in toto*, and merely suggested that the Sudete German Party should wait until they had seen the *Nationality Statute*.²

The matter may not yet be closed, however, for the German Government is now proposing that further negotiations,

¹ The *Manchester Guardian's* Editorial comment on March 25th on this programme is very apt: "It is as if Mr. De Valera, before consenting to sign a Pact with this country, had insisted that all Irishmen living in Britain shall be governed by local committees of Irish."

² The Minority Statute has been thus re-named because the Germans do not like being called a minority.

in which a representative of the Reich will participate, should now take place between President Beneš and Henlein and insisting that these shall be completed to its satisfaction by the Autumn.

Concurrently with this speech by Henlein the Nazis staged a mass meeting in Budapest of 40,000 members of the Hungarian Revision League which had not been allowed to meet for five years. This meeting passed a Resolution demanding the destruction of Czechoslovakia. On April 26th, however, M. de Kanya, the Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs, apologised to the Czechoslovak Minister in Budapest for this unfortunate incident and said that his Government did not agree with the Resolution which had been passed.

Among the non-German elements of the population a campaign of propaganda against democracy and against the League of Nations is being carried with more discretion but very assiduously. The Bolshevik bogey is used extensively to scare the bourgeois Czechoslovaks, while the more timid humanitarians are encouraged to urge the adoption of a policy of concession. Meanwhile some of the more reactionary Right Wing members of the Agrarian Party hope to profit by the situation and are already considering the formation of a Parliament from which Communists would be excluded, and in which Social-Democrats might be admitted "on condition they do not propose Socialist measures". The same reactionaries are considering ways and means whereby the influence of President Beneš on foreign policy may be excluded, imagining, strangely enough, that by this means they will improve relations between Czechoslovakia and Poland, but not asking themselves apparently on what conditions Poland would insist. Reactionaries and defeatists alike propagate the idea that it is necessary to make sacrifices—of principle if necessary—in order to win the approval of the British Government, but seem to be oblivious of the fact that by so doing they would risk losing the support of their real friends abroad.

The union of Austria and Germany will have important and unwelcome economic effects on Czechoslovakia. Goods

which Czechoslovakia has hitherto exported to Germany will in many cases now be replaced by Austrian goods, while to an even greater extent German exports to Austria will replace those which normally originate from Czechoslovakia. The exports of Czechoslovakia to these two countries represent about 30 per cent of her total export trade, and it is not unlikely that her loss will amount to one half of that amount. The articles mainly affected will be sugar, paper, glass, china, coal and machinery.

The consequent economic distress in Czechoslovakia can, moreover, be increased at will by the Nazis, for the annexation of Austria has placed in Hitler's hands an additional weapon, which he will doubtless use when he deems it convenient. All the lines of communication between Czechoslovakia and the outer world, whether by water or by rail, are already almost, and seem likely soon to be completely, under Nazi control.¹ Dependent as Czechoslovakia is on these communications for the supply of many raw materials for her industries and for the export of her coal and manufactured goods, her economic welfare, and consequently her internal political peace, have thus become dependent on Nazi policy. Hitler is now in a position to bring about an increase of unemployment and a reduction in the standard of living in Czechoslovakia and thus seriously to embarrass the Government and perhaps, in time, even force it to capitulate. Such abuse by the Nazis of their controlling position could be prevented only by a threat from Britain and France that it would be regarded with disfavour, and would be followed by retaliatory measures of a similar type directed by them against Germany.

If Hitler can succeed by economic pressure, by internal political agitation, and by the threat of war, in establishing control over Czechoslovak policy, there would, of course, be no reason for him to incur the risks attendant on open aggression against Czechoslovakia. There would no longer remain any obstacle between him and the realisation of the pan-

¹ The extension of Nazi control, direct or indirect, over Hungary would appear likely to be carried out any day. It is significant that one of the first decisions made by the Nazis after the annexation of Austria was to create an armed flotilla on the Danube.

German dream of a "Greater Germany". Let us consider, therefore, what that would mean.

The Nazis would gain control over an area within which they could obtain, at such prices as they choose to impose, almost all the raw materials required for the operations of German industry whether in peace or in war, together with an enormous reserve of cheap labour (and cheaper "cannon-fodder"). They would be able to close to the industrial exporters of Britain and other countries the market represented by some 200 million people, and thus to enable German industry, assured of the virtual monopoly of that great market, to be still further rationalised. German industry would thus be able to compete with deadly effect (as it cannot under existing conditions) in the export markets overseas. Germany would become almost entirely invulnerable to the effects of naval blockade, and at the same time her naval and aerial forces would be brought down into the Mediterranean, thus still further weakening the strategic situation of the British Empire on which Hitler has set his heart. . . . And yet Mr. Neville Chamberlain informed the House of Commons on March 24th, 1938, that His Majesty's Government considered this "an area where their vital interests are not concerned in the same degree as they are in the case of France and Belgium"!

The policy of the British "National" Government with regard to Czechoslovakia is ostensibly one of "benevolent neutrality". The stock reply given in the House of Commons when questions are asked seems to be one which was coined on February 17th, 1938, by Mr. Eden, and which has since been repeated verbatim by Sir John Simon and Mr. Neville Chamberlain, to the effect that: "This country has always had the friendliest feelings towards the Czechoslovak nation, and is fully aware of the Treaties which bind Czechoslovakia to other Powers". It is presumably hoped that this reference to the Pacts between France, Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union, which in fact merely facilitate and speed up the bringing into operation of article 16 of the League Covenant, will distract attention from the fact that Czechoslovakia is bound to Britain also—and Britain to her—by the Covenant of the League. The most strenuous efforts on several occasions

by the Opposition have failed, however, to elicit from the Government any admission of obligation towards Czechoslovakia on the part of Britain.

In view of the grave issues which are at stake, i.e., the commercial welfare of Britain and the strategic security of the British Empire, this unwillingness of the "National" Government to take preventive measures is not a little disquieting. "If it were true," said the Marquess of Crewe in a debate in the House of Lords on February 16th, 1938, "that there was no objection whatever to the union of the eighty millions of Germans, why was there an objection to the precisely similar schemes of Germany in 1914? Surely if it were then undesirable from our point of view that Germany should obtain complete control over Central Europe, and presumably in a considerable degree over Belgium and Holland, it would appear to be not less undesirable now."

Ignorance can scarcely be pleaded in explanation, for Hitler has been kind enough to tell us candidly in *Mein Kampf* precisely why he wishes to extend his dominion in Europe. Nor can our Government's policy be ascribed to impotence, for there can be no doubt whatever that, under existing circumstances, Germany, however great may be the armaments which she creates, would not be able to sustain any prolonged, or large-scale war. It may be, of course, that our sporting Tories consider it unfair to leave their friend Hitler in such an ignominious position, and wish to "even the odds" before the war starts—the suggestion is not so ridiculous as it might seem, when one considers the international character of the armaments industry, too glad to serve both sides, and of high finance, which is prepared to make loans impartially.

It is not as though no alternative presented itself, for there is the Hodža plan which, if realised, would provide a solution for several difficulties. It would create a *bloc* of Federated States which collectively would be the equivalent of another Great Power—a most useful Great Power, moreover, for its very nature would debar it from becoming aggressive or having imperialist ambitions, but would at the same time render it a formidable barrier against imperialist expansion on the part of any neighbouring Great Power. It would, moreover,

re-habilitate economic conditions in all the States concerned, increasing the purchasing power of their peoples, and would thus create a flourishing market for the export industries of Germany, Italy, France and Great Britain. The creation of such conditions, and the elimination of the fear of war between the States-Members of this Federation, would establish conditions favourable for its permeation with the liberal democratic principles which prove so successful, on the whole, despite unfavourable international conditions, in the Czechoslovak Republic. That would mean the end, of course, of the undemocratic régimes which exist in some of the States concerned, and which are now tolerated only because of the constant fear of war—for in the area under consideration there has persisted, ever since 1918, a state of armistice, rather than of peace. It would mean the end, also, of that ruthless exploitation to which reference was made in the preceding chapter. Czechoslovak capital, provided by her Co-operative Institutions on terms which would be far less onerous than those which obtain to-day, might be made available for buying out foreign interests, and indeed the development of the Federation on co-operative socialist lines might be effected.

This alternative, however, is one which would obviously not seem attractive to the financial bodies which reap such a rich harvest in Central and Eastern Europe at the present time, and which are already somewhat disturbed at the resurgence of democracy in their "colonies". For such bodies, which are certainly not without influence on British foreign policy, Hitler must fill the rôle of "gendarme of Europe"—capable and ruthless in his fight against Democracy (which he often confuses with Communism, when it suits his purpose to do so). By supporting Hitler against Czechoslovakia, they would "kill two birds with one stone", for they would remove the source of inspiration of all the democratic movements east of the Rhine, and would open up for themselves new fields for capital investment and exploitation which the Czechoslovak Republic has hitherto wisely reserved for its own nationals. The profits to be made by financing Nazi aggression and subsequent exploitation would be far higher than those which might

be earned by British industry—except, of course, by the armaments industry, which would indirectly benefit from the sustained and increasing expenditure on British armaments made necessary by the growing menace of “Greater Germany”.

From a domestic point of view—and internal conditions often throw a revealing light on a country’s foreign policy—the increased intensity of economic competition from “Greater Germany” would provide plausible pretexts for lowering the standard of living of the British people—by imposing either longer hours and/or lower wages, or protective tariffs, which would raise prices and therefore have a similar effect. What is even more important, however, from the reactionaries’ point of view—and more grave, from that of a democrat—is that the growing menace of German aggression against the British Empire would create among the Public psychological conditions which would be most unfavourable for the propagation of progressive and socialist ideas, but which would favour the introduction—under cover, perhaps, of the Defence of the Realm Act—of measures which would restrict, and perhaps completely destroy, all democratic liberties and institutions.¹

It should be evident, therefore, that the maintenance of an independent and democratic Czechoslovakia—one which was nazified and subjected to control from Berlin would be worse than useless—is essential for the preservation, not only of peace, but of democracy in the Western world. This could be done most effectively by Britain associating herself unreservedly with the defensive system represented by France, Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union. Such action would indicate to the Nazis that their “*Drang nach Osten*” would not be practicable, and would dispose the German people to “change their gods” and to consider the adoption of a policy of friendly co-operation. It would foster in consequence the creation of a Mid-European Federation, and by so doing would serve to eliminate an ever-present risk of war.

It is evident, however, that so long as the “National” Government remains in power no such common-sense action

¹ “Never has planning for strategical purposes been brought to so complete a scale as it is at present.” Mr. Neville Chamberlain, House of Commons, March 18th, 1938.

will be taken, for, as Sir Archibald Sinclair said in the House of Commons on March 14th, 1938, "*either the Prime Minister is being fooled, or he is trying to fool the British people*". Until, therefore, the Government can be changed, it is important that the democratic forces in Czechoslovakia should receive from abroad the maximum amount of moral support and encouragement. Czechoslovak reactionaries have at present been silenced because of the wave of popular determination to defend the gains of democracy, but they are still ready to come out again with their defeatist proposals, and if it is only the official voice of British reaction which is heard in Czechoslovakia, the Czechoslovak public may incline to listen to those who would betray them. As in the days of the Hussite Wars, so there are to-day the "Praguers"¹ and the "Táborites",¹ and it is the "Táborites" of to-day who need the sympathy and encouragement of world democracy, as they stand in the front rank in the fight against the Fascist International, subjected from all sides to a moral pressure of which it is difficult, perhaps, for the foreigner to conceive.

¹ See page 28.

APPENDIX

SOCIAL INSURANCE

ACCIDENT ASSURANCE

BENEFIT	CONDITIONS AND PERIOD OF PAYMENT	AMOUNT
Accident	Payable to the Assured if he (she) is unable to work	Two-thirds of the earnings of the previous year ¹ in the case of total disablement, and proportionately less in the event of only partial disablement
Widows'	Payable to the Widow of the Assured in the event of his Accidental Death	20% of his previous annual earnings ²
Orphans'	Payable to the Orphan (or Orphans) of the Assured, in the event of his Accidental Death, until they reach the age of 15	15% of his previous annual earnings if one parent only is dead; 20% if both parents are dead ³

Any person may be commuted, *subject to the consent of the community to which the Assured belongs*, for the purchase of a plot of land, a shop, or a dwelling house.

¹ Up to a maximum earning of 12,000 Kč., except in the case of railway accidents, where no limit is imposed.

² The Pensions of the Widow and Orphans must not total more than two-thirds of what the Assured earned during his last year of work; if this limit is not reached, the parents of the Assured also have a right to a Pension amounting to 20% of his last year's earnings. The same applies also to any orphan grandchildren of the Assured until they are 15 years old, if they were mainly dependent on him. A widow is entitled, on re-marriage, to a lump sum corresponding to her pension for 3 years. Funeral expenses vary in different localities, but are limited to 900 Kč.

DISABILITY, OLD AGE, WIDOWS' AND ORPHANS' PENSIONS

Compulsory for all persons over 16 years of age in regular employment.

(Payable only after Assured has completed 100 Weekly Payments)

In Czechoslovak Crowns

PENSION	CONDITIONS AND PERIOD OF PAYMENT	ANNUAL BASIC PAY-MENT	WEEKLY SUPPLE-MENT	ANNUAL STATE CONTRI-BUTION	EDUCATION ¹ ALLOWANCE (PER CHILD)
Disability	Payable if the Assured is prevented, by physical or mental disability for which he is not responsible, from engaging in work corresponding with his strength, ability, training and profession and which would bring in at least a third of what a similar wage-earner in the same district would receive	550 ²	0.60 – 1.75 (according to the category of employment)	500	One-tenth of the Basic Payment and the Weekly Supplement
Old Age	Payable, regardless of health, on the attainment of the age of 65, provided that the Assured is not engaged in work which comes under the Social Insurance Regulations and that he does not earn half of what a wage-earner of the same category who had received the same training and who was in good health would receive in the same district	550 ²	„	500	„
Widows' ³	Payable (a) to the Widow of a man who was entitled to, or who was receiving a Disability or Old Age Pension, if she is disabled or if she is aged 60 at the time of his death, or when she subsequently so qualifies, or if she is responsible for 2 or more of his children who are themselves drawing the Orphans' Pension; (b) to the Widow of a man upon whose earnings the family was dependent, if she is disabled at the time of his death and throughout the period of her disablement	225 ²	225 per annum	250	—

¹ Payable until the 17th birthday.

² Plus 50%, if the Assured is helpless without the care of some third person.

³ Payable also to a widower who has been dependent on his wife for maintenance.

SOCIAL INSURANCE

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DISABILITY, OLD AGE, WIDOWS' AND ORPHANS' PENSIONS—continued.

PENSION	CONDITIONS AND PERIOD OF PAYMENT	BASIC PAY-MENT	SUPPLE-MENT	ANNUAL STATE CONTRI-BUTION	ANNUAL ALLOWANCE (PER CHILD)	EDUCATION ¹
Orphans'	Payable to the children, grand-children and/or adopted children of a man who was entitled to, or who was receiving a Disability or Old Age Pension, until they reach the age of 17 (for grand-children and/or adopted children this applies only if the Assured was mainly responsible for their maintenance and if there is any surplus left over after providing for the Assured's widow and real children)	110 ² (children who lose one parent)	0.12 – 0.35	100	—	
		220 ² (children who lose both parents)	0.24 – 0.70	200	—	

PENSIONS OF EMPLOYEES IN PRIVATE ENTERPRISES

(Payable only after Assured has completed 60 Monthly Payments)

In Czechoslovak Crowns

PENSION	CONDITIONS AND PERIOD OF PAYMENT	BASIC PAY-MENT	MONTHLY SUPPLE-MENT	EDUCA-TION ³ ALLOW-ANCE (PER CHILD)	MINIMUM ANNUAL PENSION
Disability	Payable if the Assured is permanently prevented by physical or mental disability from engaging in his normal profession or in some other suitable profession	3,600 ⁴	2-50 (accord- ing to the category of the profes- sion)	One- eighth of the Basic Payment and the Monthly Supple- ment	—
Old Age	Payable, regardless of health, to the Assured man or woman on the attainment of the age of 60 (55) or who has completed 480 monthly payments, or to the Assured man or woman of 56 (54) when he or she has completed at least 120 monthly payments if he or she has for more than 12 months had no employment which comes under the Social Insurance Regulations	3,600 ⁴	„	„	—

¹ Payable until the 17th birthday.

² A lump sum of 550-750 Kč. is given to the dependants of an Assured person who dies before having made 100 weekly payments.

³ Payable until the 18th birthday.

⁴ Plus 50%, if the Assured is helpless without the care of some third person.

**PENSIONS OF EMPLOYEES IN PRIVATE
ENTERPRISES—continued.**

PENSION	CONDITIONS AND PERIOD OF PAYMENT	ANNUAL BASIC PAY- MENT	MONTHLY SUPPLE- MENT	EDUCA- TION ¹ ALLOW- ANCE, (PER CHILD)	MINIMUM ANNUAL PENSION
Widows'	Payable (a) to the Widow of an Assured man and (b) according to his disability, to the Widower of an Assured woman, if the latter was largely responsible for his maintenance, if the former is unable to earn a living and is in need of assistance	1,800 ^{2, 3}	1-25	—	3,000
Orphans'	Payable to the children and grand-children (to the latter only if the Assured was mainly responsible for their maintenance) until they attain the age of 18	900 ^{2, 3} (child- ren who lose one parent) 1,800 ^{2, 3} (children who lose both parents)	0.50 – 12.50 1-25	— —	1,500 3,000
Parents'	If there is nobody else responsible for them and if the Assured was mainly responsible for their maintenance	900 ^{2, 3} (for one parent) 450 ^{2, 3} (for each of two parents)	0.50 – 12.50 1-25	—	1,500 750

¹ Payable until the 17th. birthday.

² A grant, corresponding to one-fifth of the disability pension to which the Assured was entitled at time of decease, is made for funeral expenses.

³ When the Assured dies before completing 60 monthly payments, the dependants receive a lump sum corresponding to 150% of the disability pension to which the Assured was entitled at the time of decease (this is reduced to 75%, if the sum is payable to parents).

APPENDIX 2

MINORITIES TREATY

THE MAIN PROVISIONS of the Minorities Treaty are as follows:—

CHAPTER I

Article 2. Czechoslovakia undertakes to assure full and complete protection of life and liberty to all inhabitants of Czechoslovakia without distinction of birth, nationality, language, race or religion.

All inhabitants of Czechoslovakia shall be entitled to the free exercise, whether public or private, of any creed, religion or belief, whose practices are not inconsistent with public order and public morals.

Article 7. All Czechoslovak nationals shall be equal before the law and shall enjoy the same civil and political rights, without distinction as to race, language or religion.

Differences of religion, creed or confession shall not prejudice any Czechoslovak national in matters relating to the enjoyment of civil or political rights, as for instance admission to public employments, functions and honours, or the exercise of professions and industries.

No restrictions shall be imposed on the free use by any Czechoslovak national of any language in private intercourse, in commerce, in religion, in the Press or publications of any kind, or at public meetings.

Notwithstanding any establishment by the Czechoslovak Government of any official language, *adequate facilities shall be given to Czechoslovak nationals of non-Czech speech for the use of their language, either orally or in writing, before the courts.*

Article 8. Czechoslovak nationals who belong to racial, religious or linguistic minorities shall enjoy the same treatment

and security in law and in fact as the other Czechoslovak nationals. *In particular they shall have an equal right to establish, manage and control at their own expense charitable, religious and social institutions, schools and other educational establishments, with the right to use their own language and to exercise their religion freely therein.*

Article 9. Czechoslovakia will provide in the public educational system in towns and districts in which a considerable proportion of Czechoslovak nationals of other than Czech speech are residents adequate facilities for ensuring that the instruction shall be given to the children of such Czechoslovak nationals through the medium of their own language. This provision shall not prevent the Czechoslovak Government from making the teaching of the Czech language obligatory.

In towns and districts where there is a considerable proportion of Czechoslovak nationals belonging to racial, religious or linguistic minorities, these minorities shall be assured an equitable share in the enjoyment and application of the sums which may be provided out of public funds under the State, municipal or other budget, for educational, religious, or charitable purposes.

CHAPTER II

Article 10. Czechoslovakia undertakes to constitute the Ruthene territory south of the Carpathians within frontiers delimited by the Principal Allied and Associated Powers *as an autonomous unit within the Czechoslovak State, and to accord it the fullest degree of self-government compatible with the unity of the Czechoslovak State.*

Article 11. The Ruthene territory south of the Carpathians shall possess a special Diet. This Diet shall have powers of legislation in all linguistic, scholastic and religious questions, in matters of local administration, and in other questions which the laws of the Czechoslovak State may assign to it. *The Governor of the Ruthene territory shall be appointed by the President of the Czechoslovak Republic and shall be responsible to the Ruthene Diet.*

Article 12. Czechoslovakia agrees that officials in the Ruthene territory will be chosen *as far as possible* from the inhabitants of this territory.

Article 13. Czechoslovakia guarantees to the Ruthene territory equitable representation in the legislative assembly of the Czechoslovak Republic, to which Assembly it will send deputies elected according to the Constitution of the Czechoslovak Republic. These deputies will not, however, have the right of voting in the Czechoslovak Diet upon legislative questions of the same kind as those assigned to the Ruthene Diet.

NOTES

(1) These provisions have been regarded and treated by the Czechoslovak Government as a *minimum* of the rights which should be accorded to the Minorities. They have been amplified and incorporated in the Czechoslovak Constitution and other constitutional laws in the highest category of laws, *which may be altered only by a constitutional measure passed by a three-fifths majority in both Houses of Parliament*. Any ordinary Act of Parliament in conflict with them is invalid.

(2) Sections 1 and 2 of Article 7 of the Treaty were incorporated word for word in Clause 128 of the Constitution with the modifications indicated in italics as shown below:—

CLAUSE 128

- (i) All citizens of the Czechoslovak Republic are in all respects equal before the law and enjoy equal civic and political rights whatever be their race, language or religion.
- (ii) Difference in religion, belief, confession or language is not, *within the scope of the general statutes*, an obstacle to any citizen of the Czechoslovak Republic, particularly in regard of entry into the public services and offices, attainment to any dignity, or of the exercise of any trade or calling.

- (iii) Citizens of the Czechoslovak Republic may, within the limits of the general statutes, freely use any language they chose in private and business intercourse, in all matters pertaining to religion, in the Press and in all publications whatsoever, or in public assemblies.
- (iv) *This, however, does not affect the rights conferred on the State organs in these matters by laws already in force or to be passed in the future with a view to public order, the security of the State, or effective control.*

(3) Articles 8 and 9 were embodied in Clauses 130–132 of the Constitution as follows:—

CLAUSE 130

In so far as citizens of the Czechoslovak Republic are entitled by the general statutes to establish, manage and direct at their own cost philanthropic, religious or social institutions, schools and other educational institutions, the citizens of the State are all equal, no matter what be their nationality, language, religion or race, and may in such institutions freely make use of their own tongue, and worship according to their own religion.

CLAUSE 131

In towns and districts in which there lives a considerable fraction of Czechoslovak citizens speaking a language other than Czechoslovak, the children of such Czechoslovak citizens shall, in public instruction and within the scope of the general regulations relating thereto, be guaranteed a due opportunity of receiving instruction in their own tongue. The Czechoslovak language may at the same time be prescribed as a compulsory subject of instruction.

CLAUSE 132

In towns and districts where there is living a considerable fraction of Czechoslovak subjects belonging to some minority whether in respect of religion, or nationality or language, and where specific sums of money from public funds as set out in the State Budget or in the budget of the local or other public authorities are to be devoted to education, religion or philanthropy, a due share in the use and enjoyment of such sums shall be secured to such minorities within the limits of the general regulations for public administration.

APPENDIX 3

PROTOCOL PRESENTED BY DR. BENEŠ ON BEHALF OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA TO THE COMMISSION FOR THE NEW STATES AT THE PEACE CONFERENCE

Memorandum No. III

Paris, 20th May, 1919.

1. The Czechoslovak Government intends to organise its State by taking as the bases of the rights of the nationalities the principles applied in the constitution of the Swiss Republic, that is to say, the Government designs to make of the Czechoslovak Republic *a sort of Switzerland*, while paying regard, of course, to the special conditions in Bohemia.

2. Universal franchise coupled with the system of proportional representation will be introduced—which will ensure to the various nationalities in the Republic a proportional representation in all elected organs (institutions).

3. The schools throughout the whole territory of the State will in general be maintained out of public funds, and they will be established for the individual nationalities in the parishes as soon as the necessity arises, on the basis of the number of children in the parish as fixed by law, to inaugurate a school.

4. All public professions (functions) will be accessible to the individual nationalities living in the Republic.

5. The courts of justice will be mixed courts in respect of the language employed, and the Germans will be able to bring their causes before the highest courts in their own language.

6. The local administration (local affairs of the parishes and districts) will be carried on in the language of the majority of the population.

7. The question of a person's religion will not be posed in the Czechoslovak Republic—there will be no difficulties in this connection.

8. The official language will be the Czech language, and the State for external purposes will be a Czechoslovak State. In practice, however, the German language will be the second language of the country, and will be employed on a basis of equality in the current administration, before the courts, and in the central Parliament. It is the intention of the Czechoslovak Government in practice and daily usage to satisfy the population in this connection, *but at the same time, of course, a special position will be reserved for the Czechoslovak language and the Czechoslovak element.*

9. Expressed in another way we can say that the present position (the Germans had a huge preponderance) in its broad outline will remain unchanged; *only the privileges which the Germans previously enjoyed will be reduced to their due proportions (for example, the number of German schools will be reduced where these schools shall be found superfluous).*

In general it will be a very liberal régime *approaching considerably to the Swiss régime.*

APPENDIX 4

TEXT OF THE AGREEMENT

OF FEBRUARY 18TH, 1937,
BETWEEN THE CZECHOSLOVAK GOVERNMENT
AND THE GERMAN "ACTIVIST" PARTIES

IN A WELL-MEANT endeavour to make a permanent contribution to mutual understanding in nationality relations within the Republic and to eliminate all that is calculated to estrange from one another the people of this State at the crossroads of racial interests in Central Europe, the Czechoslovak Government has examined the present state of Minority Policy in Czechoslovakia, and, following the tradition of Czechoslovak democratic policy, has laid down further directives in this connection.

The Government is devoting very special attention and care to the economic situation of the areas affected by the world crisis in some branches of industry. It happens that these are areas inhabited for the most part by our fellow-citizens whose mother-tongue is German. The circumstance that the great bulk of State guarantees granted to industrial production have been allotted to German manufacturers is a proof that nothing can be more disloyal than to accuse the Government of lack of consideration for the economic situation of the German population. The Government is investing in public works and buildings in all parts of the State in due proportion to the needs of the particular areas and will see to it that everywhere—including thus the areas with a German population—local enterprise and local workers shall have first consideration. The central authorities that allocate contracts are enjoined to exercise strict supervision over all the organs subordinate to them in order that, among other things, this principle of economic justice shall be observed to the full. *The Government calls the attention of all organs in particular to their personal responsibility for the fulfilment of these*

instructions, and also calls attention to the consequences involved in any neglect of this official order.

In carrying out its measures of social welfare and of health service the Government will pay due regard not only to the number of inhabitants but also to the degree of unemployment in the individual areas. In the sphere of social and health service for the young, the Government will—as heretofore—see to it that the members of the particular nationality concerned shall be entrusted with child-relief, and will do its utmost to ensure that the institution of child-relief shall be placed on a sound basis and further expanded.

In the matter of the acceptance of candidates for the State services the Constitution of the Czechoslovak Republic lays down in the second section of Clause 128 guiding principles in this matter to the effect that “differences in religion, belief, confession and language shall be no hindrance to any subject of the Czechoslovak Republic within the limits of the common law of the land, especially in the matter of entry into the public services, and offices, or of dignities”. In addition to this constitutional principle, the Government acknowledges the permanent validity of another principle which it regards as its own and which has, at the same time, been adopted by all international authorities concerned, namely, the principle that *unconditional loyalty to the State is a natural and primary condition for the bestowal of rights upon racial minorities.*

The Government can, without the slightest bias, say that the moral force of the Czechoslovak State idea is increasingly proving its efficacy in bringing about collaboration among the nationalities. This fact and the steadily expanding knowledge of the official language enables the Government to take a further step in accepting members of the national minorities for the State services, and to pay ever increasing regard not only to general and regional interests and qualifications, but also to the interests of the Minorities so as to ensure them a just proportion of the posts in question.

In communications with public bodies and organs the language requirements of the racial minorities are guaranteed to the utmost practical degree by the constitutional law relating

to language. The Government regards it as a simple behest of political morality and wisdom that the laws of the Republic should be unconditionally observed in all departments of public administration; in the matter of the prescription relating to the correspondence of the district and certain other authorities with the parishes where the majority of the population speak a different language, *the Government has ordered that translations in the language of the national minority in the parish shall be annexed to communications couched in the official language, and that this shall be done without waiting for a demand for it, and that no charge shall be made for the translation.*

The Government is prepared to amend the scope of language tests according to the real needs in view of the posts to which candidates will be allotted, and to contribute to the issue of appropriate textbooks.

The Budget Estimates will reflect the determination of the Czechoslovak Government that the democratic Republic shall regard it as its great political and moral task to support popular education and enlightenment to the very utmost of its financial resources, that is, to encourage not only the splendid traditions of the Czech and Slovak people in this connection, but also, in a spirit of due proportion, popular education and enlightenment among their fellow-citizens and nations speaking another tongue, not only, therefore, the Germans and Magyars, but also all racial minorities. The Government also pays regard in this respect to fellow-citizens of Polish nationality. Now that no foreign influences intermeddle with our minority policy in this sphere, we are able, in conjunction with our Polish-speaking fellow-citizens, to solve all that may await solution in a spirit of justice and fraternity.

In the organisation of education regard is already paid in very special fashion to the cultural needs of the individual nationalities, and the Government does not in any way exclude the possibility of further intensifications within the framework of the organisation that has so far existed.

Wherever shortcomings or faults in local government administration shall be ascertained to the detriment of

nationality interests or minority groups, the Government will see to their removal.

The Government consistently abides by its principles of a policy of strict justice to the minorities, and will develop that policy and accommodate it to the interests of the State and the national minorities.

STATUTE OF THE LITTLE ENTENTE

H. M. THE KING of Yugoslavia, **H. M. the King** of Rumania, **H. E. the President** of the Czechoslovak Republic being desirous of maintaining and organising peace and firmly intent on strengthening economic relations with all countries without distinction and in particular with the States of Central Europe; being anxious to see peace safeguarded in all circumstances, to assure the progress of Central Europe towards a condition of definite stability, and to secure proper regard for the common interests of their three countries: having resolved for this purpose to give to the relations of friendship and alliance already existing between their three States an organic and stable basis, and being convinced of the necessity of effecting this stability on the one hand by the complete unification of their general policy and on the other hand by creating a body which shall direct this policy common to the group of the three States, which will thus form a higher international unit open to other States under the conditions applicable to each particular case, have resolved to put into effect that which is contained in the following articles:—

Article 1. A Permanent Council of the States of the Little Entente formed of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the respective countries and of delegates specially appointed for this purpose is hereby created as directing body of the common policy of the group of the three States. Decisions of the Permanent Council must be unanimous.

Article 2. The Permanent Council in addition to its regular intercourse through diplomatic channels, shall be under obligation to meet at least three times a year. One of the annual obligatory meetings shall take place in each of the three States in turn; the other will be held at Geneva following the Assembly of the League of Nations.

Article 3. The President of the Permanent Council shall be the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the State where the annual obligatory meeting is held. It will devolve upon him to take the first steps for fixing the date and designating the place of meeting, for drawing up an agenda and preparing resolutions. He will remain President of the Permanent Council until the first obligatory meeting of the next year.

Article 4. In all questions discussed as also in all decisions taken, whether concerning the relations of the States of the Little Entente to one another or their relation to others, the principle of absolute equality between the three States of the Little Entente must be rigorously respected.

Article 5. The Permanent Council shall be at liberty to decide that in any given question the defence of the point of view of the States of the Little Entente shall be entrusted to a single delegate or to the delegation of a single State.

Article 6. Every political treaty of each State of the Little Entente, every unilateral act changing the actual political situation of one of the States of the Little Entente in regard to an outside State, as also every economic agreement involving important political consequences, will require in advance the unanimous consent of the Council of the Little Entente. The existing political treaties of each State of the Little Entente with outside States shall be made progressively and as far as possible uniform.

Article 7. An Economic Council of the States of the Little Entente for the progressive co-ordination of the economic interests of the three States, whether as regards one another or in their relations with outside States, shall be constituted.

Article 8. The Permanent Council is empowered to appoint other stable temporary bodies, commissions or committees, whether for special questions or for groups of given questions, with a view of studying them and providing the Permanent Council with material for their solution.

Article 9. A secretariat of the Permanent Council shall be appointed. Its seat shall be in turn for one year in the capital of the acting President of the Permanent Council. One section of the secretariat shall be permanently located at the seat of the League of Nations at Geneva.

Article 10. The common policy of the Permanent Council should be inspired by the General principles contained in all the great political pacts concluded since the war, as, for instance, the Covenant of the League of Nations, the Pact of Paris, the general Pact of Arbitration, disarmament pacts that may eventually be concluded, and the Pacts of Locarno. For the rest, nothing in the present Pact shall be held to be contrary to the principles and regulations of the Covenant of the League of Nations.

Article 11. The treaties of alliance between Rumania and Czechoslovakia dated April 23rd, 1921, between Rumania and Yugoslavia of June 7th, 1921, and between Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia of August 31st, 1922, which were extended on May 21st, 1929, and which are supplemented by the terms of the present Pact, as also the Act of Conciliation, Arbitration, and Judicial Regulation signed by the three States of the Little Entente at Belgrade on May 21st, 1929, are renewed for an indefinite period.

Article 12. The present Pact will be ratified and the exchange of ratifications shall take place at Prague at the latest on the occasion of the next obligatory meeting. It will come into force on the day of the exchange of ratifications.

February 16th, 1933.

APPENDIX 6

THE BALKAN PACT

(February 9th, 1934)

HIS MAJESTY THE King of Rumania, the President of the Hellenic Republic, the President of the Turkish Republic, His Majesty the King of Yugoslavia, wishing to contribute to consolidation and peace in the Balkans, animated with the spirit of understanding and conciliation which prevailed at the preparation of the Briand-Kellogg Pact and the decisions relating to it taken by the League of Nations, and firmly decided to guarantee respect for the contractual engagements already existing and the maintenance of the territorial order at present established in the Balkans, have resolved to conclude a Pact of Balkan Understanding, and to this end have appointed their respective Plenipotentiaries, who have arrived at the following dispositions :—

Article i. Greece, Rumania, Turkey, and Yugoslavia guarantee mutually the security of their Balkan frontiers.

Article ii. The High Contracting Parties undertake to consult with each other on the measures to be taken in the face of eventualities capable of affecting their interest as they are defined by the present Agreement. They undertake not to embark on any political action towards any other Balkan country non-signatory of the present Agreement, without previous mutual discussion, nor to assume any political obligation towards any other Balkan State without the consent of the other High Contracting Parties.

Article iii. The present Agreement will come into force immediately after its signature by all the contracting Powers and will be ratified as soon as possible. It will be open to any Balkan countries, whose adhesion will be the object of a favourable examination by the contracting parties,

and will take effect as soon as the other signatory countries shall have ratified their agreement.

(Under the eighth Protocol attached to the Pact it will continue for two years, then, failing agreement to the contrary, for a further five years, and thereafter, failing denunciation, for a period equal to the whole period during which it shall already have been in force.)

APPENDIX 7

THE ROME PROTOCOLS OF MARCH 17TH, 1934

THE NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN the Governments of Italy, Austria and Hungary in Rome led to the conclusion of three protocols. The first dealt with political, the second with economic, collaboration between the three States; the third dealt with the further development of economic relations between Italy and Austria.

Protocol 1. The three Governments animated by the intention to aid the maintenance of peace and the economic restoration of Europe on the basis of respect for the independence and rights of every State; persuaded that collaboration between the three Governments in this sense can establish real premises for wider co-operation with other States; undertake for the above-mentioned objects:—

To concert together on all the problems which particularly interest them and also on those of a general character, with the aim of developing, in the spirit of the existing Italo-Austrian, Italo-Hungarian and Austro-Hungarian treaties of friendship based upon the recognition of the existence of their numerous common interests, a concordant policy which shall be directed towards effective collaboration between the European States, and particularly between Italy, Austria and Hungary. To this end the three Governments will proceed to common consultation each time that at least one of them may consider this course opportune.

Protocol 2. In the endeavour to develop economic relations between the three countries by giving a new impulse to the exchange of their products and thus opposing the unhealthy tendencies towards economic self-sufficiency, the three Governments are agreed on the following in harmony with the spirit of the decisions taken at the Stresa Conference and with

the principles contained in the Danubian Memorandum presented by Italy under date September 29th, 1933 :—

ARTICLE I. They undertake to extend the scope of the accords already in force by increasing the facilities for reciprocal export and thus exploiting the complementary nature of the respective national economies. To this end new bilateral accords will be concluded before May 15th, 1934.

ARTICLE II. The Governments resolve to take the necessary measures to overcome the difficulties felt by Hungary from the fall in the prices of grain. The conventions for this purpose will be concluded as soon as possible and in any case before May 15th, 1934.

ARTICLE III. The three Governments agree to facilitate and to develop to as great a degree as possible the transit traffic through the Adriatic ports, and to this end will conclude as quickly as possible bilateral agreements.

ARTICLE IV. The Governments will set up a permanent committee of three experts to follow the course of economic relations and to formulate concrete proposals for their development in the spirit of this protocol.

Protocol 3.

Italo-Austrian Addendum to Protocol 2.

The Italian and Austrian Governments, on the ground of the experience hitherto gained, which has shown that both national economies have been greatly developed, agree further to develop the economic relations between the two countries. To this end they are agreed upon the following measures :—

ARTICLE I. On April 5th, 1934, the two Governments will institute negotiations for the conclusion of a new agreement in order to widen the scope of the existing economic agreements between the two countries. The new agreement will be concluded as soon as possible and in any case before May 15th, 1934.

ARTICLE II. The agreement to be concluded will set up a preferential system for as large a number of products as possible originating in and coming from Austria into Italy. The contracting parties will take care to keep the concessions within reasonable limits according to the principles laid down in Italy's Danubian Memorandum. Before May 15th two lists will be drawn up. One of these will indicate the products for which Customs facilities may be conceded by means of the preliminary conclusion of understandings between the interested producers of the two countries. The other list will contain products for which concessions are considered applicable independently of undertakings between the producers themselves. So far as concerns the products on the first list the two Governments agree to take the measures necessary to facilitate the conclusion of industrial accords.

APPENDIX 8

TRAVELS WITH THE HENLEINIST DEPUTY, HERR FRANK

Translation from the Czech Press of a report given in the Czechoslovak Chamber of Deputies on the situation in the German Districts.

A BOOK ENTITLED *Sudetendeutschtum im Kampf und Not* had been published in Germany and subsequently in Belgium and England with the object of describing the distress of the Germans in Czechoslovakia, claiming that their poverty had been intentionally caused and kept up by the Czechoslovak Government.

The Czech National Socialist deputy, Dr. A. Neuman, succeeded in proving some time ago in the Czechoslovak Parliament the malicious intent and untruthfulness of the statements contained in the book. The Henleinist deputy, Dr. Frank, rather hastily, invited Dr. Neuman to visit with him the German border districts in order to see the distress there with his own eyes. Deputy Neuman promptly accepted this offer and undertook the suggested tour in the company of the sponsor—Deputy Frank—and journalists from both sides. The choice of the places which were to be visited, as well as the complete organisation of the tour, was entirely in the hands of Dr. Frank. On March 4th Dr. Neuman, who merely allowed himself to be led anywhere Dr. Frank wanted him to go, gave the following account of the tour in the Prague Parliament:—

“During the whole journey of 700 km. we did not see a single one of the rickety children, nor a single one of the bare-footed unemployed, of whom the book writes and shows photographs. Deputy Frank took me to the unemployed colony near Teplice, which is much on the same lines as the Prague colony, except that the former enjoys slightly more comfort. There are Czechs and Germans living there. The unemployed put on their clean “Sunday best” to mark the occasion of

our visit (clean collars, ties with tie-pins, etc.). In spite of their poverty they take pride in keeping themselves clean and tidy. The bulk of the unemployment at Trnovany and Teplice was caused by the closing of the porcelain-factory. The closing down of this factory, however, was brought about—not by the Government—but by the German Syndicate in order to avoid the reduction of prices through excessive competition. The German Syndicate was, of course, not concerned with the fate of the dismissed German workmen, but is paying the owner of the factory an income of 40,000 Kč. a year—on the condition that the factory remains idle. The unemployment at Voitsdorf was caused through a fire which destroyed the local hat-factory. Some maintain that the factory was not insured, while others claim that the fire was of a criminal nature and that consequently the claim was not paid.

“In Košťany they promised to show me a specimen of the most tragic German poverty: a man, living in a mortuary in the cemetery. True enough, we actually found there an old, worn-out glass-worker. Deputy Frank and the German journalists addressed him, but the poor man kept looking round without giving any answer so that I thought he must be deaf and dumb. At last he spoke:—“*Gentlemen, does not one of you speak a little Czech? I cannot understand you.*” Then they led me to an abandoned mine. There were two unemployed there on the top and a third one down below, helping themselves to coal. The first said he was a Henlein man, the second confessed to being a German Social-Democrat, and we heard the Henlein man shouting to the third one—a Czech—who was down below at the depth of some 20 m., the following warning—in Czech:—‘Frank, let’s make ourselves scarce, there is an inquiry here!’

“There is poverty amongst the toy-makers in Hora Sv. Kateřiny. A figure of a peacock has to be handled twenty-six times by the maker before it is finished, and the finished article brings him 5.40 Kč. a dozen. Deputy Frank took me to see one of these workmen. In the second room of his flat—the so-called “best room”—I was pleased to notice a large framed portrait of President Masaryk hanging on the wall. Formerly some 170 people in that place used to be employed across

the frontier in the neighbouring Germany which is only a few dozen yards away. They were, however, all deprived of their livelihood there, regardless of whether they belonged to the Henlein party, or anything else. *That district was officially declared to be a distressed area as far back as the reign of the emperor Joseph II (1780-1790)!* The toy-making experts said to me with pride and gratitude that they learned their art, which made their lives easier, 'in der čechoslovackischen statny učebna pro domaci prumysl' (in the Czechoslovak State School for Home Industries).

"Near the small river Scheinitz I was shown the ruins of factories grown over with grass and bushes. There was even a tall, forty to fifty-years-old fir-tree grown up in the midst of these ruins. . . . *These factories had been abandoned a long time ago in the days of old Austria-Hungary!*

"They drew my attention to the hospital at Loket which is in a miserable state. The town and the district are entirely in German hands. Why did the local authorities do nothing to remedy this state of affairs, when it was solely their business? There was a photograph in the German book of a woman from Kraslice, whose pitiful and deformed condition was claimed to be the result of semi-starvation. I called on her. I found her husband and a grown-up son both in permanent employment, earning decent wages. *Her deformed condition was not the result of any under-nourishment, but of a medically proved muscular rheumatism from which she had been suffering for many years.*

"During our tour we avoided many places where smoke was rising from the factory chimneys, a visit to the State mines of Jáchymov was also omitted from the programme, because 97% of the number of people employed there by the State are Germans."

Deputy Neuman has three times invited Deputy Frank to undertake with him a similar tour of inspection over the Czech "distressed areas" in the South of Bohemia, but up to now Deputy Frank has always found that he has no time for it.

TABLES

TABLE I

TOWNS WITH POPULATION OF OVER 20,000 (in 1930)

1. Praha (Prague) (Capital of Czechoslovakia)	848,823	17. Jihlava	31,028
2. Brno (Brünn) (Capital of Moravia)	264,925	18. Teplice-Šanov (Teplitz-Schönau)	30,799
3. Moravská-and Slezská-Ostrava (Mährisch-Ostrau)	147,546	19. Pardubice	28,846
4. Bratislava (Capital of W. Slovakia)	123,844	20. Most (Brüx)	28,212
5. Plzeň	144,704	21. Užhorod (Capital of Ruthenia)	26,675
6. Košice (Capital of E. Slovakia)	70,117	22. Mukačevo	26,102
7. Olomouc (Olmütz)	66,440	23. Znojmo (Znaim)	25,855
8. Ústí nad Labem (Aussig)	43,793	24. Trnava	23,948
9. České Budějovice	43,788	25. Karlovy Vary (Karlsbad)	23,901
10. Liberec (Reichenberg)	38,568	26. Krnov (Jägerndorf)	23,464
11. Opava (Troppau)	36,030	27. Aš (Asch)	22,930
12. Děčín and Podmokly (Tetschen and Bodenbach)	35,513	28. Varnsdorf	22,621
13. Jablonec nad Nisou (Gabalonz)	33,958	29. Nové Zámky	22,457
14. Prostějov	33,481	30. Karviná	22,317
15. Chomutov (Komotau)	33,279	31. Píseň	22,280
16. Cheb (Eger)	31,546	32. Prešov	21,775
		33. Zlín	21,582
		34. Nitra	21,283
		35. Komarno	21,158
		36. Kladno	20,751

TABLE II

OCCUPATIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF POPULATION

	1930			1921	
	<i>Actually Employed</i>	<i>Absolute¹</i>	<i>Relative (per 1,000 inhab.)</i>	<i>Absolute¹</i>	<i>Relative (per 1,000 inhab.)</i>
Agriculture, Forestry and Fishery . .	1,672,864	5,101,614	346.4	5,384,787	395.6
Industry . . .	2,501,644	5,146,937	349.4	4,552,398	334.4
Trade and Finance . .	515,444	1,094,063	74.3	787,293	57.8
Transport . . .	289,373	814,468	55.3	658,683	48.4
Civil Service and Liberal Professions . .	204,889	715,841	48.6	604,282	44.4
Fighting Services . .	205,638	193,463	13.1	159,870	11.8
Servants (Domestic and others) . . .	132,848	183,814	12.5	132,253	9.7
Without profession } . . .	924,684	1,272,171	86.3	1,107,602	81.4
No profession declared }		207,165	14.1	225,256	16.5
TOTAL:	6,537,384	14,729,536	1,000.0	13,612,424	1,000.0

¹ Including dependants.

TABLE III

NATIONAL DISTRIBUTION IN VARIOUS OCCUPATIONS

	(1930) (Numbers include dependants)					
	<i>Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing</i>	<i>Industry</i>	<i>Trade, Finance and Transport</i>	<i>Civil and Fighting Services</i>	<i>Servants and Domestic Servants</i>	<i>Various other Occupations</i>
Czechoslovaks	3,354,965	3,330,648	1,293,400	646,219	121,693	941,845
Ruthenes . .	450,834	33,804	14,648	17,224	1,917	80,742
Germans . .	744,346	1,469,756	417,027	170,118	47,245	383,196
Hungarians (Magyars) . .	441,262	117,004	44,508	35,060	5,718	48,281
Jews . . .	24,476	41,405	86,786	13,234	1,146	19,535
Poles . . .	13,259	45,401	7,389	2,705	901	12,082
Other Nationalities . .	22,405	8,239	2,154	7,355	185	9,298
Foreigners . .	50,067	100,530	42,610	17,389	5,000	34,357

TABLE IV

NATIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF POPULATION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA (Census 1930)

(A) NUMBERS

Province	Total Population	Czecho- slovak	Ruthenian	German	Hungarian	Nationality Jewish	Polish	Gipsy	Roumanian	Yugo- slav	Various
Bohemia	7,014,559	4,713,366	7,162	2,270,943	7,603	12,735	1,195	30	207	561	757
Moravia-											
Silesia	3,501,688	2,595,534	4,012	799,995	2,860	17,267	79,450	196	15	2,121	238
Slovakia	3,254,189	2,345,909	91,079	147,501	571,988	65,385	933	30,626	141	362	265
Subcarpathian											
Ruthenia	709,129	33,961	446,916	13,249	109,472	91,255	159	1,357	12,641	69	50
WHOLE											
REPUBLIC	14,479,565	9,688,770	549,169	3,231,688	691,923	186,642	81,737	32,209	13,004	3,113	1,310

(B) PERCENTAGES

<i>Province</i>	<i>Total No.</i>	Czecho- slovak	Ruthenian	German	Hungarian	Nationality Jewish Polish	Gipsy Roumanian	Yugo- slav	Various
. Bohemia .	100	67·19	0·10	32·38	0·11	0·18	0·00	0·01	0·01
. Moravia .	100	74·12	0·11	22·85	0·08	0·49	0·01	0·00	0·01
. Silesia .	100	72·09	2·80	4·53	17·58	2·01	0·94	0·00	0·01
. Slovakia .	100					0·03			
. Subcarpathian .	100	4·79	63·02	1·87	15·44	0·02	0·19	1·78	0·01
. Ruthenia .	100								
. WHOLE .	100	66·91	3·79	22·32	4·78	1·29	0·22	0·09	0·01
. REPUBLIC .	100					0·57	0·02		

TABLE V
RELIGIONS (Census 1930)

(A) NUMBERS

Province	Total Population	Roman Catholic	Uniate or Greek Catholic	Evangelical Churches	Greek Orthodox	Czechoslovak Church	Old Catholic Church	Other Christian Sects	Jewish	Other Non-Christian Sects	Agnostics	Unknown
Bohemia	7,014,599	5,316,448	8,004	325,235	14,721	618,305	17,779	3,512	76,301	224	727,916	931
Moravia												
Silesia	3,501,688	3,061,631	4,145	174,450	9,767	161,367	4,765	2,296	41,250	42	104,879	418
Slovakia	3,254,189	2,384,355	213,725	555,900	9,076	11,495	149	1,117	136,737	91	16,890	258
Subcarpathian Ruthenia	709,129	69,262	359,167	74,173	112,034	2,218	19	965	102,542	5	4,953	19
WHOLE REPUBLIC	14,479,565	10,831,696	585,041	1,129,758	145,598	793,385	22,712	7,890	356,830	362	854,638	1,626

(B) PERCENTAGES

Province	Total %	Roman Catholic	Uniate or Greek Catholic	Evangelical Churches	Greek Orthodox	Czechoslovak Church	Old Catholic Church	Other Christian Sects	Jewish	Other Non-Christian Sects	Agnostics	Unknown
Bohemia	100	74.78	0.11	4.58	0.21	8.70	0.25	0.05	1.07	0.00	10.24	0.01
Moravia												
Silesia	100	85.88	0.12	4.89	0.27	4.53	0.13	0.07	1.16	0.00	2.94	0.01
Slovakia	100	71.61	6.42	16.69	0.27	0.35	0.00	0.03	4.11	0.00	0.51	0.01
Subcarpathian Ruthenia	100	9.55	49.52	10.23	15.44	0.31	0.00	0.13	14.14	0.00	0.68	0.00
WHOLE REPUBLIC	100	73.54	3.97	7.67	0.99	5.39	0.16	0.05	2.42	0.00	5.80	0.01

TABLE VI

UNEMPLOYMENT

YEAR	MONTH	NO. OF UN- SUCCESSFUL APPLICATIONS FOR WORK	UNEMPLOYMENT ASSISTANCE (Ghent System)		HEALTH INSURANCE	
			<i>No. of Workers Assisted</i>	<i>Percentage of Trade Union Mem- bers helped</i>	<i>Average No. Drawing Benefit</i>	<i>Average Daily Benefit Paid</i>
1		2	3	4	5	6
1929 ¹	.	41,630	23,239	2.1	2,506	19.11
1933 ¹	.	738,269	245,590	16.7	1,885	16.72
1934 ¹	.	676,994	243,147	17.1	1,879	16.30
1935 ¹	.	686,269	234,125	15.7	1,919	15.93
1936 ¹	.	622,687	206,838	12.9	2,064	16.8
1935:	I .	818,005	300,852	20.8	1,626	15.81
	II .	833,194	298,069	20.7	1,642	15.65
	III .	804,794	281,932	19.3	1,682	15.70
	IV .	734,550	261,307	17.5	1,833	15.76
	V .	666,433	235,186	15.9	1,976	15.85
	VI .	605,956	211,686	14.2	2,048	15.87
	VII .	566,559	202,674	13.5	2,082	16.01
	VIII .	557,706	197,623	13.2	2,066	16.09
	IX .	573,362	192,675	12.8	2,056	16.10
	X .	601,390	190,953	12.7	2,069	16.16
	XI .	678,870	201,749	13.3	2,049	16.16
	XII .	794,407	234,797	15.4	1,875	15.84
1936:	I .	850,010	265,601	17.1	1,734	15.85
	II .	860,239	270,548	17.4	1,766	15.72
	III .	797,770	253,102	16.1	1,847	15.81
	IV .	719,166	230,936	14.6	1,994	15.92
	V .	637,385	207,673	13.1	2,119	16.05
	VI .	565,799	187,790	11.7	2,177	16.10
	VII .	508,081	184,175	11.4	2,208	16.28
	VIII .	483,502	179,213	11.1	2,210	16.36
	IX .	479,268	170,426	10.6	2,223	16.44
	X .	441,679	165,520	10.2	2,234	16.56
	XI .	510,205	170,094	10.4	2,207	16.56
	XII .	619,143	196,983	12.0	2,035	16.28
1937:	I .	667,486	209,454	12.8	1,880	16.32
	II .	677,947	220,089	13.1	1,913	16.31
	III .	627,258	209,071	12.3	2,000	16.50
	IV .	503,632	175,269	10.2	2,192	16.71
	V .	385,061	136,661	7.9	2,345	16.92
	VI .	304,345				

¹ Monthly average.

TABLE VII

BIRTH AND DEATH RATES, AND INCREASE OF
POPULATION

<i>Province</i>	(per thousand)				
	1935	1934	<i>Average</i> 1929-1933	<i>Average</i> 1924-1928	<i>Average</i> 1919-1923
BIRTH RATE:					
Bohemia . . .	14·18	15·08	17·26	19·86	22·20
Moravia-Silesia . . .	16·37	17·21	20·04	23·08	26·09
Slovakia . . .	23·63	24·14	27·66	32·06	34·74
Subcarpathian Ruthenia	33·98	34·10	38·50	41·73	40·82
WHOLE REPUBLIC .	17·91	18·65	21·34	24·39	26·75
DEATH RATE:					
Bohemia . . .	13·24	12·85	13·75	14·30	16·18
Moravia-Silesia . . .	12·47	11·92	13·21	14·16	16·61
Slovakia . . .	14·29	14·51	15·90	18·12	19·70
Subcarpathian Ruthenia	17·02	17·17	18·66	21·18	25·33
WHOLE REPUBLIC .	13·49	13·23	14·35	15·44	17·47
INCREASE OF POPULATION:					
Bohemia . . .	0·94	2·23	3·51	5·56	6·02
Moravia-Silesia . . .	3·90	5·29	6·83	8·92	9·48
Slovakia . . .	9·34	9·63	11·76	13·94	15·04
Subcarpathian Ruthenia	16·96	16·93	19·84	20·55	15·49
WHOLE REPUBLIC .	4·42	5·42	6·99	8·95	9·28

TABLE VIII

INFANT MORTALITY

(Number of children, per thousand born, who die during their first year)

	WHOLE REPUBLIC	Bohemia	Moravia- Silesia	Slovakia	Subcarpa- thian Ruthenia
Average 1919-1923 .	161·37	156·78	155·09	167·84	183·88
" 1924-1928 .	149·88	135·69	133·55	172·43	184·21
" 1929-1933 .	135·70	120·13	114·66	160·94	173·97
1934 .	127·72	112·26	100·45	154·22	171·99
1935 .	122·55	109·12	99·39	142·58	163·77

TABLE IX
EDUCATIONAL ESTABLISHMENTS

ALL EDUCATIONAL ESTABLISHMENTS	LANGUAGE OF INSTRUCTION					PROVINCE IN WHICH SITUATED				
	Czecho- slovak	Ruthen- ian	German	Magyar	Polish	Rouman- ian	Hebrews	TOTAL	Bohemia Moravia- Silesia	Slova- kia Ruthenia
1934-35	16,610	722	5,290	935	190	5	7	23,977	11,399	5,139
1933-34	16,469	722	5,319	935	192	4	6	23,869	11,332	5,095
1932-33	16,464	728	5,334	943	192	4	4	23,881	11,375	5,037
1931-32	16,446	732	5,223	948	190	3	4	23,870	11,385	3,923
1930-31	16,121	720	5,300	921	183	3	4	23,442	11,290	4,710
										1,024

NUMBER AND NATIONALITY OF PUPILS						TOTAL	
Czechoslovak	Ruthenian	German	Magyar	Polish	Jewish	Others	Girls
1,891,316	125,391	572,497	140,270	19,458	40,517	9,208	2,798,657
1,855,373	120,336	572,942	141,746	19,601	40,258	8,204	2,758,460
1,801,237	113,372	567,605	139,767	19,628	39,743	8,009	2,689,361
1,722,433	105,432	549,030	133,182	19,063	38,353	7,400	2,574,893
1,649,984	90,504	529,749	127,422	18,582	37,017	5,550	2,458,808
							1,137,754

TABLE XI

ILLITERACY

Number of persons (over 10 years of age) per thousand unable to read or write

	<i>Both</i>				<i>Both</i>		
	<i>Males</i>	<i>Females</i>	<i>Sexes</i>		<i>Males</i>	<i>Females</i>	<i>Sexes</i>
Czechoslovaks .	22.2	34.4	28.5	Bohemia .	9.7	14.9	12.4
Ruthenians .	323.4	464.2	396.6	Moravia-			
Germans .	9.4	12.8	11.2	Silesia .	12.2	17.4	14.9
Hungarians .	47.7	63.6	55.9	Slovakia .	67.5	94.5	81.6
Poles .	24.1	32.5	28.6	Subcarpa-			
Jews .	45.4	100.9	74.1	thian			
Miscellaneous ¹	594.5	659.8	629.4	Ruthenia	234.4	369.9	308.8
Foreigners .	60.6	64.0	62.4				

AVERAGE: 32.8 47.9 40.6

¹ Jugoslavs, Roumanians, Gypsies, etc.

TABLE XII

DISTRIBUTION OF LAND ACCORDING TO CULTIVATION

	(in hectares)		Bohemia	Moravia-Silesia	Slovakia	Subcarpathian Ruthenia
	WHOLE REPUBLIC					
	Area	%				
Arable Land (including hopfields)	5,855,008	41.6	2,461,620	1,385,882	1,768,830	238,676
Permanent Meadow-land	1,268,461	9.0	557,132	186,633	379,179	145,457
Gardens, Utilitarian and Commercial	102,735	0.7	46,455	27,639	21,730	6,911
Vineyards	25,090	0.2	341	6,484	13,745	4,520
Pastures	1,066,000	7.6	203,134	114,299	577,070	171,497
Osier-beds	9,274	0.1	1,652	1,417	4,552	1,653
Woods and Forests	4,587,393	32.7	1,565,823	786,888	1,645,682	589,000
Fish-ponds	46,476	0.3	40,236	5,860	340	40
Other Water Surface	85,746	0.6	21,088	11,603	42,219	10,836
Parks and Ornamental Gardens	35,946	0.3	20,361	8,237	6,771	577
Built-up Areas		1.3				
Barren Areas	828,989	4.6	269,314	126,600	373,850	59,225
Not Designated	138,889	1.0	19,060	18,912	60,617	40,800
TOTAL	14,049,947	100.0	5,206,216	2,680,454	4,894,585	1,268,692

TABLE XIII
GRAIN PRODUCTION

<i>Area under cultivation (in hectares)</i>					<i>Average</i>
	1936	1935	1934	1929-1933	
Wheat . . .	929,181	965,929	942,397	844,073	
Rye . . .	1,015,794	1,017,366	1,000,898	1,048,877	
Barley . . .	635,835	647,485	665,432	703,934	
Oats . . .	766,667	777,578	797,533	829,702	
Maize . . .	85,705	78,562	89,813	138,382	

Total yield (in 100 kilos)

	1936	1935	1934	<i>Average</i> 1929-1933
Wheat . . .	15,127,302	16,899,574	13,611,645	14,776,900
Rye . . .	14,364,064	16,384,067	15,232,749	18,540,500
Barley . . .	10,188,697	10,614,209	10,343,819	13,085,700
Oats . . .	12,183,671	10,271,200	11,789,715	14,534,800
Maize . . .	1,888,173	1,170,830	1,605,041	2,339,700

Yield per hectare (in 100 kilos)

	1936	1935	1934	<i>Average</i> 1929-1933
Wheat . . .	16.3	17.5	14.4	17.6
Rye . . .	14.1	16.2	15.2	17.8
Barley . . .	16.0	16.4	15.5	18.6
Oats . . .	15.9	13.4	14.7	17.6
Maize . . .	22.1	15.0	18.2	17.2

TABLE XIV
CZECHOSLOVAK GRAIN COMPANY

SUMMARY OF ACTIVITIES 1934-1935
Bought Sold In Stock
(in 100 metric tons)

Wheat	7,639	4,114	3,525
Rye	4,077	2,767	1,310
Barley	4,177	3,760	417
Oats	2,196	1,391	805
Maize	517	475	41
TOTAL	18,606	12,508	6,098

SUMMARY OF ACTIVITIES 1935-1936
Bought Sold In Stock
(in 100 metric tons)

Wheat	10,530.9	3,536.5	6,994.4
Rye	5,003.8	3,367.2	1,636.1
Barley	3,843.5	3,739.9	103.6
Oats	1,607.8	1,199.4	408.4
Maize	360.1	306.1	53.9
TOTAL	21,345.5	12,149.0	9,196.4

TABLE XV

NUMBER OF WORKERS EMPLOYED IN COAL AND LIGNITE MINES

	1935	1934	1933	1932	1931	<i>Average</i> 1926-1930
COAL						
Number employed .	42,667	43,874	47,072	51,454	54,887	58,000
Number on alternating unpaid leave .	1,382	2,252	1,604	5,982	—	—
Actual working strength	41,285	41,622	45,368	45,472	54,887	58,000
LIGNITE						
Number employed .	28,956	29,647	31,378	33,387	35,944	39,500
Number on alternating unpaid leave .	50	127	22	—	—	—
Actual working strength	28,906	29,520	31,356	33,387	35,944	39,500
TOTAL NUMBER OF COAL MINERS						
FULLY EMPLOYED .	70,191	71,142	76,724	78,859	90,831	97,500
PARTIALLY EMPLOYED .	1,432	2,379	1,626	5,982	—	—
TOTAL:	71,623	73,521	78,350	84,841	90,831	97,500

TABLE XVI

NUMBER OF SHIFTS WORKED IN COAL AND LIGNITE MINES

	(in thousands)				
	1935	1934	1933	1932	1931
Hard Coal . . .	8,979	9,163	9,324	10,573	12,751
Lignite . . .	6,792	6,981	6,916	7,563	8,835

TABLE XVII

PRODUCTION OF COAL AND LIGNITE BY DISTRICTS
(in 1,000 tons)

DISTRICT	<i>Machine- cut Coal</i> %	1935	1934	1933	1932	1931
HARD COAL Total:		10,895	10,688	10,532	10,961	13,108
Ostrava-Karvinná	97.1	7,725	7,461	7,601	7,729	9,561
Kladno-Rakovník	33.1	1,806	1,420	1,387	1,594	1,752
Plzeň	78.4	939	970	832	898	947
Žakleř-Svatoňovice	92.8	468	462	428	420	428
Rosice-Oslovany	62.0	362	355	274	317	411
Remainder	—	95	20	10	3	4
LIGNITE Total:		15,114	15,172	15,064	15,858	17,932
North-West Bohemian Field (Teplitz-Brux-Komotau)		11,450	11,363	11,488	12,052	13,887
Falkenau-Karlsbad-Eger		2,739	2,855	2,749	2,968	3,154
South Moravian Field		277	216	184	200	220
Remainder (Bohemia, Moravia, Silesia)		74	101	82	75	68
Remainder (Slovakia)		554	637	561	563	603

TABLE XVIII

CONSUMPTION OF COAL BY BRANCHES OF INDUSTRY
(in 1,000 tons)

	1937	1936	1935
Mines	200.2	166.2	138.1
Iron and Metallurgical Industries	4,221.9	2,895.5	2,266.5
Engineering Works	386.0	286.3	215.1
Electric Light and Power Plants	1,567.3	1,369.2	1,357.9
Gas Works	274.9	253.5	269.4
Water Works	12.9	25.4	25.1
Sugar Factories	605.8	502.6	435.0
Chemical Industry	760.4	631.8	514.8
Breweries and Malt Factories	297.1	238.9	203.5
Distilleries and Yeast Factories	180.8	154.4	135.1
Glass Works	472.5	415.1	394.7
China Factories	137.2	105.5	108.4
Ceramic Industry	149.2	111.1	96.2
Brick and Tile Works	343.3	275.8	200.3
Building and Construction Materials	96.6	80.8	75.1
Cement Factories	423.7	252.4	294.2
Textile Industries	947.0	842.6	726.9
Wood, Paper and Wood Pulp Industry	552.2	445.3	419.9
Other Industries	971.7	964.1	968.2
TOTAL:	12,600.7	10,116.5	8,837.4

TABLE XIX
INDEX OF COAL CONSUMPTION

			<i>Household</i>	<i>Transport</i>	<i>Industry</i>
1929		100.0	100.0	100.0	
1930		75.2	86.4	85.1	
1931		95.9	82.2	78.3	
1932		91.6	77.5	61.8	
1933		89.1	70.2	60.4	
1934		81.9	75.1	61.0	
1935		87.7	70.2	64.7	
1936		93.4	73.9	73.9	

TABLE XX (1)
OUTPUT AND CONSUMPTION OF COAL, COKE,
LIGNITE, HARD AND SOFT BRIQUETTES

(tons)					
	<i>Year</i>	<i>Gross Output</i>	<i>Exports</i>	<i>Imports</i>	<i>Home Consumption</i>
COAL . . .	1929	16,521,457	1,854,285	2,330,649	17,220,657
	1930	14,435,002	1,705,506	1,882,663	14,553,366
	1931	13,102,712	1,652,801	1,830,883	13,267,055
	1932	10,961,021	1,367,785	1,588,060	11,139,837
	1933	10,531,993	1,368,917	1,146,853	10,240,084
	1934	10,788,880	1,436,790	1,243,755	10,441,172
	1935	10,894,483	1,270,338	1,252,971	10,967,161
	1936	12,352,867	1,318,092	1,110,660	12,178,978
	1913	About			
		14,000,000			

TABLE XX (2)					
	<i>Year</i>	<i>Gross Output</i>	<i>Exports</i>	<i>Imports</i>	<i>Home Consumption</i>
COKE . . .	1929	3,163,194	883,975	385,532	2,653,243
	1930	2,712,332	584,282	215,415	2,086,700
	1931	2,045,527	402,392	234,299	1,901,145
	1932	1,277,295	276,531	228,790	1,216,132
	1933	1,258,611	268,288	168,014	1,203,061
	1934	1,344,786	346,190	161,332	1,163,086
	1935	1,551,152	353,807	150,906	1,345,470
	1936	1,954,400	417,741	162,899	1,751,022
	1913	About			
		2,500,000			

TABLES

TABLE XX (3)

	<i>Year</i>	<i>Gross Output</i>	<i>Exports</i>	<i>Imports</i>	<i>Home Consumption</i>
LIGNITE .	1929	22,560,796	3,061,750	107,226	19,654,186
	1930	19,193,669	2,377,655	123,327	16,637,839
	1931	17,931,635	1,960,382	118,763	16,114,191
	1932	15,858,396	1,533,285	104,294	14,363,081
	1933	15,063,095	1,629,582	55,670	13,288,504
	1934	15,070,706	1,827,229	49,289	13,461,833
	1935	15,113,576	1,714,554	57,187	13,647,229
	1936	16,070,300	1,694,826	67,736	14,516,614
	1913	About 23,000,000			

TABLE XX (4)

	<i>Year</i>	<i>Gross Output</i>	<i>Exports</i>	<i>Imports</i>	<i>Home Consumption</i>
HARD BRIQUETTES	1929	270,294	—	6,023	276,260
	1930	239,080	—	2,346	240,291
	1931	285,782	—	5,284	291,760
	1932	406,574	—	6,224	412,519
	1933	396,840	—	6,004	403,375
	1934	386,463	—	4,964	390,819
	1935	408,586	—	4,824	413,404
	1936	414,896	355	5,233	419,948

TABLE XX (5)

	<i>Year</i>	<i>Gross Output</i>	<i>Exports</i>	<i>Imports</i>	<i>Home Consumption</i>
SOFT BRIQUETTES	1929	256,111	152,367	33,790	137,092
	1930	180,718	89,865	24,771	111,639
	1931	209,435	85,907	30,011	145,317
	1932	202,003	82,129	28,064	157,196
	1933	194,497	81,806	22,149	144,915
	1934	197,893	88,408	19,420	123,022
	1935	188,466	76,784	23,613	136,376
	1936	189,303	80,506	23,672	140,875

MINES, OTHER THAN COAL—EMPLOYMENT 377

TABLE XXI

NUMBERS OF WORKERS EMPLOYED AND SHIFTS WORKED IN MINES (OTHER THAN COAL AND LIGNITE)

	1935	1934	1933	1932	1931
IRON MINES					
Number employed	3,487	2,924	2,923	4,092	5,765
Number on alternating unpaid leave	25	32	45	—	—
Actual working strength . .	3,462	2,892	2,878	4,092	5,765
OTHER MINES					
Number employed	3,512	3,227	2,963	3,141	3,708
Number on alternating unpaid leave	—	—	—	—	—
Actual working strength . .	3,512	3,227	2,963	3,141	3,708
NUMBER OF SHIFTS WORKED (in thousands)					
Iron Mines	778	590	505	758	1,429
Other Mines	911	817	732	784	992

TABLE XXII

PRODUCTION OF MINES OTHER THAN COAL AND LIGNITE

	1935	1934	1933	1932	1931
METALS					
<i>Iron Ore</i>					
Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia	373,246	288,583	232,403	233,264	517,171
Slovakia and Ruthenia . .	357,812	250,159	196,279	368,951	717,907
Total	731,058	538,742	428,722	602,215	1,235,078
<i>Manganese Ore</i>	71,434	59,371	17,069	33,480	83,883
<i>Silver, Lead and Zinc Ore</i>	151,424	139,144	133,790	147,156	153,793
<i>Iron Pyrites</i>	20,000	17,920	15,426	15,640	20,694
<i>Mercury Ore</i>	8,688	3,921	136	2,268	943
<i>Gold Ore</i>	35,592	20,475	6,136	4,377	3,662
<i>Antimony Ore</i>	24,132	14,417	12,850	2,148	2,265
OTHER MINERALS					
<i>Graphite</i>	1,870	3,503	122	922	1,830
<i>Salt</i>	163,843	147,299	156,565	177,413	190,179
<i>Crude Oil (Naphtha)</i> . .	19,946	25,971	17,776	18,493	19,736
<i>Natural Gas (in 1,000 cu. m.)</i>	1,372.2	1,205.4	1,159.3	900.7	986.3

TABLE XXIV

INDUSTRIAL STATISTICS

<i>Classes, groups, etc.</i>	<i>Number of establish- ments</i>	<i>Number of employees</i>	<i>H.P. of motors in operation</i>
INDUSTRIAL ESTABLISHMENTS TOTAL . . .	720,000	3,076,982	3,022,482·8
A. Manufacturing trades	378,015	2,291,897	2,923,544·4
B. Commerce, finance, insurance	299,927	657,405	82,886·5
C. Transport (railways and post-offices ex- cepted)	16,077	33,573	3,688·7
D. Theatres, music, sports (carried on as amusement industries or for teaching).	7,020	20,056	4,736·4
E. Sanitary institutions	18,968	2,758	7,626·8
A.			
1. (a) Mining, peat-cutting and dressing	400	116,239	383,931·7
(b) Cokeries and briquette factories	25	4,853	40,356·1
2. (a) Quarrying and dressing of stones and clays	4,277	50,633	85,516·9
(b) Other stone and clay industries	7,241	114,739	155,888·8
3. Glass industry	10,449	63,529	37,947·2
4. (a) Production of iron, steel, other metals and manufactured arti- cles made therefrom	35,095	212,226	509,882
(b) Other metal industries	8,742	178,751	226,761·8
5. Chemical industry	1,385	40,571	82,660·1
6. Textile industry	39,953	360,107	423,961·7
7. Paper-making	2,827	39,736	118,703·2
8. Printing	3,099	32,347	19,809·5
9. Leather manufacturing	5,433	22,967	25,301·8
10. Rubber and asbestos industry	84	4,008	6,104
11. (a) Saw-mills and working up of wood	3,945	41,060	113,322·9
(b) Other wood industries	42,344	133,411	103,883·3
12. Turning industry (excepting wood)	1,317	7,023	4,228
13. Brush manufactories	1,149	4,187	1,431·2
14. Manufacture of musical instruments	2,234	7,564	2,810·9
15. Manufacture of toys	473	2,804	1,496·4
16. (a) Flour mills	10,705	28,857	156,779·8
(b) Sugar manufactories	148	15,014	168,135
(c) Breweries and malt kilns	574	21,543	52,164·2
(d) Distilleries and yeast manufactories	941	4,376	20,823·7
(e) Other foodstuffs industry including beverages	47,806	168,329	111,429·8
17. (a) Shoe industry	39,179	89,239	18,668·4
(b) Other clothing industry	75,973	195,045	15,611·4
18. Building trade and civil engineering	27,588	297,303	30,571·4
19. Waterworks	577	2,303	17,763·3
20. Gasworks	83	2,700	2,261
21. Electric works	1,885	14,293	35,649·7
22-24. Other productions ¹	2,584	16,140	689·2
B.			
25. Commercial trades in the narrower sense of the word	205,984	403,856	17,220·9
26. Lodging houses, inns and public houses	57,363	153,621	10,427·1

¹ These are: 22. Breeding and fattening of cattle, and forestry. 23. Work-shops of humanitarian establishments, penitentiaries and prisons. 24. Outdoor work in houses and streets.

TABLES

TABLE XXIV—(contd.)

<i>Classes, groups, etc.</i>	<i>Number of establishments</i>	<i>Number of employees</i>	<i>H.P. of motors in operation</i>
B.			
27. Financial institutions	10,150	30,586	550.5
28. Insurance	857	17,096	493.6
29. Other similar activities	25,573	52,246	54,194.4
C.			
30. Transport (railways and post offices excepted)	16,077	33,573	3,688.7
D.			
31. Theatres, music, sports, carried on as amusement industries	4,996	16,669	4,689.7
32. Teaching in private schools . . .	2,024	3,387	46.7
E.			
33. Private sanitary institutions . . .	18,968	74,051	7,626.8

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TABLE XXV (1)

REVENUE

In million Kč.

	1937	%	1936	%	1935
A. REVENUE FROM STATE ENTERPRISES :—					
Profits from State Enterprises	1,100.0	9.8	1,031.0	9.6	1,086.4
B. TAXES AND OTHER ADMINISTRATIVE REVENUES :—					
I. Taxes and Duties.					
(a) Direct Taxes	2,363.3	20.9	2,062.0	19.2	1,954.5
(b) Turnover and Luxury Taxes	2,601.4	23.1	2,465.4	22.9	2,435.3
(c) Customs Duties	786.3	7.0	791.6	7.4	809.1
(d) Consumption Taxes . . .	2,133.4	18.9	2,104.5	19.6	2,129.6
(e) Stamps and Legal Fees, including Transport Taxes	1,595.8	14.1	1,613.9	14.9	1,710.8
II. Non-Tax Revenue.					
(a) Monopolies ¹	56.2	0.5	56.0	0.5	43.7
(b) Other Administrative receipts	643.1	5.7	641.7	6.0	584.4
TOTAL I:	9,480.3	84.0	9,037.4	84.0	9,089.3
TOTAL II:	699.3	6.2	697.7	6.5	592.1
TOTAL B:	10,179.6	90.2	9,735.1	90.4	9,681.4
TOTAL A:	1,100.0	9.8	1,031.0	9.6	1,086.4
GRAND TOTAL OF REVENUE:	11,279.6	100.0	10,766.1	100.0	10,717.7

¹ Excluding Tobacco and Lottery Monopolies whose yield appears under A.

TABLE XXV (2)

	1937	1936	1935	1934	1933	1932	1931
I. DIRECT TAXES.							
1. Income Taxes							
(a) Income Tax	1,310.9	1,170.0	1,137.5	1,095.0	1,044.0	1,020.0	1,155.0
(b) Defence Levy	8.0	10.0	10.0	—	—	—	—
(c) Military Tax	—	—	—	35.0	—	—	—
2. Taxes on Sources of Income							
(a) General Business Tax	94.0	80.0	80.6	70.0	70.0	80.0	100.0
(b) Special Business Tax	155.0	105.0	85.0	78.0	80.0	100.0	100.0
(c) Land Tax	106.4	106.4	103.7	105.9	111.0	73.0	73.0
(d) Tax on Buildings	221.0	177.2	182.4	184.3	170.5	0.7	1.0
(e) Tax on Interest	178.0	175.0	118.0	—	—	—	—
(f) Extraordinary Tax on Dividends and on the Interest yielded by certain fixed-interest-bearing securities	50.0	—	—	119.0	133.0	125.0	116.0
(g) Tax on Tantième or Directors' Fees	21.0	20.3	20.3	—	—	—	—
(h) Tax on Higher Salaries	9.0	8.2	7.0	—	—	—	—
(i) Interest on Arrears, etc.	210.0	210.0	210.0	—	—	—	—
(j) Emergency Tax	—	—	—	—	100.0	—	—
TOTAL OF DIRECT TAXES:	2,363.3	2,062.0	1,954.5	1,687.2	1,708.5	1,398.7	1,545.0

TABLES

TABLE XXV (3)

	1937	1936	1935	1934	1933	1932	1931
II. CONSUMPTION TAXES.							
(a) Tax on spirits	397.3	397.0	420.2	418.1	473.2	607.5	633.0
(b) " " yeast	50.0	48.0	48.5	48.5	60.0		
(c) " " sugar	605.0	600.0	600.8	600.6	623.0	637.5	632.0
(d) " " mineral oils	210.0	200.0	155.0				
(e) " " matches and mechanical lighters	56.0	56.1	56.0				
(f) " " electric lamp bulbs	23.0	23.0	21.0				
(g) " " acetic acid	8.0	8.0	—	—	—		
(h) " " baking powder	8.0	8.0	—	—	—		
(i) " " artificial fats	34.0	34.0	—	—	—		
(j) " " beer	366.5	352.0	441.9	453.6	457.0		
(k) " " other beverages	46.0	46.0	48.0	54.5	83.0	350.0	355.0
(l) " " sparkling wines	2.0	2.5	2.5			4.5	5.0
(m) " " meat	122.0	125.0	120.0	117.3	126.0	115.0	115.0
(n) Tolls	24.0	24.0	24.3	22.3	22.0	22.0	20.0
(o) Tax on coal	162.0	161.2	170.0	206.0	201.3	180.0	220.0
(p) Water-power tax	16.7	16.7	18.3				
(q) Miscellaneous	2.9	3.0	3.1	265.8	312.2	141.8	94.0
TOTAL OF CONSUMPTION TAXES	2,133.4	2,104.5	2,129.6	2,186.7	2,357.7	2,058.3	2,074.0

TABLE XXVI
BUDGET EXPENDITURE

I. GENERAL BUDGET	1937	%	1936	%
President of the Republic, and Chancery	16,700,000	0·2	14,941,900	0·1
Legislative Assembly	36,100,000	0·3	36,102,800	0·3
Cabinet Council's Office	38,400,000	0·3	37,210,100	0·3
Ministry of Foreign Affairs	131,900,000	1·2	132,730,100	1·2
Ministry of National Defence	1,359,500,000	12·0	1,340,000,000	12·4
Equipment Fund for National Defence	—	—	315,000,000	2·9
Ministry of Interior	773,700,000	6·9	714,740,100	6·6
Ministry of Justice and High Court of Justice	282,000,000	2·5	278,632,300	2·6
Ministry of Unification	2,600,000	—	1,896,100	—
Supreme Court of Administra- tion and Election Court	6,100,000	—	6,144,600	—
Ministry of Education and People's Culture	997,800,000	8·8	944,766,600	8·9
Ministry of Agriculture	199,200,000	1·8	195,329,200	1·8
Ministry of Commerce	42,700,000	0·4	36,825,400	0·3
Ministry of Public Works	549,500,000	4·9	475,839,800	4·4
Ministry of Post and Telegraphs	12,900,000	0·1	11,760,700	0·1
Ministry of Railways	22,600,000	0·2	21,184,000	0·2
Ministry of Social Welfare	878,200,000	7·8	836,024,600	8·0
Ministry of Health	160,500,000	1·4	156,356,800	1·5
Pensions	1,004,400,000	8·9	926,677,500	8·6
Ministry of Finance	1,932,000,000	17·2	1,522,975,200	14·1
Comptroller's Office	7,100,000	0·1	7,040,100	0·1
TOTAL I.	8,453,700,000	75·0	8,032,195,900	74·6
II. ALLOCATIONS				
Local Government Bodies and Funds	1,792,200,000	15·9	1,617,493,000	15·0
Road Fund	262,900,000	2·3	250,500,000	2·4
Water Board Melioration Fund at the Ministry of Agriculture	8,000,000	0·1	8,000,000	0·1
Water Board Fund at the Ministry of Public Works	8,700,000	0·1	8,650,000	0·1
Port for Small Breweries	6,000,000	—	6,000,000	0·1
Port Institute	3,000,000	—	3,000,000	—
Industrial Schools	3,000,000	—	3,000,000	—
Charity Funds	500,000	—	—	—
Guarantee Payments to Local Railways	188,900,000	1·7	179,938,400	1·7
Welfare of Unemployed	530,000,000	4·9	650,000,000	6·0
TOTAL II.	2,823,100,000	25·0	2,272,581,400	25·4
GRAND TOTAL ..	11,276,800,000		10,764,777,300	

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
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
MAPS



MAP OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA SHOWING PLACES AND FEATURES OF HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL IMPORTANCE



THE LITTLE ENTENTE



THE BERLIN-ROME AXIS

